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The thesis positions three modem thinkers working in different areas of the human 
sciences - William James, Ludwig Binswanger and Oliver Sacks - within a framework 
of romantic science. Romantic science is a term which is developed explicitly in the 
work of Sacks and also illuminates the central concerns of James and Binswanger. As 
such, romantic science provides a useful framework in which to discuss conceptual 
changes in the medical humanities (a branch of the human sciences directed to patient 
care) since the late nineteenth century. 
The introduction explores romantic science, frrstly, as a modem tradition of research and 
inquiry in the human and natural sciences, beginning with the ferment of intellectual 
activity in late eighteenth-century Germany, and, secondly, as a genre of writing, which 
fuses discontinuous discourses in an attempt to compensate for the inadequacies of more 
conventional modes of scientific understanding. 
My central theoretical interest is to trace significant shifts in the terminology of 'the self 
in modem manifestations of romantic science. Each of the three thinkers considered in 
the thesis is both theorist and practitioner (Binswanger was and Sacks is a professional 
physician and James consulted with private patients), which makes for a peculiar blend 
of theory directed towards practical ends. Theoretical issues of the self implicate a range 
of intersubjective problems concerning therapeutic practice. As such, the thesis is also 
concerned centrally with theories of reading which help to activate the self. 
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[H]is inclination toward the under-dog, and his insistence 
on keeping the door open for every species of human 
experiment, sometimes brought James into alliance with 
causes which his social set looked on with disfavor. .. he 
was unwilling to treat the subject as a closed question. 
George Herbert Palmer on William James (1930) 
Despite the fact that I do not know you or can barely see 
you while addressing myself to you, and that you hardly 
know me, what I am saying is, as of a moment ago, 
reaching you - regardless of the trajectories and 
translations of signs that we address to each other in this 
twilight. What I have been saying comes at you, to 
encounter and make contact with you. Up to a certain 
point it becomes intelligible to you. 
Jacques Derrida, 'My ChanceslMes Chances' (1984) 
Other people put their faces on, one after the other, with 
uncanny rapidity and wear them out. 
Ranier Maria Rilke, The Notebooks of Malte 
Laurids Brigge (1910) 
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Introduction 
(1) The Possibilities of Romantic Science 
In her introduction to a valuable collection of essays entitled Modernist Impulses in the 
Human Sciences, 1870-1930, Dorothy Ross makes explicit a link between "the late-
nineteenth-century cognitive move toward subjectivity and its aesthetic ramifications" 
(Ross 1994: 2). Most critics of modernism tend to deal primarily with cultural 
production in the early years of the twentieth century, drawing from the natural and 
human sciences just enough theoretical material by which they can account for, and do 
justice to, the conceptual developments within the field of aesthetic modernism. By way 
of contrast, the influence of the psychological sciences upon European and American 
aesthetic modernism has been traced by, for example, H. Stuart Hughes, Clive Bush and 
Judith Ryan. An exploration of the "move toward subjectivity" has enabled such critics 
to productively explore the influence of the natural and human sciences upon art in the 
early years of the twentieth century. Ross's collection exemplifies and extends this mode 
of study: instead of mapping science onto art as is usually the practice, these essays 
explore points of aesthetic convergence from the perspective of the human sciences. As 
I will argue in this thesis, the different disciplines are shown to provide a strong dialogic 
potential through a radical reappraisal of "the subjectivity of perception and cognition, 
a subjectivity that calls into question the unity of the observing subject as well as its 
relationship with the outside world" (Ross 1994: 6). 
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Within the theory and practice of the human sciences, aesthetic modes of understanding 
are important in the work of such early twentieth-century luminaries as William James, 
Ernst Mach, Henri Bergson, Carl Jung and Martin Heidegger. In a study of these thinkers 
it becomes possible for the critic to erase "the sharp separation between science and art 
that existed under the aegis of logical positivism and aesthetic modernism in the 1950s 
and turns both science and art into interpretive languages" (Ross 1994: 11). This 
dichotomy has an important precedent in Kant's argument that the transition into 
modernity necessitates the separation of three distinct spheres of substantive reason: the 
cognitive-instrumental, the moral-practical and the aesthetic-expressive. By continuing 
to argue from within a Kantian framework, mid-century writers in Britain such as A l f ( " ~ ~
North Whitehead, Jacob Bronowski, C. P. Snow and Aldous Huxley each contributed to 
this debate in their consideration of the increasing specialization of the sciences against 
the broader understanding of the arts and humanities. 
The most famous example of such a distinction is to be found in C. P. Snow's Rede 
Lecture of 1958, entitled 'Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution', in which the 
English writer considers that each "culture" tends to be intolerant of the other and 
inclined to caricature the opposition. He argues that whilst literary "intellectuals" see a 
blind faith in scientific progress, "physical scientists" discern a total "lacking in foresight" 
amongst those whom they describe as "anti-intellectuals" committed only to the 
"existential moment" (Snow 1965: 5). Although primarily speaking of the British 
condition, Snow argues that such a chasm is a "problem for the entire West" (2). He 
bemoans the fact that the divide is primarily the result of ignorance, only to be rectified 
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through a softening of the boundaries between the disciplines and also through 
educational reform. 
A number of critical articles followed the reception of Snow's lecture, focusing 
partiCUlarly on his tendency to make use of conceptual shorthand and crude categories. 
Clearly, his attempts to qualify the schematic nature of "two cultures" are often 
unsatisfactory, but his lecture does succeed in highlighting two important processes in 
Western history which, as technological consequences of the Enlightenment, can be seen 
to have contributed to the widening of the gulf: the industrial and the applied scientific 
revolutions. The principle of utility, which establishes the nineteenth-century paradigm 
of applied science, tends to preclude any practice which deviates from the directives of 
precision and efficiency. As an example of what Thomas Kuhn has called "normal 
science", this model helps to provide the "foundation" for the study of an objective and 
empirically verifiable world (Kuhn 1970: 10). In short, because it claims to tell us 
verifiable truths about the world, to deploy the phrase of the hermeneutician Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, with the widespread collapse of religious frameworks in the West normal 
science has become "the last court of appeal and sole bearer of truth" (Wachterhauser 
1994: 34). 
By way of contrast, the strain of philosophy common to much of the work of Franz 
Brentano, Edmund Husserl, William James and Martin Heidegger focuses upon 
phenomenological experiences which are unique to the individual mind. Although a 
variety of intentional experiences - those which Brentano claims implicate both the 
perceiving subject and the object of thought - may prove to be empirically useful for the 
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human sciences, they are largely ignored by the scientist intent on paring down data to 
what is conceived to be verifiable. Indeed, the eminent American philosopher Daniel 
Dennett argues in his provocative book Consciousness Explained (1991), firstly, that 
phenomenology is purely descriptive and thereby lacks any method which may be of use 
to explanatory science, and, secondly, in its mode of "intimate acquaintance" (Dennett 
1992: 65) with the first-person, it is wholly inaccessible to a rigorous methodology and 
the objective measurements of scientific instruments. However, working within 
converging areas of the natural and human sciences, the three figures whose work I 
explore in this thesis (William James, Ludwig Binswanger and Oliver Sacks) reveal the 
possibilities, as well as the difficulties, of drawing upon phenomenological modes of 
inquiry to broaden the range and develop the focus of their study. 
Whilst criticism that science neglects subjectivity may be valid, practitioners of micro-
and sub-atomic sciences examine a field of data which is detectable only beyond the 
perceptual range of human sensory apparatus. Subjectivity may not be so much of an 
issue here; but, as H. Stuart Hughes indicates, the legacy of conceptual shifts in the 
human sciences in the late nineteenth century emphasizes the problems inherent in 
discussing the study of "human behaviour in terms of analogies drawn from natural 
science" (Hughes 1961: 37). Instead, the branches of science with which this thesis deals 
indicate the crucial importance of subjective analysis. Although deduction (the process 
of reasoning from a priori premises), central to the domains of symbolic logic and pure 
mathematics, is independent of description and qualification, it is possible to conceive 
of an overlapping territory between inductive science (moving from the collation of 
empirical data to reasoned conclusions) and expressive art, for they are both involved in 
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interpretation. Such an interpretive overlap is most readily evident in modes of inquiry 
which take seriously problems of intersubjectivity and communicative understanding 
(Verstehen). 
Dorothy Ross goes on to stress that "despite the different discourses that have emerged 
around cognitive modernism, aesthetic modernism, and positivist science, they are linked 
in a common move toward human subjectivity and a common investment in the culture 
of modernity" (Ross 1994: 15). She goes on to claim that "the categories of 'aesthetic 
modernism' or 'cognitive modernism'" prove inadequate "if we assume that they are 
things-in-themselves" (15). In this thesis I will develop the argument that, with the 
growth and proliferation of human sciences in this century, and particularly in the 
discourse of the medical humanities (those applied human sciences which orient 
themselves towards concerns of patient care and, therefore, are primarily interested in the 
subjectivity of the patient: for example, clinical psychology, psychoanalysis and 
neuropsychology), dual and multiple modes of understanding can be productive in two 
important ways: firstly, they help to redefine specific areas of study; and, secondly, by 
linking rigorous study of human behaviour to the transformative power of aesthetic 
creation, they encourage the development of viable therapeutic techniques. Accordingly, 
although the thesis will focus on modes of medical writing, I also wish to contribute to 
the continuing debate over the shifting nature and ongoing implications of modernism. 
In particularly, I will focus on the manner in which my three central figures explore what 
Ewa Ziarek has called "the intense confrontation between the claims of alterity and the 
claims of rationality" in modern aesthetics (Ziarek 1996: 8). 
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c. P. Snow's argument assumes that the split between the "two cultures" is valid. in so 
much that they are two independent modes of study and, in many ways, opposing spheres 
of discursive activity. But Snow's inquiry lacks adequate historical evidence to support 
this account. The Platonic dichotomy between philosophy (or reason) as a discourse of 
truth opposed to fictive art is an easy argument to deploy when a critic wishes to 
denigrate art. Throughout modern history a number of literary critics - from Philip 
Sidney and Percy Bysshe Shelley to M. H. Abrams - have shown the vapidity of such an 
argument. Indeed, from a late eighteenth-century romantic perspective, the artist is seen 
to champion an expressive personal truth which is excluded from those scientific 
practices applied solely to discerning causal and natural laws. Post-romantic art is thus 
characterized by "things modified by the passions and imagination of the perceiver", in 
opposition to "the unemotional and objective description characteristic of physical 
science" (Abrams 1953: 299). If natural science attempts to understand the world from 
an Archimedean point of reference, then romantic art focuses on the primacy and 
irreducibility of the perceiving, feeling and imagining subject. In response to this, the 
challenge laid down for romantic scientists is to discover both a method and an object (or 
subject) of inquiry which can incorporate aesthetic interpretation, rather than dismissing 
it as the epiphenomenon of humans conceived as fundamentally material creatures. 
Abrams goes on to argue that the distinction between poetry (as a metonym for art) and 
science should only be seen as a "logical device" for "isolating and defining the nature 
of poetic discourse", but it has often tended to crystallize and reify in a manner which has 
caused a "combative opposition" (299). This point indicates another danger with Snow's 
approach: in the binary formulation of his argument he tends to lose sight of internal 
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differences in each sphere of activity, the mapping of which may elicit important 
connections. Indeed, the debate throws into confusion generic differences between 
distinct areas of research and blurs the lines between specific fields of study. It is the 
legacy of romantic science to deny neither the objective nor the subjective approaches to 
the study of the human and the natural worlds; its practitioners, through a series of 
empirical and imaginative developments, attempt to work within a paradigm which links 
particular elements in each of the fields. However, romantic science should not be seen 
to be based on the consensual model which Kuhn describes; rather, it encompasses a 
number of theoretical and practical possibilities which complement existing modes of 
scientific research. 
Romantic science is not a project which tries to fuse independent spheres of thought and 
inquiry for its own sake; traditionally, philosophies of holism tend to generalize from a 
universalist point of view and thereby ignore the specific and the contingent. Instead, if 
the truth claims of scientific thought are seen as no more (or no less) valid than the 
verisimilitude of aesthetic discourse, it becomes possible to productively blend disparate 
modes of discourse in an attempt, in the words of the American 'post-Philosopher' 
Richard Rorty, to strategically redescribe the field of inquiry. This act of hybridization 
would enable the discourse of romantic science to "be filed alongside all the others, one 
more vocabulary, one more set of metaphors which he thinks have a chance of being 
used" (Rorty 1989: 39). As Rorty comments in a discussion of the work of the American 
philosopher of language Donald Davidson, 
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whereas the metaphorical looks irrelevant to ... positivists, the literal looks 
irrelevant to Romantics. For the former think that the point of language 
is to represent a hidden reality which lies outside us, and the latter thinks 
its purpose is to express a hidden reality which lies within us (19). 
This does not mean the romantic scientist simply elides such perspectival differences, but 
attempts to compensate for the inadequacies in each point of view by juxtaposing a series 
of (apparently) irreconcilable perspectives through a layering of discourse. Although 
rarely a wildly utopian project, romantic science is projected through a language of 
idealism which lends the theoretical writing an emancipatory aim (to redescribe the terms 
of selfhood in therapeutic or pragmatic ways) to which the realities of experience do not 
always square up. However, despite the evident difficulties of carrying through the aims 
of romantic science in practical situations, when faced with inadequate alternatives, the 
three thinkers discussed here - James, Binswanger and Sacks - each prefer to work 
through a problematic, but potentially liberating, mode of writing. 
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(2) Theories of Selfhood and Consciousness 
Complementing my initial interest in romantic science as a tradition of writing, the thesis 
is also stimulated by two contemporary trends in current scholarship: first, a renewed 
interest in theories of selfhood in theoretical discourse; and, second, the study of 
consciousness as the prevalent focus for (dominantly American) cognitive philosophers 
and neuroscientists. Because each trend has ongoing significance for the conceptual 
presuppositions of my argument I will deal with each in tum. 
(i) 
During the twentieth century subject-centred notions of humanism have been strongly 
challenged by language-based philosophy and the emergence of critical theory as an 
academic field. Most significantly, the e a r l y ~ e n t u r y y promise of phenomenologists like 
Brentano and Husserl to accurately describe the contents of consciousness has been 
severely attacked. As well as presenting the evident problems of translating thoughts into 
language, the very existence of non-linguistic thoughts has been thoroughly questioned 
by poststructuralist theorists. In literary theory, positing an author's consciousness to 
establish unitary or stable meaning and, thereby, guarantee that the intentions of the 
author are unproblematically conveyed through the transparent words of a text (evident 
in the phenomenologically influenced theory of, for example, the French critic Georges 
Poulet), has been widely discredited in favour of a model of language which can be seen 
to generate a mUltiplicity of possible meanings, depending from which perspective the 
reader engages with the text (or the ways in which the text incorporates the reader). 
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This has important consequences not just for literary criticism but also for intersubjectiye 
understanding, which for the human sciences is of central concern. The implications of 
reading a text (literary or otherwise) should also concern the inquirer who attempts to 
read the behaviour and expressions of another human being. As Poulet claims, "critical 
consciousness relies, by definition, on the thinking of 'another'; it finds its nourishment 
and its substance only therein" (Poulet 1972: 46). The implication here is that if the 
inquirer is sensitive to the different mind-set of the other (as Poulet says, "the significance 
of the cogito"), then such intersubjective inquiry will form "an act of self-discovery" (47). 
However, as poststructuralist theory asserts, consciousness cannot be seen simply as a 
transparent and coherent container of words and meanings; verbal and behavioural 
languages are also understood as textually unstable and contradictory as written 
discourses. Paul Ricoeur is one such theorist who takes seriously "the existence of an 
opaque subjectivity which expresses itself through the detour of countless mediations -
signs, symbols, texts and human praxis itself' (Kearney 1984: 32). Ricoeur's use of 
"detour" here may suggest there is a manner in which to bypass language; but, it actually 
reveals an important departure from the early romantic understanding of language as 
mid-world (Zwischenwelt), through which God's book of nature could be read. With the 
respective attacks of Darwinism and poststructuralism on design and authority, the 
necessity of taking the textual "detour" implies there is no originary or transparent 
meaning (or set of meanings) to be discovered through language. 
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Such opacity certainly amplifies the difficulties of intersubjective communication, but 
may also lead towards a positing of the radical Otherness of other beings. In reaction to 
Poulet's work, the American literary critic J. Hillis Miller claims: 
another mind is so alien, so impenetrable that it is never possible ... to lift 
the veil which hides the other from me. This means I can never confront 
the other person as an immediate presence, only encounter indirect signs 
and traces of his passage (Miller 1970: 221). 
What seems to be a statement about the care and sensitivity needed to read another person 
(and also to read the process of reading), can, in the hands of sceptics, provide fuel for 
the radical questioning of the presence of a world of objects and of other beings who 
inhabit it. Although such a sceptical position is obviously untenable for practitioners 
dedicated to medical care, it must be taken seriously for the theorist of the human 
sciences. Later in the introduction I will discuss the American philosopher Stanley 
Cavell's refutation of scepticism; but, in the meantime, it is important to emphasize the 
theoretical difficulties which face a hermeneutics of human behaviour. 
If one takes seriously Fredric Jameson's analysis of the erosion of the "depth model" as 
a metaphor for establishing self-identity (the "emotional ground tone" of "intensities" 
serving to replace the "hermeneutic model of inside and outside"), then so too must one 
address the poststructuralist attack upon truth, and self as the container of that truth, as 
metaphysical and uncritical terms (Jameson 1991: 6,12). In his critique of the loss of 
depth model, Jameson states that "what replaces ... depth models is for the most part a 
conception of practices, discourses, and textual play", or, in other words, "depth is 
replaced by surface, or by multiple surfaces" (12). A modernist concern for the crisis of 
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selfhood has here been conceptually displaced by a permanent schizophrenic condition 
("as a breakdown of the signifying chain" [26]) or as a "simulacrum" (for which the 
original has been lost or had never existed as such [6]). Reading the traces of selfhood 
in such a conceptual territory is not only a treacherous activity but, seemingly, 
impossible, any strategic reading forever destabilising itself. From this perspective, the 
text of self can be redescribed not so much as an empty shell but as a corpse from which 
creative life cannot issue. 
Jameson takes Jean Baudrillard to be the critic who best epitomizes the recent theoretical 
dismantling of self - more explicitly, the embodied self - as a meaningful metaphor 
(although Jameson is critical of this trend). A powerful example of this is to be found in 
Baudrillard's short book, The Ecstacy of Communication (1987). Here, the French 
theorist claims that "the body as a stage, the landscape as a stage, and time as a stage are 
slowly disappearing" (Baudrillard 1987: 19). Furthermore, 
the religious, metaphysical or philosophical definition of being has given 
way to an operational definition in terms of the genetic code (DNA) and 
cerebral organization (the informational code and billions of neurons). 
We are in a system where there is no more soul, no more metaphor of the 
body - the fable of the unconscious itself has lost most of its resonance. 
No narrative can come to metaphorize our presence; no transcendence can 
playa role in our definition; our being is exhausting itself in molecular 
linkings and neuronic convolutions (50-51). 
If the metaphors of "body" and "soul" have lost their potency to describe what remains 
of selfhood for Baudrillard, then "there are no more individuals, but only potential 
mutants" (51). Baudrillard's vision of mutation allows no possibility of recouping the self 
from a condition of exile, in which state one could maintain "a pathetic, dramatic, critical, 
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aesthetic distance" (50): that is to say, one could still deal in terms of selfhood as 
alienated, fugitive or diminished. Instead of the modernist trope of exile, Baudrillard 
deploys the term "deterritorialization" as a "figure of metastasis", by which he means "a 
deprivation of meaning and territory, [or] lobotomy of the body" (50). In Baudrillard's 
rhetoric the "figure of metastasis" works on two levels: firstly, as a figure of permanent 
transformation from depth to surface, or from whole to fragment (from which point 
neither depth nor whole can be reconstructed); and, secondly, and more powerfully, as 
an expression of the interminable spreading of disease, a malignant cancer which rends 
the self and for which there is no treatment. 
Such ideas may appear beguiling but they only undermine one version of the self, that 
conceived of as metaphysical presence or as a transcendent. If, to deploy Rorty's 
terminology, one utilizes the fiction of selfhood as a heuristic device - given specific 
content depending in which context it is posited or for what purpose it is projected - then 
the trope of internal disorder can be recouped as provisional agency, where disorder 
represents the active mutation of what has been understood to be permanent or essential 
characteristics. Especially in medical cases when the metaphors of disease are literalized 
(the cancer patient or the schizophrenic) then such a constructed notion of selfhood is 
extremely limited, but serves an important role in a set of practices which take patient 
care as their precondition. The reading of the patient, or, even better in terms of therapy, 
the patient's reading of themselves (where reading is conceived as an active and creative 
process, despite being finally incomplete and fragmentary) provides the potential for such 
conceptual redescription in an environment of lived experience. 
17 
Instead of recouping the self as a transcendent marker of subjectivity, the embodied self 
has recently been championed as a viable heuristic construct which has served to counter 
the anti-humanistic theoretical trends in the 1970s. Despite the non-foundational moves 
made by notable contemporary theorists (characterized by the writing of Rorty), the self 
has reemerged as the locus of experience in various fields of theory: in the very different 
psychoanalytic writings of Roy Schafer and Slavoj Zizek, in the philosophy of Stanley 
Cavell and in the narrative hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. Instead of forming a 
foundation for theory, the selfhas come to be seen as firmly embedded in discourse. To 
appropriate Jacques Lacan's well-known claim: the self is understood to be spoken in 
discourse rather than the self being the sovereign agent of enunciation. In this respect, 
most current theories of self-construction also consider the linguistic and narrative 
parameters of the self. 
The return to theories of the self is foreshadowed in the work of Michel Foucault, who, 
after eschewing the individual as the focus of attention in The Birth of a Clinic (1963) 
and The Order of Things (1966), reestablishes the self as a theoretical site in his three-
volume The History of Sexuality (1976-84) and his seminar on Technologies of the Self 
(1982). A scathing criticism of the tradition of phenomenology emerges in his writings 
of the 1960s, in which he claims it is merely an outgrowth of humanism seen as 
uncritically centring a meaningful universe around the (undeconstructed) figure of man. 
When viewed within the framework of the medical humanities, Foucault's image of the 
erasure of man - "a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea" (Foucault 1986: 387) -
creates severe theoretical difficulties for the basic tenets of patient care. However, as 
Martin Heidegger discusses in his 'Letter on Humanism' (1947), the reevaluation of a 
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humanistic tradition does not necessarily entail the rejection of humane values, or, by 
implication, the abandoning of medical ethics. Romantic science is committed to the 
maintenance of humane values and attempts to redescribe selfhood in terms which 
undercut Foucault's early reading of SUbjectivity as SUbjugation. As such, romantic 
science seeks to be both an understanding and a tolerant science. 
(ii) 
By way of contrast to the tenor of such theoretical debates, but closely parallelling this 
renewed interest in selfhood, consciousness has become the most hotly contested concept 
in analytic philosophy in recent years, especially in America (as can be sensed by the 
magnitude of the second 'Towards a Science of Consciousness' conference, 'Tucson II', 
held in Tucson, Arizona in April 1996). Such thinkers as Daniel Dennett, John Searle, 
Thomas Nagel, Patricia and Paul Churchland, Roger Penrose and Francis Crick have all 
turned to redefine, or, in the case of Dennett, reject consciousness as the foundation of 
human cognitive activity. The general argument turns on a fairly traditional conflict 
between behaviourists (epitomized by Dennett and the Churchlands), who treat 
everything non-empirical as, at best, an epiphenomenon of brain activity and, at worst, 
a false manner by which to understand cognition, and those thinkers (for example, Searle 
and Nagel) who are sensitive to the irreducible areas of subjective experience which 
behaviourism does not address. 
Dennett claims in one of the liveliest books to be published in this area, Consciousness 
Explained, that whilst complex mental experiences cannot be reduced easily to a 
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chemico-physical mode of description, by following a scientific mode of interrogation 
one can simultaneously dispel the mystery surrounding the dualist claim for the 
ineffability of mind and set out an objective, third-person explanation of cognition. 
Dennett rejects the phenomenological investigation of mind for being too personal (it 
implies an introspective and autobiographical inquiry is really the only viable one); it is 
"invulnerable to correction" and, therefore, inaccessible to materialistic science (Dennett 
1991: 67). For him there are no "intrinsic qualities" of experience (65) and no self, or 
"Central Meaner" (understood as a "Cartesian theatre" [228]), who imbues these qualities 
with language. He goes on to claim that behaviourism can offer a "neutral" answer to the 
problem of verification which phenomenology poses, because it seeks an 
"intersubjectively verifiable method" of analysis by which it can interpret "vocal 
sounds ... that are apparently amenable to a linguistic or semantic analysis" (74). Dennett's 
"methodological assumption that there is a text to be uncovered" takes the form of an 
"intentional stance" (76), which he adopts towards the subject of the utterances and by 
which he understands the speaker to be an agent capable of rationality. He goes on to 
claim that the intentional stance explains why intersubjective exploration can uncover 
knowledge about the world and the inhabitants of that world, while it also circumvents 
the problems posed by retaining a conventional model of consciousness. 
In direct opposition to Dennett, in The Rediscovery of Mind (1992) John Searle describes 
a form of biological monism (what he calls "biological naturalism") as a physico-mental 
continuum which accounts for both a private subjective perspective and bodily sensations 
(Searle 1992: 1). He bases his theory upon the assertion that "mental phenomena are 
caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the 
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brain" (1). Because they emerge from brain processes these "special features", such as 
"consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity, [and] mental causation" (2), cannot be 
reduced to them (for example, like liquidity is a "higher-level emergent property of H20 
molecules" under certain conditions [14]). Searle claims that consciousness is physical 
at root; it is a feature of the brain, but also, and crucially, in its "first-person ontology" 
(17), it is also a "higher-level" mental phenomena. 
In a number of articles and, most notably, in a recent exchange in The New York Review 
of Books (November 1995), Searle claims that Dennett's eliminative account cannot do 
justice to those special features of the brain which he enumerates, whereas Dennett 
accuses Searle of a vestigial dualism. Whether either thinker has 'solved' the problem of 
consciousness is not the real issue here; rather, this latest manifestation of philosophical 
rivalry displays a continuity with the traditional philosophical split between monism 
(materialism or idealism) and dualism. Monism stresses the triumph of matter over mind 
(or vice versa), whereas dualism retains both within the philosophical frame, but leaves 
itself very vulnerable to criticism from either of the other positions. 1 In short, both 
Searle's and Dennett's theories are open to criticism: Searle's biological monism disguises 
a form of dualism and Dennett's materialistic behaviourism begs certain questions which 
rival models of consciousness address. 
I now wish to situate my primary focus within these familiar areas of contention: how and 
in what ways the self - the conscious self and the embodied self - has endured and 
I Although the implication here is that a dualistic account of mind and matter is the only altemat.ive 
position to materialism and b ~ h a ~ i o u r i s m , , as I will d i ~ c u s s s I ~ t e r , , d u ~ l i s m m of ~ e s c r i p t i o n n (rather than dualIsm 
of substance) is not necessarIly Incommensurable WIth phIlosophIcal mOnIsm. 
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developed as a theoretical construct within the medical humanities in the modem period. 
A variant of each discipline (psychology, psychoanalysis and neuropsychology) is 
represented by each of my chosen writers: James, although professionally a physiologist 
and later a philosopher, is here characterized as a psychologist who also shares an interest 
in spirituality and religion as meaningful human concerns; Binswanger, although an 
admirer of certain aspects of psychoanalysis, seeks a broader anthropological study which 
reestablishes the self (or Dasein) at the centre of analytic discourse; and Sacks outlines 
a vision of a double science, in which neurology is harnessed to psychology in order that 
he might focus on how neurological disorders appear from the patient's point of view. 
None of these thinkers finally solves any of the philosophical problems concerning ideas 
of consciousness and selfhood, but they do make significant attempts to redefine the 
tenns of the debate to their own positive ends. 
Within the context of the medical humanities and in order to position my discussion of 
selfhood within Foucault's description of the modern episteme (which he claims to stretch 
roughly from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century and which is characterized by 
the problem of subjectivity), I trace a discourse of romantic science through the work of 
my three thinkers. I understand romantic science to be both a tradition and a genre of 
writing. Beginning with the fennent of experimental and theoretical activity in Gennany 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, romantic science historically opens 
a field of investigation in the human and the natural sciences, in which systematic 
observation is yoked to an interest in the non-behaviouristic aspects of human 
consciousness, such as imagination and spirit. I discuss at length how romantic science, 
as a self-conscious movement, was short-lived, becoming largely discredited by the 
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growth of a strictly empirical science in nineteenth-century Europe. However, I also 
argue that, as a genre of writing, romantic science encompasses theories of the self, 
aesthetic creativity (especially with reference to therapy) and philosophical anthropology, 
providing an unrealized potential which is richly mined by my three thinkers. In each 
one's thought there is a strong and discernable connection with German romanticism, but 
within the context of modernity they all display theoretical and cultural differences from 
the early Germanic models. 
The reasons for my choosing James, Binswanger and Sacks as my writers are threefold. 
Firstly, each thinker is both theorist and practitioner (Binswanger was and Sacks is a 
professional physician and James consulted with private patients at his home), which 
makes for a blend of theory directed towards the practical ends of patient care. Each of 
these dimensions acts as a check on the other: theory counters technique emphasized in 
and for itself, and technique ensures that theoretical problems are directed towards 
practical ends. Secondly, the work of each is characteristic of the discursive manifold of 
romantic science within their own distinctive field of the medical humanities. They focus 
centrally on selfhood as the vehicle for understanding and expression and they concern 
themselves with the problems of dualism and metaphysics which are implied therein. 
Thirdly, although I will indicate historical and generic continuities between the three, I 
will also discuss their personal projects and the specific terminology which they deploy 
to strategically redescribe selfhood. 
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(3) The Genre and Genealogy of Romantic Science 
Romantic science is an oxymoronic term which, whilst inscribing its object of study 
within philosophical parameters, directs my attention closely towards sites of theoretical 
tension in the work of the three thinkers. The purpose of this section is to lay the ground 
for my later studies of the thinkers by providing a brief overview of romantic science in 
Germany at the turn of the nineteenth century, in order to link romantic concerns with 
contemporary theories of self. Because Oliver Sacks, in his appropriation of the term 
"Romantic Science" from the Russian neuropsychologist Alexander Luria, is the only one 
of my writers to deploy the label explicitly, I will use him initially as a way of 
fore grounding the central concerns of the thesis. 
Romantic science, firstly, characterizes a mode of writing which cannot easily be 
classified with reference to one or other available generic categories and, secondly, 
describes a particular approach for dealing with the complex theoretical problems which 
arise within the human sciences. As I will demonstrate, Sacks and Luria are sympathetic 
to both of these goals of romantic science, particularly in the field of neurology. 
However, my general comments below are also applicable to the aims and interests of 
James and Binswanger, whereas I have reserved my more detailed commentary on Sacks 
for a later chapter. 
For the purposes of the thesis, a genre is understood to be a type of writing, categorized 
in respect to the specific characteristics or features which it displays, which emerges at 
a particular historical moment. Romantic science is a particularly heterogenous form of 
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discourse which combines inquiries into selfhood (encompassing forms of inductive 
science and philosophical anthropology) with aesthetic, phenomenological and 
behavioural approaches to its subject of study. As Stanley Cavell indicates, the inherent 
problem with describing a "full-blown" genre is that it limits the evolution of a genre to 
simply recombining the discursive elements already established (Cavell 1981: 28). It is 
important to note that there is no such thing as a "full-blown" form of romantic science 
for it does not exist in anyone particular discipline of study. Cavell attests that "late 
members can 'add' something to the genre because there is ... nothing one is tempted to call 
the features of a genre which all its members have in common" (28). Accordingly, there 
is a form of internal coherence to the genre of romantic science, as each subsequent writer 
reinterprets the terms of the discourse within his specialist field of study. For Cavell, 
"membership in the genre requires that if an instance (apparently) lacks a given feature, 
it must compensate for it, for example, by showing a further feature 'instead of the one 
it lacks" (29). Furthermore, "the new feature introduced by the new member will, in turn, 
contribute to a description of the genre as a whole" (29). 
From this perspective, romantic science should be seen as a dynamic genre which 
recombines features (and adds to them) depending on which context it is used. It closely 
resembles Raymond Williams's flexible historical model which posits diachronic 
development as passing through a series of emergent, dominant and residual transitions. 
Within a genre of romantic science each emergent discourse (in which "new meanings 
and values, new practices, new significances and experiences, are continually being 
created" [Williams 1973: 41]) would be a new dominant, but within a different field of 
application. For example, the psychoanalytic discourse which is evident in James and 
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Sacks respectively in emergent and residual forms (at least in terms of the history of 
psychoanalysis) is evident as a dominant feature in Binswanger's writing (although he 
departs from the tenets of Freudian psychoanalysis in important ways). In short, it is 
important to stress that there is no one form of writing which epitomizes romantic 
science; rather, it describes an open discursive field which enables thinkers to deploy a 
combination of fragmented discourses to attend to a particular set of theoretical problems. 
Sacks diverges from classical neurology (understood both as a genre of writing and as a 
field of inquiry) because he claims it does not deal with the subjective states of mind 
which result from neuronal firings. Defined as a physical science which examines the 
matter of the brain and nervous system, neurology uses language only as it needs to 
linguistically represent anatomical detail. The use of precise referential language renders 
the blurred margins of hermeneutics negligible. By way of contrast, in his development 
of neuropsychology, Sacks stresses the critical and interpretive role of all discourse. 
Furthermore, when subjectivity becomes an issue, both the subjectivity of the inquirer 
and the subject of inquiry, referential language loses its precision and neurology, in an 
attempt to deal with non-material aspects, becomes descriptive. As Luria indicates in his 
autobiography, it is not impossible for neurological science to humanize itself by 
broadening its field of study in order to incorporate and focus attention on the disorderly 
experiences of patients. Just as mental states are intentional, they are always mental 
states of someone displaying an awareness of, and a relationship with, the world. By 
attending closely to the personal experiences of patients, especially those suffering from 
neurological disorders, the inquirer may glean more information than can be gathered 
from a neurological model designed in vacuo. Indeed, as Cavell makes explicit in his 
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discussion of genre, "an interest in an object is to take an interest in one's experience of 
the object" (Cavell 1981 : 7). That is to say, the subjective experiences which neurology 
ignores become a central area of exploration for Sacks.2 
The collation and description of subjective expenences, m itself an extremely 
complicated task, is of paramount importance for a rigorous inquiry into disorders which 
neurology is unable to fully explain. Luria rejects methods which rely crucially on the 
measurement of instruments, for he sees the importance of an inquiring, critical and 
interpreting mind: 
I am inclined to reject strongly an approach in which these auxiliary aids 
become the central method and in which their role as servant to clinical 
thought is reversed so that clinical reasoning follows instrumental data as 
a slave follows its master (Luria 1977: 177). 
The sympathies of Luria and Sacks lie firmly on the phenomenological fork of the divide. 
Sacks discerns a separation between "the apparent poverty of scientific formulation and 
the manifest richness of phenomenal experience" (Sacks 1990a: 44). The "poverty" of 
science is the result of the methodological need to bracket, reduce or eliminate the 
"richness" of lived experience. In this view, any truth (a valid assertion about how the 
brain functions) elicited from a reductive method is always a narrow or partial one, 
because it fails to recognize experiences which do not have immediate implications for 
a single mode of inquiry. Behaviourism, the science which Dennett practices and 
2 Like Sacks, James and Binswanger both react to fonns of scientific inquiry which they claim do not do 
full justice to the manifold of experience: James reacts to late n i n e t e e n t h - c e n ~ ~ b e h a v i o u r i s ~ ~ which deals 
more with physiology than psychology and Binswanger departs from FreudIan psychoanalYSIS because he 
claims it to undervalue the 'spiritual' aspects of consciousness. 
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promotes, is treated cautiously by Sacks because he sees it to be limited in its dismissal 
of private mental states. 
As I have previously commented, the debate is two-sided. Luria is quick to indicate that 
romantic science pursued to its extreme lacks logic and rigour and thereby prevents the 
practitioner from reaching "firm formulations" (Luria 1977: 175). He goes on to 
comment that "sometimes logical step-by-step analysis escapes romantic scholars, and 
on occasion, they let artistic preferences and intuitions take over. Frequently their 
descriptions not only precede explanation but replace it" (175). Luria's ideal is to 
discover a methodological balance, if not a synthesis, where observation encourages a 
causal explanation of phenomena without diminishing the importance of describing the 
"manifold richness" of phenomenology (178). Within reason, the greater the number of 
perspectives, he argues, the more likely is the possibility of understanding. Sacks also 
endorses this perspectival method, although, as I discuss later, critics have argued that his 
aims (typical of the other romantic scientists) are never fully realized in his texts or, by 
extension, in patient care. I will return to this issue; but, here, I explore the ramifications 
of the term romantic science, both in its specific historical context and its use as a 
signifying term which shifts across a variety of possible signifieds. 
The initial paragraph of a 1990 review article by Sacks, entitled 'Neurology and the Soul', 
is broken by a quotation from the first part of Goethe's Faust (1808), in which the German 
poet celebrates the "colors of life" in contrast to the drab greyness of theory (Sacks 1990a: 
44). This quotation directly echoes one of Luria's citations (Luria 1977: 174) and 
emphatically associates modem romantic science with the forms of inquiry which 
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flourished in Germany between the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. Sacks's 
article, both a review of his previous publications and an outline of other thinkers who 
broadly share his sympathies (the American neuroscientist Gerald Edelman and the 
medical theorist Israel Rosenfield), productively frames a sketch of romanticism. It is 
important not to lose sight of the relevance of Sacks (and, by implication, my other two 
thinkers) to contemporary critical debate by too easily conflating his position with that 
of early romanticism. In order to check this impulse, I will only sketch in the details 
which illuminate marked similarities and philosophical resonances. As a result, the 
complicated genealogy of romanticism is incompletely rendered. 
In an essay on 'Romanticism in Germany', Dietrich von Engelhardt indicates that, unlike 
the other European countries where romanticism was prevalent, one is able in German 
culture to "speak of Romantic science and medicine side by side with literature and the 
other arts" (Engelhardt 1988: 111). Here science refers to "a metaphysical form of 
scientific research" which is speculative but harnessed to an empirical approach to natural 
phenomena. Although many of the romantic scientists were influenced by the 
Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel, which represented an attempt "to construct all 
natural sciences from a priori speculation" (Snelders 1970: 195), they were committed 
to the practical application of speculative knowledge. There is no one essential form of 
romantic science, partly because many branches of the natural sciences were represented 
(amongst them, Justus Liebig in chemistry, Alexander von Humboldt in universal 
science, Johann Ritter and the Dane Hans Oersted in physics, Henrik Steffens in geology 
and Carl Carns and Gotthilf Schubert in medicine) and partly because no practitioner 
claimed his own discipline was categorically distinct from the others. As Alfred North 
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Whitehead indicates, it is important to note that "all the sciences dealing with life were 
still in an elementary observational stage, in which classification and direct description 
were dominant" (Whitehead 1929: 79). Rather than mutually "combative" (79), all of the 
natural sciences were seen to be interconnected and subjected to a unitary metaphysics 
of nature. 
The Naturphilosophen discerned a polar "interaction between mind and matter", 
operating under the control of "antagonistic forces of attraction and repulsion" (Snelders 
1970: 195), and, following Kant, they countered materialist philosophy by emphasizing 
the importance of subjectivity. The static model of Newtonian mechanics3 was 
challenged in an attempt to understand the natural world as a dynamic process, which 
resulted from man's sensual relationship in the world and was then applied to the 
"mysteries of [his] own earth" (194). Accordingly, the spatial and atomistic metaphors 
of the French materialist La Mettrie in L'Homme machine (1747) were replaced by 
organic and vitalistic descriptions of nature and of the forces which hold the universe 
together, "as one great organism in which individual bodies are only representatives of 
the whole" (196). A single vision, extrapolated from the perception of the 'outward' 
seeing eye, was often countered by a multiple vision in which the 'inward' creative eye 
perceives the manifold aspects of Nature. Such a distinction is analogous to Schelling's 
theory of an active and engaging mind which challenged the dominant Lockean model 
of mind as passive receptor. 
3 The attacks levelled against Newton often lose sight of the fact that he actually conceived of a universe 
made up of matter and spirit. Not until the eighteenth century did s c ~ e n t i f i c c materialism :educe this 
dualistic account to one fundamental substance which was understood WIth recourse to matenal laws. 
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Schelling also reacted to Johann Fichte's claim that nature was subordinate to the mind 
, 
by reversing the equation: "nature was not a product of the mind, rather the mind was a 
product, if also a culmination, of nature" (197). As Andrew Bowie indicates in his 
reevaluation of Schelling's place in German idealist philosophy, "what is able to know 
itself must be more than what it knows" (Bowie 1993: 23). Schelling does not assert the 
mind as representing the mythical foundations of the Absolute; rather, that the inquiring 
mind, while partially "determined by something posited outside itself', constitutes 
something which cannot be reduced to the level of matter (quoted by Bowie 1993: 24). 
Schelling's philosophy was popular amongst the romantic scientists, enabling them to 
consider "the totality of all being" (Snelders 1970: 197) without losing sight of their 
"experience of the object world" (Bowie 1993: 24). 
As Bowie makes evident, the influence of Schelling is important for any consideration 
of romanticism, but romantic science represents a slight shift away from his idealistic 
tendencies, together with a retreat from the "one-sided glorification of irrationality" 
present in the Dionysian exuberance of some early German romantic poetry (Engelhardt 
1988: 112). It is not that the early practitioners of romantic science rejected idealism per 
se, but they saw intuition and feeling as complementary to an understanding of nature 
achieved through the faculty of reason. As a consequence, it is possible to show a closer 
connection between the German natural scientists and "the pre-romantic romantics" 
(Tymms 1955: 9), figures like Herder, Goethe and Novalis. As "men of sentiment" (9) 
they displayed a relish for forms of classicism together with a regard for an emotional 
response for and in the world, and so stand as historical mediators between the 
intellectualism of the Aujkldrung and the elevation of feeling displayed in romantic 
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poetry. Natural scientists were wary of applying dogmatic reason too readily to their 
studies; they detected the stultifying alliance between a rationalist method and what they 
interpreted as the rigid laws of Newtonian mechanics. Reason was only used as an 
organizing tool to help as they collected empirical data and did not represent the basis of 
their inquiry. 
T. A. M. Snelders distinguishes one major difference between the Romantik and the 
Aujklarung approaches to scientific knowledge: 
the Newtonian mechanical-atomistic explanation of all natural 
phenomena was supplanted by a dynamical and organic concept, with a 
concomitant substitution, at the extreme, of sentiment for the critical 
mind. One tried to unriddle phenomena in the natural sciences, the 
enigma of life and disease, by intuition instead of by experiment (Snelders 
1970: 194). 
Intuition, harnessed to creative imagination, came to be valued as a powerful faculty for 
discerning "the enigma of life" which was seen to lie outside the scope of scientific 
instrumentation (powerfully represented by William Blake in his engraving of Urizen 
dividing up the material world with his calipers [Blake 1986: 60]) and apparent only to 
the "critical mind." 
The influence of Schelling's philosophy spawned a common belief in the mutual 
reciprocity of self-knowledge and knowledge of nature: the mind, as a part of nature, is 
structured by the same laws and is not representative of a separate and ideal sphere of 
existence. To understand human beings is to understand nature, and vice versa: "Nature 
attains perfection in living organisms, where the world of physical phenomena overflows 
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into that of the mind" (Engelhardt 1988: 113). Andrew Bowie frames this understanding 
in tenns of Schelling's description of "an existence (Daseyn)", and makes explicit a link 
between his thought and Heidegger's Being and Time (1927), which was to provide an 
important philosophical source for the development of Binswanger's blend of romantic 
science (Schelling, quoted by Bowie 1993: 24).4 
In their combined interest in science and literature, Goethe and N ovalis perhaps best 
represent the synthesizing potential of romantic science, although their reputations 
depend primarily on the quality of their art. For example, the notebooks of Novalis 
contain scientific musings intenningled with epigraphs, aphorisms and poetic fragments. 5 
These notebooks epitomize the notion that knowledge of the mind also provides 
knowledge of nature as macrocosm: "the world, the human world, is just as manifold as 
man is" (Novalis 1989: 96). The fragment fonn, found elsewhere in the poetry of Blake 
and Coleridge, also displays the romantic dislike for grand systems. The universalizing 
systems favoured in the Enlightenment were seen by the romantics as "prisons of the 
spirit" (Berlin 1979: 8); in a drive to generality, the system tends to neglect the particular 
and unique. To evoke Blake's image, instead of being able to discern eternity in a grain 
of sand, the single grain is neglected for the sake of conceptualizing eternity. The 
fragment, moreover, proved to have a greater scope than just as a poetic fonn: "articles 
by scientists and medical practitioners, like literary works, often appear in unsystematic, 
4 It is interesting to note that Rollo May, an American champion and popularizer of Binswanger's work in 
the late 1950s and 1960s, claims that Schelling's lecture series given at Berlin in 1841 (in which he attacks 
Hegel's totalizing rationalist system) marks one of the earliest significant moments in the founding of 
existentialism as a dominant European philosophy (May 1986: 54). 
5 One example of Nova lis's common technique of combining dual modes of understanding through analogy 
is evident in a fragment from his Encyclopedia: "Physics is nothing but the teaching of the imagination" 
(Novalis 1989: 93). 
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fragmentary, aphoristic, even poetic, form. This form is chosen deliberately, as it is 
meant to mirror what can be understood of nature" (Engelhardt 1988: 112). It was 
thought that the "mysteries" of nature could only be understood at moments of intuitive 
insight and recorded in brief jottings and unconnected fragments. While modem thinkers 
may wish to dispense with the myth of romantic genius, the fragmentary form has been 
retained as an important element in the heterogenous and, often, discontinuous written 
genre of romantic science. 
Romanticism has much to offer the natural and human sciences, but it contains inherent 
weaknesses which are of consequence to my later studies. The transcendental belief that 
human insights are somehow related to an organic and natural unity is often a matter of 
wonder and speculation rather than an empirical questioning of the framework of 
metaphysical premises. Although romantic scientists were not searching for grand 
explanations, the sense of a wordless communion with Nature has no direct applicability 
to science; the rapture (or perception) must be transposed into a description of 
phenomena which can be recorded and analyzed. The philosophical implications of this 
transposition from mental experience to linguistic description can be seen from two 
distinct, yet interconnected, perspectives. 
Firstly, a wordless and essentially incommunicable and instantaneous vision can be seen 
to be restricted, or even debased, by transferring it to a linguistic medium; for example, 
Coleridge, in Biographia Literaria (1817), speaks of the treacherously ambiguous 
"secondary imagination" as a dissolving, diffusing and dissipating process (Coleridge 
1984: 167). The purity of silent communion will always be frustrated and dismantled by 
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the self-conscious recalling and transcribing of it. However, by making use of symbolic 
language, a discourse which is suggestive rather than indicative of actual experience, the 
romantic writer can circumnavigate the intellectualization of feeling that is involved in 
self-reflection. It can be argued that, in its use of symbol, the romantic enterprise runs 
tangential to a scientific mode of interpretation which demands a precision of description. 
The second perspective, broadly poststructuralist, questions whether there is any 
experience prior to the language used to describe it. This links up with J. Hillis Miller's 
criticism of Poulet's moment of "double consciousness" in which one can self-
consciously know the cogito of the other (Miller 1970: 216). For Miller, language should 
be recognized as "the instrument by which the mind explores its own depths" without 
ever striking an epistemological bottom (225). Such an interpretation moves away from 
phenomenological revelation towards an analysis of the discursive cultural groupings 
which constitute both the experience and the subject of experience. As Paul de Man 
remarks in his Gauss Lecture of 1967, it is impossible to make "the actual expression 
coincide with what has to be expressed, of making the actual sign coincide with what it 
signifies" (de Man 1993: 12). In other words, there is no self-present sign which 
represents the "origin or constitutive focus that is onto logically prior" to experience (6). 
De Man's critique of romanticism dovetails with Jacques Derrida's interrogation of 
Husserlian phenomenology in Speech and Phenomena (1967). Derrida argues that there 
is no unmediated phenomenological meaning (conceived by Husserl as pure ideality or 
self-presence) outside the realm of signification. This idea not only throws a sceptical 
shadow over the primacy of mental experience, but also undermines the romantic notion 
35 
of transcendental consciousness by questioning the role of the subject as the locus and 
centre of the experience. To add to this, de Man questions the "fonns of romantic deceit" 
which claim "self-autonomy ... as a philosophical truth about the nature of human 
existence" and "the work of art as a self-engendered world of the subject's own making" 
(de Man 1993: 6). 
It will be necessary to return to de Man and Derrida at later points in the dissertation as 
theoretical checks to romanticism. Although there are significant challenges to the 
romantic myth of divine creator, these alone are insufficient to dismiss the project of 
romantic science for being founded on entirely misguided principles. As I have argued, 
romantic science appropriates a diluted romanticism rather than an excessive idealism. 
In response to this, a counter-argument might grant that although some scientists have 
been influenced by strains of romantic thought, their need to follow a method will 
necessarily distance them from the spirit of aesthetic romanticism. But, and it is my 
contention, such an overview reveals that the apparently irreconcilable tension between 
art and science is primarily due to a reification and, in many ways, an exaggerated 
opposition between the tenns. As de Man indicates, the romantic influence upon science 
should not be "measured by the contribution [it] makes to the elaboration of a cogent 
historical outline" (95) of romanticism; rather, in granting priority to subjectivity and 
psychological complexity (however this is to be interpreted in the light of 
deconstruction), it duplicates the counter-Enlightenment spirit of the first generation 
romantics, but without their tendency to repudiate inquiry based solely on reason. 
Furthermore, in the words of Gerald Edelman, the aspiration of romantic science is to put 
"the mind back into nature" (for Edelman, like the three romantic scientists discussed in 
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this thesis, a post-Darwinian nature [Edelman 1994: 9]), without resorting to an out-
moded dualism of substance and the interactional problems which this involves. Here, 
the importance of critical theory can be gauged through its contribution to the study of 
language and narrative, rather than dealing with an ineffable realm of mentality. As will 
become increasingly evident, de Man's challenge indicates that language and narrative 
play pivotal roles in any account of mental life. 
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(4) Stanley Cavell and the Hermeneutics of Acknowledgement 
In the concluding section of this introduction I will extend some of the ideas suggested 
above concerning the hermeneutic and the narrative dimensions of self by selectively 
reading the theoretical writings of Stanley Cavell. Although Cavell is not one of the 
major figures of the thesis, his work provides a way to characterize the common romantic 
and modernist concerns of James, Binswanger and Sacks. In particular, I will refer to 
three of Cavell's texts, The Senses of Walden (1972; expanded 1992), In Quest of the 
Ordinary (1988) and Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome (1990), in which he 
explicitly addresses some of the most important theoretical issues to emerge from 
romanticism. Although Cavell has a distinctive theoretical voice of his own, the 
philosophical figures to whom he most often returns throughout these books are Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Heidegger and, more recently, Derrida.6 
Despite evident differences in the theoretical orientation of these thinkers, all four share 
with Cavell an emphasis upon the manner in which utterances are expressed (or written), 
complementing their abiding interest in semantics. Cavell has variously called the former 
the "mood" or "pitch" of philosophy to imply the impossibility of separating what is said 
from the vehicle of language in which it is said.7 Attention to the form and style of 
language proves crucial to a consideration of the work of my three major figures, and a 
6 Three studies on Cavell have influenced my reading here: Michael Fischer, Stanley Cavell and Literary 
Skepticism (1989), Ewa Ziarek, The Rhetoric of Failure (1996) and an article by Michael Wood, 'Must We 
Believe What We Say?' (Murray 1995: 90-105). 
7 See Cavell's essay in the expanded version of The Senses Of Walden, entitled 'An Emerson Mood' 
(Cavell 1992: 141-60), and the musical metaphors deployed in his autobiographical A Pitch of Philosophy 
( 1994). 
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discussion of Cavell's thought helps to foreground these concerns. Cavell's philosophy 
represents an ongoing attempt to develop and fuse a dual tradition of thought: the 
ordinary language philosophy, deriving from Wittgenstein and 1. L. Austin, and the 
German idealist tradition, which influences the work of Heidegger. Cavell positions 
Emerson between these two as "a site from which to measure the difficulties within each 
and between both" (Cavell 1995: 13). Indeed, the Emerson who has emerged from recent 
critical debate (for example, in the work of Cornel West and Richard Poirier) combines 
an Americanist reworking of European romanticism together with an emergent 
pragmatism. Emerson thus prefigures much of my interest in James and also provides 
an important theoretical source for the dissertation as a whole. 
From Cavell's early work on ordinary language philosophy and film analysis to his recent 
work on Emerson and Derrida, his lasting concern has been with interpretation. Cavell 
has shown particular interest in self-reflective discourses: those which interrogate their 
own processes of writing and reading. The search of romantic writers, such as Emerson, 
for an expressive language provides Cavell with the modernist "idea of literature 
becoming its own theory - literature in effect becoming philosophy while contrariwise 
philosophy becomes literature" (Cavell 1989: 20). The collapsing of rigid boundaries 
between the disciplines of philosophy and literary study encourages the same kind of 
hybridity set out by Luria and Sacks in their vision of romantic science. Furthermore, 
Cavell's attentiveness to language carries more weight than just a supplementary study 
to serious scientific inquiry. In his illuminating discussion of Henry David Thoreau's 
Walden (1854), Cavell asserts that committed writing, or, as he calls it "serious speech". 
should investigate "the conditions of language as such" (Cavell 1992: 33). In other 
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words, the responsibility of the inquirer "remains a task of responsiveness" to language 
(Cavell 1990: 25). 
For Cavell, words not only imply a cultural lexicon which is "totally, systematically 
meaningful", but they can also "contain (or conceal ) [the] beliefs, express (or deny) [the] 
convictions" of human agents (Cavell 1992: 34). This may seem too close to Poulet's 
phenomenological theory of reading as the reading of another's "cogito" for theoretical 
comfort; but for Cavell writing can be as unstable, opaque and impenetrable as it can be 
illuminating. Cavell understands writing (conceived literally and as a general metaphor 
for aesthetic creation) as one of the most fundamental of human activities. This activity 
is a prerequisite for any kind of committed interpretation: to quote Emerson, "one must 
be an inventor to read well" (Emerson 1983: 59). It is the task of the committed writer 
to become a sensitive reader in order to "learn how to entrust our meaning to a word" 
(Cavell 1992: 34-35).8 Writing thus becomes both "the ground upon which they [the 
reader and writer] will meet" (62) and the promise of communication: 
Speaking together face to face can seem to deny that distance, to deny that 
facing one another requires acknowledging the presence of the other, 
revealing our positions, betraying them if need be. But to deny such 
things is to deny our separateness. And that makes us fictions of one 
another (65). 
8 Following Thoreau's work on 'Reading' in Walden (Thoreau 1966: 67-74), C a ~ e l l l m ~ k e ~ ~ explicit a ~ i n k k
between reading and writing: "Reading is a variation on writing, where they m e ~ t t ~ ~ medItatIOn and achIeve 
accounts of their opportunities; and writing is a variation of reading, since to W:Ite IS . t ~ ~ ca.:'t words together 
that you did not make, so as to give or take readings" (Cavell 1988: 18). ThIS pOSItIOn IS a d e v e l o ~ ~ e n t t
of, say, Marcel Proust's notion of active reading as an "incitement" to write "on the thresho!d of the. s,Plfltual 
life" (Proust 1994: 32, 30), because, for Cavell, deep reading is inseparable from commItted wntmg. 
40 
This assertion stresses the importance of empathy and the acknowledgement of others 
through dialogic exchange.9 As such, Cavell asserts that in romanticism "the quest for 
audience is exactly as questionable as that for expression" (Cavell 1989: 12). HoweveL 
attending to these questions does not necessarily mean they can be overcome: for Cavell, 
both quests are always "questionable" (das Bedenkliche). His reading of Thoreau and 
Emerson emphasises both the difficulty and partiality of communication, but he also 
retains the hope that language might refer to a world in which human beings can share 
mearung. 
Although Cavell's optimism closely echoes Emerson's hopeful vision of 'The American 
Scholar' (1837), the search for meaning is a laborious process. As he writes in poetic 
refrain, "a deep reading is not one in which you sink away from the surface of words. 
Words already engulf us" (Cavell 1992: 65). Mirroring Derrida's view of language (and, 
to a certain extent, Lacan's view of the self), Cavell attests that, instead of providing 
clarity and precision, language may reveal a lack, which may be a lack of sense, or a 
sense which cannot be incorporated into any preexistent frame of reference. Taking his 
metaphor from Thoreau's account of his retreat to Walden pond, Cavell sees "deep 
reading" as a project "in which you depart from a given word as from a point of origin; 
you go deep into the woods" (65). Thus the questioning (and "questionable") search for 
9 Cavell's comments on dialogic exchange and the perfectionist nature of self invite comparison with JUrgen 
Habennas's fonnulation of the "ideal speech situation" (Habennas 1990: 88), which acts as an 
communicative ideal even if it can never be actualized in practice. I wish to resist such a comparison, 
primarily because Habennas's work tends .to overlook individual differences, whereas modem romantic 
science focuses centrally on fonns of altenty and Otherness. 
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sense will always lead one away from unquestioning security towards the flux and 
dissemination of meaning. 10 
If meaning is viewed as radically unstable, the critic may be tempted to be sceptical about 
the possibility of knowing the world and other beings in it, or, at the very least, sceptical 
about saying anything significant about them. Cavell sees the futility of attempting to 
claim "a final philosophical victory" over scepticism (Cavell 1989: 38), and instead 
acknowledges that because one must act as if the world is inhabited by objects and 
conversant peoples then, to all intents and purposes, the world and its denizens do exist. 
As I shall argue in the first chapter, there is much in this claim which is indebted to 
James's view of pragmatism, but Cavell claims that this idea derives directly from 
Wittgenstein's defence of ordinary beliefs: 
it is not quite right to say that we believe the world exists ... and wrong to 
say we know it exits ... he or she would have a hard time saying what it is 
right to say here, what truly expresses our convictions in the matter ... our 
relation to the world's existence is somehow closer than the ideas of 
believing and knowing are made to convey (Cavell 1992: 145). 
Elsewhere, Cavell speaks of the need to "accept" or to "receive" (133) the world as it is 
("closer than the ideas of believing and knowing"), rather than reshaping it to how we 
want it to be, or, to use Emerson's term, to "clutch" desperately at it. This does not mean 
one cannot redescribe the world in Rorty's sense of the phrase, only that an attempt to 
engage with a world of others should not be abandoned for solipsistic flights of 
10 In similar vein, Richard Poirier comments on the positive aspects of scepticism: "the democratic impulse 
shared by Emersonian pragmatists also involved a recognition that language, if it is to represent the flow 
of individual experience, ceases to be an instrument of clarification or of clarity and, instead, becomes the 
instrument of a saving uncertainty and vagueness" (Poirier 1992: 3-4). 
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imagination. Because animals (including humans) have the propensity to resourcefully 
act in and upon the world and can adapt to moderate changes in environment, the world 
is understood to exist in real ways for them. Moreover, because humans have the 
capacity of self-consciousness, which enables them to cognitively map their environment 
and describe it in language, the world also exists discursively. 
Such an understanding does not thereby prevent the confusion of meaning which 
misrecognition may induce. Indeed, instead of verifying the unproblematic existence of 
the world, Cavell sees "deep reading" as a task which is committed "to observe the 
strangeness of our lives, our estrangement from ourselves" (Cavell 1992: 55) and that to 
which we are proximate (146). "Deep reading" leads one into the very thick of 
scepticism, but, for Cavell (as for Emerson and Wittgenstein), it can also lead one "on a 
path" out of it (Cavell 1989: 17). In other words, reading is a commitment to take 
scepticism seriously: "the scene of a struggle of philosophy with itself, for itself' (40). 
This commitment is much more than taking abstract philosophical problems seriously. 
For Cavell, philosophy "out of school"ll addresses problems of psychology, aesthetics, 
intersubjectivity and morality which arise in lived situations and deserve the experiencer's 
undivided attention. Thus, Cavell interprets Thoreau to claim that "his writing is part of 
his living, an instance of the life of philosophy" and, furthermore, "that the reader could 
not understand his claim to be a philosopher until he or she understands what it is to be 
his reader" (Cavell 1988: 10-11). 
II A phrase appropriated from Cavell's 1984 book Themes Out of School: Effects and Causes. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, reprinted 1988. 
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Deploying a common modernist technique, he claims that language, when used in an 
attentive and committed manner, has the capacity to defamiliarize the common and to 
render "the perception of the sublime in the everyday" in order that one might attend to 
the unique and the singular in the self and in others" (Cavell 1992: 150).12 "The near, the 
low, the common" are those details which most interest Emerson and Thoreau' details , 
which disclose a type of Otherness which Cavell argues has recently been neglected in 
favour of the radically Other. For instance, in 'The American Scholar' Emerson famously 
writes: 
That, which had been negligently trodden under foot by those who were 
harnessing and provisioning themselves for long journeys into far 
countries, is suddenly found to be richer than all foreign parts .. .1 ask not 
for the great, the remote, the romantic .. .1 embrace the common. I explore 
and sit at the feet of the familiar, the low (Emerson 1983: 68-69). 
Here, the "foreign" and the "romantic" are not simply eschewed as points of interest in 
favour of the common, but that foreignness and rarity can be perceived in the most 
familiar of objects: as Emerson goes on to say, "the near explains the far" (69). The deep 
reading which Cavell upholds often begins with defamiliarization of the familiar as 
something problematic or questionable. Cavell's interest in the "ordinary" proves 
ultimately to be a concern with the "intimacy of existence, and of an intimacy lost" 
(Cavell 1988: 4). 
12 See Victor Shklovsky's 1917 essay 'Art as Technique' (Schklovsky 1965: 5-22). It is notable that 
Cavell's attention to the form of writing is emphasized by borrowing the term " d ~ f a m i l i a r i z a t i ~ n " "
( o s t r a ~ n i e ) ) from the school of Russian Formalism. Shklovsky notes that T o l ~ t o y , , along WIth the romantI.cs, 
u t i l i z ~ s s this technique, but it was the modernist enterprises of Joyce, Stem, Lorca, Brecht et af which 
brought the term centraIly into twentieth-century critical discourse. 
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Crucial for my consideration - and once more echoing Poulet as much as Heidegger - an 
acknowledgement of the world turns out to also be an acknowledgement of the self 
. h' h 13 WIt In t at world. To this end Cavell claims that the "quest" of Walden "is for the 
recovery of the self, as from an illness" [my italics] (Cavell 1992: 80). When I move on 
to discuss one of Sacks's major works Awakenings (1973), the metaphor of awakening 
is indicative of this understanding of the recovery of self from a condition characterized 
by loss of meaning, brought about through debilitating illness. Emerson's "aspiration to 
the human" (Cavell 1990: 57) takes on profound significance in extreme cases where the 
fundamental criteria which constitute "the human" are stripped away. True recovery from 
such a state accompanies the awakening of self to an acknowledgement of itself within 
the context of the world. 
Moreover, Cavell locates "Emerson's proposed therapy ... of so-called man's loss of 
existence" (Cavell 1988: 112) as an acknowledgement that one cannot have an ongoing 
"original relation to the universe" (Emerson 1983: 7), but that one must necessarily 
interpret a cultural language of "relation". Cavell does not argue that one must forever 
recycle the "quotes" of "some saint or sage" (which, for Emerson, serve to postpone the 
possibility ofa committed life [Emerson 1983: 270]); rather, that the experiencer cannot 
be his or her own sovereign creator because one always already speaks and writes with 
inherited language (Cavell 1988: 113). Thus, awakening does not merely represent a 
13 This kind of acknowledgement is particular apposite in a discussion of the human sciences when the 
focus of study is the nature of human existence. As Gadamer succinctly states: "knowledge in the h.uman 
sciences always has something of self-knowledge about it" (Wachterhauser 1994: 29). When vIewed 
hermeneuticaIly, practitioners of the human sciences "experience a provocation [Anstoss]" by the world in 
which the self is only a part: we are thus "confronted not only with ourselves ... but with something else as 
weIl" (29). 
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moment of defamiliarization or a romantic epiphany, but a commitment to live (and to 
read) seriously with both the threat of scepticism and "the obligation of therapy" (12): 
what is discredited in the romantic's knowledge about self-authoring is 
only a partial picture of authoring and of creation, a picture of human 
creation as a literalized anthropomorphism of God's creation - as if to 
create myself I were required to begin with the dust of the ground and 
magic breath, rather than with, say, an uncreated human being and the 
power of thinking (111). 
Cavell's theory of the committed reader of signs indicates that it may be possible to retain 
the rhetoric of becoming without swallowing the whole "discredited romantic picture of 
the author or artist as incomprehensibly original" (110). 
The importance of Cavell's thought to my argument, apropos the theoretical-therapeutic 
perspective of James, Binswanger and Sacks, is that the hermeneutic activity begins with 
"a loss of self-knowledge; of being, so to speak, at a loss" (Cavell 1989: 36). To 
appropriate a cliche of popular psychology (and to go beyond that cliche), such a 
commitment is for the self to learn to live with loss, but also the refusal to erase or forget 
that loss. For Cavell, even if one cannot speak the self as 'I' (in the Cartesian sense), then, 
like Nietzsche's Zarathustra (following Emerson), one may be able to speak of the active 
bodily performance of'!' (Nietzsche 1969: 62).14 One of the aims of modem romantic 
scientists is to develop techniques which encourage individuals suffering from loss 
actively to reconstruct the embodied self as a meaningful vehicle of agency. But this 
possibility should be accompanied by a commitment to forget neither the provisionality 
nor the fragility of selfhood. Cavell understands the emancipatory promise of 
14 Nietzsche proves another important intellectual source for Cavell (and for t h ~ ~ thesis as a whole). 
providing a pivot between Emerson's transcendentalism and Heidegger's hermeneutIc phenomeno\og) . 
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romanticism does not entail a repudiation of the everyday and the ordinary, but a 
responsiveness to them. 
Knowledge of self and world is never indubitable, but the possibility of knowing is a risk 
which Cavell incites the reader to take. The human scientist who refutes such an 
understanding may "profit in gaining the whole world" at the risk of "losing one's soul" 
(Cavell 1990: 26). As James claims in his discussion of Pascal's wager, the gains of 
risking an encounter with the self might be infinite, whereas refusing to take the risk will 
certainly lead to "finite loss" (James 1956: 5). Cavell stresses in many of his writings that 
one must take this risk, but one must also retain the possibility of being "wrong ... unsure, 
surprised" (Cavell 1979: 397). One of the primary reasons why he cannot claim 
philosophical victory over scepticism is because this would also constitute a victory "over 
the human" and the fallible (Cavell 1989: 38). 
Ideal as Cavell's hopes might be, his project of "deep reading" begs the question of how 
such acknowledgement might be brought about. Hints of such a development are to be 
found towards the end of the section on Thoreau in The Senses of Walden, in which 
Cavell considers the idea of becoming, "to allow the world to change, and to learn change 
from it, to permit it strangers, accepting its own strangeness, are conditions of knowing 
it" (Cavell 1992: 119). Two key terms here - "change" and "allow" - emerge from 
Cavell's study of Walden and are given wider significance in the first of his 1988 Carns 
Lectures, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, in which he develops his reservations 
concerning "philosophy's anxiety about reading" (Cavell 1990: 6). 
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Cavell's 1988 lectures take their title from Emerson's essay on 'Experience' (1844): "I take 
the evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our fmgers then 
when we clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our condition" (Emerson 
1983: 473, quoted by Cavell 1990: 41). To clutch at the world implies that the 
"unhandsome" self is one who acts out of frustration or desperation in the face of doubt 
and uncertainty. Despite the urgency of which Emerson and Cavell speak, only by 
allowing the world to be, or "letting be" (sein lassen) in Heidegger's phrase, can one be 
committed or resolute in relation to it. Not only does this allow one to renew an 
intellectual and emotional relationship with a defamiliarized world (a renewed world of 
objects and others), but, also, that one can begin to use what is "to hand" in order to fulfil 
the possibility of transforming it (Cavell 1990: 38). Emerson is understood to search for 
interpretive ways in which he can "counteract the role of experience as removing us from, 
instead of securing us to, the world" (40). Security cannot be rendered through passive 
conformity or a quietist world-view, but neither can change be brought about through 
furiously (or, for Heidegger, violently) grasping at the world. Cavell thus understands 
the "handsome" part of the human condition to be "what Emerson calls being drawn and 
what Heidegger calls getting in the draw, or the draft, of thinking" (41). The "draft" of 
thinking can only be brought about through interaction and provides "the conditions for 
my recognizing my difference from others as a function of my recognizing my difference 
from myself' (53). 
One of the most problematic areas of thought which Cavell has developed over recent 
years is his discussions of "moral perfectionism" (1) and "Emersonian Perfectionism" (3). 
He defines these terms variously as "being true to oneself' (often by a romantic act of 
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defiance), a "tradition of the moral life ... called the state of one's soul" (3) and the 
neoplatonic "transformation of self through self-education" (7). Despite these and 
numerous other descriptive statements, Cavell acknowledges fmally that not only has he 
"no complete list of necessary and sufficient conditions for using the term", but he has 
"no theory in which a defmition of perfectionism would playa useful role" (4). As with 
his understanding of genre as open to a number of possible permutations, this description 
suggests an "open-ended thematics ... of perfectionism" (4) which can be extended or 
redefined to suit the needs of the individual. The criticism that Cavell endorses a form 
of individual exceptionalism (in the sense of a perfected or perfectible self) is deflected 
when one considers that for neither Emerson nor Cavell does the self imply perfectibility 
(although the ability to read the self does imply a degree of interpretive competence). 
Just as there are no absolute grounds for positing the self (at least epistemologically 
speaking), neither is there a telos at which point one can know the self through reflection. 
Instead, Cavell understands that "each state of the self is, so to speak, final" (3). One 
might understand the self ephemerally (through a combination of reflection and 
projection) within a particular context (with a particular set of spatial, temporal and 
cultural coordinates), but the potential "next self' (9) suggests the inability of ever 
comprehensively mapping, or, indeed, fully comprehending, these coordinates. 
That is not to say that the self cannot be acknowledged through interpretation, only that 
the interpretive process leaves traces ofunknowability, or a residue of mystery, which 
defies the ability to fmally fix a substantive defmition on the self. Cavell's hermeneutics 
imply that there is no truth as such to be understood (although the interpreter or 
experiencer can be true to that understanding); rather there is a set of possibilities, or 
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pragmatic paths, which can lead one through a dense network of possible significations. 
Just as the self is not to be understood by "anything picturable" nor by extrapolating 
backwards from a telos, neither can the journey along an interpretive path be understood 
"beyond the way of the journey itself' (10). Cavell concludes that to recognize the 
"unattained but attainable self' is "a step in attaining it": in other words, "'having' 'a' self 
is a process of moving to, and from, nexts ... we are from the beginning, that is from the 
time we can be described as having a self, a next, knotted" (12). It is my contention that 
the only way to map this self is to position it within a narrative framework to lend it 
spatial and temporal coordinates. Although stages of the narrative of self may suggest 
closure, the plotting of a master-narrative, or a final denouement of any unifying 
narrative, is perpetually deferred because there is always the possibility of a "next" 
narrative to be told. As such, the self is always actively under way and can never be 
finally attained. 
What makes Cavell's reading of self particularly interesting for a consideration of the 
human sciences, and particularly that sector of the medical humanities in which the well-
being of the self is of utmost concern (especially in cases where bodily passivity or 
mental paralysis are paramount), is that as the "knotted" self sides with the next potential 
self, it must also side "against my attained perfection" (31). In the knots of the self one 
must tum away from stasis and solipsism to recognize the existence of "an other" and an 
"acknowledgment of a relationship" (31) with that other (whether that relationship is with 
a family, a community, or a personal relationship with the physician). The reason why 
Cavell takes scepticism so seriously is that these relationships are always liable to 
collapse under their fragility and the fear of misrecognition and doubt. Similarly, the 
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reason why the natural and the human sciences need to be tolerant of "human" issues is 
because, for Cavell, "being human" is tantamount to being fallible. 15 
In both Cavell's and Emerson's work the "aspiration to the human" (Cavell 1990: 57) is 
intricately bound up with an inquiry into the parameters (and possibilities) of the human. 
It is clear why Cavell attributes the language of authenticity to Emerson, but whether 
there is actually a positive moral content in the orientation of the self towards the world 
(over and above a sense of commitment to taking the risk to understand others and the 
"struggle against false or debased perfectionisms" [13]) is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Save to say, the "moral urgency" which Cavell interprets Emerson to demand is not a 
moralizing tendency (associated here with pedestrian conformity) but the possibility of 
"acting beyond the self and making oneself intelligible to those beyond it" (Cavell 1990: 
46). No amount of "deep reading" can guarantee that we can know the self (whether it 
is myself or yourself); but, similarly, no amount of scepticism can shake the 
acknowledgment of self as possibility (as the epigraph from Derrida describes). 
Each of my three principal thinkers treat seriously the possibility of knowing the self 
through particular categories of understanding. However, as I develop in my explication 
of their work, it is the narrative potentiality of self as active artificer (as Cavell outlines 
it) to which each turns in order to indicate areas in which aesthetic modes of expression 
can complement the conventional scope of the human sciences. As such, a movement 
IS One of the reasons why romantic science does not adhere to Kuhn's model of "nonnal science", is 
because it treats scientific knowledge sceptically. As Barry Barnes comments: Kuhn is not "willing to allow 
that scientific knowledge is taught tentatively and provisionally, or scepticism and open-mindedness are 
seriously cultivated by teachers, with the intention of ensuring scientists remain flexible and receptive to 
new experience" (Skinner 1990: 90). 
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away from epistemology towards a narratively constructed self can be traced through 
romantic science; a movement which, following the thrust of Cavell's work, is inflected 
by both an expressive and a moral romanticism. Whilst both James and Binswanger go 
some way to dissolve the boundaries between the theory and practical application of 
romantic science, it is Sacks who most successfully combines a theorization of selfhood 
with the development of a set of viable therapeutic techniques. Accordingly, my chapters 
on James and Binswanger will trace the movement in their thinking from philosophical 
conceptions of self to their considerations of a narratively constructed self (a transition 
which is most readily discerned in the third sections of the first two chapters: James on 
will and Binswanger on dreams), whereas the concluding chapter on Sacks discusses his 
attempts to synthesize theories of self and narrative. 
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I. William James 
The one thing in the world, 
of value, is the active soul. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
'The American Scholar' (1837) 
53 
(1) James on Habit: from Physiology to Ethics 
William James was professionally a scientist and a university lecturer, in contrast to 
Binswanger and Sacks whose theories feed directly into their professional therapeutic 
practices. During his time at Harvard University, James's attention shifted from concerns 
with medicine, anatomy, physiology and psychology to a developing interest in 
philosophy and religion. James also brought to his studies an aesthetic sensibility which 
derived from his early twenties when he considered painting as a career, together with the 
influence of his equally famous younger brother. Underlying and connecting these 
various modes of thought is a preoccupation with selfhood, which aligns his ideas closely 
with the tenets of romantic science. Moreover, as Donald Meyer and Eugene Taylor have 
both indicated, James's interest in subconscious and "supernormal" mental states led him 
to practice a version of therapy on a private basis during the 1890s (Taylor 1984: 150). 
I will argue that the therapeutic strain of James's thought is an important trajectory of his 
thought and, therefore, should not be isolated from a study of the conceptual 
developments of his theory of self. In order to address these issues, this chapter on James 
focuses upon two principal works, The Principles of Psychology (1890, hereafter 
Principles) and Varieties of Religious Experience (1902, hereafter Varieties), which I will 
read alongside a number of his essays. 
The Principles of Psychology is James's first major published work and represents his 
magnum opus, at least in the discipline of psychology. In 1872 he was appointed as an 
instructor in physiology and anatomy at Harvard where he devised a seminal course on 
experimental psychology, 'The Relations between Physiology and Psychology', first 
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taught in 1875. James's experimental psychology can be seen to derive from his attempts 
to theorize, and account for, personal experience, together with his interest in the French 
experimental physiology of Claude Bernard, and an engagement with the work of two 
American thinkers, Chauncey Wright and Charles Sanders Peirce, on evolutionary theory 
and the philosophy of science.! Stimulated by his students' interest in the course, James 
was contracted in 1878 to write a book for the American Science Series on the central 
principles of psychology, which he predicted he would fInish within two years. Partially 
appearing as a series of articles over the next decade)the two volumes of Principles were 
not published until 1890. As James indicates in the preface to Henry Holt's 1890 edition, 
his "treatise" had "grown up in connection with the author's class-room instruction .. .to 
a length which no one can regret more than the writer himself' (James 1950a: v). To 
compensate for the unwieldy length of the two volumes, James outlines his pedagogical 
intention by suggesting a shorter route for "beginners" and students of psychology by 
omitting certain of the chapters "on a fIrst reading" (v). Although his manual of 
psychological principles is extensive, the implication here is that there are a number of 
possible paths towards an understanding of mind and self. 
Throughout Principles James stresses his desire to adhere to a perspective of natural 
science and thereby avoid the theoretical murkiness of metaphysics, which he 
understands to be a branch of philosophy entirely immune to empirical testing. As James 
1 In his Introduction a I'etude de la Medicine Experimental (1865) Claude Bernard proposes that 
experimental psychology should be practised under laboratory c o n d i t i o ~ s s i ~ ~ o r d ~ r r to a c ~ i e v e e " s u r g i c ~ 1 1
control over an animal's physiological reactions" (Johnson 1990: 40). Allgnmg himself with B e r n a r ~ , , m 
a 1906 lecture on 'Common Sense', James states, "the scope of the practical control of nature newly put mto 
our hand by scientific ways of thinking vastly exceeds the scope of the old control grounded on common 
sense" (James 1981: 85). 
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comments in an 1892 article in Philosophical Review, 'A Plea for Psychology as a 
"Natural Science"': "I wished, by treating psychology like a natural science, to help her 
to become one" (James 1969: 317). He conceives of psychology as a division of natural 
science, particularly in reference to the object of its study: "the mind of distinct 
individuals inhabiting definite portions of a real space and a real time" (James 1950a: 
183). By displaying a tendency to move towards the middle ground of science, James 
confirms a common sense assumption of the existence of a 'real' external world. Even 
when he makes use of the subjective technique of introspection he claims to deploy it in 
order to examine a sensory reality which "he talks about...in an objective way" (183). 
This commitment to objectivity signals James's desire to develop an empirical science, 
through which he aims "to test some pre-existing hypothesis" (194) with reference to 
concrete experience. But, as James was aware, any attempt to explicate the central 
principles of psychology, without brushing against metaphysical questions which plague 
the natural sciences, is an arduous task. 
In an 1892 essay James responds to G. T. Ladd's article, 'Psychology as so-called natural 
science', published in the same volume of Philosophical Review.2 Ladd takes issue with 
James's lack of consistency in Principles. Although he claims to treat psychology as a 
natural science, Ladd detects instances when James stumbles upon metaphysical 
problems. James's response is to argue that if "psychology is ever to conform to the type 
of the other natural sciences, it must renounce certain ultimate solutions" (James 1969: 
2 J. T. Ladd, Philosophical Review, 1,24-53. For a fuller discussion of James's r e s p o n ~ e e to ,Ladd, see 
Amedeo Giorgi's essay 'The Implications of James's Pleas for Psychology as a Natural SCIence (Johnson 
1990: 63-74). 
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317). By renouncing "ultimate solutions" James detects a set of limits beyond which he 
cannot hope to penetrate: 
This book ... contends that psychology when she has ascertained the 
empirical correlation of the various sorts of thought or feeling with 
definite conditions of the brain can go no farther - can go no farther, that 
is, as a natural science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical (vi). 
In an attempt to resist metaphysical speculation, which would undermine the empirical 
"mass of descriptive details" of Principles, he does not hesitate to indicate those areas 
where psychology "can go no farther" (vii). 
James's opening comments illuminate one of the central theoretical dilemmas of the text: 
how to set out the principles of psychology whilst resisting metaphysical speculation. 
Although, his "positivistic" solution is formulated in order to avoid two current 
metaphysically informed philosophies - "the associationist and the spiritualist theories" 
(vi) - James insistently stresses those points where natural science opens into "queries 
which only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task can hope successfully to deal 
with" (vii). He goes on to outline the major areas of nineteenth-century psychology, but 
he does not claim for his principles a set of final limits. An aspect of his thought which 
will become vital for my later considerations of his work is herein outlined: "the reader 
will in vain seek for any closed system in the book"; for, he claims, "the best mark of 
health that a science can show is this unfinished-seeming front" (vii). So, whilst 
Principles extends to over 1350 pages and ostensibly seems to take its place alongside 
Lyell, Darwin, Cornte, Spencer et al as a product of the nineteenth-century systematic 
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rigour in empirical science, it opens out into a modernist text which explores "queries" 
and aporias of knowledge. 
It is through this lens that I wish to view Principles as a pivotal work which can be 
interpreted either as a late Victorian example of rigorous empiricism or as a more 
troubled expression of modernity. I wish to choose neither template as the sole mode of 
approach to James, for it is through an examination of this moment of transition that it 
becomes possible to cast light back on the aspirations and the problems incurred by the 
early nineteenth-century romantic scientists. In many ways James stands free from this 
Germanic shadow, but it is precisely the distance from that earlier moment (both in tenns 
of history and culture) by which it becomes possible to develop the initiatives of romantic 
SCIence. 
My chosen path into Principles is through James's consideration of habit: the concern of 
the fourth chapter of the first volume and a theme which becomes a recurring principle 
throughout the work. By attending closely to James's discussion on habit it is possible 
to explore the breadth of his writing whilst maintaining a focused vision; a focus which, 
in this chapter, I will develop by interpreting his later work as a continuation of his early 
concerns in a different guise. My interest in Principles derives from those instances when 
the author of a scientific manual shifts into therapeutic territory.3 The use of multiple 
discourse characterizes James as a writer who cuts across established genres of writing 
J Philip Fisher comments that the "manual" as "a book of techniques" is a c ~ ~ o n n n i n . e t e e ? t h - c ~ n t u r y y form 
of "conduct book" (Fisher 1973: 12). Unlike, for example, Samuel SmIles s claSSIC Vlctonan book of 
conduct, Self-Help (1859), Principles is a "manual" of current psychological t e n e ~ s . . However, th,ere are 
moments (for example, the conclusions he draws at the end of his chapter on habIt) where James s work 
becomes explicitly instructive. 
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in order to broaden the field of investigation. Similarly, as I later argue, it is in the 
revision and the working through of philosophical problems that the self can be redefined 
in the face of determinism and necessity. Consequently, before I concentrate closely on 
the function of habit in James's thought it is important to delineate the philosophical 
position which underpins his psychology. 
In the first chapter of Principles, on 'The Scope of Psychology', James expands upon his 
opening statements concerning the inadequacy of spiritualist and associationist modes of 
psychological explanation. He begins by suggesting that the bewildering "variety and 
complexity" of psychological phenomena historically have been unified through the 
theologically-informed theory of "the personal Soul" (1). This kind of philosophy is 
devoted "to abstract and eternal principles" (James 1981: 9), characterized both by 
Descartes's dualistic view of mind and by Kant's idealism, the latter which found an 
American outlet in New England Transcendentalism between the 1830s and the 1850s 
and, more immediately for James, in the work of the Harvard philosopher, Josiah Royce. 
The rival associationist theory, a "psychology without a soul", proceeds by examining 
"common elements in the divers mental facts rather than a common agent behind them" 
(James 1950a: 1). Championed by John Locke and the British empiricists, associationism 
explains phenomena by reference to "the various forms of arrangement of these elements" 
(l). Unlike the spiritualist, the associationist argues that the self does not preexist 
perception and emotion, but emerges a posteriori "as their last and most complicated 
fruit" (2). 
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James rej ects the spiritualist theory in so far as it posits essences or faculties such as 
"Cognition" or "Memory" as the "absolute properties of the soul" (2). Because neither 
is empirically verifiable, he rejects the mysterious Cartesian interface which connects the 
mental to the physical, together with the metaphysical unity which Royce asserts. 
Explicitly reacting to Royce's notion of an all-encompassing principle by which every 
empirical contradiction can be resolved, James argues that essences are unverifiable 
because they exist prior to experience: "there is something grotesque and irrational in the 
supposition that the soul is equipped with elementary powers of such an ingeniously 
intricate sort" (3). Here, his choice of adjectives implies a hostility to monistic 
absolutism which is more than that of a disinterested philosopher. In conclusion, he 
stresses that "the [mental] faculty does not exist absolutely, but works under conditions; 
and the quest of the conditions becomes the psychologist's most interesting task" (3). 
However, James does not reject the spiritualist's theory wholesale, for he does gravitate 
towards a conception of "Mind" which can only be inferred through an analysis of its 
"indubitable expressions" (11). Indeed, this notion of active "Mind" is crucial to an 
understanding of James's break from a Spenserian psychology, which espouses the 
passive "adjustment of inner to outer relations" and the manner in which environmental 
"conditions" determine consciousness (6). Although James taught Herbert Spencer's 
psychological treatise on the First Principles of Psychology (1864) at Harvard and he 
commended him for advancing psychology beyond "the old-fashioned 'rational 
psychology,' which treated the soul as a detached existent, sufficient unto itself', as 
outlined in his 1884 essay, 'The Dilemma of Determinism', James found Spencer's 
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behaviourism too mechanical and detenninistic (perry 1935a: 482).4 For example, in an 
1878 essay on Spencer, James asserts that survival should be understood as "only one out 
of many interests" (James 1969: 43). He argues that humans also maintain the ability to 
interact socially, to act upon external reality and to make ideal choices. Thus, when 
James claims in Principles that "minds inhabit environments which act on them and on 
which they in tum react" (James 1950a: 6), he indicates an interaction between mind and 
world, in which the conscious self is partially determined by the natural and the social 
world but retains the power to act in and upon it. 
James goes on to reject associationism for what he deems to be a residue of the 
spiritualistic theory: the "fantastic laws of clinging" by which ideas are associated and 
arrange themselves in "an endless carpet...like dominoes in ceaseless change, or the bits 
of glass in a kaleidoscope" (6). Although James is sympathetic to the associationist idea 
that the self arises from lived experience, he is dubious about the position of sceptical 
philosophers, who, like David Hume, reject the idea of a knowing self but then cannot 
explain how the ideas that constitute a particular memory are arranged and configured. 
So, while James agrees that, on the most "immediate" level, the object-world is 
experienced through the senses and cannot be justifiably conceived from a perspective 
which preexists sensation, he claims: 
4 As the founder of Social Darwinism, Spencer tended to disregard emotions, sentiments and beliefs in his 
favour of the survival instinct. William Graham Sumner was a fervent American advocate of Spencer's 
ideas. He, like Spencer, pronounces survival as the ruling impulse in life and argues that "the mind is 
entirely moulded by circumstances" (Miller 1956: xxvii). In reaction to Sumner,. Lester .Ward, who shares 
James's assertion that humans can influence their environment, argues that "mmd, which at first was the 
servant of desire, has become the master of nature" (xxix). 
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The bare existence of a past fact is no ground for our remembering it. 
Unless we have seen it, or somehow undergone it, we shall never know 
of its having been. The experiences of the body are thus one of the 
conditions of the faculty of memory being what it is. And a very small 
amount of reflection on facts shows that one part of the body, namely, the 
brain, is the part whose experiences are directly concerned (4). 
The disregard for what James considers to be physiological reality renders associationism 
untenable for him. Instead of asserting a wholly determinant environment, James focuses 
upon bodily "conditions" through which the self develops within an environment. 
Without finally refuting either of the rival claims, James suggests that he and the reader 
must assume the "coexistence" of thoughts and brain-states as the "ultimate laws of our 
science" (vii). He devises an "empirical parallelism" through which he pursues his 
examination of cerebral patterns as co determining the philosophical result (182). He 
suggests a kind of causal reciprocity between mental and physical: "mental phenomena 
are not only conditioned a parte ante by bodily processes; but they lead to them a parte 
post" (5). As I have claimed in the introduction in reference to John Searle's philosophy 
of mind, parallelism implies a dualistic model which James cannot entirely avoid. But, 
by claiming that "no mental modification ever occurs which is not accompanied or 
followed by a bodily change" (5), James conceives of a "psycho-physic formula" (182) 
which goes some way to avoid the metaphysical problems implicit in each of the other 
two theories. 
By speaking in terms of "empirical parallelism" he avoids surrendering, firstly, to a purely 
physiological description; secondly, to the utter contingency of the mental and physical; 
and, thirdly, to a theology of soul. James does not elude the problems implicit in his own 
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theory; but, in this opening chapter, he does clear the philosophical ground for the 
remainder of his work. Indeed, he seems to understand the futility of searching for 
indubitable foundations when, later, he humbly suggests that nature "has mixed us of clay 
and flame, of brain and mind, that the two things hang indubitably together and determine 
each other's being, but how or why, no mortal may ever know" (182). Albeit surrounded 
by queries, it is this philosophical space from where James begins his exploration of 
psychological principles. 
James substantiates his opening comments by basing his psychological discussions upon 
an empirical study of physiological mechanisms and a consideration of the simple reflex 
responses of lower animals in his discussion of 'The Functions of the Brain'. Just as he 
clarifies his philosophical position in the opening chapter, here he clears a physiological 
space from which a consideration of psychology emerges. By beginning Principles with 
a description of physiology, he is able to direct his attention towards psychological 
processes without reducing his study to crude materialism. James does not overlook the 
problems inherent in dualism, because he goes on to defend his deliberate strategy of 
"mixing the physical and mental" (24). He claims that conceiving of "the chain of events 
amongst the cells and fibres as complete in itself' would be "an unreal abstraction" ~ ~
whilst speaking solely in terms of Roycean "ideas" would ignore the fundamental 
importance of their organic cause (24). However, other weaknesses of dualism remain. 
Broadly, he follows an evolutionary argument in which the more complicated cerebral 
mechanisms are discernible in higher organisms whose hemispheres have developed to 
a greater degree than those lower down the evolutionary tree. He detects an organism's 
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evolution to have taken two directions: "the lower centres passing downwards into more 
hesitating automatism and the higher ones upwards into larger intellectuality" (79). 
Intelligent action is characterized by three capacities or abilities: sentience; the ability to 
discriminate; and the ability to project goals or ends towards which action can be 
directed. He argues that, as the physiological seat of the reflex evolves from the spinal 
cord and the lower brain (medulla oblongata) to the centres of the cerebral cortex, so 
these abilities are made possible by the "passage of functions forward to the ever-
enlarging hemispheres" (79). Consequently, James asserts that those basal reflexes which 
in lower creatures are conditioned entirely as fixed responses to sensory stimuli (he takes 
for his example the frog's nervous system) have evolved into cerebral tendencies which 
are "modifiable by education" in higher organisms (80).5 
His argument here is not original. But, whilst he owes much of his thought to Spencer 
and the American Darwinists, James moves strategically to argue that it is possible to 
speak of those "cerebral reflexes" discemable in higher creatures "entirely" as a "cortical 
transaction." Prefiguring an aspect of Freud's thought, James claims that it is possible to 
arrive at "psychological truth ... without entangling ourselves on a dubious anatomy and 
physiology" (80). These psychological truths do not constitute an ineffable realm of ideas 
severed from their organic roots. But, he argues, it is possible to speak in the terms of 
aptitudes and abilities as the "fruits" of experience without needing to reduce them to a 
5 James's discussion of the frog's nervous system sheds light on the more complex neurology of humans, 
as Paul MacLean points out in an article 'On the Evolution of Three Mentalities' (1975). MacLean 
describes what he calls a "triune brain" which "expands in hierarchic fashion along the lines of three basic 
patterns that may be characterized as r e p t i l i a n , . p ~ l e o m ~ a l i a n , , and neoman:malian" (MacLean 1975: 
216,223). By examining each of these patterns It IS pOSSible to trace the evolutionary development of the 
neomammalian brain. 
causal discourse of cortical stimulation and excitation. In order to develop this argument 
J ames turns to his consideration of the "aptitude of the brain for acquiring habits" (103). 
James initially asserts the existence of habits in "living creatures" from a behaviouristic 
point of view. By observing a variety of organisms the behaviourist can perceive and 
record certain tendencies in creatures to repeat activities by following similar patterns of 
response. Habits form two types of response: instincts, which are fixed and appear to be 
innate, and those habits which are "the result of education" (104). These two types of 
habit fall into range of the classical philosophical debate on determinism and free will: 
those responses which follow the predetermined laws of cause and effect and those which 
are "variable" and can be adapted and modified "to suit the exigencies of the case." In 
contrast to a description of immutable natural laws, James (following a romantic 
precedent) attributes the variability of habits to the "organic world" (104), because, unlike 
inorganic matter, living organisms are able to repair moderate damage to tissues and 
organs.6 
J ames continues his discussion by declaring that more complex organisms possess a 
wider repertoire of flexible habits. He infers this conclusion from the physicalist 
argument that matter "of a compound mass" has a greater capacity to change its 
composition than does an "elementary particle." Importantly, it is in the relational change 
between neural components of an organism that such flexibility derives. He infers that 
6 James's suggestion that organic material contains special p r o p e r t i ~ s s o ~ , , growt? a ~ ~ c o n t r a d i s t i n c ~ ~ from 
. anic matter finds another parallel in Searle's thought. Followmg the prmclples of evolutIOnary 
morg h 'h 'fi ' 11 
b· I gy" Searle reacts to the claims of champions of strong artificial intelligence (w 0 WIS to artl ICla y 100 , , , 'I 
replicate mental activity without r e f e r e n c ~ ~ to o ~ g a n i c c m , a t t ~ r ) ) by asserting that conSCIOusness IS necessan y 
"a biological feature of human and certam anImal brams (Searle 1992: 88, 90), 
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relational change represents an ability to adapt "the outward shape" to changes in 
environment without complete transformation or total dissolution of form. Thus, James 
posits the notion of "plasticity" which is present in organisms who possess "a structure 
weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at once" (l05). 
By retaining a notion of free will, without surrendering to the law of necessity which 
automatism implies, James echoes the Victorian polymath, John Stuart Mill, who, in his 
reaction to Jeremy Bentham's and his father's versions of utilitarianism (which, for him, 
ignored the "internal culture of the individual" [Mill 1974: 15]), argues that free will can 
be maintained in the face of deterministic philosophy: "that our will, by influencing some 
of our circumstances, can modify our future habits or capacities of willing" (Mill 1981: 
169). By extending Mill's argument into the domain of biology, James is able to maintain 
a physiological principle which underpins such modification. Indeed, this is not merely 
a distant echo of Mill. James's notion of plasticity is a crucial tool in his refutation of 
Spencer's passive account of mind, enabling him to claim that an individual can act upon 
an environment at the same time that he or she is moulded by it. In what was perhaps his 
most influential book upon Victorian thought, A System of Logic (1843), Mill argues that 
the philosopher of necessity, who claims that character is wholly determined by 
circumstance, makes a critical error: a human "has, to a certain extent, a power to alter 
his character. Its being, in the ultimate resort, formed for him, is not inconsistent with 
its being, in part, formed by him as one of the intermediate agents" (Mill 1987: 117). 
Mill's famous argument for compatibility does not deny causal necessity, but reserves a 
philosophical space for self-determinism. 
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By deploying the metaphor of "plasticity", James is able, firstly, to substantiate Mill's 
assertion that character, although being strongly influenced by environment, maintains 
a resistance to it; and, secondly, he continues to stress his resistance to metaphysics by 
basing Mill's argument on a physiological principle. Mill's argument, like James's, is 
open to the criticism that "experience" (an individual's sensual and perceptive interaction 
with the world) remains the sovereign determining factor. However, as I move on to 
consider in the next section of this chapter, it is through a redescription of experience in 
the kind of writing which I am calling romantic science that James goes some way to 
distance himself from a metaphysical conception of experience and, furthermore, to 
dissolve the strict dichotomy of self and world. 
James claims that habit is "at bottom a physical principle", but he does so without 
reverting to the hard metaphors of mechanics. James's choice of language is significant 
in his description of "structural modification": 
nature has carefully shut up our brain and spinal cord in bony boxes ... She 
has floated them in fluid so that only the severest shocks can give them 
a concussion, and blanketed and wrapped them about in an altogether 
exceptional way (107). 
Here, the softness of the verbs "floated", "blanketed" and "wrapped" implies that the 
formation of habits is, for higher organisms, a kind of subterranean sculpting, in which 
sensory "currents .. .leave their traces in the [neural] paths which they take" through the 
tissue of the brain (107). Initially these "shocks" will meet resistance, but if the sensation 
is strong enough "the wave of rearrangement" will succeed in facilitating a pathway 
through the nervous system, which "once traversed by a nerve-current might be expected 
67 
to follow the law of most of the paths we know" to become "more permeable than before" 
(108). James likens a neural path to "a natural drainage-channel" which forms itself in 
relatively amorphous tissue and, thereby, contributes to the developing complexion of the 
brain. He complements his explanation of the facilitation of pathways by developing 
Spencer's ideas concerning the "beginning of a new reflex arc", which is formed by 
chance when "blocks" occur in habitual pathways (l09). However, once more, he admits 
that the details of such phenomena ~ \ ' a g u e e to the last degree" (109). 
In the same chapter, he subtly moves from a consideration of habit as a physical principle 
to the learning of skills through training and discipline. He argues that this 
developmental process occurs throughout the neural systems of higher organisms, but 
only humans can develop complex intellectual activities. Drawing heavily on the British 
physiologist William B. Carpenter's study, Principles of Mental Physiology (1874), James 
asserts two critical points. Firstly, the channelling and rechannelling of good habits can 
be acquired through discipline and effort: "our nervous system grows to the modes in 
which it has been exercised" (112). As skills are learnt and refined the effort expended 
in the accomplishment of them "diminishes": "if practice did not make perfect, nor habit 
economize the expense of nervous and muscular energy, [humans] would therefore be in 
a sorry plight" (113). This leads to the second point, that "habit diminishes the conscious 
attention with which our acts are performed" (114). 
In a skilled activity the chain of events which constitutes the action can be initialized by 
"a single instantaneous 'cue"', rather than needing to be worked through as a series of 
laborious stages; each "muscular contraction" (115) instigating the appropriate 
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contraction of the next in an automatic sequence which James compares with an 
involuntary wave of muscular peristalsis (116). As skills are learnt and mastered the 
higher regions of the brain are set free from the process of learning in order that they 
might engage with other tasks. However, anticipating Heidegger, James claims that 
although conscious attention does not attend to these learnt habits, "if they go wrong" the 
person retains the ability to intervene in an automatic process (118). Thus, he argues that 
while acquired habits may seem like involuntary actions, unlike reflex actions there is a 
level of consciousness, below the level of direct attention, which possesses a regulative 
capacity. 
In this way James indicates what he deems to be the "ethical implications of the law of 
habit" (120). By encouraging good habits a person can reserve their intellectual and 
muscular energy in order to pursue other ends. He suggests that "the period between 
twenty and thirty is the critical one in the formation of intellectual and professional 
habits" (121), whilst "the period below twenty is more important still for the fixing of 
personal habits ... such as vocalization and pronunciation, gesture, motion, and address" 
(122). The cultivation of good habits is important in the civilizing processes by which 
humans become people; the acculturation of individuals being largely characterized 
through the development of speech and writing. By instilling habits and "useful actions" 
at an early age James claims it is possible "to make our nervous system our ally instead 
of our enemy" (122). By evoking a principle of utility here James's ideas leads directly 
into his theory of Pragmatism (1907). 
69 
There are two crucial aspects of James's account of habit - firstly, the implication that 
there is an underlying moral pattern to his thought and, secondly, his principle of action -
that become central expressions of James's philosophical project. If, as I am arguing, one 
interpretation of James is as an intellectual progeny of the early nineteenth-century 
speculative German romantic scientists, it is necessary to scrutinize both these aspects 
of his thought in the light of other developments in post-romantic ideas. In order to 
position James in this context, I want to conclude this section by considering his notion 
of habit in the light of the comments of two key modernist figures: the German 
philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the English aesthete, Walter Pater. By comparing 
their positions in relation to James it is possible to consider each of the connected aspects 
- morality and action - in turn. 
In one of Nietzsche's transitional works, Human, All Too Human (1878), the German 
philosopher contemplates "the history of moral feelings" (Nietzsche 1994: 39). For his 
translator, Marion Faber, this book marks a break from Nietzsche's early romantic 
associations with Richard Wagner and his philosophical allegiance with Arthur 
Schopenhauer, towards a later rejection of Christian morality and an elaboration of his 
doctrine of will to power. He anticipates ideas he expands upon in Beyond Good and 
Evil (1886) and On the Genealogy of Morals (1887) by considering morality to be closely 
connected with a veneration for the preservation of custom: "to be moral, correct, ethical 
means to obey an age-old law or tradition" (Nietzsche 1994: 66). In this way, it is the 
"tradition or law" (67) which determines the valency of good and evil. Goodness is 
therefore a value which rests on the weight of its inheritance, whilst "evil is to be 'not 
moral' (immoral), to practice bad habits, go against tradition" (66). He discerns that a 
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form of pleasure is gained from the knowledge that a habit (Gewohnheiten) has "stood 
the test" of experience and, in pragmatic vein, proves "useful" (67). 
Nietzsche goes on to criticize this doctrine for proclaiming that "because one feels good 
with one custom" it becomes the "only possibility by which one can feel good" (67). He 
detects that some societies tolerate and preserve difficult and "burdensome" customs 
because they seem to be "highly useful" in the pursuit of more important ends (68). 
Following Emerson's comments on passive conformity (as discussed in the last section 
of the introduction), Nietzsche later develops this position to argue that often slave 
mentalities are nurtured and preserved through a desensitization to the constraints of 
custom and the values of traditional morality. 
However, far from rejecting habits wholesale, in The Gay Science (1882) Nietzsche 
claims: "I love briefhabits ... and consider them an inestimable means for getting to know 
many things and states" (Kaufmann 1974: 236). In this view, those habits which 
facilitate the development of art active self are seen to be both useful and enjoyable. But, 
he then goes on to say: "enduring habits I hate. I feel as if a tyrant had come near me and 
as if the air I breathe had thickened when events take such a turn that it appears that they 
will inevitably give rise to enduring habits" (237). Rather than providing a source of 
personal enlightenment, "enduring habits" appear to lead only to suffocating bondage and 
the repetition of sameness. By perpetuating habits, the goodness inherent in "brief habits" 
(what is good for the self at one particular moment) collapses into what is good under the 
aegis of law or the weight of custom. 
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James's theory of habit is clearly different from the Nietzschean view. Early in Principles 
James outlines a moral hierarchy which moves upwards from "permanent drunkards" 
(James 1950a: 127) and tramps who live "from hour to hour", through "the bachelor", 
"the father", "the patriot" and upwards to the heights of the "philosopher and saint whose 
cares are for humanity and eternity" (23). The formation of good habits is thought to 
influence and to contribute to the perpetuation of social values. However, there are other 
aspects of James's thoughts which push him much closer to Nietzsche. Although, on one 
level, James appears to espouse a personal morality which adheres closely to public 
values, he speaks of the "abrupt acquisition of the new habit" as the "best way" of acting 
upon resolution (124). Furthermore, echoing Nietzsche's two extremes of the release of 
powerful creative energy and worldly abstinence through solitude, James claims that the 
"best way" in which to keep "the faculty of effort alive" (126) is either by practising "a 
little gratuitous exercise every day" or through "a sharp period of suffering, and then a 
free time" (124). 
In this manner, public and private morality cannot be easily elided in James's thought; he 
proposes that the individual should fmd techniques for disrupting the passive absorption 
of pregiven values. Like his refusal to simply accept Spencer's "fatalistic" account of self, 
James combines his conception of introspection as a method of self-awareness with 
methods of resisting stasis through the activity of bodily movement. James, following 
Nietzsche, implies that the acquisition of a 'good' habit should be seen as an enabling 
device or a technique for self-creation ("to make one's self over again" [124]) rather than 
a fixed pattern which restricts individual liberty. 
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The second aspect of James's thought - his principle of action - is, perhaps, one of his 
distinctive marks as a nineteenth-century thinker. Against the "sentimentalist and 
dreamer, who spends his life in a weltering sea of sensibility and emotion, but who never 
does a manly concrete deed" (125), James encourages active decision making ("we must 
take care to launch ourselves with as strong and decided an initiative as possible") and 
the "need of securing success at the outset" (123). In this way, he positions himself 
alongside the likes of Mill and Thomas Carlyle (an advocate of hero-worship and strong 
leadership) against the decadent aesthetes who emerged in Europe towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
In an essay on 'The Failure of Habit' (1973), the critic Philip Fisher uses Walter Pater's 
famous 'Conclusion' to The Renaissance (1873) to exemplify the position against which 
James reacts. When Pater, in modernist vein, claims, 
in a sense it might even be said that our failure is to form habits. For, 
after all, habit is relative to a stereotyped world, and meantime it is only 
the roughness of the eye that makes any two persons, things, situations 
look alike (Pater 1986: 152), 
Fisher interprets him to mean that "perception, not action" is made "the center of the self' 
(Fisher 1973: 3). However, whereas James asserts that strenuous labour should be 
privileged over the defamiliarizing pleasure derived from burning with a "hard, gem-like 
flame" (Pater 1986: 152), those soft metaphors from earlier in the chapter lessen the 
distance between an autonomous self and the kind of individuation which the aesthete 
seeks. Furthermore, when James comments that the "more of the details of our daily life 
we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism. the more our higher powers of 
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mind will be set free for their own proper work" (James 1950a: 122), he does not 
preclude the appreciation of subtle distinctions or the qualitative evaluation of art. 
Indeed, in a later chapter on attention, James explicitly speaks in painterly vocabulary: 
"interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground _ 
intelligible perspective, in a word" (402). 
In contrast to Pater's post-Kantian and anti functional expression of disinterested pleasure, 
J ames adheres to the neoclassical notion that art should be instructive and morally 
edifying. Reiterating the warnings of Vita Scudder7 concerning "excessive novel-reading 
and theatre going" (125), James would seem to reject the doctrine of l'arf pour l'arf 
because: 
one becomes filled with emotions which habitually pass without 
prompting to any deed, and so the inertly sentimental condition is kept up. 
The remedy would be, never to suffer one's self to have an emotion at a 
concert, without expressing it afterward in some active way (126). 
James's two examples of action ("speaking genially to one's aunt, or giving up one's seat 
in a horse-car" [126]) indicate that art and music should invoke compassion and altruism. 
Of course, James's examples do not preclude an aesthetic response; but it is, as he says, 
the "particular lines" and "general forms of discharge" that are important in order to 
ensure that the sensation and perception of music is not merely internalized (126). Rather 
than passively receiving sense-data, James implies that only by striving to keep the neural 
pathways open to possibility by acting upon the world can a sense of bodily equilibrium 
and psychic well-being be maintained. However, equilibrium is not to be equated with 
7 See Scudder's article 'The Moral Dangers of Musical Devotees', Andover Review, January 1887,46-53. 
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repetition and bodily stasis nor, in Spencer's definition, the "equilibration" which 
represents the end or the "impassable limit" of evolution (Hofstadter 1992: 37). Thus, 
James can be seen to argue that the cultivation of good habits is an important aspect of 
character building, but the extremes of habitual action only lead back to the kind of 
compulsive necessity from which he hopes to escape. The metaphor of discharge 
(together with his previous use of soft metaphors) lends to James's conception of habit 
the language of dynamism which shifts his position away from Spencer's idea of 
biological equilibrium. 
J ames's romantic rhetoric of dynamism hovers between two notions of selfhood. Either 
the self is conceived as an autonomous and sovereign entity which creatively acts in and 
upon the world, but is relatively unaffected by it, or it is understood as a flexible structure 
which fluctuates with changes in environment. In the later pages of 'Habit' James appears 
to gravitate towards the former version of an active self, but his notion of biological 
evolutionism rests closer to the other pole of selfhood. James's theory of self actually 
rejects both poles for their extremity. He seeks a middle path by which the self is 
understood to be both an active entity (guided by the formation of good habits) at the 
same time that it fluidly changes and passively adapts to its environment.8 Moreover, this 
notion of the self in "flux" leads from James's discussion of habit directly into his chapter 
on 'The Stream of Thought.' 
8 In this way James perhaps lies closer to the Paterian strain of romantic thought than may seem a p ~ a r e n t : :
that the self is acted upon (in Pater's thought the self is acted upon by the work of art) as much as It acts. 
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(2) The Stream of Thought: a "theatre of simultaneous possibilities"? 
This section focuses upon James's discussion of 'The Stream of Thought', working from 
within the framework of habit and repetition established in the last section. Although 
theoretical problems remain unresolved in James's work, I argue that he sets up a tenable 
model of consciousness which leads neither to idealism nor dualism. This enables him 
in the following chapter, 'The Consciousness of Self, productively to discuss ideas of 
identity and selfhood. Like his thoughts on habit, much of James's discussion is not 
original and, in the light of the over-used language of "streams of consciousness", it may 
seem a particularly well-worn discourse; but, in the development of James's thought, the 
following exposition represents a crucial stage which anticipates his later work. 
In 'The Stream of Thought', and elsewhere in Principles, James deploys a series of images 
that later became potent for characterising the psychological technique implemented by 
modernist writers. The technique of free indirect speech suggests a slippage between 
different modes and levels of (represented) consciousness without requiring the writer to 
mark or signpost them as such. I will argue in this section that such writerly 
experimentation is homologous to James's description of consciousness, both for his 
broad aesthetic concerns and the series of metaphors he deploys to represent fluidity. 
The image of the stream follows closely from James's Darwinian description of the 
plasticity of mind, which moulds itself to adapt to change and mutability in the 
environment. The mental stream is conceived to flow through a landscape of objects, but 
it is not entirely distinct from it. As the phenomenologist Franz Brentano makes clear, 
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the objects can only be perceived and known through their aspects as they are available 
to consciousness.9 James's notions of flexibility and malleability become central in his 
attempt to conceive of the self midway between the sovereign and self-contained entity 
of nineteenth-century bourgeois myth and the kind of predetennined bundle of 
physiological reflexes which he understands to exist beneath the level of consciousness. 
In the chapter preceding 'The Streams of Thought', James considers one of the central 
concerns of modem philosophy: the mind in relation to an object world. He suggests an 
"individual consciousness" should not be conceived as a seamless whole, because it 
undergoes temporal breaks and interruptions (James 1950a: 199). Accordingly, he claims 
that "sleep, fainting, coma, epilepsy, and other 'unconscious' conditions are apt to break 
in upon and occupy large durations of what we nevertheless consider the mental history 
of a single man" (199). Instead of an individual's "mental history" only constituting 
waking, or conscious, life, James proposes that an interruption to this unidirectional 
history may occur "where we do not suspect it...in a.incessant and fine-grained fonn" 
(199). In this counter-Enlightenment argument, the "single man" is not aware of all the 
contents of his consciousness nor of his exact place in relation to the world (a world of 
objects and a world of humans). Although he champions the introspective method, James 
acknowledges its limitations for knowing the self: "fine-grained" consciousness can be 
only partially known. 
9 In the first volume of Mind (1876), a psychological and philosophical journal to which James frequently 
contributed Brentano's Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunie (1874) was reviewed to high acclaim. 
The review'er, R. Flint, suggests that it is "a work which no p s y ~ h o l o g i s t t should overlook" (116). Flint 
comments on Brentano's empirically based "psychological method", which enables him to move benveen 
physiological, psychological and . p h ~ n o m e n o l o g i . c ~ l . . aspects ~ f f c o n s ~ i o u s n e s s . . James acknowledges 
Brentano in Principles, both for hiS ngorous empmclsm and hiS attentIOn to mental phenomena (James 
1950a: 187, 547). 
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He goes on to claim that one does not usually experience these "gaps" or breaches directly 
(200); one only become aware of them through reference to objective or "outward time" 
(for example, "the sight of our wound" after an anaesthetized operation or the awareness 
of a lapse in chronological time). He remains uncertain how one could indubitably 
decide whether consciousness is fragmentary or continuous. But, rather than favouring 
the direction of Descartes and Locke, who claim that consciousness sinks to "a minimal 
state" or ceases to exist during sleep, he suggests that the self possesses a "form of a 
secondary consciousness entirely cut off from the primary or normal one, but susceptible 
of being tapped and made to testify to its existence in various odd ways" (203).10 
Acknowledging his debt to the French experimental physicians, Pierre Janet and Alfred 
Binet, James detects that this type of secondary consciousness is most readily apparent 
in patients with blind-sight or those under hypnotic trance, who display an awareness of 
objects even though they appear to be physiologically incapable of doing SO.11 
Binet's research in the 1880s revealed that many hysterics maintain the ability to write 
"automatically" whilst in an unconscious state. In his 1896 Lowell Lectures on 
'Exceptional Mental States' James explains his own study of automatic writing, in which 
he postulates "two simultaneously operating systems of intelligent consciousness, one 
above the threshold of awareness and one below, with separate characteristics" (Taylor 
10 James directly addresses this issue of what happens to consciousness whilst sleeping. Closely paralleling 
the French philosopher Henri Bergson, he stresses that although there is a formal ~ r e a k k ("for the ~ n l o o k i n g g
psychologist" [238]) in the durationallevel of consciousness (fa duree), the s u b ~ e c t t only e x p e n e n ~ e s s the 
break by inferring it through the passage of chronological time, or such physiological s y m p t o ~ s s as stlffuess 
or hunger. Without these signs the individual would be left with a sense of unbroken conscIOusness. 
II For a sample of the work of these two students of Charcot, see B,inet and Charles F e n ~ , , 'L'hypnotisme 
chez les hysteriques', Revue Philosophigue de la France et de l'Etranger, 19, 1885., 1-25 and J.anet, 
L'Automatisme psychologigue (1889). Binet's paper on 'Visual Hallucinations in Hypnotism' was publIshed 
in Mind, 9(35),1884,413-14 and Janet's book was reviewed in the samejoumal, 14(56), 1889,598. 
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1984: 6). He concludes in Principles that "the method of automatic writing proves that 
their perceptions exist, only cut off from communication with the upper consciousness" 
(James 1950a: 206). This severance of the two levels, or layers, of consciousness 
encourages James to postulate the splitting of identity into the "upper" and "under" self; 
a split which is particularly apparent amongst hysterics who suffer from "alterations of 
the natural sensibility of various parts and organs of the body" (202). The upper self, 
corresponding to the higher intellectual regions of the brain, can express itself through 
speech and vocal articulation, whilst the under self (which he sometimes calls the "sub-
conscious" self [207]) reveals itself through somatic symptoms ("pricks, burns, and 
pinches" [206]) and forms of writing which are free from cerebral control. 12 
James claims that even in non-hysterics these two levels of self remain to a large extent 
in "mutual ignorance" of each other (208), which serves to undermine the Cartesian idea 
of the self as privileged knower. In A Discourse on Method (1637) and, more fully, in 
Meditations (1641), Descartes postulates that the self, or mind, is able to clearly and 
distinctly conceive of itself, although it may doubt everything else. In this manner he 
arrives at his first principles of the knowing mind as the indubitable grounds for 
knowledge. However, if James takes as his model a split and semi-ignorant self then the 
epistemological certainty of Descartes's subject becomes highly questionable. For James, 
the interplay between the two levels of consciousness problematizes the idea of 
12 James parallels the work of Freud and Breuer in Studies on Hysteria (1895) and Freud's later 
metapsychological papers, with his notion of "upper" self corresponding to Freud's ego and "under" self 
with id. However, although James later came into contact with Freud's writings, he rarely uses the ~ e r m m
"unconscious", preferring "sub-conscious" or, more frequently, "subliminal self' w h i c ~ ~ he ~ ~ p r ~ p n a t e s s
from the German psychologist, F. W. H. Myers, who wrote an important paper on automatic wrltmg m 1885 
(James 1950a: 400). 
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intentionality: "we must never take a person's testimony, however sincere, that he has felt 
nothing, as proof positive that no feeling has been there" (211). 
This position lends itself to the eye of the sceptic and leads James's work towards the 
same philosophical impasse which Stanley Cavell's hermeneutics address: if the 
autonomy of the knowing and intending subject is questionable then so too is any claim 
to know anything about the world and other living entities in it. James resists pushing 
his discussion towards a rejection of all grounds for knowledge. As he later expounds 
more eloquently in Pragmatism, humans live in an as if world in which they have to 
accept certain realities in order to survive and accomplish certain ends. James's emerging 
pragmatism counters the extreme uncertainty of the Humean sceptical position, which he 
discards together with the absolute autonomy of the Cartesian self (originally posited in 
response to earlier sceptics). As I shall discuss more fully in the next section, James 
realizes the difficulties of attempting to argue for ultimate foundations and, instead, 
favours "indirectly or only potentially verifying processes" as more useful for the 
accomplishment of goals (James 1981: 95). 
The point here is that humans have to assume some knowledge of their consciousness 
and, by extension, of the object world in order to have any agency. This departs from the 
Spencerian position which states that humans have an innate impulse for survival over 
which they have little, if any, control. In response, James argues that ultimately humans 
rely on feelings and sense-perception in order to know (in both its senses, connaitre and 
savoir) about themselves and the environment in which they live. But, as he goes on to 
expound in the first two chapters of the second volume of Principles, "a pure sensation 
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is an abstraction" in so far as it is always contaminated with "voluminous associative or 
reproductive processes in the cortex" (James 1950b: 3). He goes on to qualify sensation 
as that which occurs "with a minimum of perception" (3). Nevertheless, even from a 
young age, the two are understood to be deeply and inextricably intertwined; one cannot 
philosophically rise above the system of relations and associations which constitute 
physio-psychic life. This argument, like that which posits a semi-ignorant self, resists the 
Cartesian position for a more complex world-view in which subjects have only a partial 
and incomplete perspective. 
This argument moves my discussion into the very midst of his chapter on 'The Stream of 
Thought.' James develops Spencer's discussion of the "relations between feelings" which 
characterize consciousness (James 1950a: 249), by suggesting that one is initially inside 
a phenomenological system of relations, rather than being able to secure an impartial or 
an omniscient view of it. Although James fundamentally differs from Descartes, for both 
of them the'!', or first-person, is in a unique position to explore consciousness. As a 
behavioural psychologist, James relies on observation as a method by which to study the 
mind; but, he goes on to argue, only introspective knowledge of one's own particular 
thoughts can evince a fuller understanding of personal psychology. 
When James opens the chapter by proposing that "we now begin our study of the mind 
from within" (224), he suggests that this is the only tenable position from which to view 
it. Similarly, when he outlines the "important characters in the process" of thought, he 
invites the reader "to plunge in media res as regards our vocabulary", as if this is likewise 
the only viable manner through which to view the mental process (225). For James, the 
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philosophical task is not a matter of proving that one has thoughts or that there is 
someone to whom thoughts happen (as it is for Descartes), but to characterize and 
describe the stream of thought as it occurs for the individual. This stubborn refusal to 
entertain the metaphysics of mind lends the description an empirical sense of rootedness 
in the ongoing life of the mind, which, as John Wild argues at length, encourages 
Principles to be read from a phenomenological perspective (Wild 1970: 55-78). 
James outlines, and then expands upon, five major characteristics of thought: that thought 
is personal; that it constantly changes; that "thought is sensibly continuous"; it views an 
object-world; and it displays interest "in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of 
others" and is thus able to choose between them. James posits these characteristics not 
from an a priori argument, but from an empirical exploration and description of the 
contents of consciousness. Rather than moving consecutively through the five 
characteristics, as does James, I focus my discussion on the second and third aspects 
(change and continuity) in order to explore the manner in which James interprets 
Spencer's phrase "relations between feelings." 13 
Whereas Spencer bases his conception of the brain on an economic model of neuronal 
discharge by which psychic energy is expended, James incorporates this description into 
his more subtle view of the "waxing" and "waning" of brain states: "no changes in the 
brain are physiologically ineffective, and that presumably none are bare of psychological 
result" (235). The phasing of residual and emergent elements encourages James to 
13 In a long footnote spanning four pages James reviews a section of ~ p e n c e r ' s s First P r i n c i ~ l e s s of 
Psychology (Spencer 1870: 65ff.) and other philosophers who have conSidered the problematiC term 
"relations through feeling" (247ff.). 
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describe thoughts as "overtones" (258) which cannot be isolated to a single sequence. 
James's image of the complex interplay of tonal elements promotes a model of 
"multitudinous" brain-states over the atomistic simplicity of Locke's position, a model 
which James claims is necessary in order to explain complex thought processes (236). 
He goes on to develop his view of the complex nature of thought by closely considering 
the axis of time along which such waxing and waning occurs. 
Because thoughts occur along a temporal plane James surmises that "no state once gone 
can recur and be identical with what it was before" (230). Echoing and developing the 
thought of the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus, he stresses that no two experiences 
can be exactly alike: the interplay of sense and perception ("the river of elementary 
feeling" [233]) inevitably changes with time. He argues that the complexity of such a 
relationship constitutes the peculiar and irreducible fabric of experience. Experience, 
then, emerges by acknowledging the subtle differences and variations between perception 
and sensation. Because it is only possible to speak of "pure" sensation as an abstraction, 
complex experience cannot be reduced to the level of simplicity which Locke desires. 
Moreover, because particular experiences are unique, James proposes that it is the 
responsibility of the individual to attend to his own perceptions: "experience is 
remoulding us every moment, and our mental reaction on every given thing is really a 
resultant of our experience of the whole world up to that date" (234). 
This may appear to be another manifestation of James the moralist; but, as he indicates 
in the previous chapter, not only is it impossible to adequately theorize experience, but 
it is also impossible for the self to attend to, or to comprehend the entirety of, what it 
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expenences. Because there are different and conflicting levels of consciousness, the self 
is understood to be only ever aware of a minute segment of the whole. Moreover, as 
experience alters through time so must one's ability to attend to changes in it. Quoting 
from the writing of his British friend, Shadworth Hodgson, James establishes what 
Hodgson calls "a sequence of differents" (Hodgson 1878: 290), which describes 
experience as corresponding to a succession of temporal moments. I4 One might perceive 
the same object more than once, but the ideas which an individual has of that object are 
never precisely alike. In a covert attack on the sensationalist school of philosophy, he 
claims that it is only through the refusal, or inability, to attend to subtle changes in 
perception that gives the perceiver a sense of a static and unchanging phenomenological 
world: "the entire history of Sensation is a commentary on our inability to tell whether 
two sensations received apart are exactly alike" (231). 
Once more, James resorts to his painterly vocabulary to suggest that one should be more 
attentive to the "ratio" (the contrasts and the gradations) between different kinds or levels 
of consciousness: "we feel things differently according as we are sleepy or wake, hungry 
or full, fresh or tired" (232). By inferring (rather than directly perceiving or sensing) the 
differences between these stages the inquirer can begin to make a rudimentary "first 
charcoal sketch upon [his or her] canvas" (225). Anticipating the modernist technique 
of defamiliarization, James claims that even 
14 See Shadworth H. Hodgson, The Philosophy of Reflection, 2 volumes (1878). Like James, Hodgson 
can be seen as a precursor of phenomenology, by "dealing with phenomena which are but very partially 
accessible to us" (1). Hodgson outlines his project as an attempt to "lay down the outlines, principles, and 
methods of a system of metaphysic, basing it upon known facts of c o n s c i o u s n ~ s ~ . . "" H o w ~ v e r , , ~ l i k e e James, 
he welcomes the language of metaphysics (although he acknowledges that It IS peculIarly lIable to self-
deception" [3]) in, what he calls, his search for "foundations." 
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when the identical fact recurs, we must think of it in a fresh manner see 
. , 
It under a somewhat different angle, apprehend it in different relations 
from those which it last appeared. And the thought by which we cognize 
it is the thought of it-in-those-relations, a thought suffused with the 
consciousness of all that dim context (233). 
It is not the awareness of the object as such, but the changes in the whole relational field 
of consciousness which alter the value or meaning of the object for the viewer. 
Developing his discussion of defamiliarization espoused in 'Habit', James recommends 
that the individual develops the capacity to attend to differences without losing the ability 
to think of objects "in a fresh manner." 
James's position in 'Habit' can be read to oppose the kind of disinterested pleasure 
proposed by Pater's aesthetic theory. Here, however, he appears to value the cultivation 
of good habits, but only when they are yoked to an awareness of those unharmonius, or 
unassimilable, elements which cause contrasts between levels of consciousness. James 
describes his model explicitly in aesthetic terms: "when everything is dark a somewhat 
less dark sensation makes us see an object white" (232). Similarly, "as one color 
succeeding another is modified by the contrast, silence sounds delicious after 
noise ... and .. .in music the whole aesthetic effect comes from the manner in which one set 
of sounds alters our feeling of another" (234-35). Comparable aesthetic contrasts are 
described as Pater relates his passionate engagement with works of art. Rather than the 
viewer imposing a preformulated pattern upon a painting, for Pater art tends to work on 
the mind of the viewer. To return to Pater's 'Conclusion' to The Renaissance: 
At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of external 
objects, pressing upon us with a sharp and importunate reality ... But when 
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reflexion begins to play upon those objects they are dissipated under its 
influence ... each object is loosed into a group of impressions - colour, 
odour, texture - in the mind of the observer. And if we continue to dwell 
in thought on this world, not of objects ... but of impressions, unstable, 
flickering, inconsistent, which burn and are extinguished with our 
consciousness of them ... the whole scope of observation is dwarfed into 
the narrow chamber of the individual mind (Pater 1986: 151). 
Here, Pater directly parallels James's need to cultivate reflexive attention in order to focus 
upon the subtle differences between "flickering" impressions as they are experienced by 
the individual. Making sense of the uncontrollable "flood of external objects" is a way 
of giving pattern and meaning to experience. 
By attending closely to minute changes in disparate experiences and attempting to 
express them in representational form, it is possible to redescribe Pater's image of the 
flood in terms of James's language of the stream. The stream may overflow the banks 
which define its space; but, unlike a flood, it is essentially containable and, although far 
from unidirectional, it suggests a steady, if not uniform, sense of temporal flow. As I 
discuss later in this chapter, the temporal flow implied in Jamt;\s metaphor moves his 
writing towards a concern with narrative, by which one is able to make sense of the 
deluge and confusion of sense .. impressions. 
In the opening comments of the next section on the continuity of thought, James seems 
to contradict this relational model. However, it is not unlike him to move backwards, in 
order to concede a point or complicate his own argument, before he moves on to 
substantiate his position. He opens by defining "'continuous' as that which is without 
breach, crack, or division" (237). In "a single mind" the only "breaches" directly 
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conceived are "time-gaps" and contrasts in the "quality, or content, of the thought." He 
claims that even these breaks tend to be assimilated within the general flow or plenum 
of experience. The feeling of the unbroken flow of thought enables an individual to 
retain a sense of identity with both recent and distant past: "the natural name for it is 
myself, 1, or me" (238). The qualities of "warmth and intimacy" (239) are those with 
which James associates the function of memory for maintaining a sense of enduring 
identity within the flow of experience, and by which he can recognize a particular 
experience as belonging to him. The significance of his image of stream is herein 
revealed: it describes a continuous, unjointed flow to which the more mechanistic images 
of "chain" and "train" used by the associationists cannot do justice. 
James claims that "even within the limits of the same self ... a kind of jointing and 
separateness among the parts" becomes apparent. He refers explicitly to the "contrasts 
in quality" to which he makes reference in the previous section. Some phenomena are 
"discrete and discontinuous" (for example, a loud explosion in the midst of calm), but 
their comings and goings and contrasts no more break the flow of the 
thought that thinks them than they break the time and space in which they 
lie. A silence may be broken by a thunder-clap, and we may be so 
stunned and confused for a moment by the shock as to give no instant 
account to ourselves of what has happened. But that very confusion is a 
mental state, and a state that passes us straight over from the silence to the 
sound (240). 
The sound of thunder might cause a momentary shock which registers as a sense of 
confusion, but even this confusion is part of the stream of thought. Indeed, there is no 
outside to which the stream can be contrasted on this model. Rather, the contrasts and 
differences between thoughts are contained within the flow of experience. 
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Acknowledging his phenomenological connections with Brentano, James claims that 
"what we hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder pure, but thunder-breaking-upon-
silence-and-contrasting-with-it." It is the background or context (the whole of the stream) 
which detennines the significance and the meaning of the object to which attention is 
focused. This context refers to all past experiences, whether clearly recalled, dimly 
recollected or subliminally registered, and an accompanying awareness, no matter how 
peripheral, of "our own bodily position, attitude, condition" (240). Once more, it is "our 
bodily selves" which James claims are "the seat of the thinking" and which provide the 
bedrock (or absolute grounds, although clearly these are not explanatory grounds) for 
these "phenomena of contrast" (242). 
The contrasts are not between different streams of thought, but the "difference of 
subjective states" as experienced within the stream (243). These differences are caused 
by a complex and overdetennined relationship between neurochemical excitation, the 
state of consciousness, the object attended to, the motivation of attention and the 
experiential passage of time. The stream is not unidirectional, nor does it flow at the 
same rate. James claims that "what strikes us first is this different pace of its parts .. jt 
seems to be made of an alteration of flights and perchings"; the "substantive parts" 
("resting-places") are contrasted to the "transitive parts" ("places of flight") which "lead 
us from one substantive conclusion to another" (243). 
James detects a general neglect of these 'in-between' transitive parts in psychology, in 
favour of more tangible substantives. But it is these "differents", or transitives, which 
structure and connect thoughts and to which James recommends the individual should 
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turn his or her attention; for, without vigilance, he detects the substantive conclusion "so 
exceeds them in vigor and stability that it quite eclipses and swallows them up in its 
glare" (243-44). The homology between substantive thoughts and nouns and between 
transitive thoughts and verbs and conjunctions is apparent here, but James declares that 
language is a secondary accretion which is "incapable of doing justice" to all the 
gradations and "shades" of experience. The movement and dynamism expressed, but also 
suppressed, in the conjunctions "and", "if', "but" and "by", become as important to 
James's description of the stream of thought as they do for Freud in his analysis of dreams 
(246).15 This is clearly reminiscent of James's earlier position, in which he claims the 
inquirer can only infer differences rather than perceiving them directly: only by 
cultivating an awareness of the differences between formal elements in the compositional 
field can one begin to understand consciousness. 
One major problem remains: if one cannot attend to differences directly, how can the 
necessary inferences be made? This is where James's ideas of repetition and pattern 
established in 'Habit' come into play. Like a musical scale or a sentence construction, the 
• • ". 0. • • • 
sense of familiar pattern encourages an antICIpatory response: a noun m"certaIn pOSItIon 
demands a verb in a certain mood and number, in another position it expects a relative 
pronoun" (254). Similarly, shifts in the perceptual field represent a modification of a 
previous pattern, rather than wholesale change: repetition as the pronunciation of the 
same does not follow from James's notion of the changing stream (here the Heraclitean 
15 See Freud's principles of condensation and displacement expounded in. The Interpretation of Dreams 
(1900). He argues that only by working within the logic of these mechanIsms can the analyst come to a 
knowledge of what is meant by the dream (the latent dream-thought). 
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aphorism is apposite: "we never descend twice into the same stream" [233]).16 Instead 
of positing the repetition of the same, James's model of knowledge as reflection (304) is 
inflected by the Kierkegaardian sense of repetition as recollection. Here, recollection 
suggests the memory of something previously misplaced or forgotten: one can only have 
a memory of an object or an event if it has been temporarily absent or lost.1 7 
This notion of repetition-with-difference feeds into JamesJsense of the continuity and 
preservation of identity despite flux and mutability. The idea that the organism must 
adapt itself to changes in the environment implies the impossibility of maintaining a 
static state of selfhood. Instead, the patterns that constitute mental phenomena (an 
awareness of a changing environment) are incessantly repeated in different combinations. 
As an element is rearranged, so must one modify an awareness of "its relations, near and 
remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to 
lead" (255). Rather than trekking through a previously unexplored phenomenological 
wilderness, one is led by those structures and patterns by which one can anticipate the 
rearrangement of elements: 
The significance, the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra 
that surrounds and escorts it, - or rather that is fused into one with 
16 This is not to devalue the importance of sameness in James's thOUght. A point to which he frequently 
returns sameness gives one a sense of a relatively stable world ("sameness in a multiplicity of objective 
a p p e a r ~ n c e s s is thus the basis of our belief ~ n n realities o u t s i d ~ ~ of t h ~ u g h t " " [2;2]) and, as he c ? ~ e n t s . . at 
length on 'The Consciousness of Self, the Idea of sameness IS crucial to one s sense of endurmg Identity 
(331 ff.). 
17 In Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting P s y ~ h o l o g y y (1843) Kierkegaard's a l t e r - e ~ ? ? Constantin 
C t tius states "for what is recollected has been, IS repeated backwards, whereas repetItion, properly ons an . . bl J' . 
II d is recollected forwards" (Kierkegaard 1983: 131). ThiS assertIOn resem es ames s suggestion so ca e ." fi S k' . . I' I that memory and anticipation are mtegrally mtertwmed and pre Igures ac s s mterest m neuro oglca 
disorders which affect the faculty of memory. 
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it. . .leaving it, it is true, an image of the same thing it was before but 
making it an image of that thing newly taken and freshly understood. 
At one and the same moment, an individual experiences both repetition and change: the 
experience of the loss of a particular, previously dominant, configuration of elements and 
the memory of the association of past components blended with the anticipation of new 
ones. 
In order to describe this "halo or penumbra" James introduces the word "fringe" to 
characterize the "influence of a faint brain-process upon our thought, as it makes itself 
aware ofre1ations and objects but dimly perceived" (258). Such dim perceptions account 
for the waxing and waning of relational elements as they restructure an individual's 
perceptual field, as well as for those subliminal perceptions only detectable (by the third-
person) through somatic signs, dreams or expressed through a medium such as automatic 
writing. 
When he returns to consider the individual's noetic knowledge of his or her perceptual 
field, James implies that one is "only aware in the penumbral nascent way of a 'fringe' of 
unarticulated affinities about it" (259). Even those unassimilable elements influence an 
awareness of the fringe: "a gap we cannot yet fill with a definite picture, word, or phrase, 
but which .. .influences us in an intensely active and determinate psychic way" (259). The 
gaps may either feel "definite" and tangible, or may "merely carry a mood of interest." 
Either way, the presence of gaps indicate that the flow of thought between substantives 
(those goals in which one invests a particular interest) are structured around relations and 
contrasts. Because the relations are constantly shifting they cannot be interpreted in a 
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synchronic fashion, but only as a diachronic series of fringe-like phasings which melt and 
dissolve into each other. Indeed, as James comments in an important footnote, the 
narration of these thought processes is analogous to a young child who listens "with such 
rapt attention to the reading of stories expressed in words half of which [he does not] 
understand": the child makes "flying leaps over large portions" and attends "only to 
substantive starting points, turning points, and conclusions" (264-65). In this way, one 
moves from recognizable elements without registering the elements which cannot be 
represented in language. 
This development of James's general argument leads me to his poetic claim that the mind 
is "a theatre of simultaneous possibilities" (288). Through the "agency of attention" 
consciousness selects the elements by which it has come to recognize and order the 
world. Invading and contaminating these habitual and structuring perceptions are the 
"primordial chaos of sensations" (fundamentally bodily sensations) in which they are 
embedded (288). Whilst habits, customs and social codes (such as a language system) 
encourage individuals to reject those "swarming atoms" (289) which lie beyond 
established modes of representation, these constitutive elements remain the raw material 
of one's sense-impressions. Following James's pragmatic argument, by "rejecting certain 
portions" of this entropic world it is possible to establish a composition which serves 
one's needs in the pursuit of goals. However, resonances of chaotic impressions 
(resonances which register in those subliminal regions of which the upper selfis ignorant) 
disrupt an orderly universe of which the individual is the artist-creator. Just as he rejects 
the detenninism of Spencerian psychology, James cannot accept such an extreme 
romantic position, for it reduces the hidden complexity of thought to the manifest 
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autocracy of the sovereign artist. As becomes increasingly important when I consider 
Varieties, those critical moments when chaotic impressions invade an orderly sense of 
reality imply that one can only maintain provisional control over the self. 
Before I move on to these considerations, there is one important question which remains 
unresolved in James's thinking which proves central to the development of romantic 
science. Unless one accepts the alternative position in which the self is an entirely 
passive entity or merely the epiphenomenon of the stream of thought, it is necessary to 
establish what James means when he speaks of the consciousness willing itself to attend 
to objects. It is this topic which forms the subject of my next section. 
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(3) "The heave of the will": a Chance to Act 
In order to outline the manner in which James's redescription of the processes of thought 
has bearing on his conception of an active self, I will couple a reading of James's 
discussion of will in the second volume of Principles with a look at his famous essay 'The 
Will to Believe' (1896). By addressing the "will" as a philosophical concept, James 
stumbles upon one of the most contentious areas of nineteenth-century thought, in both 
Anglo-American and German philosophy. Although in this section I will comment upon 
certain parallels between James's and Nietzsche's considerations of the willing self, I want 
to stress that James's notion of will-as-activity is subtly different from either of the 
philosophical traditions which inform his thinking. Furthermore, by taking as his starting 
point the verb "to will", rather than "the will" as noun, or, by extension, as a 
psychological faculty, James manages to circumvent the trap of metaphysics. His desire 
to bracket off metaphysics represents a positive move towards his theory of "radical 
empiricism" which enables him to describe an embodied self rather than a philosophical 
self in vacuo. 
In the language of romanticism the will takes its place alongside the soul as :"'11 ineffable 
region of the self which eludes empirical analysis, but a region which, deriving from a 
tradition of Pauline Christianity, has frequently been a defming factor of human identity. 
Empirically, however, only the effects of the will can be perceived or judged and only by 
extrapolating backwards can the causal factor be inferred. The crucial question for James 
is whether such an inference is a good one; or, more accurately, in the light of his 
pragmatic theory of action, whether it enables the individual to do useful things and to 
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pursue desired ends. James's theoretical movement away from epistemology towards 
pragmatism does not imply that questions of knowledge should be altogether suspended; 
but, prefiguring the post-foundationalist arguments of Richard Rorty, that no absolute 
grounds of knowledge will provide human beings with the ultimate foundation for an 
active (or moral) life. For James, will is the central term for understanding this transition. 
It provides for him a useful tool, not only as an explanatory idea, but also as an enabling 
device, the belief in which can reinject a notion of agency into what may seem like a 
wholly determined environment, both in a philosophical sense and, as I comment later, 
in James's personal experience. 
James wishes to retain a notion of will, but he refuses to do so at the cost of retaining a 
metaphysical foundation for psychology. Hence, he keeps the will as a useful theoretical 
and practical tool in only a limited sense. In this section I argue that James realizes his 
need to recoup a philosophical model of agency if he is to resist both Spencer's 
deterministic philosophy and the logic of his own dynamic, but subject-less, stream of 
thought. He does this in Principles by linking a notion of will to his earlier 
considerations of attention and motivated behaviour and, later, in 'The Will to Believe', 
as a hypothesis to understand meaningful activity. 
As a representative of the Anglo-American psychological tradition, the British 
psychologist Alexander Bain, in his influential work The Emotions and the Will (1859), 
reprinted four times before the turn of the century, considers the will as a faculty which 
accounts for voluntary activity. Although John Stuart Mill's argument for volition 
successfully counters an immutable model of cause and effect, it does not appear to have 
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a sound philosophical base. Instead, it seems to constitute a belief about the world. Not 
surprisingly, the faculty of will was an anathema to the Spencerians whose Darwinian 
model was founded upon the primacy of involuntary instincts and drives. In many ways, 
the existence of will was the last line of defence for those thinkers who, like Mill, wished 
to keep alive the belief in the freedom of reasoned choice. For individuals to retain a 
sense of purpose and self-fashioning in a post-Darwinian world, it is important to assert 
a capacity for volition and a belief in the ability to make choices. James adopts and 
works through these themes, but refuses to be sucked into the futile intellectual task of 
attempting to expound a theory which can verify the existence of the will. Instead, and 
with increasing clarity in his pragmatic writings, James works with will as a device which 
enables him to account for otherwise unaccountable aspects of human behaviour. 
The other strain of writing which runs through Principles and his later work is his strong 
connection with romanticism, which furnishes him with a different notion of will as a 
descriptive term. Romantic writers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
often used the term to describe the poet's sense of agency and an inherent design in 
Nature. For Wordsworth and Emerson, for example, the will is viewed as a positive force 
which, when exercised, can invoke empathic and altruistic feelings for the wider organic 
and spiritual worlds. However, for both these writers, a guiding force (Wordsworth's 
"Nature" and Emerson's "Over-Soul") is needed in order to temper the capricious drive 
of the will. Thus, for them, the will lies somewhere between an innate appreciation of 
and sympathy for, the familiar natural world (the interpretation of Nature as sacred) and 
an activity through which the poet can express feeling. 
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At the other extreme from this expression of optimism and faith in the mythical virtue of 
human nature, the importance of the German tradition for the darker aspects of James's 
thought is evident in the light of Schopenhauer's conception of will as an evil force. In 
The World as Will and Representation (1819) Schopenhauer argues at length that the will 
is the primary source of misery and pain in this world and if humans are to liberate 
themselves, then they must cultivate the denial of the will. For Schopenhauer, life and 
will are mutually incompatible and the privileging of the one means the negation of the 
other. The life of the saint should accordingly be both ascetic and altruistic, repudiating 
selfhood and self-advancing behaviour. James has an ambivalent relation to 
Schopenhauer's ideas. He credits the German for addressing "the concrete truth about the 
ills of life" (Perry 193 Sa: 721), but goes on to reject his intense pessimism, which he 
claims is merely "a species of fatalism, in the worst sense ... an abandonment of the better 
possibility for sheer inaction" (722). Schopenhauer appears as an influence upon the 
mood of James's religious writings, but the optimistic thrust of the American's writing 
resists his intensely bleak vision. 
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer's most rebellious disciple, fuses the positive and negative 
aspects of the will in his notion of will to power. This entails the self-conscious 
overcoming of the limitations of selfhood through the exertion of the will, in an ongoing 
search for spiritual self-fulfilment. For Nietzsche, the will to power expresses itself as 
a celebration of life, to which it gives value and meaning. He moves away from 
Schopenhauer's rejection of the tyranny of the will, towards an affirmatory philosophy 
in which the will to power overtakes the self as the important defining concept in human 
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actIvIty. Although both Gennan thinkers have bearing on James's ideas, it is Emerson, 
as I discuss in the next section, who provides James's most direct link to a romantic 
tradition. The American and Gennan intellectual currents merge in James's thought in 
a twofold manner: fIrstly, through the transcendental 'Concord' Emerson, and, secondly, 
through the 'Gennanic' Emerson whom Nietzsche enthusiastically read. 
Before I proceed to consider James's account of the will, in which some elements of these 
traditions will become evident, it is important to take a couple of steps backwards to see 
how his ideas on 'Habit' and 'The Stream of Thought' bear directly on his version of 'The 
Consciousness of Self.' Although 'Will' follows some sixteen chapters after his medibtion 
on the self, conceptually it leads directly on from it. In making such a chronological leap 
in Principles I neglect much of the complexity of James's argument, but where it is 
necessary I refer to the intervening chapters. 
In 'The Consciousness of Self, James shifts from describing the constituents of the self 
to the "feelings and emotions they arouse" and to the "actions to which they prompt" 
(292). This movement, from a consideration of those cultural and bodily signs that 
maintain a relatively stable sense of identity despite the flux of experience to a position 
which establishes the centrality of agency, follows the wider scope of James's writing. 
This manoeuvre is not only a philosophical exercise, which transfers attention from 
epistemology to pragmatism, but also marks his transition to an explicitly therapeutic 
18 I fr t of his notebooks from 1887, Nietzsche claims that Schopenhauer has a "basic 
n a agmen , "II' , 'b' 
, d t d' of the wI'II" I'n his "attempt to see something hlgher .. ,m WI 109 no more, 10 emg a mlsun ers an 109 , , 
b' 'h t ' and purpose'" (Nietzsche 1968' 52) Both Nietzsche and James place emphaSIS on the su ~ e c t t Wit ou alID . ' , ' ' 
, f 'II both in the weak pragmatic sense of gettmg thmgs done and the strong pragmatIc sense 
Importance 0 WI , , " ' f h' h 'If ' 
of what is good for the selfm the pursUIt of Ideals, for NIetzsche one 0 W IC IS se -overcommg, 
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form of writing. At all times James opposes stasis as a condition to avoid, whether 
intellectually or practically, because it entails the surrendering to blind forces of instinct 
or natural laws which for him lead to a fatalistic view of life. This does not mean that 
self-contemplation should be abandoned for an active life devoid of reflection. Far from 
it, the individual should understand that certain aspects of the body "seem more 
intimately ours than the rest", and thus constitute a material home. Extending outwards 
through the circles of family and social recognition (for example, name-giving, sharing 
a common language and accepting a social role), these zones constitute a habitat in the 
world. 
Unlike Spencer, James does not believe that habitat is wholly predetermined, to which 
humans must adapt themselves if they are to survive. Clearly, an argument for adaptation 
informs James's thought to a significant degree (as it does for Binswanger and Sacks), but 
the sense that humans can develop good habits (either through self-development or 
following educational programs) implies they have the ability to alter the shape and scope 
of their habitat. 
A habitat should not be figured as a fixed zone, or territory, into which individuals are 
born; rather, the habitat is the ground for a human's experience of the world: 
If the stream as a whole is identified with the Self far more than any 
outward thing, a certain portion of the stream abstracted from the rest is 
so identified in an altogether peculiar degree, and is felt by all men as a 
sort of innermost centre within the circle, of sanctuary within the citadel, 
constituted by the subjective life as a whole (James 1950a: 297). 
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James suggests that there is a portion of the stream of experience which, although in 
constant flux, adheres together and coheres more intimately than the rest. The claim that 
there is an element which "other elements end by seeming to accrete round it and belong 
to it" (298) pushes his theoretical position precariously close to the associationist model 
he resists. However, he goes on to state that "the active element" helps to constitute and 
sustain this "innennost center" of selfhood: that is to say, the forces which can act upon 
the environment and assimilate certain sensations are those which constitute a sense of 
identity within a habitat. James calls this "center" a "home of interest", which is at one 
and the same time a cognitive and a sentient centre: "that within us to which pleasure and 
pain, the pleasant and the painful, speak" (298). Through this reading, his description of 
a "citadel" can be rescued from the assertion of an imperial self to a notion of active self-
construction only within the bounds of experience. 
J ames cannot dismiss the self as fiction (at least, in the non-real or falsifying sense of the 
term), because he claims "this central part of the Self is felt ... something with which 
we ... have direct sensible acquaintance" (298-99). Once more, James endorses 
phenomenological introspection for investigating the "palpitating inward life" of the self, 
the existence of which the individual must confinn for him or herself (299). His claim 
for a sustaining self can be stated in another way: even if the self is a fiction, it is one 
which is constructed in order to make sense of, and give recognisable shape to, the 
chaotic sense impressions of experience. James counters Hume's denial that there is any 
one entity, or faculty, which exists above the flow of sense experience by claiming that, 
because one privileges and attends to some aspects of experience over others, it is 
possible to postulate a sense of experiencing self. 
100 
Attention is not an unproblematic activity which can be easily assimilated into a simple 
perspective or by the construction of a stable subject-position, for in his Pateresque 
description of the perceptual process James writes: "I cannot think in visual terms, for 
example, without feeling a fluctuating play of pressures, convergences, divergences, and 
accommodations in my eyeballs" (300). Despite the complexity and mutability of such 
sensations (whether visual, tactile, oral, aural or olfactory), the recurring and "distinct 
portions" (302) of these impressions are seen to constitute one's centre of identity. 
In order to clarify such an account, James conceptually splits the self into two aspects: 
the adjusting, or "nuclear", self which provides a sense of continuity, and the executing, 
or "shifting", self which enables one to act upon the environment in the pursuit of future 
goals (302). In the dynamic space between these two, which is both conservative (the 
cumulative result of following habitual patterns) and unstable (the revision of those 
patterns in the light of new experiences ), James locates the sense of '1'. This 'I' is both a 
linguistic structure which enables one to express oneself in language, and a felt centre of 
activity which exists despite the blurring of the mutable fringes of experience: as James 
says, "the birthplace of conclusions and the starting point of acts" (303). 
It is productive to understand James's view of the self as a site where remembering 
(retaining traces of past activities) and willing (forcing new perceptual stances) meet. 
This leads directly back to James's consideration of time in 'The Stream of Thought' 
chapter. Memory does not trace backwards in an unidirectional fashion to connect with 
a line of identical past selves, nor does the self maintain a stable shape as it pushes into 
the future. Instead, those fringes of experience which disrupt such a linear sequence 
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cause slight modifications and disruptions in habitual behaviour. The idea of repetition-
with-difference means that the self cannot preserve the same pattern over a period of 
time, because, even within the same perceptual encounter, the combination of elements 
(the "cephalic movements of 'adjustments'" [305]) change their constitutive meaning for 
the perceiver. Consequently, James reverses the priority of knowledge over attention 
when he suggests that the "condition of the experience is not one of the things 
experienced at the moment; this knowing is not immediately known. It is only known 
in subsequent reflection" (304). Knowledge of identity is thus the operation of "thinking 
back" to make connections through the activity of memory. The nuclear self constitutes 
a site in which events in the present are ordered, but it is also partly constitutive of, and 
partly dependent upon, the reconfiguration of past elements and events. This idea enables 
James to retain a sense of selfhood (the "nuclear self') as "an abstract, hypothetic or 
conceptual entity" postulated in an act of reflection (which can be either deliberate or 
involuntary), and a "Sciousness" as the active, protean and "shifting self' (304). 
This model accounts for the manifold phenomenal world and those fringes of experiences 
to which the individual must adjust, and propels James's account of the self in the 
direction of Cavell's hermeneutic self.19 Interpretation occurs most conspicuously at 
those moments when it is necessary to connect the "shifting self' with the memory of a 
formerly postulated "nuclear self': for example, at times of crisis associated with 
19 J ' d Nietzsche's interpretative accounts of self also encourage comparison. For both thinkers, 
ames s an . I h· h . I d ·d· . 
I . th cl·al element by which meaning is given to life, a va ue w IC IS persona an I IOsyncratlc. va ue IS e cru '
Th c. N· tzsche "the individual derives the values of his acts from himself; because he has to mterpret us, lor Ie , .. h' '11 ." (N' h 
. ·t· d' 'dual way even the words he has inhented ... as an mterpreter e IS stl creative. letzsc e m a qUI e m IVI . 
1968: 403) As in James's thought, here evaluation is an aesthetic manner of relatmg to the world and one 
by which the self is able to creatively "become." 
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profound bodily or environmental changes. The necessary adjustment enables one to 
locate the bridging dynamic self as the maker of meaning, rather than the epiphenomenon 
of passive sensation. Through this line of argument James reaches a convincing position 
for retaining a concept of self which is compatible with, and not contradictory to, his 
description of the stream of thought. 
Of course, his model runs up against several conceptual difficulties. The inability to 
make sense of an event (for example, a sublime experience or a traumatic crisis) may 
result in the repudiation of the present moment for a self located in a safe past. In 
addition, the loss of memory, or the refusal to remember, may loosen the "shifting self' 
from its "nuclear" moorings into a free-floating world of unconnectable and 
unassimilable presents. But, these points do not inflict real damage upon James's theory 
(although they later have bearing on my consideration of some of Sacks's more extreme 
medical cases). As James goes on to consider towards the end of this chapter, loss of 
memory and split-personalities are "not rare in mental pathology" (336). His experiments 
with hysterics indicate that those areas of experience which cannot be expressed (either 
because the patient is neurologically impaired, or because the experiencer cannot bear to 
express his or her ordeal) indicate a subliminal level of experience which contributes to 
selfhood, but cannot itself be incorporated into a conscious knowledge of identity. To 
a greater or lesser extent, these subliminal elements are seen to impinge dimly upon 
accessible conscious experiences and, theoretically, disrupt a sense of sovereign self. 
However, these disruptive elements do not preclude or disable most individuals from 
positing a sense of selfhood through which activity can become meaningful. 
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James's sustained consideration of will transfers attention from will as faculty (as 
described by Bain), towards will as the act of attending. He begins from the premise that 
we can only execute "voluntary movements" of the body if the movement has already 
occurred involuntarily prior to mental exertion: thus, "reflex, instinctive, and emotional 
movements are all primary performances" (James 1950b: 487). Far from reverting to a 
Spencerian position in which an organism is innately equipped with a set of fixed 
responses that cannot be modified or expanded, James introduces the idea of chance to 
suggest that involuntary acts are often the result of contingent changes in environment. 
Similarly, rather than always following a fixed pattern of responses, sometimes the 
disruption of habits will force the individual to take up a different mode of response. 
Once this reflexive act has occurred, James suggests one can learn to master the response 
and cultivate it as a new habit. Prior to the willed execution of an activity, one must 
entertain the "memory-images of these sensations, defining which special act it is" (492). 
Memory enables the individual to recollect the consequences of a previous activity or 
event, which, in tum, helps him or her to make informed choices about the future. In this 
way, it is possible to actualize the memory of such a response through the exertion of 
will. 
This description seems fairly conventional, but a question raised later in the chapter 
complicates matters: 
Is the bare idea of a movement's sensible effects its sufficient mental 
cue ... or must there be an additional mental antecedent, in the shape of a 
fiat, decision, consent, volitional mandate, or other s y n o ~ y m o u s s
phenomenon of consciousness, before the movement can follow. (522) 
104 
In other words, why does James retain the will if all the self needs is a "kinaesthetic idea" 
(493) or the memory of a previous response? He concedes that in certain situations "the 
bare idea is sufficient" to stimulate activity: for example, the chain of habitual responses 
which an initial stimulus triggers off (522). After William Carpenter, he calls this type 
of immediate response an "ideo-motor action." However, when he considers deliberate 
actions, James suggests some type of "fiat, mandate, or express consent, has to intervene 
and precede the movement" in order to resolve internal conflict (522). 
Following James's earlier description of the mind as a "theatre of simultaneous 
possibilities" (James 1950a: 288), the will would take the role of a judicial decision-
maker in situations in which different options present themselves as equally tenable, or 
desirable in different ways. Where James departs from the conventional position of 
positing a faculty of will, which mysteriously exists above the flow of experience and is 
called upon to arbitrate in difficult situations, is that he understands it as a vehicle by 
which an act of attention (that which constitutes motivated behaviour) is transferred into 
bodily kinetic movement: 
The effort to attend is therefore only a part of what the word 'will' covers; 
it covers also the effort to consent to something to which our attention is 
not quite complete ... although attention is the first and fundamental thing 
in volition, express consent to the reality of what is attended to is often an 
additional and quite distinct phenomenon involved (James 1950b: 568). 
The will thus becomes the key term which James postulates in order to redescribe the 
Cartesian contemplative theatre of the mind as an embodied self existing in a world of 
activity. Although "the terminus of the psychological process in volition, the point to 
which the will is directly applied, is always an idea" (567), the application or 
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actualization of this idea in a world of matter suggests that willing is part of the 
"psychological process" rather than a metaphysical entity. 
In his explication of this idea, James speaks at length about five different types of 
decision, by which one settles contradictions; by an appeal to reason; by acquiescing to 
either internal or external pressures: by following a conviction; or by resolving to follow 
a particular course of action (531-35). In most situations decision-making provides the 
individual with few difficulties: after balancing up the options, the gains of one particular 
course of action usually outweigh the losses. Reasoned choice appears to provide the 
foundation for this model, but James's understanding of "resolve" (534) undermines the 
supremacy of reason as the crucial criterion in the making of decisions. 20 He claims that 
even if he wished to retain the idea of reasoned choice, it is not that, but the feeling of 
exertion or "living effort", which encourages him to postulate the existence of will; the 
"feeling of effort" suggesting an inner activity through which conflicting impulses are 
resolved. Unlike other types of decision-making, he claims that resolve is not a blind act 
of will, but an activity by which "in the very act of murdering the vanquished possibility 
the chooser realizes how much in that instant he is making himself lose" (534). 
Overcoming internal conflict cannot be explained with reference to the concepts of habit, 
chance or reason, only, according to James, by implicating the "heave of the will" (534). 
20 J ms to use the noun "resolve" in both its senses: firstly, to detennine or decide amongst 
ames see . . . h f· 
fl .· tions· and, secondly, as possessing the conVictIOn to persevere Wit a course 0 actIOn or con Ictmg op , . .. I tho I . . .,. hi· . 
b I· f· If It is this second meaning which ma1Ota1Os James s e Ica pOSitIOn vIs-a-vIs t e cu tlvatlOn e Ie 10 onese . . h J I k . d·· 
t· f better self(or selves). The notion of resolve serves to pus ames s wor 10 two IrectlOns: or crea Ion 0 a . 
the resolute thinking of early Heidegger and the deep readmg of Cavell. 
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This hypothesis is further problematized if willing is viewed as merely another type of 
instinct or habitual response. In response to this he argues that, because an individual can 
simultaneously entertain more than one possibility, it implies, at the least, that one 
possesses the capacity to follow a particular course of action, "whether the act then 
follows or not is a matter quite immaterial, so far as the willing itself goes" (530). He 
later substantiates this idea: 
The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most 'voluntary', 
is to ATTEND to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The 
so-doing is the fiat; and it is a mere physiological incident that when the 
object is thus attended to, immediate motor consequences should ensue. 
A resolve, whose contemplated motor consequences are not to ensue until 
some possibly far distant future condition shall have been fulfilled, 
involves all the psychic elements of a motor fiat except the word 'now;' 
and it is the same with many of our purely theoretic beliefs (561-62). 
To characterize this capacity, James introduces the idea of an "ordinary healthiness of 
will" (536), which couples an "impulsive power" to a "creative contribution" with some 
external criterion like reason, convention or belief mayor may not result in immediate 
or remote kinetic action. By extension, an unhealthy will would be one in which "the 
action may follow the stimulus or idea too rapidly, leaving no time for the arousal of 
restraining associates" (James calls this the "obstructed" will), or "the ratio which the 
impulsive and inhibitive forces normally bear to each other may be distorted" (the 
"explosive" will) (537).21 Like his relational model of mind, it is crucially the "ratio" 
between impulses and motives which constitute an area of activity over which one has 
21 Although "obstructed" and "explosive" willing is sometimes usefui for extricating ~ e e self fr?m 
particularly exacting situations, this.may. be a covert. reference to the "unhealthy" ~ e e 0:,:111 ( ~ h a t t w h l , ~ h h
. t ' ood' for the self in most SItuatIons) of whIch Schopenhauer speaks. WIth thIS m mmd, I \\ III IS no g . fi d' . f 
suspend my discussion of James's deployment of the language of health and sIckness or my ISCUSSlon 0 
Varieties. 
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some control, rather than the individual being the victim of impulse and caprice or, 
conversely, stasis and immobility. James claims the feeling of effort is the result of the 
inhibition and neutralization of those impulses of "a more instinctive and habitual kind": 
a feeling which occurs "whenever strongly explosive tendencies are checked, or strongly 
obstructive conditions overcome" (548). 
In summary, he characterizes the activity of will as a type of habit which has entered the 
realm of conscious life, and by which one has the capacity to override and legislate for 
activities which would normally occur beneath the realm of consciousness. In other 
words, it is at those moments of difficult decision making when one must recoup a sense 
of a nuclear self from the plenum of phenomena, in order to reflect and consider options 
based upon past experiences. This does not imply that James wishes to rescue some 
timeless sense of selfhood as a therapeutic prop, only a sense of selfhood which can be 
constituted from, and bears upon, previous experiences. 
According to James, the "machinery" of willed activity is "essentially a system of arcs 
and paths, a reflex system" (575). By grounding volition in physiology, he demonstrates 
that will can only be posited within the limits of natural laws and cannot transcend them: 
"the reflex way is, after all, the universal way of conceiving the business" (575). But the 
capacity to resist, inhibit or override the reflex or habitual "way", suggests a realm of 
indeterminacy, dependant upon the decisions which an individual (or, by extension, a 
collective group) makes. The "formation of new paths" (580) is an activity within 
volitional control which enables the self to switch from one course or pattern of activity 
to another. Crucially, this ability to choose between a variety of options and to 
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consciously adapt to situations is dependent upon bodily constitution (the neurological 
and physiological base) and mental aptitude (the "education of the will" [579]), but also 
upon random movements of "quasi-accidental reflexes" (580). As I elaborate in the fifth 
section of this chapter, accidental or random discharge is an important manner in which 
"new paths" can be formed, but here it is the selective capacity to choose amongst 
"possibilities" (584) which enables James to affirm the construction of a nuclear self 
which can act in and upon an "indeterminate" world (571). He claims: 
I shall ... never hesitate to invoke the efficacy of the conscious comment, 
where no strictly mechanical reason appears why a current escaping from 
a cell should take one path rather than another. But the existence of the 
current, and its tendency towards either path, I feel bound to account for 
by mechanical laws (571). 
James's position can be dismissed as paradoxically asserting the coexistence of a 
determined and an undetermined world. But, in his defence, he discerns a space of 
indeterminacy within the natural laws of cause and effect in which the self can act. 
In the preface to The Will to Believe (1897), a collection of his short philosophical essays 
from the 1880s and 1890s, James characterizes "radical empiricism" as a twofold 
enterprise which accounts for this hypothesis of a willing self. Firstly, it is empirical 
because "it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact 
as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience" (James 1956: vii). 
That is to say, the hypothesis of self emerges from an engagement with the world, its 
meaning and function being revisable in the light of future experiences. He claims it is 
a radical position "because it treats the doctrine of monism as an hypothesis, and ... it does 
not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to 
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square" (vii-viii). An inquiry into the "absolute unity" (viii) of phenomena is therefore 
suspended for a pluralistic position in which "the crudity of experience remains an eternal 
element thereof' (ix). James sets up a series of incomplete and revisable concepts by 
which he can account for those fringes of experience that philosophical monists tend to 
ignore. He does not try to prove the existence of the willing self from fIrst principles, but 
posits it in order to account for his empirical observations of individuals. Here he 
recapitulates his claim in Principles that "only by postulating such thinking do we make 
things currently intelligible" (James 1950b: 571). 
In the essay 'The Will to Believe' he substantiates this by claiming hypotheses should be 
judged upon empirical evidence. He attests "any hypothesis is either live or dead", the 
quality of the hypothesis depending on whether it "appeals as a real possibility to him to 
whom it is proposed": the "deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic 
properties, but relations to the individual thinker ... measured by his willingness to act" 
(James 1956: 2-3). James realizes that the presence of will cannot be established 
indubitably on a rational basis, because fInally it relies on a matter of belief.22 The 
hypothesis of the willing self is thus dependent upon whether it is in the individual's 
interest to entertain a notion of selfhood, by which he or she can order the flux of 
experience and act meaningfully with reference to it. For James, the postulate of will 
22 James realizes the futility of searching for philosophical absolutes. He. claims " t ~ ~ know is one t h i ~ ~ , , and 
kn &: rtam' that we know is another One may hold to the first bemg true Without the second (12). to ow lor c · . . 
F II . tho line of argument, even though J a m e ~ d e s c r i p t i o n n of physiology encourages him to pOSit the o owmg IS . . . .... fu bl I 'Th W·II 
. f ·11 as a psychological activity he realIzes that thiS pOSitIOn IS re ta e. n e I to eXistence 0 WI' . 
Believe' it is that v>'hich the idea o f . ~ i 1 1 1 makes. possible ~ o r r the individual that becomes the most Important 
consideration (in this case, the abilIty to act In a meanIngful way). 
does not enable one to alter or transgress the laws of nature, but it does provide the 
individual with a belief that he or she is capable of aspiring towards goals. 
As I commented in reference to Cavell's response to scepticism in the introduction, James 
cites the example of Pascal's wager, by which he suggests that the individual must weigh 
up finite loss (the risk of setting up false models) against infinite gain (the benefits which 
can be accrued through investigating and investing in those same models). He suggests 
"the risk of being in error is a very small matter when compared with the blessings of real 
knowledge, and be ready to be duped many times in your investigation rather than 
postpone indefinitely the chance of guessing true" (18). Even if the postulate of self turns 
out to be erroneous, James suggests that by avoiding the realm of philosophical absolutes 
individuals can revise their opinions dependent on environmental or bodily change. In 
any case, he admits, errors are inevitable, and should not (in either philosophical or 
practical tenns) be seen as "such awfully solemn things" (19). Indeed, James goes on to 
suggest that the existence of the willing self may be a moral question, "whose solution 
cannot wait for sensible proof' (22). That is to say, one needs to have a sense of identity 
to get on with life (even if its existence is irrationally postulated), without waiting for an 
irrefutable argument by which to confinn its existence. James does not refuse the right 
for other inquirers to "wait" for such proof, but for him (the experiencer, as well as the 
philosopher) to do so would be analogous to the stasis he seeks to avoid. Thus, he claims 
finally that only by acting, and believing that such activity is meaningful, can "we" begin 
to take "our life in our hands" (30). 
III 
James wishes to establish the importance of activity on grounds which are both empirical 
(the close physiological observation of Principles) and philosophical (although not 
foundational). It is through the postulate of a willing self that he is able to do this, a 
hypothesis without which his later work on religious experience would not be possible. 
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(4) "That shape am r': the Narrative of Self 
In one of the most frequently cited passages of Varieties, James disguises a lurid 
description of the mental and spiritual breakdown he had experienced in the autumn of 
1872 by attributing it to a (fictional) French correspondent. At the time of delivering his 
1901 Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh no public evidence existed to suggest that this 
passage was anything but another of the lengthy quotations which frequent the pages of 
Varieties and lend to the text a breadth which authorial discourse would fail to 
accomplish. Two years after the publication of the book James wrote to Frank Abauzit, 
who was in the preliminary stages of translating Varieties into French, admitting that "the 
document on p.160 is my own case - acute neurasthenic attack with phobia. I naturally 
disguised the provenance! So you may translate freely" (quoted in Myers 1986: 608). 
Two crucial issues are raised here. Firstly, by disguising his intention, James is able to 
leave the dramatic rhetoric to work upon the reader, instead of framing the account with 
the medical diagnosis he uses in the letter. Secondly, by concealing the provenance of 
the account he throws it open to the kind of expansive interpretation which he encourages 
in his gloss on many of the quoted passages in Varieties. Instead of reducing the 
description to the level of medical materialism, he encourages a hermeneutic pluralism 
which mirrors his own growing commitment to a pluralistic and open-ended philosophy, 
later outlined in A Pluralistic Universe (1909). 
The central italicized line of the account - "That shape am I, I felt. potentially" (James 
1985: 160) - crystallizes the fear and dread the correspondent feels in the face of the 
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vision of a mummified epileptic patient whom he had previously seen in an asylum. The 
description of the epileptic idiot ("with greenish skin, entirely idiotic") can be seen to 
draw on the ideas of the German psychologist Carl Carns who, in his ground-breaking 
book Psyche, published in 1846 and expanded in 1851, postulates that epilepsy is an 
unstable phenomenon which occupies a precarious middle space between insanity (a 
structural malady) and idiocy (an anatomical affliction): that is, between illnesses of mind 
and body. The account in Varieties depicts a wretched figure sitting motionless in a 
fugue state, which makes his appearance "absolutely non-human" (160). The figure is 
characterized, almost caricatured, in traditional nineteenth-century fashion by possessing 
all the outward physiological markers of a profound internal disorder. Sitting prostrate 
in the asylum like "a sort of sculptured Egyptian cat or Peruvian mummy", he is portrayed 
in an analogous fashion to the medical drawings which Sander Gilman suggests 
characterize the prevalent view of madness as manifesting itself in outward grotesquerie. 
In his book on Disease and Representation (1988), Gilman argues that one of the ways 
in which medical art of the nineteenth century (at least in Western Europe) distanced "the 
fear of collapse, the sense of dissolution" (Gilman 1988: 1) from the general public was 
by exaggerating the features of sufferers so that they appeared to be totally consumed by 
the disease. However, by focusing attention on the exaggerated features of the face and 
body, psychological illness tended to remain enshrined in mystery. Importantly, in 
James's account, this type of representational confinement is spatially mirrored not only 
by the limited space of the asylum, but it is also repeated by the enclosure of the 
"benches, or rather shelves against the wall" and the "coarse grey undershirt ... inclosing 
his entire figure" (James 1985: 160). 
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When the correspondent exclaims "that shape am f' he perceives in himself a potential 
coincidence with the condition of the figure who is entombed not only in the cell and his 
body, but also by the mode of language which describes him in this stigmatized fashion. 
Carus is important for a discussion of James because his book is one of the first medical 
accounts to elaborate upon a model of the unconscious, which he believes to have a 
profound influence on conscious mental life. Following closely from this, Carus 
understands the appearance of hallucinatory phantoms to be a projection of the fear of the 
self: the mental manifestation of an unconscious or barely known double who is 
nourished on anxiety and psychic trauma. He outlines three forms of "derangement of the 
conscious by the unconscious" - love, visionary trance and religious ecstasy - which 
characterize the experience of "sinking into a new world" of Otherness. In this new 
world Carus detects the "psychopathological phenomena [which are] precariously 
governed by occult forces lodged in the self, in others, and in the cosmos" (Rice 1985: 
140). 
This kind of psychic "derangement" is reflected in the acute emotional reaction of James's 
correspondent: 
There was such a horror of him, and such a perception of my own merely 
momentary discrepancy from him, that it was as if something hitherto 
solid within my breast gave way entirely, and I became a mass of 
quivering fear (160). 
In direct contrast to the enclosed and confined picture of the imagined figure, the 
emotional reaction is one in which solidity disintegrates into "quivering fear." This 
contrast is vital. The figure is stylized, hidden away from himself and the world. 
115 
categorically defined in the limited topographical and conceptual space assigned to him, 
whereas the correspondent's fear is described as a breakdown of rigid solidity into 
something fragile and unstable. Following James, it is possible to interpret this emotional 
crisis as a threshold state out of which emerges a fresh perspective. The correspondent 
is converted to a "morbid" or melancholic view in which the dominant feeling is one of 
persistent dread and insecurity. When he goes on to explain why he thinks his 
melancholia "had a religious bearing" (161), he does not retreat into the immediate 
security of the scriptures, but he reads them as a means by which he can resist the 
paralysis encapsulated in his vision. For James, the person displaying "fighting faith" 
does not seek a religious panacea, but utilizes the scriptures for the wisdom and solace 
they may sometimes bring in an ongoing pursuit for, what he calls, a committed and 
"strenuous" life.23 
Later, in his disclosure to Abauzit, when he admits that the vision actually depicts his 
own youthful experience, James appears to endorse my reading of the passage, in which 
he juxtaposes his open-ended interpretation with the enclosed and stylized image of the 
epileptic idiot. This opposition dovetails with the affiliation he displays for the morbid 
temperament over and above the attractions of the healthy-minded. Both examples 
represent attempts to resist a world-view which ignores mists and shades in its pursuit of 
monochromatic vision. Through this Cyclopean lens the healthy-minded ignore or 
dismiss the existence of evil which James perceives as part of the "very essence" of the 
23 The American historian T. J. Jackson Lears in No Place of Grace (1981) argues that, during the decades 
straddling the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was a widespread. tendency in ~ e r i c a a (b.ut ~ l s o o
apparent amongst the aesthetes ofjin-de-siecle Europe) to seek new and mtense e x p e n e ~ c ~ s . . ThIS lmks 
to James's proposal for a "strenuous life", a phrase which had widespread currency at thIS tIme. See, for 
example, Theodore Roosevelt's The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses (1900). 
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morbid-minded life (131). His philosophical aim to disrupt unity and harmony in order 
to privilege doubleness and plurality becomes, in the disguised story of the breakdown, 
a textual deployment which seeks to open up the spaces which tend to enclose, confine 
and, in the case of the mummified epileptic idiot, dehumanize. The liberation of these 
textual spaces represents James's attempt to introduce a more complex philosophy to 
religious discourse. 
The popular interpretation of the passage is that by including a third-person account of 
his own breakdown James is practising a form of self-therapy. I would like to extend this 
idea by suggesting that the passage dramatizes James's attempt to break down any system 
of thought which seeks to define and disambiguate rather than liberate (an attempt which 
characterizes one of the defining tendencies of romantic science). This quest sets the tone 
for his lectures on religious experience. By deeply embedding a notion of open-
endedness within his autobiographical account, James renders Varieties as a generically 
hybrid text. In doing so, James interweaves different strands of discourse (combining 
empirically based methodology, an interest in the unrecorded areas of psychological and 
spiritual experience, a preoccupation with the body, a collection of religious case studies 
and a theoretical subtext) to form a pluralistic discourse. However, unlike the critic 
Frederick Ruf who discerns Varieties to be structured around patterns of entropy and 
dissolution, I argue that structures can readily be found by which James places temporary 
limits and boundaries on what he considers to be the amorphous mass of pre-definitional 
flux. By examining the discontinuities between the different discursive levels of the text 
it is possible to illuminate James's notion of pluralism. 
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In the light of my earlier sections on James, the description of his breakdown indicates 
that his resistance to Spencer's deterministic principles is not based solely on 
philosophical grounds, but also derives from very personal concerns. In Varieties, James 
continues to stress the possibility of free will and autonomy in order to resist surrendering 
to the blind forces of biology and neurology. The contemporary medical language of 
neurasthenia available to James did little to uncover identifiable traits of mental illness· , 
as Jackson Lears discerns, the "common effect" of neurasthenia was a "paralysis of the 
will" (Lears 1983: 50). If illness is closely associated with a loss of volition, then belief 
in free will may enable the experiencer to invest psychic energy in narrative possibilities, 
without giving up to the lure of metapatterns or interpretive absolutes. James's therapy 
is not confined to the covert inclusion of the autobiographical passage, but can be 
discerned throughout his work. Instead of the description of his breakdown representing 
a point of rupture where autobiography leaks into the discourse of the lectures, the 
passage is better understood as one of the nodal points of the text where many ideas 
played out at length elsewhere are compressed into an explosive dramatic moment. 
In order to substantiate this claim I will take the phrase "that shape am f' and trace it 
laterally through Varieties with special reference to James's various comments on 
narrative patterns. Narrative is not merely of incidental importance to him: as he goes 
on to expound in Pragmatism, "things tell a story. Their parts hang together so as to work 
out a climax" (James 1981: 67). James's account of narrative moves away from a 
traditional linear structure which neatly resolves itself in a final denouement. Instead, he 
outlines a discontinuous discourse: "the world is full of partial stories that run parallel to 
one another, beginning and ending at odd tin1es. They mutually interlace and interfere 
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at points, but we cannot not unify them completely in our minds" (67). This form of 
narrative provides a method by which events can be ordered and interpreted, without the 
story ever reaching a te/os or a final moment of stasis. Here, James displays a close 
connection with modernist writers who resist the closure of dominant nineteenth-century 
narrative forms in an attempt to do justice to the complexities of experience. But, rather 
than pushing his thought in the direction of the aesthetic modernism of his one-time pupil 
Gertrude Stein, James looks to a romantic template to give "a shape and significance" to 
his experience of modernity (Eliot 1975: 177). 
In his comprehensive survey of romantic aetiology, Natural Supernaturalism (1971), M. 
H. Abrams pays special attention to the geometric formations which recur throughout 
romantic poetry and philosophy. He discerns the most recurrent pattern to be the circle; 
a figure which he discerns in the writings of Hegel, Novalis, Holderlin, Wordsworth and 
Coleridge, through to Nietzsche's conception of eternal return and to the beginnings of 
modernist literature. 
Abrams traces romantic theodicy (which, after Carlyle, he terms "natural 
supernaturalism" [Carlyle 1991: 193]) back as far as S1. Augustine. In Augustine he 
perceives a shift from "the classical procedure of putting oneself forward as the 
representative of a cultural ideal, performing overt deeds on a public stage, into a 
circumstantial narrative of the private events of the individual mind" (Abrams 1973: 83). 
He goes on to characterize the Confessions as "the first sustained history of an inner life' 
(83), in which Augustine reflects upon "the silent workings of God's providential plan" 
(85) and the "significance" (86) of his own spiritual journey. Furthermore. Abrams 
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discerns in this text the establishment of "the spiritual vocabulary for all later self-
analyses and treatments of self-formation and the discovery of one's identity" (86-87). 
It is, however, in Augustine's understanding of memory and time (both external and 
subjective time) where the motif of the circle first occurs. In the final book of the 
Confessions Augustine reflects upon the end of time as a return to the beginning and the 
"uncreation of all things" (87). At the end of the book Augustine speaks of the cycle of 
the days and the eternity which will arrive with the "seventh day", which "has no evening 
and has no ending" (Augustine 1992: 304); but, at the same moment, he completes a 
formal circle by recalling the beginning of his work and reverting back to his initial praise 
of God. Because in God is contained both beginning and end (227) and because His 
"seeing is not in time" (304), by communing with Him through prayer and rapture, 
Augustine claims he is able to catch brief glimpses of the eternity which lies beyond the 
time-bound constraints of perception and sensation (127). 
By transferring this circular template from the macrocosmic universe to the private quest 
of the individual Augustine paves the way for the kind of circuitous and wandering, even 
discursive, journey found in later religious allegories, such as those by Edmund Spenser 
and John Bunyan, through to the romantics and Coleridge's rather more pagan image of 
"the snake with it's Tail in it's Mouth" (quoted in Abrams 1973: 271). The quotation 
from Coleridge is particularly significant, for, just as Hegel discerns that the dialectical 
journey to ultimate knowledge (Wissenschaft) "is a circle that returns to itself, that 
presupposes its beginning, and reaches its beginning only in its end", Coleridge argues 
that the purpose of narrative (the telling of that journey) is to make "those events. which 
in real or imagined History move on in a strait Line, assume to our Understandings a 
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circular motion" (quoted in Abrams 1973: 235, 271). For Coleridge imaginative art 
contains within it the potential to make whole a universe which could otherwise only be 
perceived in sensual fragments. For example, in the tenth chapter ofBiographia L i t e r a r i ~ ~
Coleridge speaks of the "esemplastic power" of imagination which has this capacity to 
"shape into one" (Coleridge 1984: 91). However, for many of the romantics, the "circular 
motion" does not return to its point of origin, but is a constantly evolving entity which 
returns upon itself at the same instant that it moves: in the words of Hegel, "this circle is 
a circle of circles; for each member. . .is intro-Reflection which, returning to the 
beginning, is at the same time the beginning of a new member" (quoted in Abrams 1973: 
509). Out of the traditional figure of the circle emerges another more complex pattern, 
the spiral, helix, or "ascending circle" (Abrams 1973: 184), which constantly develops 
and expands at the very moment it turns back on itself. 
One of Abrams's major achievements in Natural Supernaturalism is to chart the historical 
transition from the neoplatonists who, like Plotinus, follow the mystical circle back to the 
"simple, undifferentiated unity of its origin" to the romantics who, through their art, strive 
to attain "a unity which is higher, because it incorporates the intervening differentiations" 
(183-84). The major difference between the circle and the spiral is that the latter "rotates 
along a third, vertical dimension, to close where it had begun, but on a higher plane of 
value. It thus fuses the idea of the circular return with the idea of linear progress" (184). 
Moreover, whereas the circle is a closed shape which circumscribes a well-defined space, 
the spiral is open-ended and constantly shifts its position along both its vertical 
(symbolic) and horizontal (narrative) axes. As I move back towards a consideration of 
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James's Varieties, through a reading of Emerson's important essay 'Circles' (1841), this 
geometric distinction is a crucial one to bear in mind. 
'Circles' opens with a series of repetitions: visual perception opens a concentric series 
which emanates outwards in widening arcs "throughout nature" to be "repeated without 
end" (Emerson 1983: 403). Because, like James, he roots the genesis of the circular form 
in the act of human perception ("the eye is the first circle"), Emerson immediately 
prioritizes a pattern which arises from personal experience, rather than an abstract system 
which he imposes on the world. He cites Augustine's image of "a circle whose centre was 
everywhere, and its circumference nowhere" which exists outside the range of all 
experience and represents the logical impossibility of circumscribing an outward limit to 
knowledge (403). He sees the circularity to extend in all directions: 
every action admits of being outdone ... around every circle another can be 
drawn; that there is no end in nature, but every end is a beginning; that 
there is always another dawn risen on mid-noon, and under every deep a 
lower deep opens (403). 
Although it is here symbolically deployed, the circle is a spatial pattern by which 
Emerson defines his perceptual zone in a world which fades out of view at the perimeter. 
These momentary perceptions are constantly interconnected and fused to create a 
capacious sense of the world. But there is no sense of permanence: it "is only a word of 
degrees" (404). 
The visual act cannot be frozen in order to trace the absolute circle which lies in an ideal 
sphere outside of experience. Only the individual who has the strength to resist the 
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pretentions of those who wish to track these ultimate and permanent fixtures (like the 
Unitarians whose doctrine Emerson rejected) will be able to see beyond a limited world 
of sensuous reality: 
The life of man is a self-evolving circle, which, from a ring imperceptibly 
small, rushes on all sides outwards to new and larger circles, and that 
without end. The extent to which this generation of circles, wheel 
without wheel, will go, depends on the force or truth of the individual 
soul (404). 
The "force" of the individual refers not to brute aggrandisement, but to the recognition 
that certain aspects remain outside the "mental horizon" of human knowledge: that "there 
is no outside, no enclosing wall, no circumference to us" (405). 
Emerson can be read to suggest that every limit, or floor, is provisional and will fall 
through or give way to the next, although the experiencer is not always in a position to 
see over the horizon. He claims that those who are content with limits are sinful (406) 
in rejecting the virtues of the "experimenter" (412) and the "sacred" coming of the active 
and "energising spirit" (413). Whilst his philosophy is optimistic and forward-looking, 
Emerson does not see a simple progression from one state to another as a cumulative 
process which tends towards "rest, conservatism, appropriation, inertia" (412). 
Movement comes instead through spiritual renewal which may as well go backwards to 
germination and "spring" as it goes onwards to the realization of goals. Far from the 
interconnected circles, or horizons, revolving around a stable axis 7 they are liable to 
overlap or tum back on each other: "we now and then detect in nature slight dislocations, 
which apprise us that this surface on which we now stand is not fixed, but sliding" (409). 
These sliding surfaces indicate that the circle is never completed on one plane and a 
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return to the "aboriginal" act of perception can never be truly accomplished, for the 
circular formation is open and constantly shifting away from one's grasp. Like Cavell's 
knotting and unknotting selves, tracing a circle is a temporary measure which enables one 
to ascertain location, before it is reinscribed in another conceptual space. 
Emerson concludes his essay by suggesting that the "great man" possesses the 
"character", "power and courage to make a new road to new and better goals" (413).24 
Again, this is not accomplished by blind forward movement, but by nourishing the 
"enthusiasm" and "courage" to abandon former goals (413): in short, the resolve not to 
shy away from diversions and changes of direction because of the risk involved. The 
ability "to draw a new circle" in Emerson's sense does not rest upon the desire to make 
of nature a closed and understandable system, but the "insatiable desire ... to forget 
ourselves" and previously cherished beliefs (414). The application of volition tempered 
with a belief in a guiding force (for Emerson, internal impulses directed from without by 
a benevolent Over-Soul) is a precarious combination by which Nietzschean ruthless 
autonomy is rejected without surrendering to the blind forces of whim or caprice. 
In a 1903 address delivered to commemorate the centenary of Emerson's birth, James 
begins by lionizing Emerson for his unique "blend" of morality and literary insight 
(James 1988: 316). James shares with Emerson a tendency to resist "consecutive" and 
systematic thinking, truth coming to them "in gleams, in sentences" and fragments (316). 
Despite their similarities, he remains critical of Emerson for his dual tendency towards 
24 Here the "great man" may be interpreted either as one of Emerson's R e p r e s e n t ~ t i v e e Men (1850), as the 
distinguished public figures lauded .in Carlyle'.s w o ~ k , , On . H ~ r o e s s and Hero-Worship (1841), or as one who 
seeks the "strenuous life" of the samt as outlIned m Varieties. 
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"absolute monism" and "radical individualism" (316). James goes on to say: "they sound 
contradictory enough; but he held to each of them in its extremist form" (318). In order 
to make conceptual connections between Emerson and James in my reading of 'Circles' 
I have tried to resist both these impulses which are, nevertheless, equally apparent in the 
essay. It is much easier to argue for James's proximity to Emersonian individualism than 
it is for them holding similar metaphysical positions. Having said this, James detects 
that, despite Emerson's idealistic tendencies, he "never drew a consequence from the 
Oneness that made him any the less willing to acknowledge the rank diversity of 
individual facts" (319). 
Emerson and James each ground their philosophies ultimately in the "concrete 
perceptions" of experience and, in James's words, they both conceive the individual as 
"an angle" of the "Cosmic intellect", "each moment in us a refracted ray of its vision" 
(319). Here, the metaphor of refraction implies a disruption to the process of vision and 
provides a metaphor which encourages both thinkers to turn to a spiritual "more", in 
which they detect the source of light to be beyond the realm of the senses. For James, 
this does not mean a blind turning to spiritual authority as manifested in orthodox and 
institutionalized religions; for him, the primacy of individual experience is of 
fundamental importance. James ends his speech with a line which echoes Emerson and 
Blake (who, together with Henry James Snr., were both one-time followers of the 
eighteenth-century mystic Emmanuel Swedenborg) as much as Thoreau's notion of civil 
disobedience: "it follows from all this that there is something in even the lowliest of us 
that ought not to consent" (319). 
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James's biographer, Ralph Barton Perry, detects two strong propelling forces in Varieties. 
Quoting from James's letters, Perry suggests, firstly, that James wishes to defend 
experience as the "real backbone of the world's religious life"; and, secondly, the life of 
religion is "mankind's most important function" (Perry 1935b: 327). The vital impulse 
of religion is understood to derive from the individual's own place in, and experience of, 
the universe (both the sensual world and the supersensual world of the unseen and 
unseeable), rather than issuing from the "systematic" theologies found in institutionalized 
religious creeds. For James, "abstract definitions and systems of concatenated adjectives" 
should be viewed as "secondary accretions upon these phenomena of vital conversation 
with the unseen divine" (James 1985: 446-47). If doctrinal thought is subordinated for 
its tendency to restrict and delimit the range of possible experiences, then so too should 
its narrative pattern be rejected as a universal template to follow. Instead of describing 
a totalizing narrative, James suggests that for the "twice-born ... the world is a double-
storied mystery" (166), and, elsewhere, that the morbid-minded find themselves 
immersed in "a universe two stories deep" (187). 
This rejection of established religious narratives pushes James's position toward the 
romantic (and, later, the existentialist) need to renew the social carapace of language in 
order to make it intense, personal and authentic. Moreover, it also demands that one does 
not whimsically follow ill-considered caprice, for this speaks not of "vital conversation" 
but an instinct which compels the individual to take up a necessary pattern of response. 
The pattern should not be seen to be totally determined, either culturally or biologically, 
but neither should it be completely disbanded. Instead, James seems to be searching for 
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a structural pattern through which he can avoid the dogmatism of creed as well as the 
disturbing chaos of a wholly disordered universe. As he says in a long footnote: 
When one views the world with no definite theological bias one way or 
the other, one sees that order and disorder, as we now recognize them, are 
purely human inventions. We are interested in certain types of 
arrangement, useful, aesthetic, or moral, - so interested that whenever we 
fmd them realized, the fact emphatically rivets our attention. The result 
is that we work over the contents of the world selectively. It is 
overflowing with disorderly arrangements from our point of view, but 
order is the only thing we care for and look at, and by choosing, one can 
always find some sort of orderly arrangement in the midst of any 
chaos ... We count and name whatever lies upon the special lines we trace, 
whilst the other things and the untraced lines are neither named nor 
counted (438). 
Here James illustrates the archetypal experience of modernity: the moral and aesthetic 
need to trace new patterns in the loose sand of what was once the solid stone of pre given 
religious paths. He outlines the dual need to recognize that the concepts of "order" and 
"disorder" are imposed by the observer on the "vast plenum" of "Nature" (438) and that 
the psychological complexion of humans demand that they direct attention towards 
certain aspects in order to arrive at ends-directed plans to follow. Whilst recognition and 
attention are part of his vocabulary of cognition, their guiding force consists of an 
admixture of a "vital conversation" with the unseen "more", shaped by an act of will both 
to foresee goals and to devise plans to obtain those ends. Far from being able to master 
a fixed repertoire of decisive movements, the demands upon the religious traveller force 
him or her constantly to revise and reconsider the paths started out upon. The "morbid-
minded" traveller is plagued not only with a denser and more contradictory universe than 
it once seemed, but with the added difficulties that all his or her steps must be tentative 
and carefully considered, without falling into the equally modem trap of perpetual 
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prevarication. In the tradition of protestant humility, the traveller must be constantly 
wary of the vice of pride, but, at the same time, develop the strength of character to seek 
the "strenuous life" which James proposes. 
The chapter on 'Mysticism' provides many of the clues which lead towards unravelling 
James's notion ofpath-fmding which I began to trace in his work on habit. James wishes 
to rescue mysticism from its general usage as a word of "mere reproach" (379) as he 
attempts to ground the ineffability and transience of religious experience into a concrete 
pattern which can bridge the inchoate source of inspiration with the demands of this 
world. The sense of "deeper significance" which characterizes such an experience opens 
the subject to "vague vistas of a life continuous with our own, beckoning and inviting, 
yet ever eluding our pursuit" (383). These vistas, often experienced as "dreamy states", 
are, according to James, accompanied by "the feeling of an enlargement of perception 
which seems imminent but which never completes itself' (384).25 
The haziness and capaciousness of these experiences signify a path which cannot be 
judged solely by worldly ends and which are therefore impossible to foresee to their 
ultimate conclusion. The very fact that such experiences occur indicates the presence 
ofa "beyond [to] anything known in ordinary consciousness" (412): 
25 James quotes the phrase "dreamy states" from an article by Sir James C r i c h ~ o n - B r ~ w n n p ~ b l i s h e d d in Th,e 
L t (6th & 13th July 1895), Whilst James appropriates the tenn, he takes Issue WIth CrIchton-Brown 5 
ance dd ' '" th b d I, t' osition which "follows" the phenomenon "along the downward la er, to InsanIty, ere y ua IS lC P " th h'" h h 
d ' 'ts personal significance to the level of medIcal fonnulae, James c1auns at IS pat pursues t e re ucmg I fi d 'Ofi 0 
upward ladder chiefly" (a romantic movement upwards and outwards) in an attempt to In slgnI Icance In 
all "of a phenomenon's connections" (James 1985: 384), 
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We pass into mystical states from out of ordinary consciousness as from 
a less to a more, as from a smallness into a vastness, and at the same time 
as from an unrest to a rest. We feel them as reconciling, unifying states. 
They appeal to the yes-function more than to the no-function (416). 
Whilst such an experience seems to move upwards and outwards, like Emerson, the 
perception "never completes itself': there is no fmal point of stasis, but only the promise 
of affirmatory rest. 
At the end of this lecture James characterizes mystical states as signifying "the supremacy 
of the ideal, of vastness, of union, of safety, and of rest", they open up a "wider", a "more 
extensive and inclusive world" which, taking his lead from Emerson, James believes 
cannot be known and bounded by systematic thought (429).26 As I discuss later in the 
thesis, this is analogous to Sacks's conception of health, which contains within it the 
promise of homecoming as a spur to encourage the patient to move in a direction which 
liberates rather than limits and restricts. Whilst some may choose, or be compelled to 
follow, a fixed or repetitive pattern, only by loosening these strictures can the idea (and 
ideal) of health be redescribed elsewhere. So too, for James, only the morbid-minded 
traveller who seeks a fresh and fuller conception of the universe and, in the process, 
succeeds in pushing back the boundaries of the old, can forego the material comforts of 
an earthly home in the pursuit of this final, always elusive, homecoming. 
26 This structure closely echoes the central aspects of Buddhism: at every limit there is a higher stage, or 
h · h t te of contemplation (dhyana), the pursuit of which takes the experiencer past the semblance of Ig er s a I.. . 
t Although James's religious thought has connections with Buddhism, he c alms In a postscnpt res. . . "(522) Th· b to Varieties that "I am ignorant of Buddhism and speak under correctIOn. . IS comment can e 
interpreted as a modest disclaimer or a recognition of the limitations of hiS work. 
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However, this reading begs several questions. If one can no longer invest importance in 
the old and outworn religious paths because they only lead to the strictures of earthly 
creeds, then in what direction do transient mystical experiences lead? In other words, 
where can conceptual redescription take one in pragmatic terms? James's answer is 
complicated, but he appears to suggest that the marks of mystical experience bring about 
both a new orientation to life and an inner conviction that the direction to follow should 
eschew the worldly goals of affluence, comfort and security, in order to pursue an 
Emersonian path which is constantly merging with higher routes too difficult to directly 
perceive. This path is not wholly other-worldly: the actions of those who follow the 
saintly path can have direct effects on the worldly environment around them. As 
"vivifiers and animators of potentialities" (358) saints have the strength of will to transfer 
their vision of the ideal into the realm of the real and thereby "energize" those around 
them in order to produce "practical fruits" (259). Whilst their initial orientation is 
melancholic, from this emerges a "denial of the finite self' and a spiritual need to identify 
with nan always enlarging Self' (418). This idea may seem to lead back to the 
undifferentiated unity of the neoplatonists and forward to the universal consciousness of 
Carl Jung, but James (like Cavell) is distinct in insisting that the journey to this state is 
always under way and incomplete. As a result, the narrative of the journey can never be 
finally told and must be continually revised en route. 
James concludes his lectures by commenting on the irreducibility of personal experience: 
"I tum back and close the circle which I opened in my first lecture" (484). Rather than 
actually closing the circle, he goes on to add that "I might easily, if time allowed, multiply 
both my documents and my discriminations" (484). This suggests that the circle is 
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perpetually open and its dimensions are always provisional and, therefore, revisable. In 
a footnote to his concluding lecture, he discusses the possibilities of romantic science in 
bridging the chasm between "scientist facts and religious facts" (501). This should be 
done, he says, by giving up the notion of "final human opinion" and by reverting "to the 
more personal style, just as any path of progress may follow a spiral rather than a straight 
line" (501). Not only is the circle forever open, but the figure of the spiral gestures back 
to the figures which Abrams detects in romantic writing. The pattern cuts against any 
notion of either simple return to origins or a straightforward progressive movement and, 
by implication, provides the template for the saintly journey. The spiral may seem to 
move upwards and outwards away from a material world, but, as it circles round, it 
cannot leave the body behind for more than a fleeting moment of transcendence. James 
can be read to claim that there is an unbreakable link between the idealistic aspirations 
of man who searches for "the highest society conceivable" (375) and, as is dramatized in 
his account of the breakdown, an intractable organic embeddedness in the world. 
On returning to the disguised portrait of the breakdown I have moved through an arc of 
James's writing without reaching firm ground. But, as I have argued, James's suggests 
a therapeutic path along which the convert can move away from the total paralysis 
dramatized in the hunched and lifeless figure who is bereft of will or the possibility of 
self-definition. When the correspondent retches forth the apocalyptic words "that shape 
am 1, I felt, p o t e n t i a l l y ~ ~ the reader is made aware both of an identification with the figure 
and a dissociation from the state of utter wretchedness. Varieties can be read as James's 
attempt to find an alternative shape, or pattern, which can lead away from determinism 
without leaving behind the organic body for abstract metaphysical musings. For 
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Emerson, the act of perception is central to a sense of self and a place in a cosmos and, 
without that initial act, a narrative of self-overcoming cannot unfold. Similarly, for 
James, without attention and acknowledgement (grounded in psychology and physiology) 
one cannot hope to locate oneself, for however briefly, in a pluralistic universe. 
(5) Breaching the Path: Energizing the Body 
In the last section I highlighted an emergent spatial pattern in James's writing which 
projects noetic knowledge gained through mystical experience along a temporal plane, 
but without abandoning that moment of insight for linear progression away from it. Like 
Emerson, James wishes to abort the doctrinaire aspects of Puritanism and derive a new 
spirituality from a transcendent moment of divination. Similarly, they both believe in a 
moral pattern which is intuited and divined from personal experience and without 
"reference to external authority" (Howe 1986: 9).27 In the words of Irving Howe, where 
James wishes to depart from Emerson's attempt to maintain "an immediate apprehension 
of the divine" by transfiguring experience as "consciousness lifted free from the alloys 
of circumstance" (11), is his preoccupation with the corporeal body which insistently 
encroaches on a transcendent "bliss of spiritual exchange" (9). I argue in this section that 
James's conception and formation of religious paths or, more accurately, because they are 
always constructed through an interpretive framework, spiritual narratives, should be 
conceived as energizing structures which motivate the body into action, as much as they 
do the mind. However, James's insistence on the corporeal body permits only the 
possibility of a spiritual realm by which material limitations can be transcended. 
27 One problem detected by Irving Howe is how a "moral pattern" can be " d e ~ i v ~ d " " w h o l l ~ ~ from " p e r s o ~ a l l
experience." Howe can only conjecture that Emerson's reply would be submIssIon to an mner truth WhICh 
is nurtured and counselled through contact with God and Nature. The problem for Howe seems to be that 
one can only understand this kind of counselling through the language of prayer and ecclesiastical codes. 
This is a problem which haunts James's notion of the irreducibility of personal e x p ~ r i e n c e e ~ d d Cavell:s 
version of Emersonian perfectionism: of what does experience consist? through whIch (SOCIal) codes IS 
reality interpreted? 
133 
The conceptual differences between Emerson and James also help to clarify the different 
moods of the two thinkers. If, as Nietzsche characterizes him, Emerson is to be seen as 
"enlightened", "happier", "contented", "grateful", and "cheerful" (Nietzsche 1990: 85), 
then James shares with Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer a "darker" (James 1985: 83) and 
more troubled view of the selfs relation to the universe. In his two lectures on 'The Sick-
Soul' James starkly characterizes the difference between the two tempers: "the sanguine 
and healthy-minded live habitually on the sunny side of their misery-line, the depressed 
and melancholy live beyond it, in darkness and apprehension" (135). James reverses the 
Enlightenment optical dichotomy of light-dark, to suggest a mysterious universe which 
cannot be clearly illuminated and understood. In addition, his image of the "misery-line" 
stresses the primacy of an emotional engagement over the intellectualized process of 
cognitive ratiocination. For James, the "ennobling sadness" of the European writers 
coincides with his general attitude to religion ("solemn, serious, and tender"); but, as he 
goes on to say, it "is almost as often only peevishness running away with the bit between 
its teeth" (38). He also claims that the "sallies" of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche "remind 
one, half the time, of the sick shriekings of two dying rats." James's writing resists such 
primal extremes and is characterised instead by an 'in-between', or purgatorial, tone which 
imbues it with the solemnity of "religious sadness" (38). 
Although it asserts a strong influence on his writing, the romantic gloom of the Germans 
is nevertheless tempered by the influence of Emersonian optimism which, in James's 
interpretation, rather than descending into the abyss of nihilism, results in motivating 
movement and activity. This is not the "sky-blue" optimism of the New England mind-
curists, but an inherent piety which serves to "protect all ideal interests and keep the 
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world's balance straight" (33). James's notion of a pluralistic uruverse IS more 
heterogenous and complex than Emerson's "divine soul of order", but both thinkers share 
a motivation to create anew. Varieties can be understood as James's contribution to an 
ongoing American debate (but also, more broadly, a romantic project) to relocate a 
spiritual life outside the support of religious institutions, but without ignoring its central 
importance for the solitary and experiencing human being. The "American Newness", 
detected by Howe among others, echoes A b r a m ~ c o n c e p t i o n n of "natural supernaturalism" 
and indicates the post-romantic need to redefine spirituality within the terms of 
modernity. 
Following on from my discussion on narrative patterns in the last section, I conclude my 
reading of Varieties by focusing on James's conception of energy as a motivating force, 
which, deriving from his earlier discussions of physiology and consciousness, is given 
a central place in his understanding of religious experience. James's consideration of 
energy pulls together my reading of his work on habit, 'The Will to Believe' and spiritual 
narrative. 
The "new life" which emerges out of the French corespondent's vision of the "epileptic 
patient" (160) both represents a departure from, and a supplement to, the old narrative 
pattern by projecting it through a new dimension. James calls such moments of insight 
"temporary 'melting moods', into which either the trials of real life, or the theatre, or a 
novel sometimes throw us" (James 1985: 267). The metaphor deployed here suggests a 
softening, or a liquification, of previously unified material which is stimulated by a 
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change in the habitual emotional composition.28 At these moments the self stands at the 
threshold between two possible patterns, the outcome, crucially, resulting from individual 
choice. By choosing the easy option, whether it is the comfort of simple ecclesiastical 
piety or a backsliding into drunkenness and vice, the liberation of transformation is 
eschewed for the safe and the habitual. Conversely, by choosing the more complex 
pattern the experience resolves itself as contributing towards the pursuit of the strenuous 
life: the ego-boundaries dissolve and reform in a different configuration. 
J ames does not reserve this eschewal of openness and plenitude only for those who 
safeguard themselves against religious conversion, for the "narrow" excesses of 
sainthood, characterized by absorption, withdrawal, limitation and fanaticism, also run 
tangential to his embracing vision of mysticism; only the precarious blend of energetic 
action and surrender to a sense of a larger self will propel the experiencer along the 
"extensive" and "inclusive" path. 
These two forces of action and yielding converge by affirming "the new centre of 
personal energy" and allowing it to "burst forth" (210). The active and creative element 
is the will to believe in an inner voice, to break through the constraining force of 
inhibitions and conventions and to nourish the ability to say "Yes! yes!" (261). Like 
Carlyle'S Teufelsdrokh in Sartor Resartus, James indicates this affirmatory movement 
passes "from the everlasting No to the everlasting Yes through a 'Centre of Indifference'" 
(212). In Carlyle's thought the 'Centre of Indifference' can be thought to "represent the 
28 James's phrase "melting moods" is worth comparing with the following passage from.The Stream of 
Thought' chapter in Principles: "as the brain-changes are continuous, so do all these conSClOusnesses melt 
into each other like dissolving views" (James 1950a: 247-48). 
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soul's inability to cast aside an enervating egotism, in order to attain a broader 
perspective" (Buckley 1981: 95). By undergoing a "little death" a new life can emerge 
which sheds the constraints of egoism. Whilst James acknowledges correspondences 
between his and Carlyle's affirmatory voices, the temper of James's writing positions him 
nearer to the Dionysian exuberance of the "Yes-saying" Nietzsche than the strong 
conservative politics which inform Carlyle's writing. But, while James's notion of will 
to believe overcomes the passivity of mystical experience and the activity of pursuing 
ideals, he does not share in Nietzsche's ruthless drive to overcome the self at the expense 
of human fellowship. His sharp criticism of those activities which tend towards self-
absorption and withdrawal from the world lends to his writing a note of altruism and 
compassion which Nietzsche lacks and which sets the tone for James's moral framework. 
For James the cries of "Yes! yes!" accompany the release of hidden energies; but these 
energies are already guided by an almost pantheistic feeling. James presents a negative 
example to characterize this moral framework. He argues that the impulse of the 
alcoholic which encourages him to imbibe more alcohol may seem to be affirmatory, but, 
within James's scheme, this would only be a surrender to habit: a yielding without action 
and a refusal to pursue an ideal. In his opinion, only by affirming the nuclear self in its 
connection to a subliminal self and, in so doing, giving up the earthly limits and restraints 
of selfhood can the negative and false voices be overcome. 
As I have stressed James is not a "refined" (James 1985: 520) systematic thinker who 
wishes to define either the universe or consciousness; nor does he seek the clarity of 
traditional philosophy. Instead he understands that 
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elements of the universe which may make no rational whole in 
conjunction with the other elements, and which, from the point of view 
of a ~ y y system which those other elements make up, can only be 
consIdered so much irrelevance and accident - so much 'dirt' as it were , , 
and matter out of place (133). 
Similarly, "the psychological basis of the twice-born character [is thought] to be a certain 
discordancy or heterogeneity in the native temperament of the subject, an incompletely 
unified moral and intellectual constitution" (167).29 Inspiration does not emerge from a 
conscious and reasoned process, but derives from a sudden and often violent revelation 
or manifestation of the subliminal self: "the higher condition, having reached the due 
degree of energy, bursts through all barriers and sweeps in like a sudden flood" (216). 
Such a revelation forces the experiencer to reevaluate his or her former life and redirect 
him or herself towards new goals. 
To expand upon James's understanding of energy I wish to turn my consideration to his 
1906 Presidential Address, 'The Energies of Men'. James suggests a parallel to 
Teufelsdrokh's "Centre of Indifference" through the colloquial Adironrackian term 
"oo/d": a feeling of "intellectual or muscular" staleness or fatigue. This notion is 
analogous to the state of "adhedonia" or spiritual apathy outlined in Varieties and appears 
to share characteristics with those illnesses grouped together under the collective title 
neurasthenia. James interprets adhedonia as a spiritual vacuum: a "mere passive 
joylessness and dreariness, discouragement, dejection, lack of taste and zest and spring" 
29 James's phrase "native temperament" seems to work in tension with his argument that through 
conversion the former path can be diverted or one can alter the ideals which one pursues. However, rather 
than ersonality being entirely determined, James's view of "temperament" does not preclude the e f f ~ c t t of c i r c u ~ s t a n c e e and experience to modifY disposition. Thus, he speaks in terms of "a temperament organically 
weighted" rather than genetically prescribed (135). 
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(145). It represents a state of absolute depletion and stasis accompanied by a feeling of 
spiritual vacuityj characteristics common to the symptoms which were, at that time, 
thought to comprise neurasthenia. Championed by the New York neurologist George 
Beard in the 1880s, the popular cure for the nervous exhaustion brought on by modem 
life was considered to be rest and the conservation of energy.30 
James's argument directly counters Beard's rest-cure therapy. He argues that we should 
not surrender to this general feeling of fatigue: 
it gets worse up to a certain critical point, when gradually or suddenly it 
passes away, and we are fresher than before. We have evidently tapped 
a level of new energy, masked until then by the fatigue-obstacle usually 
obeyed. There may be layer after layer of this experience (James 1971: 
34). 
By tapping into the hidden resources of the subliminal self the individual is able to draw 
upon latent motivating forces which can energize him or her into renewed activity. This 
is a very different kind of abandonment from the rest-cure. In a distinction suggested by 
the political theorist William Corlett, this would represent a loss of self-control or a 
"giving in to" impulses which exist beneath the level of conscious control rather than a 
"giving up" from asking questions about selfhood implied by Beard's recommendation 
(Corlett 1993: 3). This distinction does not necessarily implicate a model of the 
unconscious, but of an inner bodily energy which exists latently in the deeper recesses of 
30 Beard's rest-cure is diametrically opposite to James's energetic recommendations, in that it seems to 
represent an escape from, r a t h e ~ ~ than the confrontatio.n of, the f o r c e ~ ~ a ~ d d logic .of m ~ d e m i z a t i o n n as 
described in Georg Simmel's clasSIC essay 'The Metropolis and Mental LIfe (1903), In whIch the German 
sociologist speaks of the plethora of chaotic sense-impressions encountered in modem cities. Even when 
James writes on 'The Gospel of Relaxation', he suggests that the individual should "resolve to become 
strenuously relaxed" [my italics] in a self-reliant Emersonian manner (James 1899: 507). 
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the self. By making contact with the subliminal self the release of spiritual inspiration 
has the capacity to galvanize the body into a more strenuous life. As for Nietzsche, by 
tapping into a Dionysian energy source James envisages a self liberated from the rigid 
structures of egoism. By linking to the range of fluid metaphors employed in 'The 
Streams of Thought' chapter of Principles, James extends his notion of those "melting 
moods" which characterize mystical experiences. 
Once again, James's ideas touch upon Buddhistic thought (as well as Cavell's version of 
moral perfectionism) which encourages the overcoming of mental barriers in the pursuit 
of spiritual enlightenment. Moreover, the spiritual pursuit of Buddhism, like James's 
strenuous life, is never completed: the pursuit is always under way. Believers should 
aspire, for the Buddhist, toward Nirvana and, for James's strenuous religious man, toward 
saintlihood, but the ultimate achievement of the status is always deferred. Again, despite 
the similarities, one crucial difference between the two positions is that, whereas the 
Buddhist internalizes the energy and, in so doing, tends to deny the body in the search of 
higher levels of consciousness, James suggests the release of hidden energies which could 
sustain our "inner as well as our outer work" (James 1985: 37). 
James pushes his ideas of "hidden" energies towards a very individualistic doctrine of 
living at maximum energy and performing to the optimum: a doctrine which coincides 
with the late-century trend to seek intense experiences as outlined by Jackson Lears. He 
plugs into this contemporary feeling when he speaks of "excitements, ideas, and efforts" 
which can "carry us over the dam" of apathy or of "chronic invalidism" (38). James 
argues that the source of this energy (biochemical, psychic and spiritual) must stem from 
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the individual's will to confront stasis. However, the problem which shadows both The 
Energies of Man' and the lectures of Varieties is one which questions the form of 
discourse in which it is possible to conceptualize energy flow. It is to this problem that 
I wish now to turn. 
There are at least three possible discourses by which James can speak of "hidden" 
energies. The first, which links with James's metaphoric use of "dam", is the hydraulic 
system shared by Herbert Spencer in his essay on 'The Physiology of Laughter' (1860) 
and the early writings of Freud. They both posit theories which conceptualize the build-
up of nervous energy until it reaches a critical limit, at which point it necessitates release 
through a bodily outlet. In his abandoned 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' (1895), 
Freud parallels James's psychological project in Principles by seeking to "furnish a 
psychology that shall be a natural science ... to represent psychical processes as 
quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles" (Freud 1971: 1, 295). 
Freud goes on to outline a neural model of the mind "in terms of increase, diminution, 
displacement and discharge of energy or 'quantity' conceived as flowing through and 
accumulating within a differentiated network ofneurones" (Dews 1987: 45). In his later 
writings Freud can be seen to move away from a natural-scientific standpoint in the 
direction of a more explicitly metaphorical understanding of psychic apparatus. 
However, notions of discharge continue to inform a work such as Jokes and Their 
Relation to the Unconscious (1905) in the shape of laughter, which Freud conceives as 
a cathartic channel of psychic relief. 
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The second option, and one with which James also shares an affinity, links directly with 
the mood and experimentation of early nineteenth-century German romantic science. In 
his 'Condition of England' essay, 'Signs of the Times' (1829), Carlyle makes an 
impassioned plea for the emergence of a "dynamic science" which could counter what he 
considers to be the dehumanizing mechanization of rationalistic thought seen to be 
embodied in systems of utilitarianism. By evoking a distinctly romantic metaphor, 
Carlyle proposes to revitalize a science which, at that time, remained reliant on the 
physical laws of a Newtonian science: a "dynamic" science "which treats of, and 
practically addresses, the primary, unmodified forces and energies of man, the mysterious 
springs of Love, and Fear, and Wonder, of Enthusiasm, Poetry, Religion, all which have 
a truly vital and infinite character" (Carlyle 1987: 72). If Carlyle'S "science" could be 
conceptualized it would enable James to speak of ineffable phenomena in terms of 
emotions, without reducing them to the level of undifferentiated psychic energy. 
Although Carlyle outlines a programme to revitalize science he does not have the 
technical rigour to detail particulars. 
The third option)and the one to which James most closely adheres, is a discourse of 
relational structure. Here, as in the 'Stream of Thought' chapter, energies would be 
conceptualized as being part of a relational system conceived in an homologous manner 
to consciousness understood asj,erpetually moving stream. In the Jamesian description 
of consciousness, transitive relations between intentional objects are considered to be of 
greater importance than unconnected substantives. The channels through which energy 
is directed and the modes in which it becomes kineticized should not deflect one's 
attention from a consideration of the energy flow understood as the relations between its 
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physical manifestations. At the same time, one can speak figuratively of poetic, spiritual 
or religious energy as the particular end toward which biochemical energy is channelled 
without needing to revert to, for James, an obsolete faculty-based philosophy. By 
exercising the will it is possible to redirect energy through one particular channel. This 
active exertion represents both a rupturing of the old pattern and an establishment, or 
facilitation (Bahnung), of new pathways. 
In a shift away from Freud's early neurological model of mind, and anticipating his later 
thoughts on 'A Note Upon the "Mystic-Writing Pad'" (1924), Jacques Derrida encourages 
the reader to think of Freud's hypothesis of "breaching" or "path-breaking" (jrayage) "as 
a metaphorical model and not as a neurological description" (Derrida 1978: 200). In this 
way, Derrida releases the metaphorical content of "path" from Freud's explicitly 
neurological context in order to associate it with his later elaboration of a "trace which 
breaks open its own path" (214). Thus, for Derrida, "breaching, the tracing of a trail, 
opens up a conducting path" in which the old "path is broken, cracked,fracta, breached" 
before it can be rechannelled towards a new end (200). This, then, would constitute 
repetition-with-difference rather than a repetition of the same. Transferred into Jamesian 
language, "breaching" would represent either a willed or an accidental deviation from the 
rigid pattern of habit. 
For Freud, facilitation depends on the "magnitude of impressions" and the "frequency 
with which the same impression is repeated" (Freud 1971: 1, 300). But Derrida detects 
that if, as Freud conceives, memory is associated exclusively with quantity and 
"perception without memory" linked solely to quality, then "the concept of breaching 
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shows itself intolerant of this intention" (Derrida 1978: 201). Instead, the inquirer should 
attempt to examine the qualitative differences between remembered traces. Only by 
highlighting the notion of "difference between possible breaches" can Derrida reconcile 
Freud's general description of mind with the idea of "preference" (201): "the possibility 
of choice determined by facilitation" (Freud 1971: 1, 301). This position coincides with 
James's various descriptions of the directedness and attentiveness of mind to object, the 
"phenomena of contrast" (James 1950a: 242) and the will to invest spiritual energy in the 
pursuit of a goal as described in Varieties. Indeed, Freud's "magnitude of impressions" 
should not be dismissed as the remnants of his abandoned philosophy; it is possible to 
trace this notion back to romantic theories of the immensity of the sublime and the 
dramatic impression which James associates with religious experiences. 
In order to speak in terms of religious experience James must first articulate a conception 
of energy, both as a real, but latent, force (like will, the inquirer can only detect energy 
empirically through its kineticized manifestations) and as a metaphor for action. Thus, 
when he speaks of "the threshold of a man's consciousness in general, to indicate the 
amount of noise, pressure, or other outer stimulus which it takes to arouse his attention 
at all" he is talking in terms of excitation of the mind "at which one state ... passes into 
another" (James 1985: 135, 134). The mystical experience will often occur at such 
moments as a perceptual manifestation of this excess of bodily energy. But rather than 
arbitrary epiphenomena of bodily excitation, James conceives of these revelations as 
disclosing the possibility of a different path to follow than the self-serving worldly road. 
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Whereas Carl Cams links peculiar mental states with a visionary revelation of a double 
self, Freud understands hallucinations to be merely a manifestation of psychopathology. 
Rather than trying to explain away these kinds of hallucinatory phenomena, as Freud does 
in his essays on Dostoyevsky and 'A Religious Experience' (both of 1927), James, like 
Carns (and, later, Binswanger), speaks in terms of the exceptional and extraordinary 
nature of mystical experiences over and above an attempt to characterize them in terms 
of pathology. For James, the threshold between one mental state and another, where the 
"new" state leaves a permanent mark on the psyche, would be the moment of "breaching": 
both in terms of the rupturing of an old pattern and the reformulation of a different 
configuration which, adhering to the spiral pattern discussed in the last section, moves 
upwards and outwards away from earthly constraints. 
In James's philosophy this "giving in to" the revelations as they occur is not a passive 
process. The search for a strenuous life is one which sets the tone for the energetic excess 
of these experiences. In addition, the choice to heed insights takes a resolute strength of 
will, because invariably the vision points out the more arduous of the two directions. 
Rather than stimulating a "backsliding" to an old pattern, the experiencer should realize 
that his perception of himself is always temporary and incomplete. Such a recognition 
may then initiate a striving for a fuller appreciation of the human condition, which, in 
Jamesian thought, is representative of both an acknowledgement of a subliminal self and 
an urge to overcome "the habit of inferiority to our full self' (James 1971: 38). 
James poses two important questions which emerge directly from this desire to be other 
than, or more than, the existing self. Firstly, 
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admit so much, then, and admit also that the charge of being inferior to 
their full self is far truer of some men than of others; then the practical 
question ensues: to what do the better men owe their escape? and, in the 
fluctuations which all men feel in their own degree of energizing, to what 
are the improvements due, when they occur? (38)31 
James directly answers his questions when he suggests that "either some unusual stimulus 
fills them with emotional excitement, or some unusual idea of necessity induces them to 
make an extra effort of will. Excitements, ideas, and efforts, in a word, are what carry 
us over the dam" (38). Whether it is "stimulus" or "idea", only by cultivating a sensitivity 
to the qualities of the "unusual", the peculiar and the strange is it possible to shake off "an 
inveterate habit" and the adhedonia of daily life. According to James, daily life tends to 
impress upon individuals a routine pattern which encourages "habit-neurosis" (39). One 
can make an exerted effort to avoid such repetitions by defamiliarizing the ordinary and 
the habitual; but the abrupt and unpremeditated nature of the revelations serve to indicate 
to the experiencer "a deeper kind of conscious being than he could enjoy before" (James 
1985: 157). 
Secondly, James suggests that conversions can be empowering. He claims they can 
"unify us", even if only temporarily, to result in "freedom, and often a great enlargement 
of power" (James 1971: 47). By following the arduous path, then, one may encounter a 
range of freedom which would be unthought from within the strictures of daily routine. 
The tracing of a visionary path may lead to an understanding from which one is able to 
confront, or to escape from, one's imprisoning condition, even if it is at the risk of 
31 For James these "better men" are those "twice-born" religious believers who have written of their 
conversion experiences: Ignatius Loyola, St. Theresa, St. John of the Cross, Swedenborg, Tolstoy, Bunyan 
and Emerson. 
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socially defmed integrity. This notion of rebellion against social confonnity and clinical 
categories of illness perhaps indicates a higher realm of morality. James goes on to say 
"whatever it is, it may be a high-water mark of energy, in which 'noes,' once impossible, 
are easy, and in which a new range of 'yeses' gains the right of way" (47). This would be 
the possibility of negation and affinnation on a higher, existential, platfonn which 
eschews class-bound morality, "intellectual respectability", "literality" and "decorum" for 
their tendency to confine the ends to which humans can direct their energy: "locking up 
the rest of his organism and leaving it unused" (49). The metaphor here of "locking up" 
and unlocking the self suggests an activity more refined than simple unblocking brought 
about by a release of energy. It seems the key is to be procured only through constructing 
and nurturing a narrative pattern which can incorporate vivid and intense perceptual 
manifestations. 
For James, a life of moral virtue is not necessarily a stoic life. Anything which unlocks 
or excites the "Yes function in man" and which "makes him for the moment one with 
truth" should be utilized (James 1985: 387). Anticipating Aldous Huxley's 
experimentation with mescalin, James suggests that to stimulate mystical experiences one 
should make experimental use of alcohol, nitrous oxide and the search of the 
extraordinary in order to unlock this "higher" life.32 Where James and Nietzsche part 
company, however, is the Jamesian notion that there are boundaries where the pursuit of 
32 In the double-book The Doors of Perception (1954) and Heaven and Hell (1956) Huxley reflects upon 
his attempts to extend the mystical tradition with "controlled" use of hallucion?genic drugs ° ° It is also 
° t to g that Oliver Sacks, in one of his numerous appendices to the 1990 edItIOn of Awakenmgs, pays 
ill eres m ° h °th h" ° 
°b t t three early medical experimenters - Freud, James and Havelock Ellis - w 0 toy WI t e notIOn 
trlueo ° °b °b 
of a drug which wiIl banish sadness and fatigue, increase energy, expand conSCIOusness, 1m ue or relm ue 
the world with wonder" (Sacks 1991 a: 323)0 
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intense experiences should be delimited by a strong sense of morality and human 
compassion. 
I intimated in my opening comments to this section that James's writing on sublime 
experiences proves richer for my consideration than either the transcendentalists or the 
mind-curists, primarily because of his preoccupation with the body. At the beginning of 
both Principles and Varieties he commences his discussion with reference to physiology 
and neurology. He expresses the psychological postulate that "there is not a single one 
of our states of mind, high or low, healthy or morbid, that has not some organic process 
as its condition" (14). Although he wishes to shift his consideration to the "higher" 
processes of mind, he constantly returns to a notion of the body as the material vehicle 
for mental experiences: "every one of them without exception flows from the state of 
their possessor's body." While one may transcend the corporeal to maintain an 
unmediated union with God (or a similar transcendental signifier), James is intensely 
aware of limits which infringe and constrain these metaphysical flights of the mind. He 
criticizes the limited "healthy-minded" perspective which in the search for a sanitized 
"perfect health" (183) tends to "divert our attention from disease and death" to create a 
hygienic "poetic fiction far handsomer and cleaner and better than the world really is" 
(90). In an 1897 tract entitled In Tune With the Infinite, written by one of New England's 
chief mind-curists, Ralph Waldo Trine, this would be achieved by a simple "exchange 
[of] dis-ease for ease, inharmony for harmony, suffering and pain for abounding health 
and strength" (James 1985: 101). However, for James, this would be a denial of the 
presence of evil or strife in the universe and with it a denial of man's finite and complex 
conlposition. 
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James goes on to quote another mind-curist, Henry Wood, who, in Ideal Suggestion 
Through Mental Photography (1899), considers the "soul's real world" to be that 
which it has built of its thoughts, mental states, and imaginations. If we 
will we can turn our backs upon the lower and sensuous plane, and lift 
ourselves into the realm of the spiritual and the Real, and there gain a 
residence ... The spiritual hearing becomes delicately sensitive, so that the 
'still, small voice' is audible, the tumultuous waves of external sense are 
hushed and there is a great calm (117). 
Herein are echoes both of James's recommendation to exercise the will in order that the 
individual might move away from a "lower" plane and his attention to qualitative detail 
("a still small voice" [James 1950: 549]) which is discerned amongst the noise of sensual 
tumult. However, it is also possible to detect a strain of divine healing, which, closely 
connected to ideas of mind-cure, encourages a shedding of all that is corporeal. Thus, 
James states "in mind-cure circles the fundamental article of faith is that disease should 
never be accepted. It is wholly of the pit" (James 1985: 113). Whilst he would 
encourage the pursuit of goals to lift humans out of repetitive and dehumanizing patterns, 
he realizes that only by accepting and embracing the "dirt" of the "pit" can one begin to 
understand mortality. James evokes the supernatural elements of Macbeth (c.1606) as 
well as the universal morality dramatized in mediaeval Everyman plays when he tropes 
on a fine phrase: "still the evil background is really there to be thought of, and the skull 
will grin in at the banquet" (140). 
It is as if the body acts as a material regulator for mental or spiritual life which will 
always betray a Faustian flight to reach divinity. Of course, the betrayal is only apparent. 
James claims that biochemical energy provides the initial stimulant for mystical 
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expenences. Thus, the flight is inscribed in the space of the body. Indeed, there is no 
real flight because the mind and spirit can only be understood in reference to the 
physiological. 
James does not suggest that all mystical experiences occur in a state of bodily excitation 
(take, for example, the case of J. A. Symonds and his state of muscular rest [385]); but 
only that, for him, the body represents the ultimate site of one's experience (although, in 
Human Immortality (1898), he does leave open the possibility of an afterlife). 
Conversely, although psychic experience is seen to be a transmissive function of the 
brain, it is irreducible to the bodily states which determine it. Only with reference to 
James's activity of willing, as described in Principles and 'The Will To Believe', is it 
possible to approach a conception of Carlyle's "dynamic science." In this way, James 
seeks to avoid the traps of monism and dualism for a pluralistic model which enables him 
to speak of directing energy towards the "breaching" of old paths and towards the pursuit 
of new. It is not a wish to escape the bodily condition which James commends, because, 
for him, the body is a source of life and vitality. Rather, he encourages a conceptual shift 
away from stasis towards an open and incomplete universe and, with it, a pragmatic 
movement towards a narrative of spiritual plenitude. 
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II. Ludwig Binswanger 
I sat listening to my strange travelling-companion, 
who spoke to me of Being, of Life, of Man. 
Thomas Mann, 
Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Man (1954) 
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(1) Circumventing the Mind-Body Problem: Binswanger versus Freud 
In the first chapter I discussed the manner in which James shifts his discussion of the 
conscious and embodied self away from a Cartesian description of two distinct, yet 
interacting, realms, towards the formulation of an integrated psycho-physical structure. 
However, despite James's attempts in Principles to dissolve this dichotomy, he continues 
to deploy a language of mind and body and, thereby, retains an implicit dualism. This 
does not directly inflict damage to his theory of pragmatism; but, his attempts to wrest 
psychology away from metaphysics continue to remain problematic. 
It is Ludwig Binswanger, the Swiss psychiatrist and existential analyst, to whom I now 
tum in order to investigate another set of ideas which attempts to dissolve mind-body 
dualism in order to reconceptualize the sphere of human existence. I This is not purely 
a theoretical exercise for Binswanger, but also a means by which he can radicalize what 
he calls the "Magna Charta" of psychiatry which bases the psychological study of man 
on a model taken from natural science. Binswanger's extensive correspondence with 
Freud during the 1910s revolves around a dispute concerning the nature and role of 
psychological analysis in the human sciences; the outcome of which provided impetus 
for the practice of various strains of existential therapy across Europe during the 1930s 
and thereafter. 
1 Binswanger's only direct link to James is a mention of the American thinker's "endogenous depressive 
desperation and anxiety" (as represented in the b r e a k ~ o ~ ~ ~ f t h e e French correspondent in V a r i e t i e s ~ , , in 
Uber Ideentlucht, ZUrich, 1933, 138. However, as I will mdlcate, there are a number of conceptuallmks 
which align the two thinkers in key areas of their thought. 
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Whereas James's interest in psychology is, more often than not, directed towards either 
himself as experiencer (as can be detected in the disguised account of his breakdown in 
Varieties) or the abstract psychological subject of Principles, Binswanger's case studies 
focus explicitly on the life-world (Lebenswelt) of individual patients. In order to describe 
this shift of emphasis, which I develop further in the chapter on Sacks, this chapter will 
be divided into five sections in which I explicate Binswanger's thought and assess his 
contribution to the tradition of romantic science. Carl Jung, his one-time teacher at 
ZUrich, perhaps has as much claim to this tradition as does Binswanger, but Jung, in his 
studies of mysticism and the occult, arguably leans further towards the pole of 
romanticism than would be productive for my thesis. By linking questions of identity 
with problems of interpretation, Binswanger's thought lends itself to the tenor of my 
study, especially through his engagement with Martin Heidegger's hermeneutic 
phenomenology. Moreover, Binswanger's emphasis on Being (Sein) does not totally 
debunk Freud's vision of psychoanalysis, but seeks to complement it, by introducing a 
method of study which he deems to have been hitherto neglected in the human sciences. 
In the first two sections of this chapter I construct a framework, both historical and 
theoretical, through which Binswanger's case studies can be viewed and tested. This 
section considers some of the central areas of dispute between Binswanger and Freud, 
especially with reference to the former's appropriation of ideas expressed in Heidegger's 
Being and Time. In the second section I explore Heidegger's influence on Binswanger 
more thoroughly and examine some of the areas in which the Swiss psychiatrist departs 
from the German's founding existentialist work. Here, I consider the claims of a rival 
Swiss analyst, Medard Boss, who takes issue with what he and Heidegger view as a 
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subjectivist undercurrent in Binswanger's work. The third section focuses on 
Binswanger's essay 'Dream and Existence' (1930), which is central for assessing his 
importance both to existential analysis and to the thought of Michel Foucault. Foucault's 
early work rooted in phenomenology is important here, including his introduction to 
Binswanger's essay (1954), but I also read back into 'Dream and Existence' Foucault's 
later neo-Nietzschean writings on the aesthetics of existence in History of Sexuality and 
Technologies of the Self. Like the section on will in the previous chapter, this section 
provides a theoretical context for my concluding two sections, in which I attend to the 
details of the cases of 'Lola Voss' and 'Ellen West', published in Binswanger's book, 
Schizophrenie (1957). 
Swiss psychiatry made important advances in the early years of the twentieth century, 
especially in the Gennan speaking parts of the North where Binswanger studied at 
Burgholzli hospital under Eugen Bleuler and lung. Burgholzli had served as a training 
clinic for ZUrich University since 1860 and became an important focal point for Swiss 
psychiatry after lung's arrival in 1900 and Binswanger's in 1906. Binswanger met Freud 
in 1907 on a trip to Vienna and developed a close friendship after his move to 
Kreuzlingen, where he took up a post at Bellevue sanatorium founded by his grandfather 
Otto Binswanger (who wrote the standard Swiss textbook on hysteria in 1904) and 
continued by his father Robert Binswanger. 
Freud knew the Binswanger family and felt favourably about Bellevue, referring some 
of his own patients there. Although both lung and Binswanger came to disagree with 
similar aspects of Freud's psychological principles, the younger Swiss retained his 
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personal friendship with the Austrian analyst long after their meeting in 1907. The 
friendship is documented in Erinnerungen an Freud (1956)2, a book in which Binswanger 
comments on the paternal role Freud took in relation to him (an attitude which Jung 
rebelled against).3 Indeed, in his diary Binswanger writes that he cared more for Freud 
as a "human being" for his "scope and depth of humanity" than he did for Freud as a 
scientist (quoted in Schmidl 1959: 47). This expression of emotion is not merely 
illustrative of his depth of feeling for Freud, but is central to Binswanger's analytic 
project, through which he seeks an anthropological understanding of man and an 
empathic relationship with his patients. In short, he believes it is necessary to empathize 
(einfuhlen) with his patient's condition prior to any thematic study of him or her. Despite 
the obvious problems such an emphasis poses for transference in therapy, Binswanger 
links this empathic understanding with an attempt to include those aspects of the patient's 
psychological world which the approaches and taxonomies of natural science fail to 
address. In a similar manner to James, Binswanger wishes to include aspects of psychic 
life (primarily phenomenological and spiritual aspects) which are not directly available 
to empirical investigation. Both thinkers wish to radicalize empiricism by developing a 
phenomenological approach to the self. 
2 Translated as Sigmund Freud: Reminiscences of a Friendship, New York: Grune and Stratton, 1957. This 
book provides an alternative view to standard biographies of Freud (Jones 1955 & Gay 1989), which tend 
to underplay the private and p r o f e s s i o ~ a l l relationship ben:een. Binswanger ~ d d Freud. See also 
Herausgegeben von Gerhard Fichtner, SIgmund FreudlLudwIg Bmswanger, Bnen:echsel 1908-1938 
(1992) and Fritz Schmidl's essay on 'Sigmund Freud and Ludwig Binswanger' (Schmldl 1959). 
3 This is best illustrated in the letters Jung sent to Freud in the years preceding his resignation from the 
presidency of the International Association of Psychoanalysis in 1914, The Freud/Jung Letters ~ M c G u i r e e
1991: 256). See also the chapter on Freud in Jung's autobiographical Memories, Dreams, ReflectIOns, 1961 
(Jung 1995: 169-93). 
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Binswanger's attempt to broaden the focus of psychoanalysis represents the cornerstone 
of his thought, and one which is best viewed from a dual perspective. Many of his 
theoretical writings and public addresses discuss those areas of thought Freud inherited 
from a nineteenth-century tradition of biological science which, in tum, had helped to 
delineate a specific area of study for psychiatry and psychoanalysis. As I discussed in the 
last section on James, Freud's attempt to forge psychoanalysis as a natural science is 
evident throughout his writings, from the abandoned 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' 
through to his important Metapsychological Papers written in the mid-1910s and his 
lectures on psychoanalysis in the 1930s. To investigate Binswanger's descriptions of this 
project and his departure from it, it is important to clearly identify the theoretical 
differences of the two analysts. I will do this by coupling a consideration of Binswanger's 
characterization of Freud's project with a reading of the related areas of Freud's own 
writings. This will enable me in the next section to clarify those aspects of Heidegger's 
thought which bear upon Binswanger's work and furnish him with an alternative 
theoretical vocabulary. 
In his essay on 'Freud and the Magna Charta of Clinical Psychiatry' (1955), Binswanger 
states that psychoanalysis has inherited its "basic conceptual categories" from what he 
views as the founding moment of clinical psychiatry in 1861 (Needleman 1963: 186).4 
The second edition of Wilhelm Griesinger'S Pathologie und Therapie der psychischen 
4 S al of Binswanger's essays to which I refer in this and subsequent sections have been translated in 
tw e v e l ~ ~ ctions on existential psychoanalysis: Jacob Needleman, ed., Being-in-the-World: Selected Papers o co e . . d . b th d· d II . 
of Ludwig Binswanger (1963), which includes a long theoretical mtro uctlOn ~ ~ e e It or an a c.o e c t ~ o n n
fB · anger's previously untranslated essays, and Rollo May et ai, eds., EXistence: A New DImenSIOn o msw . . f h . I I ·d in Psychiatry and Psychology (1958), which proVides a variety 0 ot er source matena a ongsl e 
translations of B inswanger. 
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Krankheiten was published in this year (originally published in 1845), in which the first 
director at Burgholzli claims that because psychic phenomena are shown to be organically 
rooted in brain processes, they "ought only to be 'interpreted' by natural scientists" (186). 
Binswanger criticizes Griesinger's understanding that the psyche is comparable to the 
physiological reflex action, and therefore should be approached through similar 
conceptual and methodological procedures: he "reduced human psychic life to 
quantiatively variable, dynamic elementary processes taking place in objective time" 
(186). This materialistic model dictates that subjectively-felt qualitative experiences are 
to be understood to derive from "elementary processes in neural matter" (187). In a later 
case history, Binswanger expresses his reservations about such reductionism: 
we immediately realize how radical is the process of reduction which the 
natural-historically oriented clinical method must use in order to be able 
to speak of a disease-process and to project it upon the 'organism' and the 
structure and modes of functioning of the brain (May 1958: 329). 
Whilst Griesinger does not preclude the possibility of leaving "the door open for a 
'descriptive and analytical' or verstehende psychology" (Needleman 1963: 187), 
Binswanger writes that "today [1955] the charter shows signs of having become so 
dogmatically rigidified that many of its advocates deem any measure proper that would 
condemn and excommunicate those scientists who seem to hold opposing views" (188). 
If the Magna Charta proclaimed that Western psychiatry should be understood as a 
branch of natural science, then Freud's adherence to this model is seen by Binswanger to 
strengthen and dogmatize Griesinger'S ideas. However, although contaminated with the 
language of natural science, it is important to note that, as Paul Ricoeur argues, Freud's 
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project seeks to extend the scope of medical psychiatry by developing psychoanalysis as 
a specifically interpretive practice (Ricoeur 1970: 20-36). 
Binswanger goes on to state that "Freudian theory fills in a very pronounced gap in the 
charter", but it also "deepens the very ideas contained in it by casting light upon things 
that could never have been seen from within the charter alone" (204). By strengthening 
the claim of psychiatry to be viewed as a branch of a natural science, Binswanger accuses 
Freud of translating the "pictorial language of psychology" into "more uniform, coarser, 
chemical and physical 'images' that, for him, seemed closer to reality" (200). This 
statement implies that it is not Freud's understanding of empiricism per se to which 
Binswanger takes exception, but the materialistic and epistemological presuppositions 
which underpin Freud's conception of psychic life. 
Binswanger reiterates and expands upon these ideas in many other of his essays, but his 
basic point is that psychoanalysis cannot fulfil itself as a general theory of psychology if 
it is conceived only as a branch of natural science. This moot point arises from the 
central differences between the two analysts. Despite Freud's assertion that "strictly 
speaking ... there are only two sciences - psychology, pure and applied, and natural 
science" of which psychiatry is one branch (Freud 1946: 229), in his lecture on 'A 
Philosophy of Life' (1932) he argues that psychoanalysis is not "in a position to create a 
Weltanschauung of its own" (232). Freud speaks derogative1y about a Weltanschauung, 
by which he means: 
an intellectual construction which gives a unified solution of all the 
problems of existence in virtue of a comprehensive hypothesis, a 
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construction, therefore, in which no question is left open and in which 
everything in which we are interested finds a place (202). 
Instead of offering a "unified solution", Freud realises that psychoanalysis "does not take 
everything into its scope, it is incomplete and it makes no claim to being comprehensive 
or to constituting a system" (232). 
Binswanger's disagreement with Freud rests upon what he understands as the Austrian's 
misconception of Weltanschauung as a totalizing philosophy of life. Freud claims that 
psychoanalysis "is quite unsuited to form a Weltanschauung of its own; it must accept 
that of science in general" (203), whereas Binswanger wishes to extend Heidegger's 
project by examining the basic structures of existence. By focusing upon "the existential 
concept of science" Binswanger argues that "psychiatry in general [is placed] in a position 
to account for the actuality, possibility, and limits of its own scientific world design or, 
as we may also call it, transcendental horizon of understanding" (Needleman 1963: 206). 
The "transcendental horizon of understanding" enables the existential analyst to address 
the limits of the natural-scientific view and to contribute to "the effort of psychiatry to 
understand itself as science" (207). He goes on to suggest that "such an accounting 
cannot be executed with the methods of the particular science itself, but only with the aid 
of philosophical methods" (208). 
The disagreement is essentially with Freud's resistance to the "encroachment" of 
speculative philosophy into the realm of natural science (from which psychology had 
broken free in the late nineteenth century), against Binswanger's assertion that such a 
modification would provide science with the means to "understand itself', by accounting 
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"for the manner in which "qua this particular scientific mode of grounding, it approaches 
the things it studies and has them speak of it" (208). He clarifies this point when he later 
claims that an "analytic of existence ... can indicate to psychiatry the limits within which 
it may inquire and expect and answer and can, as well, indicate the general horizon within 
which answers, as such, are to be found" (211). In this way Binswanger seeks to rescue 
the spirit of Weltanschauung (if not the term itself) from Freud's criticisms of it and to 
forge an analytic method which addresses the "total phenomena" of psychic life (May 
1958: 329). 
In the same essay, Binswanger claims that both psychiatry and psychoanalysis (stimulated 
by the defections of Jung and Alfred Adler) have recently reached a crisis point 
concerning their founding presuppositions. He argues that the crisis can only be resolved 
by carrying out a form of "empirical existential-analytic research", in order to "cast light 
on psychiatry's horizon of understanding" (211). In practical terms, this directive 
encourages a radical reconception of both psychic disturbance and the human being in 
whom the disturbance is manifested. Binswanger claims that most practitioners of 
psychiatry have tended to view human beings "within the natural-scientific - mainly 
biological - horizon of understanding" (208-9). This means that the object of study for 
natural scientists is "the 'sick' organism", whereas Binswanger wishes to attend to the sick 
"human being": in other words, how sickness is manifested in the individual psyche. 
Although this comment does not seem very different from a reading of Freud's case 
studies as close investigations of idiosyncratic psychic disturbances, it does emphasize 
how important it is for the analyst to be receptive to the psychological requirements of 
the patient. As with other branches of romantic science, this anthropological project 
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firmly emphasizes the individuality and peculiarity of the subject over against a 
cataloguing of symptoms. 
Whilst he wishes to broaden "the horizon of understanding", Binswanger does not see the 
two projects - the scientific and the anthropological - as mutually exclusive: "in actual 
practice, these two conceptual orientations of psychiatry usually overlap" (209). 
However, he does stress that empathy with the patient in therapy must occur prior to any 
systematic categorizing of the patient as a specific type. This point corresponds to 
Heidegger's division between ontological understanding (the study of structures of 
existence) and ontic, or thematic, understanding (the study of factical and factual 
structures). In an essay on Edmund Husserl, Binswanger stresses 
the idea of being is not wholly coincident with the idea of being an object, 
or, in other words, that being and being an object cannot be used as 
interchangeable terms ... this is at any rate the fundamental thesis of 
Heidegger's ontology, as well as our own (Binswanger 1942: 201). 
He argues that only if an ontological mode of understanding provides the focus for 
analysis can ontic understanding be rescued from a reductive or partial understanding of 
psychic disturbance. Binswanger is not primarily worried about Freud's rigorous 
scientific approach, but he is concerned with his dismissal and reduction of those areas 
of psychic life which manifest themselves in ways not discernible within a conventional 
empirical framework. The aim of an analytic of existence is to indicate what is 
withdrawn, or lost, when humans are understood only with reference to the concepts 
taken from a limited sphere of ontic understanding. As such, like James, Binswanger's 
phenomenological approach can be seen to be radically empirical. 
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Freud and Binswanger crucially differ over their respective understanding of what an 
empirical approach to the self entails. In 'The Existential Analysis School of Thought' 
(1946), Binswanger characterizes these two types of "empirical scientific knowledge" as, 
firstly, "discursive inductive knowledge" which entails "describing, explaining, and 
controlling 'natural events'" and, secondly, ''phenomenological empirical knowledge in 
the sense of a methodical, critical exploration or interpretation of phenomenal contents" 
(May 1959: 192). In the hermeneutic thought of Ricoeur (himself influenced by the 
phenomenology of Gabriel Marcel and Heidegger in the 1930s) the former is aligned with 
an explanatory project which seeks to "expose and to abolish idols which are merely the 
projections of the human will", whereas the latter stresses understanding which "requires 
a willingness to listen with openness to symbols and to 'indirect' language" (Thiselton 
1992: 344). Ricoeur wishes to combine explanation with understanding to compensate 
for the limitations of each: the reductive tendency of the former and the uncritical nature 
of the latter. 
It is an oversimplification to suggest that Freud adheres only to the explanatory pole and 
Binswanger to the ideal of understanding, but for the purposes of this discussion the 
general drift of their respective writings can be characterized as such. Moreover, it is 
Binswanger who seeks to redress the explanatory bias of Freudian writing, not to 
deliberately oppose it. I will consider each of these approaches (explanation and 
understanding) in turn in order to clarify the parameters of, and the problems posed by, 
Binswanger's existential analysis. 
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In 'A Philosophy of Life' Freud stresses the scrupulous attention demanded by the object 
of psychoanalytic study and the importance of the intellect in analytic thought: "our best 
hope for the future is that the intellect - the scientific spirit, reason - should in time 
establish a dictatorship over the human mind" (Freud 1946: 219). He claims that his 
psychoanalytical concepts are postulated only after attending closely to behaviour and 
symptoms. Thus, for example, the unconscious and the ego are not to be seen as part of 
"a speculative system of ideas" which are then imposed on his patients' experiences; but, 
as he says, they are "the result of experience, being founded either on direct observations 
or on conclusions drawn from observations" (208). Indeed, Freud's understanding of the 
revision and modification of concepts is quite sophisticated and, at times, reminiscent of 
James's pragmatic approach. For example, in 1915 Freud writes: 
The true beginning of scientific actIVity consists .. .in describing 
phenomena and then in proceeding to group, classify and correlate them. 
Even at this stage of description it is not possible to avoid applying 
certain abstract ideas to the material in hand, ideas derived from 
somewhere or other but certainly not from the new observations 
alone ... They must at first necessarily possess some degree of 
indefiniteness; there can be no question of any clear delimitation of their 
content. . .It is only after more thorough investigation of the field of 
observation that we are able to fonnulate its basic scientific concepts with 
increased precision, and progressively so to modify them that they 
become serviceable and consistent over a wide area (Freud 1984: 113). 
Without such explanatory concepts psychoanalysis would have no basis for therapy nor 
any adequate tools for analysing anxiety or psychosis. The hypothesizing, revision and 
modification of concepts is thus confinned as a necessary precondition for an interpretive 
SCIence. 
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Binswanger agrees both with these points (although, as I later discuss, he came to query 
the existence of the unconscious in terms of a "simple opposition" to consciousness 
[Binswanger 1957: 64]), but he is unhappy with Freud's reductive views of religion and 
art. Freud claims both are the epiphenomena of instincts which themselves lie "on the 
frontier between the mental and physical" (Freud 1984: 108) and he understands spiritual 
and aesthetic impulses to be sublimations of those instinctual drives which form the basic 
dynamics of psychic life. Because imagination and spirit are impalpable, he perceives 
them both to be illusions: art is "almost always harmless and beneficent, it does not seek 
to be anything else but an illusion" and the irrational affirmation of religious life is seen 
to be diametrically opposed to rational inquiry (Freud 1946: 205). In 'A Philosophy of 
Life' and The Future of an Illusion (1927), Freud acknowledges the rival claims to truth 
of religion, but he emphasizes that "truth" can be unearthed through scientific methods 
alone: 
The bare fact is that truth cannot be tolerant and cannot admit 
compromise or limitations, that scientific research looks on the whole 
field of human activity as its own, and must adopt an uncompromisingly 
critical attitude towards any other power that seeks to usurp and part of its 
province (Freud 1946: 205). 
In both of these essays he subjects religion to the "critical examination" (213) of science 
and concludes that, unlike art, religion is not merely an illusion, but a dangerous illusion 
which leads to the kind of pacification which Nietzsche claims to derive from deeply 
entrenched habits. 
Binswanger reacts strongly to these views, believing that such conclusions derive from 
Freud's strict adherence to a limited version of empiricism. Moreover, he is concerned 
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about Freud's dismissal of the "actual content of the human psychic life in its whole 
richness", which is the result of "an enormous simplification of the life of the psyche and 
to a reduction of it to a crude natural scientific schema governed by a few principles" 
(Needleman 1963: 203). Closely reflecting James's theoretical move from epistemology 
to radical empiricism, Binswanger understands that an empirical method should entail 
close description of psychic phenomena as they appear to the individual. In this way, 
religious experiences are to be understood and investigated as they subjectively arise, to 
recall James's term, as the "fruits" of experience, rather than subsequently translating the 
phenomena into a preexistent discourse of metapsychology. 
This does not mean that Binswanger simply reintroduces the language of soul (dirt., Seele) 
into analytic vocabulary. He claims that soul "is a religious, metaphysical, and ethical 
concept" which can be admitted "only as a theoretical, auxiliary construct within a 
specific field - as, for example, in psychopathology" (May 1958: 231). Instead, 
Binswanger wishes to preserve a language of spirituality which he reinterprets through 
Heidegger's framework of Being. He describes this kind of phenomenological-analytic 
project as follows: 
In phenomenological experience, the discursive taking apart of natural 
objects into characteristics or qualities and their inductive elaboration into 
types, concepts, judgments, conclusions, and theories is replaced by 
giving expression to the content of what is purely phenomenally given 
and therefore is not part of 'nature' in any way (May 1959: 192). 
Here the dichotomy of " t a k i n g ~ a r t " " and "giving expression to" emphasizes the creative 
and collaborative aspects of therapy over those elements which tend to be reductive to 
the level of libido. Corresponding to Cavell's romantic attention to expressive language, 
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Binswanger implies here that the mode, or form, of expression cannot be untangled from 
the content of thought. One example of this can be detected in Binswanger's analysis of 
dreams for their manifest dream content; an investigation which Binswanger believes 
should be carried out in preference to the dream work (a causal interpretation) which 
Freud recommends. This does not mean that phenomenology ignores the importance of 
dispelling illusions, only that Binswanger wishes to shift his emphasis from determinate 
explanations to descriptions of the "essential structures" (194) which characterize the life-
world of the individual. 
Three fundamental criticisms of Binswanger's phenomenological approach need to be 
addressed here. Firstly, the claim that phenomenology is an uncritical and purely 
descriptive philosophical practice is a common criticism of the tradition in which 
Binswanger places himself. However, in an essay 'On the Nature and Aims of 
Phenomenology" (1943), John Wild asserts that phenomenology should be distinguished 
from phenomenalism, "which sets for itself the really hopeless task of transcribing the 
infinitely variable succession of appearances as they occur" (Wild 1943: 85). He argues 
that phenomenology is "radically empirical" by directing "its attention to that formal or 
eidetic structure of the phenomena, which is implicit in them, but which requires 
painstaking and repeated observation" (85). Wild stresses the "laborious and uncommon 
effort" (90) involved in such an attempt to describe phenomena, but he also stresses this 
kind of study is preferable to any "premature attempts at synthesis" (91). 
The second criticism is that phenomenology preserves the object-subject dichotomy and, 
in this way, does nothing to depart from the Cartesian tradition of rational inquiry. Here, 
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it is Heidegger's break from Husserl's phenomenology which helps to dissolve the 
dichotomy. Heidegger departs from Husserl's project to extract the essences which 
structure phenomena ("the concealed foundation" of idealizations), because he sees no 
possibility of objectively "dismantling" the phenomenological sedimentations (Husserl 
1973: 47-48). This position marks a move away from Kantian transcendental 
phenomenology, which attempts to rescue the things-in-themselves lying behind 
phenomena, towards a hermeneutic phenomenology which recognizes that the inquirer 
is always already embedded in the world. Like James's metaphor of the stream of 
thought, the subject of consciousness does not face the object, but each is implicated by, 
and partially constitutive of, the other (Needleman 1963: 13-23). This idea enables 
Heidegger to reject both idealism and materialism. By grounding his philosophy on 
neither subject nor object, he stresses the intractable nature of each through the radical 
notion of Dasein or Being-in-the-world. 
Binswanger appropriates Heidegger's formulation of Being-in-the-world as a way of 
circumventing the mind-body problem. Heidegger claims it is "a purely theoretical 
problem", implying that it has little, ifno, practical significance, and he goes on to claim 
that the mind-body problem is "incorrectly formulated" (Heidegger 1963: 209-10). As 
a therapist Binswanger would obviously disagree with the practical import of this 
theoretical problem, but echoing Heidegger he detects that 
the situation can be put to rights only if we go behind both conceptual 
horizons or reality-conceptions - that of nature and that of "culture" - and 
approach man's basic function of understanding Being as the establishing 
of ground - a transcendental function (210). 
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This does not represent a return to the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl, but 
implies that Being-in-the-world is a condition of existence which is anterior to a subject-
object split.5 Heidegger's notion of "thrownness" into existence transforms Kant's 
description of the transcendental ego and Husserl's rhetoric of essences into an 
exploration of the "temporality of human existence" (206). Not only does this rescue a 
temporal dimension which seems lacking in Husserl's ahistorical phenomenology, but it 
also implicates the task of the interpreter. As Heidegger's translator, David Farrell Krell, 
comments: "because Dasein is itself historical all inquiry concerning it must scrutinize 
its own history: ontology of Dasein must be hermeneutical, that is, aware of its own 
historical formation and indefatigably attentive to the problem of interpretation" 
(Heidegger 1978: 21). By adopting this Heideggerian position, Binswanger makes 
temporal and interpretive understanding central to an analysis of his patients' life-worlds. 
The third criticism of phenomenology and one which has been taken most seriously by 
poststructuralist critics is, in Wild's words, that phenomenologists seek to disclose the 
"original pre-analytic data" of phenomena (Wild 1943: 86). As Derrida and de Man 
argue, interpretation is always already the domain of any data one wishes to examine, 
whether in the practice of phenomenology, of natural science or of literary studies. Thus, 
if "pre-analytic data" is held to be synonymous with pre-linguistic, or raw, culturally 
unmediated, data, then Binswanger's phenomenological method reaches a serious 
theoretical impasse. However, in Binswanger's defence, the third section of his essay on 
'The Existential Analysis School of Thought' states "the phenomena to be interpreted are 
~ ~ In Heidegger's words: "the existential analytic ofDasein comes before any psychology or anthropology, 
and certainly before any biology" (Heidegger 1962: 71). 
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largely language phenomena" (May 1959: 200). The existential structures which he seeks 
to disclose are those always already expressed in language, a medium through which they 
"actually ensconce and articulate themselves and where, therefore, they can be 
ascertained and communicated" (200). Although his comments on language are not a 
dominant focus of his writings (he worked briefly on aphasia in 1926), admissions like 
this imply that, instead of attempting to discover the essences of sedimentations stripped 
of language (the aim of Husserl's phenomenology), he realizes that structures can only 
be disclosed through language and, furthermore, that the underlying structures themselves 
are part of a wider semiotic matrix. 
How then does the phenomenological method (and particularly the Heideggerian 
interpretation of it) allow Binswanger to shift emphasis away from the scientific 
explanation expressed in Freud's analytic writings? Fundamentally, it is in his attempt 
to redescribe Weltanschauung, not as a totalizing and complete picture of the world, but 
as an inquiry "into the being of man as a whole" (Needleman 1963: 211). Even if one 
rejects Freud's reductive criticisms of the spiritual and aesthetic dimensions, Binswanger 
argues that the scientific conception of man "as a physical-psychological-spiritual unity 
does not say enough" (211). In his thought, such a "summative enumeration" will always 
be partial and fall short of addressing "the Dasein as being-in-the-world" (211). In short, 
"existential analysis undertakes to work out being human in all its existential forms and 
their worlds, in its being-able-to-be (existence), being-allowed-to-be (love), and having-
to-be (thrownness)" (May 1959: 315). He claims that psychoanalysis can deal only with 
the last of these (a form of psychic determination), whereas existential analysis not only 
enables Binswanger to retain the possibility of affirming a spiritual dimension in his 
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conception of the human psyche, but also furnishes him with an analytic vocabulary 
which transcends the biological basis of Freud's project and enables him to circumvent 
the mind-body problem. 
There are many theoretical problems left open in this section, in particular, the claim that 
Binswanger's position is merely a disguised form of idealism. Accordingly, his deeper 
engagement and ultimate departure from Heidegger's early existentialist philosophy forms 
the focus of my next section. 
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(2) Binswanger and Heidegger: the Question of Being 
Binswanger was not the only influential existential analyst to distance himself from 
Freudian orthodoxy. A number of years after Binswanger had written his most important 
analytic papers, a younger Swiss analyst, Medard Boss, also sought to align his work with 
Heidegger's thought in an attempt to compensate for the limitations of psychoanalysis. 
In Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis (1963), Boss, like Binswanger, takes issue with the 
"prescientific presuppositions" which underpin Freud's conception of psychoanalysis as 
a natural science (Boss 1963: 75). Boss claims that these presuppositions result in 
splitting up 
the unity of man's 'Being-in-the-world' into three primordially separated 
particles: the 'psyche,' the human body, and the external world. Once this 
conceptual split had been achieved, these three theoretically abstracted 
parts of man's world can never be linked together again (78). 
In response to this natural-scientific tendency, Boss affirms Heidegger's description of 
Being-in-the-world as the primary, and irreducible, condition of human life. Moreover, 
Boss stresses that it is important "to determine - through careful investigation of their 
origins, their essences, and their respective practical impacts on psychiatry and 
psychotherapy - whether there is any connection at all" between psychoanalyse and 
Daseinanalyse (2-3). He also wishes to distinguish his allegiance to Heidegger's 
"fundamental insights" (4) from "the shocking intellectual confusion which has come to 
prevail under the blanket term 'existentialism'" (3). Whilst Binswanger's name is only 
mentioned twice in the course of the book, the writings of the elder Swiss analyst 
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represent one strain of "fashionable" existentialism from which Boss wishes to 
disassociate himself.6 
Boss delineates several misconceptions ofDasein, by which he clears the way for his own 
reading of Heidegger. His primary concern is to prevent existential analysis from falling 
back into an idealistic, pre-Heideggerian, manner of conceiving the self. Binswanger's 
theory of existential analysis is accordingly criticized for being a "subjectivistic revision" 
of Heidegger's philosophy (51). According to Boss this entails the recuperation of a pre-
existentialist notion of subjectivity which pushes "aside the real meaning of Being-in-the-
world" (53). Far from resolving the "subject-object dichotomy", "Being-in-the-world is 
then pictured as a property, or as a character trait, of a subject 'in' whom this property 
resides or who 'has' it" (53). Thus, "Being-in-the-world turns out to be merely a 
somewhat wider and more useful version of the concept of subjectivity" (54). In other 
words, rather than Being-in-the-world representing the primary "luminous realm of 
Being-ness", Boss claims it "gains access to the unity of human existence only at the price 
of losing all psychotherapeutic possibilities" (53). 
Boss's criticism, levelled at Binswanger, Jung and Sartre for different reasons, indicates 
that, instead of Being signifying an originary and intractable embeddedness in the world, 
the Cartesian private subject is asserted as the primary model of selfuood. Whilst there 
are elements of Binswanger's thought which are vulnerable to criticism, such a comment 
6 The criticisms of Binswanger are more evident in the original German version of Psychoanalyse und 
Daseinsanalytiker. the manuscript of which was approved by Heidegger .. As William S ~ ~ l ~ r r n ~ t e s , , "in the 
enlarged English version, published apparently without Heidegger's aSSistance, the cntlclsm IS less clear 
and to the point" (Sadler 1969: 118). 
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indicates that Boss misunderstands Binswanger's insistence on Being-in-the-world-with-
others, which is the crucial starting point both for his conception of self and for his 
existential analysis. Indeed, although Heidegger claims in section twenty-six of the first 
division of Being and Time that man is fundamentally "Being-with", he and Boss often 
underplay the importance of such an assertion (Heidegger 1962: 153). 
In order to clarify Binswanger's position vis-a-vis Heidegger and to defend his work 
against the criticisms of Boss, I will use Heidegger's comments on "Being-with" to 
discuss Binswanger's theoretical position and thereby outline the intersubjective 
dynamics of his analysis. In his book on existential phenomenology, William Sadler cites 
a personal letter from Binswanger, in which the Swiss analyst notes "that he had in fact 
misunderstood the nature of Heidegger's ontology; however, he hoped that his own 
development of a Heideggerian type of existential analysis would be considered a fruitful 
misunderstanding" (Sadler 1969: 118). This comment tends to limit much of the critical 
material on Binswanger to his adherence to, and departure from, Heidegger's working 
through of ontological questions in Being and Time. Instead of simply linking the 
positions of Binswanger and Boss to early and late Heidegger respectively, where 
relevant I will couple a consideration of Binswanger's theories to Heidegger's later work, 
in order to stress the Swiss analyst's place in a tradition of romantic science.7 
7 In a paper on 'Martin Heidegger's Zollikon Seminars' (1968), Boss recounts his first correspondence with 
Heidegger in 1946 (Boss 1988: 7-20). At this time Heidegger had already "turned" from the concerns of 
Being and Time towards a more explicit concern with language. Heidegger continued to stress the chasm 
between ontology and psychology, but in this later phase, during which time he gave seminars in 
Switzerland to Boss's medical students, he does outline some common ground between the two disciplines. 
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Heidegger's conception of Being-in-the-world implies a connection with a shared "world" 
in which Dasein is "co-determined" (Heidegger 1962: 154). He describes a state in which 
the assertion of'!' does not begin "by starting out and isolating" the self against the 
backdrop of others; rather, that iterating 'I' necessarily implicates those others "from 
whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself - those among whom one is 
too" (154). Once more, the Cartesian subject is implicitly attacked for conceptually 
dividing the world into a private self (which 'I' can know by following a sceptical method 
of doubt) and those other shadowy "beings" (objects and entities) which inhabit the 
world, and from which epistemological doubt arises. This split rests upon Descartes's 
association of mind with the true self and body as representative of the contingent world 
in which the mind is corporeally suspended.s By way of contrast, Heidegger, by 
suggesting a model of Dasein which is anterior to the subject-object split, undermines the 
Cartesian model by arguing that "with" and "too" (in the above quotation) "are to be 
understood existentially" as relational terms which link the self with others (155). Thus, 
"by reason of this with-like [mithaften] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one 
that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]" (155). 
Heidegger clarifies what he means by Being-in-the-world by claiming that 'I' is always 
already "I-here", a "locative personal designation [which] must be understood in terms 
of Dasein's existential spatiality" (155). This does not mean that'!, does not signify; 
rather, that each articulation and affirmation of 'I' confirms the coexistence of the spatial 
plane (here rather than there) and the temporal plane (now rather than then). Heidegger 
8 Husser! adheres to the Cartesian model of self: he admits that his transcendental phenomenology is "a 
neo-Cartesianism, even though it is obJiged ... to reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of 
Cartesian philosophy" (Husserl 1977: 1). 
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addresses the temporal dimension of existence in the second division of Being and Time 
and he goes on to emphasize the coexistence of the spatial and the personal dimensions 
in 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking' (1951), a paper in which he argues that the one term can 
only be expressed and understood in relation to the other. Heidegger suggests humans 
are homeless in two ways - they are estranged both from Being and from an authentic 
mode of dwelling in the world - and it is the task of philosophy to work through such 
estrangement. As a Cavellian reading of the opening of Being and Time implies, 
although understanding often leads to the perplexity of scepticism, perplexity may also 
lead back towards understanding. Moreover, as I comment later in this chapter, 
Heidegger's expression of double estrangement is important for Binswanger's therapy. 
Heidegger's comments in 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking' indicate a shared public 
language, over against a private language of selthood, which presupposes a relational 
model of Dasein. This view is evidently shared by Binswanger, when he claims that 
"what attracts our attention in existential-analysis is ... the content of language expressions 
and manifestations in so far as they point to the world-design or designs in which the 
speaker lives or has lived or, in one word, their world-content" (May 1959: 201). Such 
a relational view of language denotes a social dimension which patient and analyst share 
and through which communication is possible. By attending closely to the behaviour and 
expressions of the patient, the analyst may be able to understand "the way in which the 
given form or configuration of existence discovers [the] world designs" 
(Mundanisierung) which structure an individual's life-world.9 Because Binswanger 
9 Jacob Needleman translates Mundanisierung as "existential a priori" (Needleman 1963: 23-31). 
Binswanger expands most thorough.ly on the " f o ~ s : ' ' which underlie behavioural patterns in Gm"dfonnen 
und Erkenntnis Menscliichen Dasems, 2nd ed., ZUnch, 1953. 
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realizes that an understanding of Lebenswelt always rests upon a series of intersubjective 
interpretations, his hermeneutic model stresses the primacy of a shared network of Being-
with. In other words, in order to complement areas to which introspective inquiry is 
inadequate, Binswanger recommends that the analyst should encourage dialogic exchange 
with his patients and to attend closely to the vocal and bodily expressions which may 
disclose alterations in their world-designs. 
The communal dimension of language is confirmed in Binswanger's thought when he 
describes the primacy of "certain phenomenal, intentional, and preintentional modes of 
Being-together (Mitseinandersein) and co-being (Mitsein)", the expressions of which are 
central to his analysis (May 1959: 226). He thus deems intersubjectivity to be the central 
arena for existential analysis and the crucial problematic for any form of therapy. I will 
return to Binswanger's comments on love and sympathy and how they resist Freud's 
theorization of transference in my reading of his case studies, but here it is important to 
note that the Swiss analyst insists upon the centrality of Being-with: 
since world always means not only the What within which an existence 
exists but as the same time the How and Who of its existing, the forms of 
the How and of the Who, of the being-in and being-oneself, become 
manifest quite 'of their own accord' from the characterization of the 
momentary Ueweilig] world. Let it be further noted in advance that the 
term 'world' means at one and the same time the Umwelt, the Mitwelt, and 
the Eigenwelt. This by no means constitutes a fusion of these three 
worlds into a single one, but is rather an expression for the general way 
in which 'world' forms itself in these three world-regions (269). 
Dasein is simultaneously related to itself in its own habitat ("Eigenwelt presupposes self-
awareness, self-relatedness") and to the social (Mitwelt) and natural (Umwelt) worlds in 
which it is embedded (63). By emphasizing the interrelated nature of these three worlds, 
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it is possible to defend Binswanger's position from Boss's criticisms: instead of 
misreading Heidegger from a subjectivist perspective, Binswanger claims that any 
singular understanding of "being-oneself' (Eigenwelt) is only one expression of Dasein 
which needs to be understood in terms of the other two "world-regions" (Mitwelt, 
Umwelt). Binswanger goes on to characterize his patient's inability, or the diminution of 
their ability, to understand their world designs from such a multiple perspective as being 
closely associated with psychosis. For him, only the reaffirmation of a coexisting world 
can rectify the turning inward which is often associated with psychiatric disorder. 
It is Binswanger's concept of world-design which Boss regards with a particularly critical 
eye. In 'The Existential Analysis School of Thought', Binswanger indicates that world-
design is peculiar to human beings (as distinct from animals) "not only [as it] contains 
numerous possibilities of modes of being", but because it is "precisely rooted in this 
multifold potentiality of being": "the what of the respective world-design always 
furnishes information about the how of the Being-in-the-world and the how of being 
oneself' (May 1959: 197, 195). In other words, Binswanger claims that, unlike animals 
which are (largely) genetically determined, humans, on an ontic level, are capable of 
taking up a variety of roles within society and, on an ontological level, are capable of 
motivating (or creatively "designing") themselves "toward the most different 
potentialities of being" (198). This claim has similarities with James's stress upon the 
overcoming of the limitations of the self through an exertion of will; but Binswanger is 
careful to emphasize both the limitations of world-designs which are anterior to 
consciousness (and therefore cannot be lucidly examined by a conscious act nor wholly 
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refashioned through an act of will) and the range of "potential modes of being for the 
self' (198). 
Binswanger goes on to assert that animals do not have worlds in the same way as humans 
because they do not possess a notion of selfhood (that is, the inability to say "I-you-we"); 
he claims that "self and world are indeed, reciprocal concepts." Selfhood is thus defined 
not merely as the ability to say the words "I-you-we", but, in doing so, the ability to 
position the self as a subject within a shared discourse. Moreover, unlike most animals, 
humans have the potential to "transcend" their determining environment into which each 
one is thrown, by designing, or opening up, their world. However, if one has the 
potential to transform the determinate context (to "decide independently in and for a 
situation" [198]), then it follows that the self is separable from such a context. In this 
reading, Binswanger seems to recuperate a pre-Heideggerian conception of self. 
However, later in the same essay, Binswanger asserts that a world-design is not a 
conscious fashioning of the world by which the individual imposes him or herself on the 
world. Indeed, he claims that world "does not refer to anything psychological but to 
something which only makes possible the psychic fact" (204). That is to say, one cannot 
change a world-design in its entirety by an act of will, for the world-design is constitutive 
of the psychological self. But, and here Binswanger converges with Heidegger's thought, 
this does not prohibit the self from devising "other ways of Being which we can choose 
as our own" within the parameters of the world-design" (Hoeller 1988: 3). 
There are obvious links between Heidegger's exposition of Being (Sein) and Binswanger's 
conception of world-design. In his introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger claims 
178 
that Being is "the most universal and the emptiest of concepts", which eludes definition 
but, at the same time, "does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we 
look that question in the face" (Heidegger 1962: 21, 23). The world-design for 
Binswanger has a similar elusive definition. His project to disclose world-designs 
adheres closely to Heidegger's assertion that "what is sought in the question of Being is 
not something completely unfamiliar, although it is at first totally ungraspable" (46). 
Binswanger argues that a world-design is discemable in each of the utterances and acts 
of an individual, but is not wholly deducible from them. Similarly, Heidegger asserts that 
"Dasein is ontically 'closest' to itself, while ontologically farthest away" (58): only by 
addressing the ontic level can the ontological level be approached. However, the problem 
of how to move from the ontic to ontological level remains to haunt both Heidegger and 
Binswanger. An argument can be mounted to suggest that Binswanger's project to 
disclose world-designs never actually breaches the ontological level, but instead is wholly 
of the ontic. In order to explore these issues more thoroughly, I will consider each 
problem in relation to Binswanger's work: firstly, the question of meaning and, secondly, 
the conceptual gap between ontic and ontological. 
Binswanger's notion of world-design implies a "meaning-matrix" (Bedeutungsrichtung) 
through which the self experiences itself in relation to the world and to others 
(Needleman 1963: 29). This is less an innate propensity to view the world in a certain 
manner (which would adhere to Binswanger's view of genetic conditioning), and more 
a factor which conditions aptitudes and a ground against which an individual can 
understand him or herself in their own personal terms. An awareness of the structure of 
world-designs thus represents the possibility of finding meaning within language. 
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Through an examination of Binswanger's case studies it is evident that a world-design 
revolves around a set of binary oppositions, one side of which, under certain conditions, 
is limiting or debilitating and the other which is enabling or freeing. While there are a 
number of oppositions which Binswanger outlines (full-empty, order-chaos, movement-
stasis, continuity-discontinuity, rising-falling) the exact manifestation and combination 
is peculiar to individual. Because of this, it is impossible for Binswanger to set out a 
metapsychology through which the general cause of neurosis can be evinced. Instead, his 
analysis demands close attention to, and a working through of, the expressions of the 
patient in order to discover the dynamics of a particular world-design. This raises a 
question of epistemology: how is it possible for either analyst or patient to uncover the 
characteristic world-design? The answer to such a question lies within the purview of the 
hermeneutic phenomenology which Heidegger sets out, an activity which situates the self 
(and an acknowledgement of the self) within discourse, and one which is integrally 
concerned with the problem of interpretation. The world-design as "meaning-matrix" 
thus represents a frame of reference which constitutes its world by investing meaning in 
it, and which, furthermore, links a communal world inextricably to the 'private' world of 
the individual. It is the ability to understand and make meaning out of Dasein which 
constitute the grounds of being human and the structure of which determines all 
possibilities of experience. 
Throughout Binswanger's writing there is an ambiguity as to whether there is one world-
design (one axis of meaning) for each individual, or whether there are a number of 
complementary world-designs which are constitutive of a particular set of activities or 
responses to stimuli. At different points he seems to endorse both readings; or, at least. 
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he suggests the possibility that several world-designs structure the life of an individual. 
However, in his defense, Binswanger does distinguish between what he means by world-
design and those "categories" of understanding through which the analyst is made aware 
of it: 
the emptier, more simplified, and more constricted the world-design to 
which an existence has committed itself, the sooner will anxiety appear 
and the more severe will it be. The "world" of the healthy with its 
tremendously varied contexture of reference and compounds of 
circumstance can never become entirely shaky or sink. If it is threatened 
in one region, other regions will emerge and offer a foothold. But where 
the "world" .. .is so greatly dominated by one or a few categories, naturally 
the threat to the preservation of that one or those few categories must 
result in more intensified anxiety (May 1959: 205). 
Whilst, like James, Binswanger associates health with multiplicity and plurality and 
illness with limitation and constriction, there is an ambiguity as to whether "categories" 
are different manifestations of a set of universal world-designs (which manifest 
themselves in different structural combinations for different individuals), or whether they 
are themselves constitutive of different world-designs which characterize how individuals 
come to understand and act upon their experiences. 
A brief glance at two of his shorter case studies serves to clarify this point. His "first 
clinical illustration" in 'The Existential Analysis School of Thought' describes "a young 
girl who ... experienced a puzzling attack of anxiety and faint when her heel got stuck in 
her skate" (203). These fits continue throughout the woman's life "whenever a heel of 
one of her shoes appeared to loosen" or when she saw "a loose button hanging on a thread 
or a break in the thread of saliva" (205). By observing these symptoms (which he 
describes in greater detail in the paper), Binswanger discerns a "depletion of being-in-the-
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world" of the woman which, because of the existential consequences of this event, is 
"narrowed down to include only the category of continuity" (205). This case indicates 
that "categories" are really different ways of conceiving the world within the framework 
of a world-design, which, in the case of this woman, is limited to one mode of 
interpretation. A world-design is thus understood as a formal structure which, through 
experience, allows for the development of a habitual set of responses which subsequently 
helps to mould, or, in Jamesian terms, to sculpt, particular categories of understanding. 
Shock or trauma (but trauma which is rarely linked to a Freudian Oedipal scenario) serves 
to rigidify this multiplicity into one pattern, or category, of meaning. 
Similarly, the world-design of another patient is described as being polarized around the 
axis of "urgency" and "narrowness" (206), which allows for "no steadiness": "everything 
occurs by jerks and starts" (207). When I move on to consider the work of Sacks the 
neurological content of such a patient's world will become of greater importance; but, 
here it will suffice to indicate that only when a world-design becomes contracted into one 
manner of interpretation does psychosis manifest itself. As I shall discuss in the next 
section, Binswanger's therapy encourages the patient to cultivate different techniques and 
practices to open up their experience of the world on all levels (Eigenwelt, Mitwelt and 
Umwelt). 
This reading defends Binswanger against the assertions of Boss, but the second question 
remains as to whether these existential structures are actually ontological, or, as 
Needleman argues, are "meta-ontic" (Needleman 1963: 26). By "meta-ontic" Needleman 
means "any discipline that concerns itself with the transcendentally a priori essential 
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structures and possibilities of concrete human existence is, strictly speaking, neither 
ontological nor ontic, but lies, rather, somewhere in between" (27). From this premise, 
Needleman suggests that world-designs "are the universal forms that stand to the 
experience of each human being." Boss is particularly concerned with Binswanger's 
claim that through existential analysis it is possible to disclose the "universal forms" 
which underlie Dasein and thereby overcome the blockages of psychosis. Heidegger 
understands authenticity to arise from an attempt to disclose the question which is Being 
(that question from which humans are under most conditions estranged); but, like Cavell's 
reading of him, the task is always under way and is never permanently achieved. In other 
words, the structure of self-recognition, which enables a human to disclose Being in 
relation to the self, to the natural world and to society, is an ongoing pursuit which seems 
to preclude any therapeutic solution. lo However, the main concern for Heidegger and 
Boss is that uncovering a meta-ontic structure does not represent a disclosure (aletheia) 
of Being, and, indeed, may well constitute another obscuring factor in the pursuit of 
Being. 
This is the point at which Binswanger's project of Daseinanalyse departs from 
Heidegger's Daseinanalytik and, perhaps, is the one vital factor which distinguishes the 
phenomenological anthropology of the Swiss analyst from the phenomenological 
ontology of the German philosopher. Binswanger addresses this problem when he 
differentiates his project from that of Heidegger: 
10 This position mirrors one which Freud moves towards in his essay on 'Analysis, Tenninable and 
lntenninable' (1937), in which the patient's renewed ability to cope is stressed over and above successful 
psychoanalytic cure. This is a sn:ain o ~ ~ Freudian thought which Philip Rieff develops in the last chapter 
of Freud: The Mind of the Morahst (Rleff 1979: 329-57). 
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Existential analysis (Daseinanalyse, as we speak of it) must not be 
confused with Heidegger's analytic of existence (Daseinanalytik). The 
first is a hermeneutic exegesis on the ontic-anthropological level, a 
phenomenological analysis of actual human existence. The second is a 
phenomenological hermeneutic of Being understood as existence, and 
moves on an ontological level (May 1958: 269-70). 
Because Binswanger's project is of a practical nature, the "ontic-anthropologicallevel" 
necessarily encroaches on the ontological. Addressing himself to this kind of 
encroachment, Paul de Man, in his essay on 'Ludwig Binswanger and the Sublimation of 
the Self (1966), focuses on the discrepancy between the ontological and the meta-ontic. 
He comes to the conclusion that 
[a] certain degree of confusion arises when this knowledge is interpreted 
as a means to act upon the destiny that the knowledge reveals. This is the 
moment at which the ontological inquiry is abandoned for empirical 
concerns that are bound to lead it astray (de Man 1983: 48). 
Whilst de Man's criticism is explicitly directed towards Binswanger's writing, he admits 
that such a tension arises in any study which forsakes "the barren world of ontological 
reduction for the wealth of lived experience" (49). With this tension in mind, the 
remainder of this section investigates the manner in which the world-design is developed 
in Binswanger's work and how it forms the basic premise of his methodology. 
Binswanger's central point is that, by virtue of the world-design, humans have "the 
possibility of transcending this being ... of climbing above it in care and swinging beyond 
it in love" (May 1958: 198). By transcending (Ueberstieg) Binswanger means "a 
climbing over or above, mounting", an activity involving both a goal or aim "toward 
which the Ueberstieg is directed" (the world) and "that which is ueberstiegen" (193) or 
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transcended (being [Seiende] , rather than Being [Sein]). Although this appears 
comparable to Nietzsche's description of overcoming, the terms "care" and "love" are 
crucial limiting factors in such an activity. Both of these terms - "care" (Sorge) and 
"love" (Liebe) - involve the detailed attention of self to other: the fIrst in showing concern 
for the Otherness which is the self (Eigenwelt) and the second a concern for those others 
with which one inhabits the world (Mitwelt). Although both terms can be attributed to 
the thought of Heidegger, it is only the fIrst which receives detailed attention in Being 
and Time. 
For Heidegger, "care" is seen as fundamentally ontological: "it lies 'before' ... every factical 
'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it 
always lies in them" (Heidegger 1962: 238). On this account, care is a looking after, and 
a looking out for, the self: 
because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside the ready-
to-hand could be taken in our previous analyses as concern, and being 
with the Dasein-with of Others as we encounter it within-the-world could 
be taken as solicitude (237).11 
What Heidegger terms "solicitude", Binswanger, following the existential work of Max 
Scheler, Gabriel Marcel and Martin Buber, calls "love": a way of responding or relating 
to another human, which enables the situation (usually limiting or depleting) to be 
II Elsewhere Heidegger defines the "Being of the ready-to-hand (involvement) is definable as a context 
of assignments or references" (Heidegger 1962: 121). Hubert Dreyfus translates Zuhandenheit as 
"availableness": those "available" techniques for coping or dealing with situations. 
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transcended in a joint venture. 12 Following Scheler, Binswanger cultivates the 
importance of an ethic of genuine sympathy, or "fellow feeling" (Mitgefuhl), in his 
therapy: "fellow-feeling for other people's circumstances, values and standards" enables 
humans "to effect a real enlargement of our own lives and to transcend the limitations 
of our own actual experience" (Scheler 1954: 49). While care is a technique of looking 
after the self, only sympathetic love can induce a "creative movement" which combines 
solidarity with independence, and which simultaneously affirms companionship without 
obscuring Otherness (Sadler 1969: 48-62). 
By appropriating this conception of sympathetic love from Scheler, Binswanger clarifies 
his development of Heidegger's position: "Being-in-the-world as being of the existence 
for the sake of myself( designated by Heidegger as 'care') has been juxtaposed with 'being-
beyond-the-world' as being of the existence for the sake of myself(designated by me as 
'love')" (May 1959: 195). Binswanger stresses intersubjectivity (an "overswing" 
[Oberschwung] of love) over and above the care of the self (a Nietzschean "overclimb" 
of care), and, in so doing, he claims that only through reciprocity can the self overcome 
its existential limitations. He sees love as possessing a two-fold potential: firstly, as an 
ideal to be striven towards (eternity [Ewigkeit]) and, secondly, as a "haven" (Heimat) 
which the sympathetic encounter with the analyst offers (201). This kind of reciprocity 
does not mean a renunciation of the undeniable limitations and finitude of living for an 
unobtainable ideal, but an acquiescence to the conditions of existence without 
12 Despite Boss's criticisms of Binswanger, as he describes in his article on 'Martin Heidegger's Zollikon 
Seminars' (1977), their projects are fundamentally similar in their search for "that highest form of 
humanness in the relation to others, namely, of that selfless, loving, 'vorspringende' caring which frees the 
other to his own selfhood" (Hoeller 1988: 10). 
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surrendering completely to them. Authenticity for Binswanger thereby represents a 
striving to disclose Dasein with the care and support of another which, in the therapeutic 
encounter, is designated the empathic task of the analyst. Once more, by stressing Being-
with as the central concern of existential analysis, Binswanger directs attention to an 
embeddedness in the world of others in which he detects the roots of therapy. 
In the above cited case of the woman who gets her heel stuck in her skate as a child, the 
anxiety (Angst) which Binswanger describes is appropriated from Kierkegaard (via 
Heidegger). By this Binswanger means a subliminal dread of existence which cannot be 
associated with an identifiable object or a particular set of psychological demands. In an 
article on 'Dread and Authenticity' (1989), Julius Heuscher distinguishes between fear 
which "is linked to 'actual' dangers, whereas 'dread' and 'anxiety' are viewed as having 
'imaginary,' 'uncanny,' 'incomprehensible,' and 'irrational' elements" (Heuscher 1989: 
140). Although Binswanger often associates the locus of anxiety with a traumatic 
moment in childhood, this understanding does not contradict such a distinction. The 
actual moment of trauma seems less important than its subsequent limiting of experiential 
categories. For Binswanger, therapy would not constitute a coming to tenns with the 
incident in order to purge the patient's feelings of anxiety: this would represent an 
inauthentic covering up for him. Instead, the therapeutic goal seeks, firstly, to disclose 
anxiety as a vital response to authentic existence and, secondly, to disturb a repetitive 
pattern of compulsion by nurturing a mutual relationship of care and love. Heuscher later 
agrees with one of the key commitments of existential analysis when he claims that 
"dread is the shadow-side of love: not of an ethereal, fantastic love, but of the committed 
love by an embodied human being for another mortal individual" (142). 
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(3) Binswanger and Foucault: Dreaming through Existence 
Before I move on to consider two of Binswanger's most illuminating case studies, it is 
important to spent some time addressing his article Dream and Existence (1930). In this 
essay Binswanger restates many of his central arguments concerning analytic 
anthropology and existential structures. But, he extends his previous discussion of 
therapy as the attempt to disclose a patient's world-designs by stressing a close 
association between imaginative creation and dreaming. To supplement my discussion 
of this essay I read it alongside Michel Foucault's essay 'Dream, Imagination and 
Existence' (1954), as well as the French theorist's later work on the aesthetics of 
existence. I do not wish to mask the central concerns of Binswanger's essay by using 
Foucault's work13 ; rather, I will combine certain ideas which emerge in my reading of 
'Dream and Existence' with Foucault's more rigorous expression of self-creation. Here, 
the work of Nietzsche provides the point of convergence between Binswanger and 
Foucault, as well as recalling many of the ideas raised in the chapter on James. 
Nietzsche's subtitle to Ecce Homo (1908) - 'How One Becomes What One Is'- although 
not in itself a romantic dogma, proves central to the current of thought which I am tracing 
through romantic science. 
\3 In his review of the recent Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry reissue of the combined 
essays of Binswanger and Foucault, David Macey suggests 'Dream, Imagination and Existence' (the 
anglicized title given to Foucault's 1954 essay) tends to overshadow t h ~ ~ earlier text, p ~ l y y because it is 
twice the length of Binswanger's essay and partly because of Foucault's Important place In contemporary 
theory. As Macey suggests, "Dream and Existence is now much more likely to be read for the light it sheds 
on Foucault's early development" (Macey 1994: 59). I wish to retain my central interest in the development 
of the Binswanger's thought by following Foucault's wish "only to write in the margins" of the Swiss 
analyst'S text (Hoeller 1993: 33). 
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Freud's seminal work on The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), followed soon after by his 
own synopsis of it, 'On Dreams' (1901), set the tenor for the importance of dreams in 
analysis. Although Freud's emphasis on interpretation in these works is more akin to the 
theoretical drift of Binswanger's project than is the biological model which underpins his 
metapsychology, there are fundamental differences between the two thinkers as to the 
meaning which they assign to dreams. Indeed, Freud's model of the unconscious (a 
structural presupposition in his writing on dreams) is alien to the phenomenological 
method which Binswanger adopts. Freud understands the unconscious to represent a 
repository for repressed libidinal feelings, which are only discernible through dreams or 
psychic lapses, such as slips of the tongue, jokes or repetitive behaviour. Binswanger 
agrees about the influence of dreams upon waking life, but rejects Freud's notion of a 
structural unconscious. As Foucault notes, "Freud ... restored a psychological dimension 
to the dream, but he did not succeed in understanding it as a specific form of experience" 
(Hoeller 1993: 43). Although Binswanger characterizes dreaming as having a status 
distinct from that of waking thoughts (and here he relies on Freud's explication of the 
logic of condensation and displacement which characterizes dream states), they are both 
undercut by the plenum of existence. As Foucault corroborates, "if dreams are so 
weighty for determining existential meanings, it is because they trace in their fundamental 
coordinates the trajectory of existence itself' (60). 
The unconscIOUS has a place in Binswanger's thought, but only as a regIOn of 
consciousness which the experiencer is unable to reflect upon at that particular moment: 
in his words, a "sense of nonattention or forgetting" (May 1958: 326). Repression of 
unconscious desires is therefore not the primary cause of n e u r o s i s ~ ~ but an aspect of it. 
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Referring to the case of the patient who, as a young girl, caught her hed in the ice-skate, 
Binswanger claims: 
We should ... not explain the emergence of the phobia by an overly strong 
"pre-oedipal" tie to the mother, but rather realize that such overly strong 
filial tie is only possible on the premise of a world-design exclusively 
based on connectedness, cohesiveness, continuity. Such a way of 
experiencing "world" - which always implies such a "key" [Gestimmtheit] 
- does not have to be "conscious"; but neither must we call it 
"unconscious" in the psychoanalytical sense, since it is outside the 
contrast of these opposites. Indeed, it does not refer to anything 
psychological but to something which only makes possible the psychic 
fact (204). 
The primacy of Being-in-the-world in Binswanger's thought does not permit him to 
conceive of an unconscious as a "second person" existing in a negative realm "behind" 
consciousness (326), because, 
an unconscious id is not in the world in the sense of existence (Dasein), 
for being-in-the-world always means to be in the world as I-myself, He-
himself, We-ourselves, or anonymous oneself; and least of all does the id 
know anything of "home," as its true of the dual We, of the I and Thou. 
The id is a scientific construct which objectifies existence - a "reservoir 
of instinctual energy" (326-27). 
He implies that the Freudian unconscious is merely an extension of a biological model 
of psychic instincts; a model to which existential analysis, with its emphasis on an 
anthropological approach to man, does not adhere. Moreover, the interarticulation of 
space (the "home" of Dasein) and time (Heidegger's "thrownness" into being) implies a 
need for Daseinanalysts to describe the unconscious world of dreams in terms of a multi-
dimensional locative region or landscape. 
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Binswanger's main point of contention is that the dream-world should be conceived 
precisely as "world" in the sense of a locative experience. Borrowing a tenn from 
Heraclitus, Foucault reads Binswanger's description of the dream-world to represent an 
"idios kosmos": "a world of its own .. .in the sense that it is constituted in the original 
mode of a world which belongs to me, while at the same time exhibiting my solitude" 
(Hoeller 1993: 51 ).14 I will return to Binswanger's reading of Heraclitus, but here it is 
important to stress his conception of dream-world as a stage for the imaginative 
dramatization of unresolved psychic problems. 
Binswanger frequently elides the memory and verbal (or written) accounts of dreams with 
passages from literature (most often from Gennan romantic literature) which, for him, 
are characterized by similar elevated moods (Stimmung). Indeed, in a paragraph omitted 
from the 1947 version of the essay (and thereafter), Binswanger claims that to understand 
dreams "we must even today still turn primarily to individual creators of language, to the 
poets" (104). There are obvious problems here concerning the craft and artifice 
associated with the creation of art versus the, at least supposed, immediacy of dream 
recreation. For a start, it tends to recycle the mystifying comments of romantic poets 
such as Coleridge who claimed the "dream" of 'Kubla Khan' came to him in a vision 
which he wrote down immediately before being "awakened" by a visitor. 15 However, 
14 It is important to note that for Heraclitus kosmos does not just signify universe (idios kosmos as private 
universe), but also, as his translator indicates, "an orderly arrangement" and "something which beautifies 
and is pleasant to contemplate" (Barnes 1987: 19). This second dimension of kosmos is c ~ c i a l l to the 
Binswangerian-Foucauldian notion that one possesses a capacity to make (poetria) or aesthetically create 
a personal world. 
15 See Coleridge's account of the composition of'Kubla Khan' which was published alongside the P?em 
in 1816 (Coleridge 1986: 163-64). It is interesting to note that here, in one of the ~ o s t t famous e x p r e ~ s l . o n s s
of spontaneous creation, Coleridge writes: "on awaking he [the poet] appeared to h ~ s e l f t o o have a d l s t l ~ c t t
recollection of the whole" vision. Implicit in this phrase is the mediating mechamsm of memory which 
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following a tradition which can be traced back at least as far as Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer, Coleridge's transformative vision is an example of a particular kind of 
elevated consciousness which is aesthetic in character. Thus, for example, Nietzsche 
speaks of "elevated moods" (hohe Stimmungen) in The Gay Science, which he 
understands as transitory but necessary goals to be striven towards as a permanent 
possibility. In the flrst volume of The W orId as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer 
claims that in such aesthetic states "man relinquishes the common way of looking at 
things"; one "can no longer separate the perceiver from the perception" because "both 
have become one, because the whole of consciousness is fllled and occupied with one 
single sensuous picture" (Schopenhauer 1907: 231). Revealing similarities with the 
moods portrayed in the symbolist poetry of Stephane Mallarme, heightened states of 
consciousness in which the perceiver and perception are fused together (at least 
phenomenologically) are central to Binswanger's understanding of those moods 
characteristic of dreams. 
If one takes as given the inevitable creative element at work during the recollection of 
dreams (stressed in Emerson's and Nietzsche's language of creative energy as opposed to 
the disinterested aesthetic ideal of Kant), it is possible to view both dream-reflection and 
literary creation on a re-constructive level, whilst still accounting for their respective 
contexts of production or utterance. Because Freud tends to dismiss aesthetic products 
as representing a sublimation of libidinal instincts, Binswanger's donnee can be seen to 
be essentially very different. For example, in 'The Case of Ellen West', Binswanger 
filters the immediate experience of dreaming and the subsequent rendering of it. 
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considers autobiographical accounts, diary entries, poems, dreams and testimonies by 
others to explore the "human individuality" of his patient (May 1958: 267). In 
Daseinanalysis each of these products is taken as an imaginative "seeing" of the 
existential structures which make up a life (Gras 1973: 185). It is the relative value 
which each analyst assigns to imagination which provides the key to understanding this 
difference. 16 
Foucault rightly understands Binswanger's essay to privilege the "dream experience", 
which "silently encompasses ... a whole anthropology of the imagination" and requires "a 
new way of conceiving how meanings are manifested" (33). As I have shown, 
Binswanger stresses his anthropological approach in an attempt to counter the ontic 
limitations of any single line of inquiry; an understanding through which, as Foucault 
goes on to claim, he "rediscovered the notion that the signifying value of the dream tends 
to be tailored to the psychological analyses that can be effected" (44). On this account, 
it is not surprising that Freud is able to read the expression of unresolved Oedipal crises 
into the dreams of his patients. 
Whilst Freud subscribes to a trend in nineteenth-century psychology to understand a 
dream as "a rhapsody of images" (43) - as the translator of Foucault's essay, Forrest 
Williams, suggests, "a degenerated variety of imagining" (25) - Binswanger and Foucault 
both argue that there is a textual quality to dreams which "has a content all the richer to 
16 J 's chapter on 'Imagination' in the second volume of Principles is helpful here for mapping the 
ames . Id f h . d"d I 
ongoing interest of romantic scienti.sts in th.e i m a g ~ n a t i ~ e e and .creatlve wor ~ ~ t e In IV.I ua. James's 
d fi 't' n of imagination proves particularly mstructlve: sensations, once expenence, modify the nervous e 1m 10 .. I d' I' " (J 
organism, so that copies of them rise again the mind after the ongma outwar stlmu us IS gone ames 
1950b: 44). 
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the degree that it is irreducible to the psychological determinations to which one tries to 
adapt it" (44). This kind of comment shifts the interpretive emphasis from image to 
symbol, and thereby to a trope which, by its nature, is inexhaustible on the level of 
meaning and irreducible to anyone mode of inquiry. As James detects in Principles, 
objects are "imagined by a 'cluster' or 'gang' of ideas", but these cannot be broken down 
into their constitutive parts in terms of the phenomenological world of the individual: "an 
imagined object, however complex, is at anyone moment thought in one idea, which is 
aware of all its qualities together" (James 195Gb: 45). Moreover, for Binswanger, the 
imaginative impulse of dreams represents an elevation in the mood of the dreamer which 
demands that the analyst respond with particular sensitivity to, and qualitative 
appreciation of, the language in which the dream is expressed. 
Like Freud, Binswanger studies dreams in order to probe the psyche of the patient and 
the structures of existence which characterize it, but the emphasis upon these evaluations 
is very different for each analyst. For one, Binswanger emphasizes the "manifest content 
of the dream" - both its formal vehicle and its remembered content - which he claims 
"has in modem times receded all too far into the background", over and above the "latent 
dream thoughts" which Freud wishes to uncover through his dream-work (88).17 This 
does not necessarily imply a lapse into a naive form of dream interpretation; rather a 
reconception of what dreams mean in terms of the life-world of the experiencer: by 
"steeping oneself in the manifest content of the dream ... one learns the proper evaluation 
17 In his two books on dreams, The Analysis of Dreams (1958) and "I dreamt last night" (1977), Boss goes 
so far as to dispense entirely with the language of dream-work. He sees Freud's postulate that there is a 
causal relation between latent thoughts and manifest content undennines his (and, in this case, 
Binswanger's) focus upon the individual's subjective response to dreams (Boss 1958: 34-36 & Boss 1977: 
7). 
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of the primal and strict interdependence of feeling and image, of being attuned 
(Gestimmtsein) and pictorial realization" (88). Aligning himself with the aims of the 
French symbolists, the double focus - on image and mood - is interpreted by Binswanger 
as reflective "of the larger and deeper rhythms of normal and pathologically manic and 
depressive 'disattunement' (Verstimmung)" (88). He understands dreams to be distinct 
from life by virtue of the logic of image-condensation, but they are continuous with life 
in the mood they evoke in the individual's consciousness. However, only by reflecting 
upon the double displacement of dreams, where the dreamer takes the roles of both 
participant and observer, can these moods be identified and rearticulated in an analytic 
encounter. 
Binswanger presents an example of such a "double movement" in those dreams in which 
'I' (the experiencer) "keep my feet on the ground even as I fall and introspectively observe 
my own falling" (85). In 'Dream and Existence' he focuses particularly on the moods 
associated with rising and falling, but the same emphasis on mood is deemed to hold true 
for the other sets of categories "which [ contain] a particular existential significance 'for' 
our Dasein" (82). Analysis is directed towards the mode in which "the pulse of Dasein, 
its systole and diastole, its expansion and depression, its ascension and sinking" is 
expressed (88). The task of the therapist is to encourage patients to remember their 
dreams in order that they can reenact the double movement in waking life and thereby 
open up the possibilities of new modes of being. Mirroring Heidegger's assertion that 
"only where there is language, is there world" (Gras 1973: 31), Binswanger claims that 
the experiencer needs language as a precondition for recreating dreams: 
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if the individuality is what its world is ... and if its world is only affinned 
in language, in other words, needs language to be world at all, then we 
cannot speak of individuality where language is not yet language, that is, 
communication and meaningful expression (May 1958: 326). 
Through such an intersubjective endeavour both therapist and patient, in Foucault's 
words, can hope "to arrive at a comprehension of existential structures" which are 
anterior to psychic phenomena (Hoeller 1993: 33). 
Freud describes three kinds of dream: "intelligible" dreams which "can be inserted 
without further difficulty into the context of our mental life"; dreams which "have a 
bewildering effect, because we cannot see how to fit that sense into our mental life"; and 
"dreams which are without either sense or intelligibility, which seem disconnected, 
confused and meaningless" (Freud 1986: 89-90). It is the latter two types towards which 
Freud's dream analysis is directed, in an attempt to piece together fragments and 
discontinuities so that coherent meaning can be established. The psychoanalyst faces the 
difficulty of trying to unravel the transfonnative logic of dream in order to overcome "the 
obscurity of the dream-content and the state of repression ... of certain of the dream-
thoughts" (114). The puzzling character of dreams, "modified [by] repetition, 
complicated by interpolations", is that to which Freud pays particular attention, as he goes 
on to admit "faithful and straight-forward reproductions of real scenes only rarely appear 
in dreams" (103). As Slavoj Zizek discerns, the real mystery which dream interpretation 
seeks to uphold is not the latent content in itself, but the dream-work "which confers on 
it the form of a dream" (Zizek 1989: 12). It is the very fact that latent dream-thoughts 
cannot be retranslated into "the 'nonnal', everyday common language of inter-subjective 
communication", because that would serve only to ignore the ''form of the 'dream' in 
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which "unconscious desire [is] articulated" (13). As Freud asserts, and Zizek quotes, "the 
dream-work. .. creates that form, and it alone is the essence of dreaming - the explanation 
of its peculiar nature" (Freud 1977: 650). 
Binswanger does not explicitly refer to Freud's conception of dream-work in his essay, 
partly, perhaps, because it implies a causal understanding of unconscious from which he 
wishes to distance himself. For the Swiss thinker there is no such transformative logic 
to unravel, only a need to pay close attention to the heightening of mood and 
intensification of image in the dream. Nevertheless, his emphasis on the form of dreams 
is comparable to Freud's. Whereas Freud speaks of dream-work, Binswanger identifies 
the intensity of mood as the dynamic factor of dreams: "Dasein moves within the 
meaning matrix (Bedeutungsrichtung) of stumbling, sinking and falling .. .in this case form 
and content are one" (Hoeller 1993: 82). In dreams, literally "we are completely 
uprooted, and we lose our footing in the world" (81). Thus, the mood of the dream is 
encapsulated both by the images of rising and falling and the affect induced in the 
"dramatis persona" of the dreamer (85). The persona of the dreamer in no way need 
resemble "the individual body in its outward form") 8, but refers 
to something that can serve as the subject of the particular structural 
moment (in this case the moment of rising and falling), and this subject 
may well be, in its sensory aspect, an alien, external subject. It is, 
18 Binswanger's claim that the "isolated fonn" of the body is "unessential" in itself,. ~ n ? ? thus may ~ e e
transmuted into a "thousand" personae.in dreams, leaves him vulnerable to the cntlclsm that he IS 
establishing an argument for idealism. If Binswanger is understood to equate the essential part of the self 
with the disembodied 'I' then such a reading is tenable. But his point that the "essential ontological 
structure" is conceived as prior to any dualistic split implies that the self is always already embodied. On 
this reading, Binswanger can be aligned with Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Roy Schafer in their stress upon 
the meaning which 'I' assign to my embodiment. 
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nevertheless, I who remain the primal subject of that which rises and falls 
(84). 
The "structural moment" in which the 'I' is positioned and the meaning to which the 
individual assigns to it are the central factors of concern here. Binswanger goes on to 
suggest that "falling itself ... and its opposite, rising, are not themselves derivable from 
anything else. Here we strike bottom ontologically" (83). 
In many of the examples presented in this essay the rhythm of rise and fall is dramatized 
by dreams in which birds act as the symbolic focus. Binswanger's examples suggest two 
main forms of "bird" dream: firstly, the awe evoked by the sight of a majestic bird 
(Binswanger provides examples of an eagle, described in Eduard Morike's Painter Nolten 
(1832), and a kite, taken from the journals of the Swiss writer Gottfried Keller); and, 
secondly, scenes in which birds of prey attack smaller birds symbolic of beauty or frailty, 
such as a dove or a pigeon. 19 Binswanger implies that these symbols are universals (in 
the first case, perhaps, a variation on the Icarus myth and, secondly, a generic narrative 
of anxiety), but there seems to be a particularly Germanic feel here resonating through 
the overreaching figure of modernity, Faust, who is caught between his soaring desire for 
the heavens and a gravitational attraction to the physical world. 20 Although Binswanger 
19 To confirm that Binswanger is not citing isolated cases of dreams in which birds figure as important 
symbols, Ellen West writes an early poem entitled 'Spring Moods' in which she expresses an ecstatic 
longing for death: "I'd like to die just as the birdling doeslThat splits his throat in highest jubilation" (May 
1958: 246). Other examples from literature can be mentioned to substantiate Binswanger's claim as to the 
prevalence of such symbols (although this does nothing to help establish these symbols as universals). For 
example, Bard Bracy's dream in the second part of Coleridge's 'Christabel' (1801), in which a snake is seen 
coiled around a dove, and the autumnal wanderer who follows the migrating birds in Georg Trakl's 'The 
Wanderer' and 'Song of the Departed' (1914). 
20 As the German critic Johannes Pfeiffer discerns in his reading of Faust, Goethe's hero is divided between 
a self-serving drive to master the secrets of nature and a search for "authentic being as the highest value" 
(Gras 1873: 218). The two modes of being - the single mode of egotism and the dual mode of love -
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concentrates primarily on bird imagery, he does provide other examples of the rising and 
falling of moods, such as in a passage describing a "boat dream" in Goethe's Italian 
Journey (1816), where a "sudden change of a victoriously happy vital current into one 
that is fraught with anxiety is expressed by the fading or disappearance of brilliantly lit 
colors and by the obscuring of light and vision" (89). The passage from Goethe is 
significant not only as an example of his romantic-scientific interest in optics, but also 
in its description of dreams and visions, which "have a charm, for while they spring from 
our inner self, they possess more or less of an analogy with the rest of our lives and 
fortunes" (quoted by Binswanger [90]). Both the "charm" of the dream (which "invites" 
the reader/analyst to "feel" himself into world of the writer/patient [88]) and its 
"analogous" function to waking life are two aspects of dreaming upon which Binswanger 
lays particular emphasis.21 
As the examples given here and the accounts of his patients' dreams emphasize, 
Binswanger is interested in those dreams which fall into Freud's first two categories: 
those which are intelligible, but may also induce bewilderment or unease in the dreamer. 
These are the types of dream in which the experiencer stages, or works through, an 
emotional crisis or an affective response to an event in waking life as he or she 
imaginatively recreates the situation through dreams. Although Binswanger does not 
overlook the fragmentary and contradictory character of dreams, his conception of 
dramatically staging unresolved, or troublesome, feelings is important because it implies 
represent the two extremes between which many of Binswanger's patients are thrown. 
21 An alternative translation of this sentence by W. H. Auden & Elizabeth Mayer is equally revealing: 
"Such fantastic images give us great delight, and, since they are created by us, they undoubtedly have a 
symbolic relation to our lives and destinies" (Goethe 1962: 112). 
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some level of meaningful activity in the dream-world of the individual. This does not 
mean the individual is in control of his or her dream in the respect that they are the 
conscious and lucid maker of it (the individual is "the one for whom ... the dream occurs" 
[102]); rather that the creative moment shuttles between the remembering and 
interpretation of the dream in waking life and the dream-world itself: 
the dreamer awakens in that unfathomable moment when he decides not 
only to seek to know "what hit him", but seeks also to strike into and take 
hold of the dynamics in these events, "himself' - the moment, that is, 
when he resolves to bring continuity or consequence into a life that rises 
and falls, falls and rises. Only then does he make something (102). 
If the dream is seen as a vignette of waking life, then by attending to the meaning of the 
symbols as experienced in dream and situating them within the context of the individual's 
threefold world (Eigenwelt, Mitwelt, and Umwelt), one can actively recreate the self 
through an act of narration. In this way, Binswanger departs from Freud's wholly 
epistemological model of dream interpretation to one which approximates to James's 
notion that pragmatic activity needs to supplement an inquiry into self-knowledge. 
Binswanger positions the self in, and by means of, an ongoing narrative which, in its 
retentive and potential elements, characterizes "the inherent temporality of human 
existence" (23). The spatial coordinates of dreams - the "overlapping of journeys, paths 
crossing, roads which converge to the same place on the horizon" (61) - are, through the 
act of narration, given an explicit temporal meaning within the life-world of the 
experiencer. Binswanger places emphasis on the portentous and revelational aspects of 
dreams because it is these which characterize one's movement towards infinity and death: 
"just as we do not know where life and dream begin, so we are, in the course of our lives, 
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ever again reminded that it lies beyond man's powers 'to be "individual" in the highest 
sense'" (103). A concerted attempt to understand dreams is not a futile activity merely 
because one can never reach such a transcendent moment (although it may be 
experienced fleetingly through the rhythm of dream); nor should a coherent (that is, static 
and complete) understanding of dreams ever hope to be elicited. In his essay, 'On a 
Quote from Hofmannsthal' (1955), Binswanger states: "the poet's [or dreamer's] quest 
never arrives at its destination. Every poem [or dream] signifies ... a being-at-home and 
a breaking-up simultaneously" (Binswanger 1981: 192). Rather than adding to a 
seamless perspective of life, as Foucault indicates, "the ultimate in all those dreams that 
are haunted by the anguish of death" may, in fact, "paradoxically" disclose "the 
movement of freedom toward the world, the point of origin from which freedom makes 
itself world" (Hoeller 1993: 54, 51). 
Taking his lead from Heraclitus, Foucault goes on to understand the responsibility of self-
interpretation to represent a vital element of one's idios kosmos. Despite a turning away 
from a phenomenological approach to self during the course of his writing, Foucault 
returns to examine those practices which are constitutive of the self in his later work on 
The History of Sexuality. While his emphasis here is on those "etho-poetic" rules of 
conduct which are followed in order to transfonn the self, he retains an emphasis on "the 
way a human turns him- or herself into a subject" (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 208). He 
shuns what he considers to be the oppressive subjugation of self in recent history, and 
instead favours the Stoic technique of askesis: "an exercise of oneself in the activity of 
thought" (Foucault 1992: 9). In his extended analysis of "the relation between care and 
self-knowledge", he explains that askesis is "not a disclosure of the secret self' (the laying 
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bare of an unconscious). "but a remembering" (Foucault 1988: 21 ~ ~ 35). Askesis is thus 
understood to be the 
progressiye consideration of self, or mastery over oneself. obtained not 
through the renunciation of reality but through the acquisition and 
assimilation of truth. It has as its fmal aim not preparation for another 
reality but access to the reality of this world. The Greek word for this is 
paraskeuazo ("to get prepared"). It is a set of practices by which one can 
acquire, assimilate. and transfonn truth into a pennanent principle of 
action. Aletheia becomes ethos. It is a process of becoming more 
subjective (35). 
\\ rule it is not necessary to assimilate the entire Stoic doctrine to appropriate the 
movement from aletheia to ethos for my discussion of dream analysis. Foucault 
importantly indicates that one Stoic technique of premeditatio mallorum ("an ethical, 
imaginary experience") dictates that "one shouldn't enyisage things as possibly taking 
place in the distant future but as already actual and in the process of taking place" (36). 
The tenor of this practice is central to understanding the manner in which Binswanger 
conceives of dream interpretation as combining self-understanding and a recognition of 
"the fact of [one's] own destiny". along \\1th an active moral commitment to exercise 
insights in waking life (Hoeller 1993: 54). 
Binswanger also takes his lead from pre-Socratic yersions of a "dynamistic world-yiew", 
as contrasted to a modem "explicatiye (erklarich)" science (96).22 His writings appear 
caught between Nietzsche's stress on the ceaseless flux of becoming and Heidegger's 
emphasis on Being revealed through henneneutic disclosure. But. as the political theorist 
~ 1 1 Here Binswanger's comments can be aligned with the thought of Heidegger who, in hi.s e s s a ~ ~ ?n The 
Question Concerning Technology' (1953), favourably contrasts the techne of the pre-Socratlcs (partIcularly 
poiesis) with the menace of modern t e c h n o l o g ~ ~ (Heidegger 1978: 318ff.). 
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Leslie Thiele discerns, if Being is understood not as "stable and unchanging", but as "a 
coming to presence, less a what than a how, then becoming is not only compatible with 
Being but constitutes its very essence" (Thiele 1995: 26).23 This conceptual shift is 
detectable alike in Foucault's techniques of existence and Binswanger's dynamistic 
understanding of self and is also reminiscent of James's shift of emphasis from the 
epistemological inquiries found in Principles towards his development of the theory (and 
practice) of a pragmatic self. 
For Binswanger, this reconception is illustrated by his quotation of a remark by the 
Roman philosopher Gaius Petronius, that "Each man creates his own!" (sed sibi quisque 
facitl), which he deploys as a central maxim for considering the question of dream and 
existence. In pondering the Quisque of Petronius, Binswanger fixes upon the "problem 
of man's moral responsibility for his dreams", which leads him away from the idios 
kosmos of the isolated dreamer (and with it the morally dangerous overreaching which 
is implicit in Nietzsche's doctrine of self-overcoming) towards a responsible attitude to 
the "koinos cosmos", or the larger community of humans (99). By shifting from the 
private world of dreaming to the collaborative venture of interpretation, Binswanger 
affirms his emphasis on the love and care which is demanded in order to help the patient 
understand his or her structures of existence. 
2J Thiele substantiates his claim by quoting from Heidegger's work on Schelling: "Becoming is a manner 
of preserving Being, serviceable to Being, not the simple opposite of Be.ing ~ s s it might easily a p ~ e a ~ ~ if 
Being and becoming are only distinguished in formal respects and Bemg IS understood as objectIve 
presence" (quoted in Thiele 1995: 26). 
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In so doing, he draws a distinction between the temporary state of dreaming and 
permanent delusion which represents a withdrawal into "private opinion" or "doxa" (98). 
From Heraclitus he understands "genuine awakeness" to result only if the patient 
struggles to comprehend the whole plenum of existence: if "we live in awareness of this 
interconnection" between the individual, the natural and the social worlds. In the analytic 
encounter this would be represented by a patient 
[who] must decide whether, in pride and defiance, to cling to his private 
opinion - his private theater. .. - or whether to place himself in the hands 
of a physician viewed as the wise mediator between the private and the 
communal world, between deception and truth ... none can attain to 
genuine health in his innermost being unless the physician succeeds in 
awakening in him that little spark of spirituality that must be awake in 
order for such a spirit to feel the slightest breath (99). 
The analyst, whilst not equipped with miraculous powers of health-giving, is able to 
indicate existential structures which the patient may overlook or may not wish to see. But 
the analyst can only do this if he or she is aware of the exact meaning of the dream 
symbolism for the patient. Appropriately, the collaborative activity of analyst and patient 
is the key to Binswanger's theory of dream analysis. However, as I make clear in the next 
two sections, the realities of dialogic communication often renders this therapeutic goal 
as optimistic in the extreme. 
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(4) Lola Voss and the Fear of Living 
In the previous three sections I provided a reading of Binswanger's grounding in, and 
understanding of, existential analysis, with particular reference to his Heideggerian 
reconception of self as Dasein. Although his thought can largely be defended against the 
criticism of rival analysts like Boss, there are undeniable weaknesses running through his 
work; most notably, the applicability of Dasein to clinical analysis and the lofty 
therapeutic aims of existential analysis. In order to address these aspects, in this and the 
next section I will contextualize Binswanger's theoretical writings with extended 
reference to two case studies taken from the collection Schizophrenie.23 
It is not surprising that Binswanger chose to study the psychological manifestations of 
schizophrenia. Eugen Bleuler, his former teacher at the Burgholzli, coined the term to 
describe patients who display a particular form of dementia, characterized by "a loosening 
of the tension of associations, in a manner more or less similar to what happens in dreams 
or in daydreams" (Ellenberger 1970: 287). As described in Dementia Praecox, oder 
Gruppe der Schizophrenien (1911), Bleuler's "organo-dynamic" theory broke with the 
strictly organicist theories of nineteenth-century psychiatry and give rise to extensive 
research into schizophrenia in the ensuing years. Just as James addresses thefin-de-siecle 
urban illness of neurasthenia, so Binswanger follows the work of Karl Jaspers and 
Eugene Minkowski by focusing closely on the various mental and behavioural 
23 The collection consists of an introduction (translated in Needleman 1963: 249-64) and five case studies 
which had been printed separately in journals over the previous decade: the cases of'Ilse', .'Ellen West', 'Jilrg 
ZUnd' 'Lola Voss' and 'Suzanne Urban'. 'Lola Voss' is available in the Needleman collectIon (266-341) and 
, 
the first two cases have also been translated (May 1958: 214-36 & 237-364). 
205 
phenomena which characterize schizophrenia.24 Their shared methodology of descriptive 
phenomenology appears inadequate for those patients who cannot remember and/or 
articulate their experiences to the analyst. This problem is one which strains against 
Binswanger's description of collaborative therapy in 'Dream and Existence'. However, 
taking his lead from Minkowski's work, Binswanger's extensive study of existential forms 
is deployed to complement the patient's phenomenological descriptions of his or her life-
world, by disclosing "connections and interrelations between ... data" provided by the 
patient (May 1958: 99-100). 
In his introduction to Schizophrenie, Binswanger states that his primary aim is to 
approach each patient without theoretical preconceptions in order to glean "insights into 
the specific ontological structure of our cases" (Needleman 1963: 251). He outlines his 
hostility to the clinical tendency to "transform" data into "symptoms of illness" because 
this implies the patient is conceived as a "disease unit" (250-51). Instead, he wishes to 
view the patients as individuals who reveal "a unity of definite existential structures and 
processes" (251). Although schizophrenia is varied and cannot be reduced to one 
definable set of symptoms, for Binswanger it represents a disproportionate and 
particularly "unfortunate form" (Sadler 1969: 289) of Being-in-the-world which is 
characterized by delusions and grandiose ideals. Such an understanding enables him to 
dispense with the normative taxonomies "of healthy and sick, normal and abnormal" in 
order to concentrate on the "distinct modes of existence" which schizophrenic patients 
display (Needleman 1963: 250). For example, in 'The Case of Lola Voss' (1949), 
24 See Jasper's General P s y c h o p a t h o l o ~ ~ (B.erlin,. 1923) and M i n k ~ w s k i ' s s L ~ ~ Schizoph.ren,ie. ( P a r i ~ , , 19'27.). 
One of Minkowski's earlier papers, 'Fmdmgs m a Case of SchizophrenIC Depression, IS avaIlable m 
translation (May 1958: 127-138). 
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Binswanger claims the analyst must "focus upon the 'world' in which Lola presents 
herself to us already as a very sick person ... without bothering in the least about the 
purposive biological judgment that pronounces Lola as 'sick'" (289). Similarly, in a 
review article published two years before Schizophrenie, Manfred Bleuler, the son of 
Eugen and also a professor at the Burgholzli, outlines this kind of approach to 
schizophrenia: 
Existential analysis refuses absolutely to examine pathological 
expressions with a view to seeing whether they are bizarre, absurd, 
illogical or otherwise defective; rather it attempts to understand the 
particular world of experience to which these experiences point and how 
this world is formed and how it falls apart ... The remarkable result of 
existential analytical research in schizophrenia lies in the discovery that 
even in schizophrenia the human spirit is not split into fragments .. .If the 
mental life of a schizophrenic .. .is not merely a field strewn with ruins but 
has retained a certain structure, then it becomes evident that it must be 
described not as an agglomeration of symptoms, but as a whole and as a 
Gestalt (quoted by Ellenberger in May 1958: 124). 
It is the attempt to recognize and explicate this Gestalt which forms the basis of 
Binswanger's methodological approach to his patients. 
The theoretical problem here is one which I have already intimated and is crucial to a 
consideration of Binswanger's aim to disclose his patient's world-designs: is there an 
inherent pattern which reveals itselfby closely attending to a patient's behaviour and their 
phenomenological descriptions, or is the pattern generated by the mode of analysis? 
Whilst Binswanger's anthropological approach addresses the limitations of Freudian 
analysis, it nevertheless carries the presupposition that there is an underlying world-
design (or a combination of world-designs) which can be mapped despite disorderly. and 
often contradictory, behaviour. The question turns on the issue of whether experiential 
207 
states can be expressed, whether aesthetically or otherwise, in order that a world-design 
can be discerned; or, indeed, whether expression is reducible to a structural principle. 
By contrast, as is evident both in Binswanger's early word-association experiments (1907) 
under the supervision of Jung and in the examples of , literary' dreams cited in 'Dream and 
Existence', although he responds to the excess of meaning inherent in symbolic language, 
he maintains that the content and mood of dreams are an expression of the patient's 
world-design. However, following a romantic precedent recognizable in Emerson's and 
James's thought, Binswanger, in his emphasis upon the transformative nature of 
expression, also suggests a world of flux and instability which is constantly being 
remade: the Gestalt is thus "something which [patients] actively create, by the use of the 
power of the imagination" (Binswanger 1964: 586). In Binswanger's reading of his 
patients' attempts to disclose the structure of their world-designs he appears to admit that 
temporal experience is not wholly reducible to a synchronic pattern. The cases in 
Schizophrenie help to foreground this problem, by providing concrete cases of patients 
whose behavioural patterns change through the course of their illness, rather than just 
intensifying in degree. 
It is interesting to compare the cases of Lola Voss and Ellen West, not only because they 
share similar schizophrenic characteristics, but also because they illustrate the place of 
the body in Binswanger's thought: Lola displays an outward phobia towards clothes and 
Ellen incorporates her anxiety into her eating habits. Both cases indicate that, whilst the 
self conceived as Dasein is primarily concerned with meaning structures, because Dasein 
is embedded in the world it often seeks expression through the body. Compared with the 
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emphasis on physicality in the worktMerleau-Ponty, Binswanger can be accused of 
neglecting the body in his work on Daseinanalysis. However, he explicitly defends 
himself from those who "accuse Daseinanalyse of 'neglecting the body'" (212). He is 
keen only to stress that "if physical needs are given authority over the whole of man's 
being, then the image of man becomes one-sidedly distorted and ontologically falsified" 
(Needleman 1963: 160). For him, the spatial and temporal trajectories of corporeality 
should be "accommodated within the totality of man's knowledge of himself', rather than 
privileging them over the existential dimension. 
Although the body is often underplayed in Binswanger's writing, it reappears in the guise 
of metaphors relating to the world designs of depth/surface and rising/falling which are 
thought to characterize patients suffering from schizophrenia. In developing this theme 
I will argue that the acute anxiety experienced by both patients is manifested by their 
inability to come to terms with the Otherness of embodied life. Thus they find 
themselves in a state of exile, or, in Heidegger's phrase, double estrangement, from 
themselves. A consideration of Binswanger's analysis of the "loss of world and self' 
(Needleman 1963: 338) not only clarifies certain areas of his thought, but also mediates 
links between the work of James and Sacks as representatives of converging currents in 
modem romantic science. 
In the introduction to Schizophrenie Binswanger proceeds to outline four characteristic 
qualities, or stages, of schizophrenia. Firstly, the patient undergoes a "breakdown in the 
consistency of natural experience" which is accompanied by the "inability to 'let things 
be' in the immediate encounter with them, the inability ... to reside serenely among things" 
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(Needleman 1963: 252). As I indicated in the introduction, the Heideggerian notion to 
'let be' (sein lassen) is characterized by composure of mind and equanimity: "this ... mood 
springs from resoluteness, which, in a moment of vision, looks at those Situations which 
are possible in one's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole as disclosed in our anticipation 
of ... death" (Heidegger 1962: 396). Far from being a "quietist" philosophy, the 
resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) of 'letting things be' is a "highly positive and active" 
posture by which one is able to face the finite limits of existence (Needleman 1963: 252). 
In this way Dasein is rendered "ahead of itself in resolve" (a term comparable to 
Foucault's understanding of the Stoic preparatory technique of askesis).25 Unable to bear 
such anxiety, Binswanger's patients also appear unable "to come to terms with the 
inconsistency and disorder of their experience" and so they construct delusions in their 
search "for a way out so that order can be re-established" (253). In the cases presented 
in Schizophrenie these delusions take the form of each patient choosing, or compulsively 
following, an "inappropriate" course of action (as opposed to Emerson's choice of 
appropriate, or moral, action). In Binswanger's words, their world-design "manifests 
itself without exception in the formation of Extravagant [verstiegene] ideals that 
25 In his interpretation of the first division of Being and Time, Hubert Dreyfus indicates that 
Entschlossenheit means both resoluteness and, when written with a hyphen, "unclosedness" or "openness" 
(Dreyfus 1992: 318). He quotes Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics (1953), in which the Gennan 
claims "the essence of resoluteness (Ent-schlossenheit) lies in the opening (Ent-borgenheit) of human 
Dasein into the clearing ofbeing .. .Its relation to being is one ofletting-be" (Heidegger 1959: 17). Dreyfus 
understands that by embracing openness one acknowledges the "impotence" of the self for making 
absolutely "lucid" and rational decisions. Transposing this reading onto B i n s w a n ~ e r ' s s work, a patient who 
cannot 'let things be' and is forced into a restrictive binary logic cannot accept thIS powerlessness and the 
"impossibility" to be resolute in "an authentic being-toward-death [Sein zum rode]" (Needleman 1963: 
257). 
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masquerade as a life .. stance, and in the hopeless struggle to pursue and maintain these 
ideals" (253).26 
The second quality of schizophrenia is a consequence of the first, in that the patients 
display a "splitting off of experiential consistency into alternatives" which take the fonn 
of a "rigid either-or" logic (254). Such disproportionate logic leads back to Binswanger's 
theory of the diminution of the plurality of various world-designs which structure the 
psyche of the individual into one fixed pattern of response. Subsequently, 
the complete submersion of the Dasein in the particular pair of 
alternatives also means that the existence can, in general, temporalize 
itself only in the mode of" deficiency" - in the mode, namely, that we have 
come to know asfallenness to the world, or in short, as "mundanization" 
[Verweltlichung] (257). 
In an attempt to avoid facing the alternative modes of Being-in-the-world the individual 
often conceals those choices which are "unbearable to the Dasein so that the Extravagant 
ideal might thereby be buttressed" (258). This inauthentic activity of "covering" 
represents the third characteristic of schizophrenia. The fourth constitutes the feeling of 
"no longer being able to find a way out or in" (258), a self-surrender "to existential 
powers alien to itself' (259), either in the fonn of "the will of others" (263) or compUlsive 
26 I will return to the concept of Extravagance later in this and the next section, a translation of 
Verstiegenheit to which William Sadler objects. He prefers to translate the term as "high-flown" which 
"suggests a climber who has gone too high up the mountain and has become stuck on a ridge; he can neither 
rise higher nor can he come back down onto common ground", as characterized by the character of Hal."ard 
Solness in Henrik Ibsen's The Master Builder (Sadler 1969: 292). The extravagance of the master builder 
is an important image for Binswanger which recurs in his essay on V e r s t i e g e n ~ e i t t (Needleman 1963: 3 . . l ~ ~
49), originally the first chapter of Drei Formen MissglUckten Daseins (Tilbmgen, 1 ~ 5 6 ) , , as well as hIS 
longer work on Henrik Ibsen und das Problem der Selbstrealisation in der Kunst (HeIdelberg. 1949), an 
extract of which is translated as 'Ibsen's Masterbuilder' (Gras 1973: 185-216). 
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behaviour, and a final "resignation or a renunciation of the whole antinomic problem" 
which "takes the form of an existential retreat" (258). 
The case studies in Schizophrenie are each divided into roughly three parts: the first is 
a standard case history of the patient; the second represents Binswanger's attempt at 
existential analysis; and the third, a clinical analysis in which he attends closely to the 
particular form of psychopathology displayed by the patient. This format is similar to 
Freud's case studies and serves to contextualize the forms of psychopathology within the 
fuller life-history of the patient. By responding to the peculiar situation of each patient 
Binswanger is forced to attend scrupulously to their testimonies (verbal and written 
accounts of letters, diaries, dreams and hallucinations) and also to information which may 
be garnered from families and associates of the patient, as well as from medical records. 
Binswanger's primary interest is not in the final stage of schizophrenia per se, but rather 
"the existential process" (249) which leads to a retreat from the communal life of Being-
in-the-world-with-others. For him, 
the decisive element lies .. .in the particular nature of the resignation or 
final capitulation of the Dasein culminating in the withdrawal from the 
Dasein's decisional frame of reference ... the Dasein's surrendering of itself 
to the will of "alien" forces or "alien" persons. In the place of antinomic 
tension ... between two irreconcilable alternatives, what emerges now is a 
more "one-sided" and thus more consistent, "incorrigible", 
"unproblematic" experience in the sense of a psychotic experiential model 
according to which all new experience is fashioned (264). 
In his attempts to investigate the "existential process" Binswanger focuses his analysis 
on the personality of the patient and the unique situation in which they find themselves. 
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The data available to Binswanger concerning the life of Lola Voss before she enters 
Kreuzlingen at the age of twenty-four is limited. He is forced to rely on her father to fill 
in the biographical details of her life, details which he states were later confirmed by her 
mother. Lola was born in South America to a German father and Spanish American 
mother. Spoilt as a child, she suffered from typhoid fever at the age of twelve and 
attended a Gernlan boarding-school at thirteen where she showed a propensity for 
needlework and painting. Not until she fell in love with a Spanish doctor at the age of 
twenty and her father expressed concern about the suitability of the match did she show 
signs of fasting. appearing "joyless and depressed" (267). At twenty-two she displayed 
the first signs of 'clothes-phobia' on a trip with her mother to a German spa: she "refused 
to go aboard the boat unless a certain dress was removed from the luggage" (267). 
Around this tinle the Spanish doctor delayed his proposal to Lola and she became 
"melancholic and peculiarly superstitious" (268), displaying an aversion to particular 
objects as well as to hunchbacked wonlen ("hunchbacked men she considered lucky, 
however. and even tried to touch them"). Whilst spending time with her aunts in 
Gennany she turned against her nlother. considering anything associated with her 
"bewitched" (268). particularly personal items such as clothes and underwear. 
In the earl" days of her entry to the sanatorium no systematic study was attempted. 
.' . 
although ht:r first physician notices that she was "verbally astute", particularly in "the art 
of lying" (269). Fronl this early stage it seems unlikely that Binswanger's collaborative 
ideal is a viable tl1odt: of therapy to help Lola contend with her growing anxiety. which 
began to nlanifest itself in extrenle superstition and a rt:fusal to change her clothing. 
Fortunately. ant:\\' physidan tOl)k over supervision of Voss with whom she was more 
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inclined to communicate. Although she continued to resist talking about herself, this 
physician eventually learnt that her superstition regarding clothes derived from a stay in 
New York when she began to fear that "something might happen to her friend if she 
wrote to him while wearing a particular dress" (271). Her fear of hunchbacks is also 
thought to be linked closely to a letter expressing bad feeling between her and a male 
friend. During her trip to America, she visited a department store to buy a new dress, but 
she ran out "in horror" when she noticed that "the saleslady" was "squint-eyed" (275). 
These "obsessive ideas" become more intense during the period of her engagement, at 
which time her superstition begins to take on different guises: she "explained that it was 
the compulsion to 'read something into everything that made her so exhausted, and the 
more so, the more she was among people" (271). In this hyper-analytic state, Lola 
becomes obsessed with objects whose names she associates with either good or bad luck. 
One particular instance, which she initially claims was "so terrible that she could not 
possible talk about it", concerned an umbrella, which in German (Schirm) contains the 
word si, "an affirmation" (272). This incident she associates with a previous traumatic 
moment when, 
her father had bought a new umbrella ... [and] she (hadJ met a woman 
hunchback on the street...now all the bad luck emanating from the 
hunchback was displaced onto the umbrella ... the bad luck ... confirmed 
through the meaning of the si (272). 
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Also documented are other instances when an umbrella symbolizes for Lola the 
transferral of bad luck onto people (her mother and, later, her nurse27), or the 
contamination of objects with which it had been in contact. At this time she expressed 
her ongoing suffering in a letter to her physician, in which she writes of her unrelenting 
"terror" (273) and "sadness" which accompanies the "horrible possibility" (276) of bad 
luck. Her residence at Bellevue was soon terminated (after a total of fourteen months at 
Kreuzlingen) when she received news that her family "was now ready to pennit her to 
marry the Spanish physician" (277). To supplement the infonnation already collated, the 
next year of Lola's life in Paris and, later, in South America is charted through letters to 
her physician, in which she expresses her ongoing fears and anxieties. The first section 
of the case study ends here. 
In his existential analysis Binswanger outlines definite signs of schizophrenia in Lola's 
behaviour. He discerns a shift from the early stages of schizophrenia, in which "the self 
was still able to preserve itself to some modest degree" (312), towards "an extreme 
degree" (284) of the second stage of the schizophrenic process in which Lola "is 
completely delivered to the superior power of the world, and benumbed by it" (312). 
This stage is characterized by 
what we call mundanization ... a process in which the Dasein is abandoning 
itself in its actual, free potentiality of being-itself, and is giving itself over 
to a specific world-design ... the Dasein can no longer freely allow the 
world to be, but is, rather, increasingly surrendered over to one particular 
world-design, possessed by it, overwhelmed by it (284). 
27 The importance of the mother, nurse and father in Lola's story lends itself to a Freudian analysis of the 
family romance. However, I wish to resist approaching the case in this manner in order to explore 
Binswanger's mode of Daseinanalysis. 
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Binswanger calls the state in which Dasein surrenders itself to powers external to itself 
"thrownness" (Geworfenheit), as oppose to Heidegger's use of the term to characterize 
existence in general. Thrownness for Binswanger describes the gradual erosion and 
"absorption" (285) of existence by those objects and people that populate the world of 
Dasein. Instead of seeking a Being-in-the-world-with-others through the dual mode of 
love, Lola is "not able to harmonize ideal and reality" (285). Heidegger asserts that 
Dasein "finds itself primarily and usually in things because .. .it always in some way or 
other rests in things" (Heidegger 1982: 159). Similarly, the others in Lola's life, who "for 
the most part 'are there' in everyday Being-with-one-another" (Heidegger 1962: 164), 
represent the usual state of affairs, so long as the Dasein maintains a relational distance 
through the activity of care. If Dasein becomes overwhelmed by the Otherness of 
relations it finds its "extreme expression in the phenomenon of delusion" (Needleman 
1963: 285). In Lola's case this manifests itself in her belief in a malevolent fate and her 
fears of paranoia and persecution. 
Lola's extravagant ideal is understood to protect herself from the anxiety she associates 
with human relations and to secure her existence by "being left alone by the world ... to let 
no one and nothing come close to her" (285). For her, "the coexistors [Mitdaseinenden] 
are accessible only by way of a predesign of unfamiliarity, of the Uncanny 
[Verunheimlichung], or - alternatively - of the expectation of the Threatening" (285). As 
a consequence, "when it retreats from the world of fellowmen, from its coexistors, the 
Dasein also forgoes itself, or rather forgoes itself as a self' (288). Such a retreat 
represents an inability of "being-oneself' (284) or of "achieving the self 
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[Selbstgewinnung]" (296), because avoiding relations with others means only a surrender 
to their will or investing magical controlling properties in objects. Thus, 
where Dasein no longer temporalizes and spatializes, where it has ceased 
to be a self and to communicate with others, it no longer has a "here" (da). 
For it has its "here" only in the transcendence [Oberstieg] of Care [Sorge] 
- not to speak of the exaltation [Oberschwang] of Love (288). 
Binswanger designates such a loss of selfhood as "existential weakness", by which he 
means, 
a person does not stand autonomously in his world, that he blocks himself 
off from the ground of his existence, that he does not take his existence 
upon himself but trusts himself to alien powers, that he makes alien 
powers 'responsible' for his fate instead of himself (290). 
In James's language this weakening of will (an important aspect of resolve and care) is 
representative of an inability, or a refusal, to be socialized in a manner deemed 
appropriate by others. This claim may appear to reimpose those normative structures of 
health/sickness and sane/insane which Binswanger wishes to discard, by covertly 
criticizing the schizophrenic patient for not living up to social expectations. However, 
rather than resisting the constraints of expectation, a Foucauldian reading of Binswanger 
suggests that Dasein should first accept these limitations in order to transcend (or, for 
Foucault, transgress) them in an act of self-transformation. Paradoxically, for 
Binswanger, "existential richness" (289) and resolve springs from letting things be, rather 
than surrendering to the will of others by retreating from the world of human relations. 
Here, the similarity between Binswanger's resolute self and James's strenuous self (in 
contrast to the existential retreat characterized by George Beard's rest-cure) is startlingly 
evident. 
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Because Being-in-the-world is characterized by relations with others, the powers to which 
Lola surrenders "although alien to the self, cannot be considered alien to existence, as 
something outside or above it" (291). Lola's state ofthrownness "seduces existence time 
and again, reassures it temporarily, alienates it more and more from itself, and completely 
prevails upon it" (291). The significant others in Lola's life - for the most part her mother 
and nurse - are not the primary agents who impose this condition upon her, but rather they 
make manifest to her "a superior, uncanny, even dreadful it, confronted with which the 
Dasein feels completely forlorn" (292). Thus, while Lola feels "abandoned by the others" 
(and here Binswanger makes the physician the only exception - he is "the post to which 
existence clings while adrift in the whirlpool "), it is she who surrenders herself over to 
the constant threat of "the Uncanny and the Dreadful" (292).28 
Binswanger suggests two responses by which Lola experiences the Uncanny: she 
attempts to "'capture' the Dreadful and anticipate its 'intentions' with the help of words 
and playing on words" and she also tries "to put spatial distance between [herself] and the 
persons and objects struck by the Dreadful's curse" (292). Both responses - Lola's 
tendency to read profound significance into phonetic associations and her retreat from 
"spatial closeness" (293) which leads to a "narrowing of the life space" (296) - are 
described as deriving from a feeling of the self being overpowered by each of the spheres 
of existence (Umwelt, Mitwelt and Eigenwelt). Her belief in fate "combines with the 
28 Binswanger admits that he favours Schelling's definition of the uncanny - "anything which ought to 
remain in secrecy and obscurity and has become manifest is known as uncanny" (306) - to Freud's 
discussion in his 1919 paper. Binswanger supplements Schelling's understanding by stating "what was 
supposed to remain in secrecy and hiding is the original anxiety, which now 'has emerged'" (306). Although 
both versions of the uncanny tum on the axis offamiliarity/unfamiliarity, as I discuss in a consideration of 
Sacks's The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat, Freud's discussion is useful for a fuller understanding 
of the tenn. 
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Uncanny and superstition" throws her into a state of "anxiety without any possibility of 
regaining herself, or even becoming aware of herself' (297). This does not necessarily 
mean that Lola is unaware of her anxiety, rather that she cannot see that her belief in fate 
as "an uncanny objective power" is unjustifiable. Binswanger, revealing himself to be a 
true modem, draws the analogy with this state of hyper-analysis with "astrological 
superstition" (298). He claims that "what is common to both is the clinging to alleged, 
blindly operating, power and evasion of the opportunity to retrieve oneself from 
thrownness and return to being one's real self or to accept genuine religious faith" (298). 
This "return" is not to some essential, or foundational, selfhood. Although memory is a 
retrospective activity, it acts primarily as a means for self-transformation. As for James 
and Emerson, the "genuine religious faith" in Binswanger's thought is a confirmation of 
the spiritual dimension of the self. 
In a manner similar to the grotesque vision experienced by James's French correspondent, 
Binswanger understands Lola's fear of female hunchbacks to be a potential staging of her 
future, a staging which she believes to be confirmed by the hunchback's association with 
the umbrella (si). The symbol of the female hunchback thus represents 
[an] ominous portent Gust as does the squinting salesgirl) from the 
"abnormality" of these life-phenomena, an abnormality in the sense of a 
"descending life" ... namely, of deformation, crippling, disfigurement. 
These forms of "descending life" figure so prominently in all superstition 
because superstition "springs" from the anxiety of being-in-the-world per 
se, of the naked existence thrown into uncanniness (298). 
Whereas Heidegger describes authenticity as a Being-towards-death, Lola is understood 
to retreat from a symbol which she associates with her "descending life." In doing so, her 
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anxiety "makes the world appear ever more insignificant, ever more simple, because it 
'petrifies' existence, narrows its openness, its 'here', down to ever smaller circles" (299). 
Contrasted to the optimistic plenitude of Emerson's "self-evolving circle, which, from a 
ring imperceptibly small, rushes on all sides outwards to new and larger circles" 
(Emerson 1992: 147), the image of decreasing circles is characteristic of a restricted and 
petrified life without escape. The resulting "loss of freedom and compulsive 
entanglement in the net of external circumstances" derives from "a transformation of life-
historical spaciality into mundane space" (Needleman 1963: 300). In other words, the 
interarticulation of time and space gives way to the "mundanization" of a perpetual 
present which repeats itself ad infinitum. This covering strategy, added to her retreat 
from the world of others, combine in Lola's attempt to stave off her Being-towards-death, 
but only serve to compound her anxiety. 
Closely connected to Lola's fear of female disfigurement is her peculiar relation to 
clothing.29 Binswanger suggests that clothing for Lola, particularly dresses, "become 
actual representatives ... of the mother." In contrast to Jiirg Ztind who refuses to remove 
his coat for fear of others thinking that he is a degenerate, Lola actually fears "the world 
of garments" (301). As I discuss in the next section, Ellen West, like Jiirg Ztind, is 
anxious about what lies beneath the surface of the body, whereas Binswanger claims that 
Lola is concerned "only with the cover provided by the clothes" (301). However, if each 
29 Binswanger admits that to address this issue fully "we would have to conduct a biographical 
investigation. Unfortunately, we do not have any historical points of reference at .our disposal" (300). 
Details such as the kinds of dresses Lola dislikes and what particular items of clothmg mean to her were 
presumably unavailable. Such limiting factors are common in this kind of analysis and check ~ h e e
therapeutic ideal stressed in 'Dream and Existence.' However, Binswanger is more successful at collectmg 
biographical infonnation in the case of JUrg Zund. 
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case is seen to display "the transformation of existential anxiety into the horrible fear of 
a 'worldly' shell" (301), Lola's refusal to wear clothes only associated with good omens 
can be read as an attempt to preserve the depth of her body. Because Binswanger sees 
Lola to have lost a hold upon her "physical and psychic world", the surface world of 
clothing "assumes prime importance" (301).30 Furthermore, because Lola cannot express 
her "physical and psychic world" except through the metonymy of clothing, when she 
cuts them up and destroys them she is, in effect, enacting a displaced masochistic 
violence to her body. 
This insight strikes at the core of Lola's condition. In her wish to literally wear good luck 
she attempts to wrest "from the intangible, uncanny Dreadful a personlike character, 
namely the personification of a fate that proceeds according to predictable intentions" 
(302). Rather than associating her "worn-out dress" with the "descending life" signified 
by the female hunchback, Binswanger understands Lola's reluctance to buy new clothes 
as a- sign of the imminent "catastrophe" she feels to be "implicit in the new dress" (303). 
She is seen to accept the "external mundane continuity" of the old dress rather than 
"risking an uncanny adventure" by acquiring a new one: in other words, "the Sudden 
against which she tries to protect herself' (303). Consequently, the ideal of "existential 
continuity, the authentic becoming in the sense of authentic historicity", in which Dasein 
is granted some agency, "is replaced by the uncannily sudden jump from one 'now-point' 
30 Binswanger stresses the "expressive significance" of clothing in dreams in an important footnote (302). 
Instead of metaphoric or metonymic logic only serving to structure a logically a u t o n o m ~ u s s :ealm of d r e a ~ s , ,
the nature of schizophrenia suggests a constant slippage between dream-states, hallucmatlOns and wakmg 
life. When, at the end of 'Dream and Existence', Binswanger speaks ofa "genuine awakenness" he gestures 
towards an untangling of this logic in order to reflect upon it. Most clearly. illustrated in ~ ~ c k s ' s s c ~ s e e of 
Leonard L., although an individual may have moments of insight into hiS or her conditIOn, ultimate 
enlightenment is a state always deferred because the self is always already articulated in language. 
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to the next" (303).31 Kierkegaard's description of repetition-with-difference, signifying 
"genuine existential continuity", is abandoned in favour of "recurrence of sameness." 
Following James's work on repetition, the habit of wearing worn-out clothes crystallizes 
into a compulsive-repetitive pattern for which, in Lola's case, there is no apparent escape. 
Binswanger extends James's understanding of habit by offering an analytic understanding 
of particular cases. Lola's clothes-phobia (closely related to her delusions of persecution) 
is not a symptom of an underlying fear of the future (although Binswanger can be read 
to mean this), but the manner in which inexpressible uncanniness is articulated in terms 
of her world. 
To conclude this section it is useful to quote the American analyst Carl Rogers, who, in 
his essay on 'The Loneliness of Contemporary Man' (1961), outlines "two elements to the 
sense of aloneness" which are characteristic of schizophrenic patients (Rogers 1961: 94). 
Both elements are indicative of Lola's inability to express her condition: firstly, Rogers 
describes "the estrangement of man from himself, from his experiencing organism ... thus 
we find man lonely because of an inability to communicate freely within himself'; and, 
secondly, "in our loneliness is the lack of any relationship in which we communicate our 
real experiencing - and hence our real self - to another" (94). Even if one ignores the 
problematics of the word "reality" for Rogers, this appraisal of a self divided from itself 
and from those others whose language it shares, but with whom it consistently fails to 
communicate, is illustrative not only of schizophrenic patients but of the central isolating 
experience of modernity, as symbolized by the title of the American sociologist David 
31 This may be read to mean that Binswanger is promoting a form of commodity ~ e t i s h i s m m ("a change of 
clothes is identified with a change of persons II [333]), but the acquisition of clothes IS used here only as an 
example in which the schizophrenic foregoes Being-towards-possibilities in favour of a mundane present. 
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Riesman's book The Lonely Crowd (1950). Binswanger's ideal of empathic 
understanding and collaborative overcoming is less an antidote to such loneliness than 
a belief in future possibility. For him, a 'case' is never closed but always open to self-
transformative reworkings. However, as the next section makes clear, the optimism of 
medical care faces its sternest test with terminable cases in which the "potentially fatal 
division" that Rogers describes inexorably moves towards its conclusion. 
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(5) Ellen West and the Revolt against Corporeality 
'The Case of Ellen West' (1944-45) is the one single piece of Binswanger's work which 
has received the most critical attention. Not only is Ellen West presented as the most 
articulate, and therefore the most insightful, of Binswanger's patients (echoing James's 
lucid, yet fictional, French correspondent and prefiguring the most perspicacious of 
Sacks's post-encephalitic patients, Leonard L.), but the denouement of her case provides 
one of the most dramatic moments in Western analytic history. My primary interest in 
this case is twofold: firstly, to conclude my discussion on the active and embodied self 
in Binswanger's thought; and, secondly, to outline how schizophrenia delineates a certain 
imaginative space (simultaneously as the illness diminishes the possibility of 
participating in the world of others). The insights gleaned from Ellen's dreams, poems, 
diaries and letters are invaluable sources for Binswanger's existential analysis. Moreover, 
these 'first-hand' accounts (as always, a degree of scepticism accompanies this term) often 
introduce elements which are either overlooked or cannot be assimilated into the 
anthropological schema of Daseinanalysis. Appropriately, this section indicates some of 
the limits of Binswanger's project. 
Here I will outline only the essentials of the case, reserving my comments on particular 
details for later in this section. Ellen's family background is described as displaying 
instances of mental instability: she has a Jewish father with "suicidal ideas" (237), a 
nervous mother, a mentally ill aunt, an uncle who shot himself, a grandmother who died 
of "dementia senilis" (238) and a manic-depressive great-grandmother. Ellen is 
characterized as a "headstrong and violent child" (but by whom the reader is not told); 
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at school she favours languages; she expresses signs that she wishes to be a boy (a desire 
which she later renounces); and she is prone to excessive mood swings. At the age of 
seventeen she reads the Danish writer Jens Peter Jacobsen's novel Niels Lyhne (1880) 
which stimulates her transition "from a deeply religious person ... to a complete atheist" 
(239). The characteristics of "rigorous esthetic individualism and religious nihilism" 
(272) displayed by Jacobsen's protagonist are reflected in Ellen's expressions of her own 
spiritual struggle and existential anxiety, which she subsequently attempts to stave off by 
thinking less and working more. Her early adult life is characterized by "happiness, 
yearning, and hopes" (as she looks forward to a journey overseas with her parents [241]) 
and the feeling that she is "small and wholly forsaken in a world which she cannot 
understand" (when she goes to nurse her brother in Sicily [242]). 
As a child Ellen shows a liking for meat and a "resistance" (238) to deserts and sweets. 
By the age of twenty-one her anxiety begins to manifest itself with worries over the size 
of her body: she is "constantly tormented by the idea she is getting fat" (242). In her diary 
she writes: "my inner self is so closely connected with my body that the two form a unity 
and together constitute my'!', my unlogical, nervous, individual 'I'" (242). This close 
identification of "inner self' and body becomes a central characteristic of her eating 
disorder. At this time her poems begin to figure death as atimaginative and seductive 
force, "not a man with a scythe but 'a glorious woman, white asters in her hair, large eyes, 
dream-deep and gray'" (242). 
In the following year she marries her cousin, but she continues to experience a worsening 
struggle between physical mortification (ttl long to be violated - and indeed 1 do violence 
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to myself every hour" [255]) and her spiritual aspirations ("I still will not give up my 
'ideal'" [250]), the latter to which, Binswanger claims, she subordinated "every one of her 
actions to this end" (249). She writes powerfully of her feelings of imprisonment: "I am 
in a prison caught in a net from which I cannot free myself. I am a prisoner within 
myself; I get more and more entangled, and every day is a new, useless struggle; the 
meshes tighten more and more" (258). She is subsequently advised to follow a variation 
of Beard's model of rest cure. This advice is to little avail. She suffers a miscarriage at 
the age of twenty-nine and a general decline in strength, mainly because she begins to 
imbibe laxatives. She begins psychoanalysis in her early thirties to which she shows little 
response. At the age of thirty-three she attempts suicide for the first time "by taking fifty-
six tablets ofSomnacetin" (which she vomits up) and soon after "she makes her second 
suicide attempt by taking twenty tablets of a barbiturate compound" (252). 
Soon after her first suicide attempt she joins the Bellevue clinic at Kreuzlingen but 
continues to display eating disorders, suicidal tendencies, increased agitation and 
profound depression. Much of the information concerning the turmoil of Ellen's life-
world is documented during this time as diary entries and dreams, both of which express 
her longing for death. In the light of her "increasing risk of suicide" and her failure to 
respond to therapy at Bellevue, the three physicians (Binswanger, Eugen Bleuler and "a 
foreign psychiatrist") eventually decide either to move her into a "closed ward" or to 
release her, the latter which they decide would mean "certain suicide" (266). After 
lengthy consultation with both Ellen and her husband the doctors decide to "give in to the 
patient's demand for discharge" (266). 
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On returning home initially her symptoms do not alter, but the case reports "on the third 
day of being home she is as if transformed" (267). She is in "festive mood", eats 
healthily, walks with her husband, reads Rilke, Storm, Goethe, and Tennyson (writers 
who describe high passions and imaginative exuberance) and she writes a letter to another 
patient friend (a transcript of this letter is not provided). The report closes with this 
statement, presumably offered by her husband: "in the evening she takes a lethal dose of 
poison, and on the following morning she is dead. 'She looked as she had never looked 
in life - calm happy and peaceful'" (267). 
In one extreme response to the publication of the full case history, the critic David Lester 
argues that not only are "the facts ... distorted by omission in the report of the case" (indeed 
there are absences: for example, a full report by Ellen's husband) in order that Binswanger 
could use Ellen's "life and death ... as a vehicle to demonstrate the technique of existential 
analysis" (Lester 1971: 251), but the details of the case conceal the possibility of psychic 
homicide. Lester argues that this phenomenon, in which "suicide victims may be 
propelled into unconscious or partly conscious acting out of the wishes of others", takes 
the form of "hostile neglect" on the part of the husband (252). Together with the gross 
irresponsibility which he attributes to Binswanger (by agreeing to release Ellen from 
Bellevue and by orchestrating "an intellectual exercise in abstract thought with no 
implications for behavior change or psychotherapy"), Lester argues that the case 
expresses Binswanger's "need to acquit himself for responsibility for her death" (262). 
While such a reading is tenuous and overlooks the sensitivity with which Binswanger 
addresses Ellen's death wishes, Lester's comments indicate serious areas of concern for 
reading this case. 
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In one of his later books, The Voice of Experience (1982), the famous anti-psychiatrist 
R. D. Laing cites 'The Case of Ellen West' as "generally taken to be a standard work in 
its field, an exemplary model of its kind" (Laing 1982: 53). Having established this, 
Laing goes on to criticize Binswanger both for his diagnosis of Ellen as schizophrenic 
(despite discernable traces of the four stages of schizophrenia, the other analysts dealing 
with the case had variously diagnosed hysteria, severe obsessional neurosis with "manic-
depressive oscillations", melancholia and psychasthenia [59-60]) and for evidence of 
central contradictions in his methodology. 
The "dual mode of love", outlined in his theoretical writings and recapitulated as a 
therapeutic goal in 'Dream and Existence', is present only as an unfulfilled ideal in the 
case of Lola Voss. Having established this ideal it is surprising that, at the beginning of 
the analytic section of Ellen's case, Binswanger claims that "the foregoing account 
summarizes what we know, on the basis of credible autobiographical and biographical 
documents and testimonies, about the human individuality to whom we have given the 
name Ellen West" (May 1958: 267). Already the reader has the sense that Binswanger 
does not know Ellen intimately, since he never interacts with her at length or analyses her 
dreams in terms of her own responses to them. Binswanger goes on to claim that 
this knowledge is of a purely historical sort ... her specific name loses its 
function of a mere verbal label for a human individuality ... and takes on 
the meaning of an eponym (lama). The name Ellen West (in this 
connection, of course, it makes no difference whether this name is real or 
fictitious) thus designates the totality of a historical figure or personage 
(267). 
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Again, the personal quality of Ellen's condition appears absent. Added to this is the 
surprising assertion that by assigning the patient an "eponym" (to protect the real Ellen 
and her family) he does not alter the symbolic proportions of the case, especially 
regarding the choice of such an evocative surname. 
Binswanger attempts to suspend clinical judgments ("be they moral, esthetic, social, 
medical, or in any other way derived from a prior point of view, and most of all our own 
judgment" [268]), seemingly, even at the expense of personal contact with Ellen. Of 
course, Binswanger cannot be held wholly responsible for attending to the patient for the 
full duration of her stay at Bellevue, but, as Laing scathingly indicates, 
in view of [his previous] theoretical reflections it is surprising that 
Binswanger writes .. .that conditions were particularly favourable to 
existential analysis, just because he did not know her [Ellen] personally. 
Better than that, he has at his disposal an abundance of written material. 
Usually, in such cases of deteriorated schizophrenia, material for 
existential analysis can only be obtained by persistent and systematic 
exploration of patients over months and years. Evidently, the attempt to 
establish a 'dual' relationship with such patients is only a waste of time. 
In her case, he has pages and pages of useful material. He can spread it 
out before him, all at once, and look at it. No need to spend time in the 
presence of a person whose presence in the world is so totally unfortunate 
and miserable. The existential Gestalt that is Ellen West is unable to 
'relate'. His study exemplifies exactly what he attacks (Laing 1982: 61). 
I agree with Laing that Binswanger counters his earlier emphasis on the "love, the dual 
mode of existence" (May 1958: 273) - although he does retain it as an unfulfilled 
possibility for Ellen - and, in light of his comments on the role of the analyst ("the post 
to which existence clings while adrift in the whirlpool "), his professional distance appears 
to amplify Ellen's feelings of loneliness. However, given the terms of the case, he can 
(at the stage of writing it) only hope to analyze the material he and his colleagues have 
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collected over the previous years "in as many details as it is at all possible" (May 1958: 
268). Furthermore, in displaying a proximity to the central concerns of romantic science, 
Binswanger asserts that "Extravagance can never be understood solely from a subjective 
point of view, but only from the combined perspective of subjectivity and objectivity" 
(Needleman 1963: 349). 
To his credit, Binswanger writes of his "uncertain, fluctuating, and incomplete" 
judgments (which are the only ones to be evinced from the available data) and he 
expresses a need to respond to the details sympathetically (as opposed to applying 
"scientific judgment"): "love alone, and the imagination originating from it, can rise 
above this single point of regard" (268). Here, though, he has shifted his stance from that 
of analyst-therapist of patients to analyst-hermeneutician of a literary text of Ellen's life. 
If the conflation of life and text is all that can be hoped for after Ellen's death, then the 
"dual mode" of inter subjectivity is transformed into a mode of textual interpretation. It 
transpires that the question posed in the last section, apropos the importance of disclosing 
the structures of Dasein in order to reorient the patient in her world, here implies that the 
world-design is an analytic structure which, at least in this case, can be fully discerned 
only after the event. The resulting form of posthumous literary criticism (which reveals 
marked similarities with Binswanger's interpretation of Ibsen's The Masterbuilder) retains 
the search for an underlying world-design, both as a structuring pattern and as a temporal 
dynamic which is seen to undergo certain "transformations" during the course of Ellen's 
life (269). Whilst Binswanger's reading certainly addresses important aspects of the case, 
I wish to indicate that the account of Ellen's life generates alternative readings which can 
complement and, often, challenge the structures of existential analysis. Ellen's text 
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generates an excess of meaning, particular in relation to the prominent role her body-
image plays in her life-world, instead of Daseinanalysis simply disclosing the central 
pattern. 
The very opening words of the case ("Ellen West, a non-Swiss ... ") suggest an Otherness 
that cannot be contained within the framework of Daseinanalysis, and, perhaps, indicates 
that Binswanger's description of world-designs is, at best, culturally specific. Otherness 
in this case is twofold: the difficulty which Binswanger experiences in his appraisal of 
Ellen's "death-history" (296) and Ellen's constant battle with her split self: "I confront 
myself as a strange person" (254). This assertion does not mean that Binswanger is 
insensitive to the strangeness of the case, but that the rhetoric of empathy and union of 
Daseinanalysis is inadequate to Ellen's internalized experiences. Having stressed this, 
it is productive to see Ellen's case and Binswanger's analysis of it as extending (if not 
completing) the complex world of Dasein which his earlier comments on love seem to 
brush over. I wish to suspend commentary on the medical ethics of Binswanger's 
position in his agreeing to release Ellen from Bellevue, noting only that, following 
Heidegger, he stresses that Ellen's existence is authentic "only when she/aces death" [my 
italics], a comment which does not necessarily mean he is in agreement with her final act 
(310).32 When he writes "only in her decision for death did she find herself and choose 
herself' (298), he interprets Ellen's decision from within the framework of her personal 
symbolic world rather than making an explicit moral comment. 
32 For another response to the (in)authenticity of Ellen's actions see Foucault's introduction to 'Dream and 
Existence' and his American biographer James Miller's interpretation of Foucault's response to Ellen's 
transgressive "limit experience" (Miller 1994: 73-78). 
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Ellen's "becoming" can be seen as her attempt to discover a self-reliant and autonomous 
path for her life; her early religious distance from her parents indicates a lasting wish to 
take responsibility for herself. From a promethean romantic perspective it is 
commendable that "in no respect does she care about the judgment of the world" (239), 
but her later renunciation of the worldly (rejecting the significant others in her life) and 
the corporeal (the wasting of her body) displays how extravagantly she seeks such 
independence. To quote Binswanger's words from the introduction to Schizophrenie, in 
Ellen's desperate search for self-reliance, "the Dasein .. .'grabs blindly and falsely' in its 
choice of means, overruns itself in a single experimental possibility that, regardless of its 
own inner consistency, has all the earmarks of the larger inconsistency" (Needleman 
1963: 254). Beneath her desire for independence lies Ellen's profound unhappiness with 
her earthly condition, an unhappiness which is to reveal itself in the deficiency of 
mundanization (Verweltlichung). Ellen's will to self-reliance can be seen to conceal her 
resignation to those alien forces within herself. Because she aligns her identity so closely 
with her body, it is not surprising to find that the constricted world-design manifests itself 
in a compulsion to eat followed by bodily mortification. Rather than becoming herself 
through starvation, Ellen's attempts to empty her body perversely tum into "nothing but 
a metamorphosis of freedom into compulsion" (341). Ellen can be seen to eschew, or 
abandon, a future of "defmite possibilities" for one which is empty and "hangs in the air" 
(303). 
Just as the protagonist of Jacobsen's Niels Lyhne renounces the promises of conventional 
religion, Ellen has "no star" to follow, or, following Cavell's comments on moral 
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individualism, no map to perfectionism which could guide her in her life. Binswanger 
writes, 
she suddenly discards her faith, which she had cherished in opposition to 
her father, and feels confirmed, indeed strengthened, in her individualism. 
Feeling no longer any trust in, or obligation to a deity, "nowhere caring" 
again about the judgement of the Mitwelt, she is now completely reliant 
on herself, determining the guide-lines and goals of her actions, in the 
words of Niels Lyhne, entirely "as a solitary individual," "by what she in 
her best moments ranks highest according to what there is in her." With 
such concepts as "best moments" and "highest," existence and ideas are 
raised to the realm of the superlative. This superlative, however, requires 
as correlative a superlative measure of "strength and independence." 
After reading Niels Lyhne, Ellen credits herself with that measure (272-
73). 
Ellen introjects all her yearning into the world of the Eigenwelt, but, according to 
Binswanger, "that also means that the self remains limited to passionately wishing and 
dreaming" (273). The "moral responsibility" of which Binswanger speaks in 'Dream and 
Existence' is a directive which should lead the individual away from the idios kosmos of 
the dreamer towards a participation in the communal "koinos cosmos" (Hoeller 1993: 99). 
Rather than Emersonian self-reliance here leading to a freedom imbued with an 
optimistic effusion of creativity, Ellen's poems and dreams reveal a wish to escape the 
confines of worldly existence - in this case the Mitwelt and the Umwelt - for a poeticized 
world of ethereal existence. 
All four of Ellen's dreams described in the case link her desire to eat with encroaching 
images of death: "the joyous expectation that I shall soon die"; "she asks him to get a 
revolver and shoot them both"; "she jumped into the water through a porthole"; she 
"wants to set herself on fire in the forest" (263). Obviously, the dreams ha\'e been 
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selected by Binswanger for their reflection of her anorexic schizophrenia33 and their 
anticipation of her final suicide: he claims that, taken together, the dreams form "the 
expression of one and the same anthropological fact, namely, the intertwined, inner 
connectedness of the motif of gluttony and death" (291-92). In terms of the whole case, 
only in her resolve towards death is Ellen able to extricate herself from a repetitive 
pattern which invades both her dreaming and waking life. However, to read Ellen's final 
act into her earlier dream serves to set up a form of psychic determinism. A fairer 
reading would be to suggest the images of death are expressions of Ellen's deep 
unhappiness about her condition. Indeed, the variety of scenes of death experienced in 
the dreams connote death as an empty signifier which may as well suggest any form of 
transition (perhaps a figurative death and rebirth instead of an actual one). 
Accordingly, Binswanger brings his readings in line with the pattern of her world-design 
rather than reading Ellen's death as inevitable. As Binswanger's extensive analysis of the 
third 'sea dream' makes clear, the peculiar combination of fire and water of the last two 
dreams is atypical of Ellen's Dasein which passes between opposing images of earth and 
air. Appropriating the elemental symbolism of Gaston Bachelard, Binswanger conceives 
the elements as suggestive of a set of universal properties.34 Binswanger interprets the 
33 I have deliberately avoided the tenn anorexia nervosa to describe Ellen's condition for the purposes of 
my explication of Binswanger's work. Although Ellen's eating disorder is certainly a fonn of both "intake-
restricting (or abstinent) anorexia and bulimia/anorexia (characterized by alternating bouts of gorging and 
starving and/or gorging and vomiting)" (Bordo 1985: 94), not only does Binswanger use the term sparingly 
(Ellen's case being one of the first extended clinical case studies of anorexia), but, following the aims of 
existential analysis, clinical tenninology is resisted in order not to obscure the personal dynamics of the 
case. 
34 See, for example, Bachelard's La Psychoanalyse du Feu (Paris, 1938) and L'Air ~ t t les s ~ n g e s s .(Paris, 
1943). Despite Binswanger's commitment to read only the manifest dream content, by l m p o ~ m g g thiS f o ~ ~
of elemental symbolism he can be accused of merely resorting to another structural v ~ r s l O n n of F r ~ u d d s 
dream-apparatus. However, by appropriating a very broad symbolic schema and by usmg the details of 
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deep water of Ellen's past to be contrasted, in the fourth dream, with the fire of 
purification (later to manifest itself in her resolution to commit suicide). The upward 
movement of fire and air combine to portend a revolt against, and a flight away from, 
time (water) and body (earth) which is as true of the pattern of her bulimia as it is of her 
suicide. 
As Binswanger comments in his essay on 'Extravagance', it is "possible for human 
existence to go too far" by enacting a "disharmony in the relation between rising upward 
and striding forth" (Needleman 1963: 342-43). In Ellen's case such an "anthropological 
disproportion" is characterised through an imbalance in the structure of her empty/full 
world-design. By emptying her body of food - an ascetic starving or a gorging followed 
by the imbibing of laxatives - as an extravagant manner of "rising upward" from her 
earthly state. Binswanger speaks of the desire to overcome "earth's gravity", as a desire 
to "gain a 'higher' perspective" upon that which surrounds and limits the self (345). This 
desire is realized in Ellen's case by a choice to rise "above the particular worldly situation 
and thus above the ambit of the known and seen" (345). In his description of "manic 
ideation", Binswanger distinguishes between the exertion of will, understood merely as 
"taking a stance", and "being carried' by moods. The element of desire implicit in this 
second condition indicates that Binswanger moves the terms of his study beyond the 
Jamesian notion of simply making a willed choice. As such, the interplay of compulsion 
and decision is one which links Binswanger's writing as much with Freud as it does with 
Heidegger. 
Ellen's case to dictate the typical or atypical tenns of the dream (at a particular time in her life) an argument 
can be mounted to defend his position. 
235 
While Ellen's renunciation of the worldly (in the language of her poetry, "the wonn on 
earth") may seem like a fonn of asceticism, in a letter to her husband she speaks of the 
"greed to realize my ideal" and the "hatred of the surrounding world which wants to make 
this impossible" (251). Characterized by modes of excessive hardship, asceticism shows 
the same kind of extravagance and disproportion more apparent in fonns of greed. In 
Ellen's case, as a mode of expression - "the birdling ... that splits his throat in highest 
jubilation" - the ascetic starving of her body becomes a negative choice, rather than a 
positive acceptance, or a letting things be. Alone, the rising upward - the "being-beyond-
the-world" - robs itself of "communio and communicatio" and thereby "Dasein can no 
longer widen, revise, or examine its 'experiential horizon' and remains rooted to a 'narrow 
minded', i.e., sharply limited, standpoint" (343). The obstinacy of such a position is 
characteristic of the kind of "hysterical twilight state" by which Dasein reacts to the 
deficiency of a mundane existence (252). 
Binswanger interprets the two images of the wonn and the jubilant bird as being 
characteristic of the two poles of Ellen's world-design between which she shuttles. On 
the one pole accumulate the tenns fat, earthy, burdened, passive, lazy, withered and aged, 
and on the other pole gather images of slenderness, airiness, freedom, activity, flowering 
and youth. Ellen's wish to renounce the fonner pole is evident in her early hatred for 
indolence and confonnity: 
I am twenty-one years old and am supposed to be silent and grin like a 
puppet. I am no puppet. I am a human being w i t ~ ~ r e ~ ~ blood and a 
woman with a quivering heart. And I cannot breathe In thIS atmosphere 
of hypocrisy and cowardice, and I mean to do something great and must 
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get a little closer to my ideal, my proud ideal...1 am not thinking of the 
liberation of the soul; I mean the real, tangible liberation of the people 
from the chains of their oppressors ... Call it unsatisfied urge to action ... To 
me it is as if this boiling in my blood were something better. Oh I am 
choking in this petty, commonplace life. Bloated self-satisfaction or 
egotistical greed, joyless submissiveness or crude indifference; those are 
the plants which thrive in the sunshine of the commonplace. They grow 
and proliferate, and like weeds they smother the flower of longing which 
germinates among them ... The morning must come after this siege of 
nightmares (243-44). 
I have quoted the patient at length because I wish to contend that Binswanger's 
interpretation of a single world-design (empty/full) is here complicated by a third term: 
an expression of an intensity of bodily existence ("boiling" blood) which is both of a 
bodily and ideal (or ethereal) order. Her fear of being reduced to an uncanny puppet 
which, as I elaborate in my reading of Freud's essay on 'The Uncanny' in the next chapter 
on Sacks, is conceived as being neither entirely human nor entirely non-human, provides 
a central image of Ellen's desire to fulfil this third way which is excluded within the rigid 
either/or dichotomy of her world-design. 
To deploy Jamesian terminology, this third way would enable Ellen to harness her 
romantic yearning with a celebration of her corporeality in a strenuous drive to 
meaningful and life-affirming action. However, Ellen's poems and dreams express that 
this path is barred: "all your projects/ ... all of them lie buried/Scattered in wind and 
storm/And you've become a nothingiA timid earthy worm" (244). Later on she does not 
even equate her existence with that of the worm, but, as Binswanger notes, "to lifeless, 
worthless material: she is nothing more than discarded husk, cracked, useless, worthless" 
(286). As Ellen's youthful romanticism is quashed by the mundanity of her existence, so 
the possibility of becoming herself through this third way diminishes: "she now hates her 
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body too and beats it with her fist" (286). As such, the rest of her life dramatizes a 
desperate wish "not to be oneself' (297). The retreat from herself is played out in the 
negative cycles of gorging and fasting which eventually lead to her suicide: "in her death 
we perceive ... the existential meaning, or more accurately, contra-meaning, of her life. 
This meaning was not that of being herself, but rather that of being not herself' (297). 
Binswanger is sensitive to the early possibility of the third way, in which he sees an 
"attempt at harmonizing the ethereal world ideal with the world of practical action", but 
he concludes that "in view of the powers available to her this attempt is so high-flown as 
to make us dizzy" (283). Ellen is thought to lack the power to achieve her dreams only 
because she severs herself from the shared worlds of Mitwelt and Umwelt and introjects 
all her desires into Eigenwelt. The suggestion here is that isolated existence leads to the 
projection of unrealistic or extravagant goals: only in communion with the natural and 
social worlds can ideals be achieved. However, it is interesting to note that one limitation 
of Binswanger's perspective reveals itself in the pronoun "us" in the above quotation, 
implying that it is the analyst (as reader of Ellen's life) who is destabilized and liable to 
fall as much as, or rather than, the patient herself. Such an admission complicates 
Binswanger's otherwise sound analysis of Ellen's condition and indicates the fragile basis 
on which his analytic interpretation is based. By setting up a coherent narrative pattern 
which structures Ellen's existence and actions, Binswanger's analysis falls short of 
addressing the discrete experiences of Ellen's life: the complex marriage to her cousin, 
her recurrent wish to violate her body and the letter to the patient-friend at the end of her 
life. Perhaps lacking vital information for some of these incidents, the third-person 
analytic narrative nevertheless reveals its own inadequacy in telling the life of another. 
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especially one whose world-design is so extravagant. At the end of the account the reader 
is left with a feeling of the substantial gap between Ellen's experience and Binswanger's 
interpretation of her condition. 
To conclude this chapter, it is useful to consider how the centrality of the body in this 
case illuminates Binswanger's broader view of the self conceived as Dasein. Towards the 
end of his analysis of Ellen's case he states that the body "signifies the sphere of our . 
existence which is on hand here and now, spatially expanded, present here" (341). What 
differentiates this statement from the classical philosophical definition of physical bodies 
extended in space is the notion that the body is "on hand", in the respect that it actively 
presents itself in the world. Because, for Binswanger, the world of Dasein is always 
threefold, the bodily self is properly understood as a phenomenal body (Merleau Ponty's 
corps propre), by which it is embedded both spatially in the organic and social worlds 
and temporally through the possibility of self-becoming. By limiting her existence to 
Eigenwelt, Ellen conceptually empties the self of meaningful content and cuts herself 
from the potentiality of time. Consequently, the manifold "sphere of existence" is 
reduced to the image of the "worm of the earth ... cut off from the future [ which] no longer 
sees wideness and brightness before her, but now only moves in a dark, tight circle" 
(306). Elsewhere, Binswanger uses the same image of the closed circle to symbolize the 
entrapment cycle in which she is caught, characterized by gorging and fasting (289). 
Although this image is Binswanger's, rather than one which figures prominently in Ellen's 
writings, the closed circle beautifully symbolizes an existence which is self-enclosed and 
cut off from the possibility of the temporal. Instead of Emerson's optimistic image of 
connecting circles, or James's figure of the ascending spiral, the closed circle becomes 
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a prison which prohibits both a communal Being-in-the-world-with-others or an authentic 
Being -towards-death. 
This chapter on Binswanger's thought has shown that, by breaking with certain 
presuppositions of Freudian metapsychology and deploying a Heideggerian exploration 
ofDasein, he is able to dispense with much extraneous psychoanalytic apparatus in order 
to study what he conceives to be the basic patterns of experience, manifested variously 
in his patient's testimonies, dreams, aesthetic expressions and bodily symptoms. 
However, the limitations of this form of case-history and subsequent analysis (conceived 
as a two-stage analytic process) are also very apparent. Especially evident in 'The Case 
of Ellen West', a totalizing narrative written after the patient's death seeks to circumscribe 
transitory experiences within a framework of phenomenological meaning and with the 
hindsight of narrative closure. If no overall pattern can be mapped without undermining 
temporal flux, one must tum to a fragmentary and more modest type of medical narrative 
to represent the experience of illness. It is the writings of Oliver Sacks to which I now 
turn to explore these ideas. 
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III. Oliver Sacks 
Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: 
he is the hidden face of our identity, 
the space that wrecks our abode ... 
Julia Kristeva, 
Strangers To Ourselves (1991) 
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(1) "No safe point": Awakening the Self 
This chapter assesses the importance of the writings of Oliver Sacks for approaching 
questions of selfhood from the perspective of romantic science, as discussed in the 
chapters on James and Binswanger. As I have intimated in the introduction, Sacks 
associates himself with romantic science more explicitly than do the other two thinkers. 
However, it has been important to work through alternative possibilities of romantic 
science to indicate what is implicit in Sacks's account. This chapter is less philosophical 
than the previous two, with more attention focused on theories (and practices) of a 
narratively constructed self. As such, this forms the concluding chapter of the thesis in 
which I link together the strains of thought already discussed. By situating Sacks's work 
as the culmination of an intellectual history I detect the danger of composing a kind of 
heroic eulogy to him. Instead, this fmal chapter seeks to resolve certain problems which 
James and Binswanger encounter in their work without masking the limitations which 
are implicit in Sacks's version of romantic science. 
My prefatory comments here position Sacks's work within the context invited by him: a 
self-conscious reaction against scientific practices which aim to objectively classify 
diseases, often at the expense of overlooking the subjective experience of illness. A 
distinction made by Howard Brody in Stories of Sickness (1987) between disease as 
objectively classified and illness as subjectively experienced, provides an appropriate 
focus for Sacks's hope (following James's) to account for more, rather than less, of his 
patients' experiences of illness. In the following sections I move on to consider the 
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narrative forms which Sacks deploys in order to broaden the scope of neurological 
SCIence. 
(i) 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to indicate one privileged discipline illuminated by 
Sacks's work, because his theoretical trajectory cuts across a variety of discourses, or, 
more precisely, it represents an attempt to fuse and synthesize what he interprets as 
hitherto discrete modes of inquiry. Presently a professor of neurology at the Albert 
Einstein College of Medicine in the Bronx, New York City, Sacks's work with post-
encephalitic patients at Mount Carmel chronic hospital in the late 1960s, presented in 
Awakenings (1973) and documented in the Yorkshire TV film (1974), brought him 
widespread critical attention. As is apparent from reading any of his books, Sacks's 
romantic sensibility challenges accepted modes of inquiry into neurological illness and 
its relation to the self. Sacks claims that classical neurology, in partnership with 
cognitive science, tends to view brain disorder as objectively analyzable through tracing 
neural networks and mapping energy-pockets, whereas he is also integrally interested in 
illness as it is embodied in, and experienced by, the patient. Accordingly, he emphasizes 
the subjective experience of illness: how it feels for patients to be ill and how they narrate 
their condition in an attempt to understand and accommodate debilitating illness. He 
discerns that the physician should encourage such discourses because they have the 
potential to challenge or disrupt the presuppositions of existing models. Sacks, in his 
numerous revisions of Awakenings and in his subsequent publications, has concentrated 
on the phenomenological aspect of illness, but not at the expense of neurological 
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integrity. Because his mode of inquiry often runs tangential to the hard science of 
neurology, it can be argued that he is merely a scientific popularizer, who has, at least in 
his books, overshadowed the serious pursuit of science with literary pseudo-science. He 
insists, however, that his is a complementary approach to classical neurology and not a 
substitute for it. 
Much of Sacks's writing explicitly encourages such a reading. He has often criticized the 
forms of classical neurology for being too narrowly interested in the physical aspect of 
disorder; and hence a tendency to ignore or eliminate the mental states of the patient. 
Consequently, his interest is not only in the physiological aspects of neurology, but also 
the psychology of the patient suffering from the disorder. By foregrounding a description 
of mental states, interwoven with expositions of brain dysfunction and neurological 
impairment, he attempts to put this aim into practice. 
There are two traditional neurological approaches which trouble Sacks: the holist and the 
mosaic views. The former approach conceives of the "'total energy' of the brain" as 
"uniform, undifferentiated, and quantifiable" and the latter describes a myriad of energy-
centres which break down the total brain-energy into smaller "sub-systems" (Sacks 
1991 a: 239-40). Whilst he sees each approach to have certain strengths, he deems both 
to be inadequate when pursued in isolation because, he claims, "they are completely alien 
to the experiences of the patient" (240). Instead, he argues that the physician should be 
less the disinterested inquirer and more the intimate collaborator who is able to "feel 
with" the patient (240), in the sense that he is receptive to the patient's idiosyncratic and 
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qualitative expressions of awareness. 1 Sacks's hope for an expressive space, where the 
patient can figuratively describe the idiosyncrasies of illness, may provide the physician 
with a method by which to challenge, or to expand upon, the presuppositions of these two 
neurological approaches. 
Although Sacks has often called for institutional reform, he understands that the patient's 
expressive space is crucially determined by the degree and severity of the illness: that is, 
whether the patient has the neuropsychological motility to collaborate in the production 
of such a space. Following Binswanger's comments on care and love, the 
recommendation for a more humanistic approach to patients is central to Sacks's 
professional ethics, but only faintly brushes against a mass of theoretical implications 
which surround it. 2 In order to give some ballast to his retreat from the classical trends 
of neurology, Sacks has appropriated and developed romantic science from the late work 
of Alexander Luria. In doing so, he not only marks a break with existing institutional 
models, but associates himself with a strain of scientific counter-culture which emerges 
out of the 1960s Anglo-American anti-psychiatry trends. 
The argument that Sacks is a romantic reactionary against a hegemonic neurology (a 
neurology practised under the aegis of the Enlightenment pursuit for knowledge) can be 
I As Binswanger implies in his image of the physician as "the post to whic? existence c l i n g ~ ~ while a d . r i ~ ~
in the whirlpool" (Needleman 1963: 292), the ideal of empathic u n d e r s t a n ~ m g g does. ~ o t t require, even If It 
were possible, that the physician should identify completely with the . p a t I e n t ' ~ ~ ?OsltlOn. ~ s s my study of 
Sacks demonstrates, the physician should be able to shift his or her s u b J e c t - p o s l ~ l O n n as the different m?des 
of inquiry demand: sometimes the sympathetic friend, sometimes the collaborative partner and sometimes 
the authoritative physician. 
2 For a discussion of the project to humanize medical protoc?l see the. article by Michael S ~ h w a ~ ~ ~ ~
Osborne Wiggins, 'Science, Humanism and the Nature of Medical Practice: A Phenomenological Vle\, . 
in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 28(3), 1985, 331-61. 
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countered in his attempt to synthesize or reconnect what Jfugen Habennas, following 
Max Weber, calls the "separation of the spheres" (Habennas 1982: 131). Following 
Habennas's argument, if the now "autonomous" Kantian spheres of science, morality and 
art are reunited, then the "hermeneutics of everyday communication" (132) may be 
released from the knot of specialization. Following the aspirations of James and 
Binswanger, Sacks does not want to debunk the whole neurological programme; but. 
from his place within it, he wishes to include certain elements in order to broaden its 
foundations and the objects, or, more accurately, the subjects, of its study. In short, his 
goal is to phenomenologize neurology. Accordingly, Sacks's critical position can be 
sketched at the intersection of the human and the natural sciences. In addition, through 
his frequent deployment of figurative language, he also highlights a central place for an 
aesthetics of expression. His writing can be positioned at the interface between different 
modes of inquiry projected through a variety of written fonns, some clinical and some 
literary. It thus represents one of the recent developments in the tradition characterized 
by the work of James and Binswanger, in which Sacks seeks to problematize the 
taxonomies of self-other and self-world. 
In order to introduce Sacks's particular vision of romantic science I wish to return to his 
essays 'Neurology and the Soul' (which I considered in the introduction) and 'Luria and 
"Romantic Science'" (1990b), to examine the significance of the tenn for the 
development of neurological science. 
As a physician it is Sacks's professional purpose not only to study neurological 
dysfunction for its own sake, but also to help suffering patients regain their ability to li\'e 
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in the most expansive manner possible. The institutionalization of medicine in the 
nineteenth century has done much to shake off the archaic meaning of physician as 
healer; nevertheless, Sacks wishes to stress that his fundamental task is to cure patients 
of their ills and help restore them to health. Biological investigations and technological 
advances have turned the body into a medical arena where reparation is increasingly 
possible, but the complexities of brain activity remain beyond current understanding. 
Neuropsychology, the double science endorsed by Luria and Sacks, approaches the brain 
less as a physical entity and more as centre for the mental processing of meaning, 
involving both "the higher cortical functions and cognitive activities in humans" (Sacks 
199Gb: 189). Sacks charts the manner in which Luria in his last two books begins to "see 
his way to resolving the 'crisis' ... to a conjunction of the two ... modes of anatomy and art" 
(189). This is done, firstly by the Heideggerian reconception of the "individual as a 
being", "a living being, containing (but transcending) organic functions and drives, a 
being rooted in the depths of biology, but historically, culturally, biographically unique"; 
and, secondly, by creating a "biological biography" which attempts to construct (or 
discursively reconstruct) the life-world of the patient. Sacks follows Luria in his attempts 
to restore the patient from the "statistical entity" (Sacks 1986a: x) of medical records to 
a descriptive and narrative account of an experiencing being. 
In order to conceive of the human being in this manner, Sacks does not resort to the 
mysterious dualistic interface between mind and body; like both James and Searle, he 
deploys the mental and physical as two different descriptive categories. In ~ e u r o l o g y y
and the Soul', following the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza, Sacks depicts the body 
and mind as two realms. or levels of meaning, by which the individual exists and 
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requiring two quite different modes of description. One flaw in Spinoza's philosophy is 
that the monistic substance (fundamentally neither mental nor physical) turns out to be 
as empirically elusive as the Cartesian mind. One way around this problem is to posit a 
biological monism which can underpin property dualism. As Searle claims, 
consciousness is not connected to the brain by a quasi-mental, quasi-divine umbilical 
cord, but is a metastructural sector emerging from the organic brain, a sector which 
enables the assignation of meanings and categories to sensual perception. This sector, 
to use a Freudian principle, is overdetermined and therefore cannot be reduced to a single 
determining factor. Thus, whilst ultimately dependent on the unimpaired functioning of 
the organic brain, it is a structure which cannot be adequately explained on the level of 
synapses or neurone-firings. Rather, it demands a mode of description on the level of 
semantics: the organization of meanings and the assignation of hierarchies to values 
which are essentially cultural rather than physical. 
Gerald Edelman, another 'multiple' scientist working on the boundaries of biology, 
neuropsychology and philosophy, asserts that the mind-brain, in all its aspects, can only 
fully be understood through an interactive study of morphological and evolutionary 
processes, both biological and cultural. By placing the individual patient within a 
biographical framework, the discerning physician may be able to unearth peculiarities of 
the self which lie in the intersecting spheres of neurobiology and social psychology. 
Sacks, echoing both James and Edelman, posits a self, 
rISIng from experience, continually growing and revised ... [It] is a 
confederation, an organic unity, of innumerable categorizations, and 
categorizations of its own activities, and from these, its self-reflection, 
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there arises consciousness, the Mind, a metastructure ... built upon the real 
worlds of the brain (Sacks 1990a: 50). 
He substantiates his use of "confederation" by assigning "an organic and personal and 
historical unity" to the mind. This unity is the result of the interaction between primary 
and higher-order consciousness, both of which emerge from the biological brain: the 
former providing a sentient awareness of the world and the latter enabling the individual 
to reflect upon conscious awareness. Following James's description of 'The Stream of 
Thought', such reflection is nevertheless provisional and evolving through time. Humans, 
together with other primates, are unique in their evolutionary development of higher-
order consciousness and with it "the powers of language, conception and thought" (Sacks 
1991 b: 186), and, as such, they have the ability to articulate their condition (the ability 
to say "l-you-we" as described by Binswanger [May 1958: 198]). Sacks does not view 
the self as a seamless metaphysical whole, but as a series of evolving constructs, which 
derive from higher-order consciousness, and, when placed in a symbolic structure (a 
structure of meanings which give content to the self), enables personal identity to be 
constructed. 
Much of Sacks's work has dealt with patients who, through neurological impairment, 
have lost a significant function of their primary consciousness (which usually elicits 
automatic or subconscious, feelings of wholeness, solidity and, in Fredric Jameson's 
phrase, "depth"), which, in turn, creates a "hole" or lacuna in higher-order consciousness 
(186). Sacks is particularly interested in individuals for whom the breakdown of primary 
consciousness results in a "philosophical emergency." By activating their faculty of 
higher-order consciousness, such patients must attempt to understand and, if possible, to 
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discover a means by which they can compensate for neuropsychological loss. The 
language of alienation and loss is often the only available idiom to describe these 
sensations. Of course, Sacks, as physician, has no divine access to understanding the 
unique fonnations of and impainnents to the levels of consciousness of his patients. He 
is reliant not only on observing their behaviour, but also in listening to and interpreting 
their attempts to convey a loss of identity and selfhood. Once more, attention to language 
and, more broadly, aesthetic expression (and the various fonns which it takes), provides 
a mediating zone between interpersonal psychology and philosophical inquiry and, as I 
shall discuss in my studies of Sacks's central texts - Awakenings (1973), A Leg To Stand 
On (1984) and The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat (1986, hereafter The Man)-
is vital for his ongoing project of romantic science. 
In a study of romantic science it is important to distinguish between the method of study 
and the object being studied. Ostensibly this task presents few problems. Practitioners 
of medicine and neuroscience can cultivate a humanistic approach to deal with patients 
as living people with particular desires and needs, but also maintain a perspective which 
relies on the observation of behaviour and the development of experimental research, in 
order to map neurone-circuits in the brain and nervous system. In this manner, 
neurological illness is conceived as the disorder of brain functions stemming from 
damaged or altered neural groupings. Thus, while patients are treated as holistic 
organisms with their own phenomenal life-world, the primary aim of neurology is to 
understand dysfunction at the level of brain mechanisms and processes. Through an 
understanding of the hard-wiring of the brain it (hopefully) becomes possible to reduce 
the intensity of the dis-ease, both for the suffering patient and those who may develop 
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similar conditions. Moreover, as Patrick Wall comments in The Listener (3/8/72), the 
suffering patient may also participate in the currency of such a viewpoint. According to 
Wall, a patient will be relieved to learn that a prolonged pain results "from some fault in 
the body mechanism" (Wall 1972: 139), rather than to believe that the pain is mental and 
hence not easy to locate, because the latter understanding may implicate the whole self.3 
If the pain can be isolated and materially rooted, it may be possible to treat it, either 
chemically or physically. Conversely, if the pain represents a general feeling or overall 
condition, the patient may feel it results from a personal failure, or an inability to 
integrate and to cope. In this case directive treatment cannot be easily implemented 
because the material root may elude inquiry, or appear altogether impalpable. 
Sacks agrees with the above description, in so far as he conceives neurological illness to 
be crucially grounded in an understanding of bodily disorder. But, in his acceptance of 
Edelman's model of primary and higher-order consciousness, he subscribes to a more 
sophisticated understanding of illness, conceived both as fact and value. By this he 
means that on one level illness should be understood as a factual description of bodily 
impairment and on another level represents a qualitative evaluation of the strength and 
ability of the person. Whilst he endorses the importance of a test-based approach for 
mapping neural complexities, he claims that the mysteries of brain functions are such that 
sometimes the best possible route to the understanding of illness is through dialogic 
contact and close interaction with the suffering patient. The patient should not be 
3 However, some patients react adversely to being categorized as suffering from a recognizable illness and 
as displaying a set of 'classic' symptoms. 
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conceived as a statistic to be treated or a problem to solve, but as a unified person who 
is undergoing a variety of debilitating effects: physical, mental, moral and spiritual. 
Unlike scientific approaches which claim to be value-neutral, this medical development 
of romantic science demonstrates the impossibility of separating the object of study from 
the method, because the former is always already construed through the conceptual 
presuppositions of the latter. Romantic science, as conceived by Luria and Sacks, has 
such a defamiliarizing potential because its conceptual framework is not precisely defmed 
nor easily delimited within a particular epistemological method. As Sacks comments in 
an earlier article, 'The Great Awakening' (1972), the terms by which he attempts to 
understand the various conditions of his patients "are ontological defmitions, and as such 
cross the boundaries of the usual neurological or psychiatric 'diagnoses'" (Sacks 1972: 
522). In addition to being at root a disorder of function, neurological illness can be 
conceived as having ontological proportions; that is to say, crucially bound up with a 
sense of existence. An attempt to glean knowledge of these supra-physical dimensions 
represents an endeavour to understand and elaborate upon Heidegger's conception of 
Dasein. In short, such an inquiry into disease can be equated with a radical questioning 
of seltbood. 
The philosopher Thomas Nagel argues that even if the brain could be completely 
understood on a physico-chemical level, it would still leave out what it means to 
experience and feel in the first-person. Nagel's view is diametrically opposed both to the 
extreme empiricism ofHume, in which the 'I' of experience exists above the flow of sense 
impressions as a unified centre of mental-processing, and to the claims of scientism. 
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which claims that every aspect of life can be reduced to a fundamentally physical 
explanation. He argues that the 'I' as a mark of identity has two fundamental aspects, 
which he calls objective and subjective (or external and internal viewpoints), but, as with 
Spinoza's philosophy, held together by an underlying monism. Whilst the two aspects 
are never mutually independent (there are only ever continuous grades of subjectivity and 
objectivity), recourse to only one of them will always do an injustice to the other. The 
objective point of view has a capacity "to transcend our particular viewpoint and develop 
an expanded consciousness that takes the world in more fully" (Nagel 1986: 5). But, 
Nagel claims, "there are things ... that cannot be adequately understood from a maximally 
objective standpoint", a position which can only lead to "false reductions or to outright 
denial that certain patently real phenomena exist at all" (7). As I outlined in the 
introduction, natural science, particularly the classical neurology which Sacks combats, 
tends to privilege the objective perspective over and above the subjective views from 
which it has developed" (5). As do James and Binswanger, Sacks attempts to develop 
a scientific approach which can combine behaviouristic and introspective methods of 
study in order to rectify this imbalance. 
Just as an empirical investigation of experience can omit the experiencing self, there is 
no manner of scientifically verifying this broader conception of illness because it is 
wholly personal. However, although Nagel runs into the problem of extreme 
subjectivism where it is impossible to know anything about anyone else's subjective 
condition4, following Sacks's lead, it is possible, through careful readings of his patients 
4 See Douglas Hofstadter's 'Reflections' on Nagel's essay 'What Is It Like To Be A Bat', in The Mind's I 
(1981),403-14. 
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(readings which include the patients own expressions of their illness in addition to the 
observation of their behaviour), to enter an interpretive space which can broaden a 
conception of the health-illness complex. By this, Sacks can be understood to mean that, 
instead of health being seen merely as the absence of malady and illness conceived as a 
series of diagnoses, they should be seen to be in a perpetual dyadic centre of conflict, 
around which manifest symptoms revolve. Through the filter of romantic science the 
balance between the art of medicine (figuring and imagining) and the science of medicine 
(inquiring and examining) is held in check: experimentation is thus balanced by "poetic 
vision."5 
(ii) 
By positioning Sacks's work within a framework of romantic science I have traced a 
tradition of thought through James and Binswanger which provides his writing with a 
clear set of values. It is now important to move the focus of the discussion into close 
range of the texts. Although I progress through a rough chronological discussion of 
Sacks's writings, many of the ideas are central to his whole project and cannot easily be 
confined to individual texts. As a result, there is often a need to oscillate between close 
a reading of his work and a more generalized commentary. 
S Quoted from a letter of comment to 'The Great Awakening', by R. M. Allott in The Listener, 30111172, 
756. 
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In order to explore the role of illness for understanding the self as conceived by romantic 
science, I will examine first Sack's major book, Awakenings. The historical context of 
the illness is recounted by Sacks in the early stages of the book and provides an important 
context for the philosophical lines he later follows. He recounts the spread of the 
encephalitis lethargica pandemic (sleeping sickness) from Vienna in the winter of 1916-
17, which resulted in worldwide deaths over the following ten years. Of those that 
survived the coma, some recovered to the extent that they could return to a working life, 
but many of the sufferers "subsequently developed neurological or psychiatric disorders" 
(Sacks 1991a: 20). Such disorders were not easily categorizable, as can be gauged from 
the five hundred "distinct symptoms and signs" documented by Constantin von Economo 
in 1929 to the "twenty thousand clearly different disorders of function" recorded by Sacks 
(Sacks 1972: 521). Mount Carmel Hospital was set up after the Great War for war-
victims suffering profound damage to their nervous system, but later admitted some of 
the most chronic post-encephalitic patients. In the mid-1960s Sacks was commissioned 
to treat these patients, but, such was the unique and strange nature of the disorder, that 
the book describes his uncertainty about how to implement any form of rehabilitative 
treatment. Awakenings documents the close study of twenty of these post-encephalitic 
patients, from which Sacks draws his preliminary conclusions in the later sections of the 
book. His primary aim is to understand the illness, or group of illnesses, in such a 
manner that the patients could be treated. Because each patient shows a wide variety of 
individualized symptoms, he soon realizes that in order to understand the particular 
manifestation of the illness, it is important to elicit personal responses from each of them. 
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Despite the plethora of symptoms recorded by Sacks, he is able to distinguish two moods 
of being, which he terms "negative" and "positive disorders." Many of those who 
recovered from the coma "failed to recover their original aliveness. They would be 
conscious and awake - yet not fully awake ... They were as insubstantial as ghosts, and as 
passive as zombies ... They were ontologically dead, or suspended, or 'asleep'" (522). 
Others display "over-animations and excesses and perversions of behaviour" closely 
connected to Parkinsonian symptoms. Those displaying "negative" behaviour appeared 
to have entirely lost their selthood during the course of their illness6, in contrast to the 
bodily "coercions" exhibited by the other group of patients; Sacks comments that it was 
"as if their very selves were being clenched or tensed or twisted or tom" (522). Both 
types of description reveal Sacks is concerned not only with the mechanics of 
dysfunctional illness but how, in an ontological sense, the disorder undermines and strips 
away a sense of selthood. Still, although the "positive" patients retain an ability to 
express themselves, so remaining ontologically alive or "awake", Sacks, through close 
observation, is certain that the "negative" or catatonic patients continue to exist in a 
minimal sense. In the face of profound illness Sacks develops a version of Dennett's 
"intentional stance" (as discussed in the introduction) by acknowledging (in the Cavellian 
sense) the ongoing existence of the life-worlds of his more severely afflicted patients. 
Much of the philosophical interest in Awakenings stems from Sacks, as physician, 
standing in relation to the catatonic patients as people rather than bodies emptied of any 
mental life. The exact impairments of their brains are shown to be a mystery to the 
6 As can be gleaned from von Economo's description of the patients as "extinct volcanoes" (Sacks 1991a: 
14). 
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methods of classical neurology and, not until Sacks approaches the problem through a 
series of intuitions, hunches and guesses, do the enigmas of the illness begin to unfold. 
Periodically an "oculogyric crisis", a "sudden spasmodic activity" characteristic of 
Parkinsonism, breaks through the catatonia (Sacks 1991 a: 45). Sacks, following his 
predecessors working in this field, recounts his realization that there are as many different 
crises as there are patients. He comes to the conclusion that only by positioning each of 
his patients within their individual life-story can he begin to unravel the intricacies of the 
disorder: 
what seemed an impersonal or even depersonalizing disease had, in fact, 
a strong quality of the personal, and could not be understood without 
reference to the personal. It was not merely humanly, or ethically, 
necessary to see these patients as individuals, it was scientifically 
necessary to do so as well (45). 
Accordingly, the central section of the text is a collection of individualized cases which 
chart the responses of the patients to the drug L-DOPA, which was administered to them 
during the summer of 1969.7 Although some patients do not respond at all to the drug 
and others react badly, the remarkable awakening displayed by a number of the catatonic 
patients enables them to regain many of the lost dimensions of selfhood. Sacks lays 
particular emphasis on two primary abilities, which correspond to the two central aspects 
I have explored in relation to James and Binswanger: the ability to give expression to the 
personal qualities of their illness and the ability to act practically. He claims that it is as 
if L-DOPA presents them with a chemical window through which their mental life can 
7 L-DOPA was administered in order to compensate for a defective level of the nerve-transmitter 
dopamine, but, as Sacks has frequently indicated (Sacks 1991 a: 30), the long duration of the illness (b.oth 
in its latent and manifest stages) meant that, for the patients of Awakenings, much of the neurologIcal 
damage was of a structural nature and could not simply be "topped up" (30). 
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fmd a concrete outlet. Whilst the documentary evidence of the various responses to L-
DOPA represents the empirical data for Sacks's technical commentary, as I discuss later, 
the cases are presented in a manner closer to symbolic narrative (through which Sacks 
hopes to convey something of the drama of recovery) than to clinical record. A simple 
comparison between the huge number of impersonalized entries in his earlier book 
Migraine (1970) and the extended narratives of Awakenings is enough to indicate this 
shift in emphasis. 
Awakenings represents a study which is simultaneously scientific and romantic, but, in 
its attempt to fuse perspectives, is often in danger of being essentially neither. The 
condition of the patients at Mount Carmel is primary neurological; but, as the title 
implies, the poetic triumph of the book derives from the possibility of rediscovering, or 
recalling, an active and expressive self. One of the figurative connotations of the title is 
the tearing away of a veil, by which a truer, or more authentic, self is to be discerned 
behind the catatonic mask of illness. In conveying the general exuberance which the 
awakenings release, Sacks often treads a precarious line between his tribute to, and 
celebration of, his patients' attempts to cope with the profound effects on their nervous 
system and the preservation of the professional bearing of an inquisitive, but impartial, 
scientist. Consequently the book reads as a hotchpotch of ideas and observations which, 
although deriving from his clinical experience, indicate his concerted attempt to render 
what he views as something basic to the human condition: a life-force, or repository, of 
health which survives despite illness and can transcend, if only momentarily, the severity 
of bodily constraints. 
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He maintains an optimistic and often sentimental vision which frequently jars with the 
bodily disorders he depicts. But, as he claims in his 'Preface to the Original Edition' 
(1973): 
The general style of the book - with its alteration of narrative and 
reflection, its proliferation of images and metaphors, its remarks, 
repetitions, asides and footnotes - is one which I have been impelled 
towards by the very nature of the subject-matter. My aim is not to make 
a system, or to see patients as systems, but to picture a world, a variety of 
worlds - the landscapes of being in which these patients reside (Sacks 
1991a: xviii). 
The painterly verbs here import to the text a figurative quality which blurs the margins 
between orthodox case study, symbolic narrative and a form of philosophical 
contemplation. This is a deliberate strategy, since Sacks is not a systematic thinker who 
wishes to categorically define selfhood. He relies heavily on metaphors by which he 
hopes to gesture towards a Being which can never be adequately described. His later 
editions of the text (1982, 1991) read as a series of revisions and reflections, constantly 
widening the focus of his study within larger circles and thought-patterns. Where the 
fragments of the text meet and intersect, meanings proliferate in centrifugal rings which 
cannot be traced back to a centre. If selfhood can be said to exist for the patients it is 
always fleeting and fugitive, inscribed within discourse but unable to be ever fully 
revealed by description. 
In the preface, Sacks acknowledges the difficulty of writing Awakenings, "although" he 
claims "its ideas and intentions are simple and straightforward" (Sacks 1991a: xix). This 
may go some way in accounting for his need to periodically revise and extend the text. 
It also, importantly, indicates that he is aware of the various dynamic problems in writing 
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a study of this kind. When he comments "one struggles to gain the right perspective, 
focus and tone - and then, one loses it, all unawares" (xix), the reader is made aware that 
the text is only provisional: it is always in process and under critical revision. Just as the 
patients struggle to discover a voice from within their illness, Sacks struggles to deliver 
a study which can be both descriptive and explanatory, romantic and classical. The 
ongoing tension between the two modes of inquiry creates a site of conflict which at the 
moment of elucidation may, paradoxically, tend to opacity. 
Sacks's chief aim is to combine an understanding of his patients' phenomenological 
condition with an interrogation into behavioural patterns resulting from neuronal 
disturbance. He attempts to retrieve "a combined vision of body and soul, 'It' and 'I'" 
(Sacks 1986a: 88), which, through the influence of Luria, he believes has been lost in the 
professional bifurcation of the neurological and the psychological sciences early in the 
century. He wishes to supplement the study of "It" (the object of neurological study) with 
an investigation into "the terms in which we experience health and disease", terms which 
"neither require nor admit definition; they are understood at once, but defy explanation; 
they are at once exact, intuitive, obvious, mysterious, irreducible and indefinable" (Sacks 
1991 a: 224). Closely resembling Binswanger's recommendations for analysis, Sacks's 
notion of giving, or presenting, the self over to the experience of dialogic relation (a 
relation of mutual acknowledgement) correlates with a belief that the physician should 
cultivate a human relationship in an "existential encounter" (226) which should 
complement, rather than conflict with, a technical understanding of symptoms and 
syndromes. 
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Sacks's ideal dialogue would incorporate the institutional relationship and move beyond 
it into a realm of "direct and human confrontation, an 'I-Thou' relation, between the 
discoursing worlds of physicians and patients" (225).8 Such a dialogue should not entail 
a complete effacement of the physician's role, in which he attempts complete intimacy 
with the patient; Sacks claims, "he must inhabit, simultaneously, two frames of reference, 
and make it possible for the patient to do likewise" (226). Extending Binswanger's 
comments on fellow-feeling, Sacks's ideal of "real communication" represents a scenario 
in which "the physician becomes a fellow traveller, a fellow explorer, continually moving 
with his patients, discovering with them a vivid, exact, and figurative language which will 
reach out towards the incommunicable" (225-26). 
The obvious problem here is that Sacks often uses his own voice to comment on the 
experiences of his patients, rather than attempting to incorporate their individual voices 
within the text. One general criticism of Sacks's writings is that, although his intention 
to render the feelings and thoughts of the post-encephalitic patients is well-meaning, he 
does little more than to project his own preoccupations onto the textual site inhabited by 
his patients. J. K. Wing, writing a review of The Man, comments that, although "not so 
obtrusive in Awakenings", "one is ... uneasily aware ... that Sacks's patients all talk as he 
8 The major influence on this aspect of Sack's thought is the religious existentialist Martin Buber, a thinker 
to whom Binswanger acknowledges his debt in the introduction to Grundformen (Binswanger 1964: 11). 
Sacks shares with Buber an optimism that, whilst an interpersonal intimacy is rarely, if ever, achieved, the 
possibility of dialogic understanding should be a continual motivation. In I and Thou (1923) Buber's central 
claim is that "primary words are not isolated words, but combined words" which indicate "relations" (Buber 
1987: 15). He describes two "primary words" - I-Thou and I-It - which hold the 'I' in relation with a ~ o t h e r , ,
and by which the signification of that 'I' is determined. Like Cavell. Buber's w.ork r ~ v e ~ l s s a faIth that 
Otherness can be met through relation, elevating it to a Thou rather than oblIteratIng It through the 
projections of selfhood. Relation thus constitutes a boundary over which 'I' can only transgress at the risk 
of losing the Thou. Corresponding to Heidegger's distinction between the ontological and the ~ n t i c , , Buber's 
philosophy indicates that only the I-Thou relation is authentic for it "can only be spoken WIth the whole 
being", whereas the I-It relation "can never be spoken with the whole being" (15-16). 
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does. He cannot quite give them their own accents and idiom" (Wing 1986: 146). One 
indication of this occurs when Sacks relates that Leonard L. (on whom the central 
character of Penny Marshall's film Awakenings (1990) is based) "using his shrunken, 
dystrophic index-fingers ... typed out an autobiography 50,000 words in length" (Sacks 
1991a: 212). But he does little more than comment on Leonard's study in a short 
footnote. Extensive documentation or quotation from Leonard's autobiography would 
lend Sacks's project a depth and authenticity which is often under threat from the 
persistency of his voice.9 
I do not wish to mount a defence of Sacks on this issue, although it will later inform my 
readings of his case histories. Instead, I wish to indicate that,just as Sacks comments that 
"one cannot go straight forward unless the way is clear, and the way is allowed" (xix), it 
is important to clear the way in order to approach Sacks's project within the terms of his 
texts. In his deployment of the existential language of "I and Thou" (xix), Sacks sets for 
himself a project which is always in danger of falling short of the mark, of breaking into 
monologue or resulting in dissolution. Clearing the way is a task which the reader needs 
to accomplish just as much as the author; a task which considers the potential of romantic 
science as much as its limitations. 
9 This criticism can be levelled at Luria too, who, in The Man With a Shattered World (1972), almost edits 
Zasetsky's voice out of the narrative. 
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(2) Clinical Tales: A Question of Form 
One of the distinctive features of romantic science is the juxtaposition and assimilation 
of different types of written discourse. Appropriately, Sacks's interest in the form of 
medical writing coincides with a wish to extend the area of traditional empirical study 
towards a type of inquiry which does justice to the idiosyncratic psychic worlds of his 
patients. For Sacks, romantic science offers a distinctive way of seeing, facilitated 
through close attention to methods of interpretation and to the form of what he calls his 
"clinical tales" (Sacks 1986b: 16-23). 
Although Sacks deploys figurative language in order to challenge the dominant forms of 
medical charts and case histories, he is primarily a neurological scientist who wishes to 
expand the conventional forms in which medical knowledge is documented. However, 
in his reliance upon symbolic and associative language Sacks seems to endorse two anti-
rationalist directives. Firstly, he acknowledges that Cartesian lucidity does not always 
lead to a clear and distinct view of truth; and, secondly, in adherence with the 
Heideggerian view, Being may only be disclosed through a non-intellectualized, non-
cognitive beholding of it. But, far from being an irrationalist, Sacks shifts his stance 
between an explanation of mental states with reference to material causes and an 
expression of his own enchantment with ineffable phenomena. Accordingly, his aim to 
romanticize science should not solely be seen as a self-conscious echo of the earlier 
movement's commitment to an expressive poetic language. In contrast to the 
philosophical emphasis in the thought of James and Binswanger, Sacks is primarily a 
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practitioner, and secondarily a theorist. Accordingly, it is his tales in which he seeks to 
redescribe the conditions of health and illness. 
Although I am broadly sympathetic to Sacks's desire to redescribe medical knowledge in 
literary terms, the rhetoric of his project has often been understood by his critics to 
obscure his actual, empirical accomplishments. It can be claimed that Sacks uses the 
literary accoutrements of romanticism to hide his, essentially, institutional polemic. As 
such, the form of his tales may be seen as secondary and peripheral to his role as a 
clinical and, in some respects, reactionary neurologist. However, it is my contention, that 
the two aspects, the clinical and the literary, cannot be easily distinguished without doing 
an injustice to them both. Sacks's riposte to the dominant practices of neurology relies 
as much on his consideration of literary form as it does upon the thrust of his argument. 
Indeed, the argument, whether directly in commentary or covertly in his tales, is 
fundamentally one which seeks to refigure disability in terms of aesthetic expression. As 
such, Sacks's aim to find a suitable genre in which to write mirrors, what he believes to 
be, the patient's need to discover, or rediscover, an expressive voice. He argues that if 
one is to experience an "awakening" it is essential to develop both aesthetic and 
neurological awareness. Rather than adopting the role of a mind-curist, who would argue 
that once the body is cured the mind will be set free, Sacks (echoing James and 
Binswanger) senses that cure must be of the whole Being. 
The form of Sacks's "clinical tale" can be productively thrown into relief by a 
consideration of the presuppositions that inform institutionalized medical formats. The 
"tales" are not simply introduced into the medical arena from the outside, but they 
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represent a development from accepted forms. Nor should they be seen to conform to a 
generically distinguishable model. Within the corpus of Sacks's writing one can discern 
emergent details which indicate the hybridity of the form he hopes to develop. By 
acknowledging a debt to his predecessors (most frequently Luria and Freud), he enables 
the reader to glimpse the larger cultural dynamic from which his individual project 
unfolds. To balance the broad intellectual framework described in the flrst section, I will 
now consider the medical forms out of which Sacks's work emerges. Before I return to 
a close reading of Awakenings, it is productive to consider one of the crudest forms of 
clinical documentation, the medical chart, in order to indicate the manner in which Sacks 
develops his clinical tales. 
In 'Charting the Chart', a collaborative essay published in the journal Literature and 
Medicine (1992), Suzanne Poirier and the Chicago Narrative Study Group assess the 
textual qualities of a particular patient's chart. As the editors of this issue comment, the 
contributors "form a shadow team, a chorus of voices, to comment on the work of the 
health care-team" (Poirier 1992: ix). The chart documents a patient, Mrs. R, who had 
been admitted to a rehabilitation centre after initial hospital treatment for a stroke. Her 
two month stay was recorded by a team of two physicians, a nurse, two therapists, a 
chaplain, a psychologist and a social worker. The chart is structured around a series of 
journal entries, characterized by the type of brevity and clarity of comment that can 
facilitate communication between consultants. First devised by Lawrence Weed in the 
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late 1960s and known by the acronym "SOAP", the protocol aims at producing a 
''problem-orientated record' (3) of a patient in care. to 
SOAP entails a four-point method for documenting aspects of the patient's condition: 
their subjective response, an objective description of the condition written by the health 
official, followed by an interpretive assessment and a plan outlining any subsequent 
action. Weed's intention was to complement a version of scientific medicine "based on 
the Newtonian model", by producing a medical history in the form of a "scientific 
document" (Hunter, 1992: 166). SOAP was devised in reaction to the impressionistic 
case history, which, Weed claimed, "often failed to take account of physiological fact", 
by employing a structure through which a clear hierarchization of problems could replace 
the "narratively recorded impressions of change" (166). 
The SOAP format fits well with the "computer-assisted, decision-making field of medical 
informatics" which Kathryn Montgomery Hunter, in 'Remaking the Case' (1992), discerns 
to be the prevalent practice of American medicine during the 1980s. Hunter is critical 
of both Feinstein and Weed. She claims that Feinstein's appeal to found scientific 
knowledge on the model of mathematics is "primarily rhetorical, a way of addressing the 
problem of uncertainty" (167). She develops her criticism by claiming that "Weed's goal 
is the identification and control of the observer's subjectivity in the face of an 
unattainable scientific objectivity" (177). She goes on to argue, however, that the 
interpretive methods deployed by medical teams derive less from the physical and 
10 Lawrence L. Weed, 'Medical Records That Guide and Teach', New England Journal of Medicine, 278, 
]4/3/68 593-600 & 21/3/1968, 652-57. , 
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deductive sciences favoured by Feinstein, than from "methodology familiar to social 
scientists" (167). In the 1950s and early 1960s the goal of objectivity, Thomas Nagel's 
"view from nowhere", was not confined solely to the domain of the natural sciences, but 
also exemplified by trends in the human sciences, namely the French structuralists (with 
whom Binswanger shares some of his basic presuppositions) and the Annales historians. 
These ideals have since been challenged by two types of theory: firstly, a hermeneutic 
reconsideration of diachronic narrative and storytelling in case history; and, secondly, the 
poststructuralist focus on the indeterminacy of language. 
Hunter develops her argument in the light of these theories, discerning that, "Weed's 
assumption that the clinical observer can be labeled objective ... aligns his problem-
orientated record with the work of those social scientists, now under attack, who make 
no allowance for their own socially conditioned, inevitable subjective viewpoints" (167). 
The objectivity of scientific description implies that the medical official, and, by 
implication, the profession, has attained a position of unquestionable authority. But, 
Hunter suggests, "such an assumption is part of the problem of unacknowledged 
epistemological uncertainty", an uncertainty which Sacks implies is especially true when 
the medical profession encounters the complex illnesses of neurology. Influenced by the 
likes of Sacks in the neurological sciences, Roy Schafer in psychoanalysis and Paul 
Ricoeur in literary theory, many of the critics who have contributed to Literature and 
Medicine (first published in 1982) have begun to assess the vital importance of narrative 
modes in preserving a humanistic approach towards the patient. Rather than advocating 
a return to the impressionistic case history denounced by Weed, the contributors have 
mounted a rigorous investigation into the institutional and textual politics implied in 
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different medical forms. This kind of serious study not only opens up the medical arena 
to a variety of theoretical influences, but also highlights that medical writing should be 
seen distinctly and fundamentally as a cultural production. 
The co-authors of 'Charting the Chart' respond individually to particular aspects of the 
chart and, more generally, to whether they thought "Mrs. R received "good care" and 
whether hers was a "good story" (Poirier 1992: 2). Although, as Poirier suggests, a "good 
story" may appear to be an unfair criterion by which to judge a medical record, it is one 
which serves to provoke responses concerning "how 'reality' is constructed" by particular 
institutions and to what extent the reader is able recoup the patient's personality from 
their representation on the chart (19). Although the commentaries elicit some positive 
responses, many of the authors are critical or, at least, sceptical about such a rigid format. 
On the positive side, Barbara Sharf acknowledges the benefits of the procedure in that it 
"enables health professionals to work from a fuller data base and provide more 
coordinated care" (7). The document is a vital means of communication, which allows 
consultants to briefly scan over particular comments and diagnoses in order to more fully 
inform their own. However, the information conveyed by the chart is limited. Later in 
the essay, Lioness Ayres points out that "this format suits small, well-defined problems, 
such as surgical wounds" but is found inadequate for more general or intricate complaints 
(10). 
The contributors collectively indicate three broad types of problem which arise from their 
consideration of the SOAP protocol and of the chart itself. Firstly, attention is directed 
towards the material conditions under which the document is completed. Sharf indicates 
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that "chart writing is regarded by many as an onerous task or an administrative or legal 
exercise" (7). Daniel Brauner recognizes that the brevity of the notes can be explained 
by reference to the time and the circumstances of their composition: "written during 
stolen moments in a physician's cluttered day, they represent the execution of a chore 
whose benefits may seem abstract when compared to other necessary tasks" (12). 
Both Sharf and Brauner indicate that instead of documenting valid intersubjective 
responses, the actual conditions under which writing occurs may mean that aspects of the 
written report are often cursory and fail to do justice to either the patients themselves or 
their condition. Moreover, Sharf points out that "charts do not invite interaction and 
feedback", tending "to be more a collection of monologues than a true dialogue or 
colloquy" (7). She implies that charts are sometimes viewed as little more than 
procedural exercises which (often because of illegibility or indecipherable shorthand) 
rarely fulfil their communicative potential. 
The second type of criticism is directed towards the subjective entry of the chart, usually 
represented by a direct quotation from the patient. Although the patient's contribution is 
given some priority, the quotation tends to be delimited by the length of the space on the 
chart as much as the attitude of the health professional to the patient. As the cultural 
critic Kenneth Burke terms it, this "representative anecdote" (Burke 1969: 59) is clinically 
selected from a variety of experiences articulated by the patient; anecdotes which are 
more likely to be guided by the subsequent categories of description and assessment than 
by comments which the patient feels to be important. The personal context, against 
which comments are to be understood, is given the barest of attention. Relevant 
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conditions may include the patient's tone of voice; the status and severity of the ailment 
at the time of enunciation; whether the patient is cooperative or reluctant to impart 
information; or whether patients have difficulty in articulating a description of certain 
bodily experiences. In short, the SOAP chart limits the contribution of the patient to a 
selected anecdote, often without any contextualizing remarks. 
Thirdly and, perhaps, most importantly the critics raise questions concerning the demand 
that health officials record "objective" comments. Pursued alone, objectivity denies both 
the expression of the individual's particular point of view and the emotions which he or 
she may experience. I have already discussed Hunter's claim that epistemological 
uncertainty undermines the scientific status of the chart, so here I will limit my discussion 
to the comments of the health officials. Close and extensive work with a patient is likely 
to provoke a range of emotions amongst the interacting members of the medical team, 
especially the type of interaction in which nurses and social workers involve themselves. 
Focusing her comments on the nurse's entry, Ayres writes: 
SOAP charting excludes from the clinical record any evidence of the 
feelings or reactions of the nurse, and focuses on the objective (and by 
implication unbiased) facts. Opinions, impressions, and hunches may 
form the keystone of expert practice, but they lack objectivity and thus 
resist clinical documentation (9). 
Although the nurse's feelings may inform many of the objectified comments presented 
in the document, the SOAP format does not permit any emotive description, thereby 
prohibiting the patient's story from being told in anything other than flat and clinical 
terms. 
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The critics do not wish to counterpoise the SOAP format with an unwieldy and lengthy 
series of emotional responses from each of the consultants; but, rather, they prefer a 
document which would enable the reader, whether a clinical- or a lay-reader, to glean a 
sense of the patient's story in both its private and institutional dimensions. An expression 
of emotion can serve to highlight aspects of a relationship which objective description 
omits. In addition, the frequent use of medical jargon and shorthand succeeds in 
objectifying the voices of both patient and physician and of highlighting the institutional 
relationship, often at the expense of the interpersonal. Although, this may have been 
Weed's intention, if, as for the Chicago Study Group, the patient's story is seen to be of 
a paramount importance, the SOAP chart appears to entail an entirely unsatisfactory 
format. Lorie Rosenblum sums up this third criticism by commenting that procedures 
such as SOAP may, ultimately, effect "a deeper dismemberment of the patient's story" 
(15) which, although it is necessary if vital information concerning the patient is to be 
relayed across time and space, may not be recoupable by the reader. 
Poirier, in summary, questions whether the commentary is "fair to the intent (and content) 
of the medical record [designed as] an internal document, a data base, and a means of 
communication" (19). In response to her own query, she claims that the article in 
Literature and Medicine was written in order to evaluate "to what extent do perceptions, 
misperceptions, hasty judgments, professional interest, or prejudice carelessly enter the 
chart in a way that contributes to a 'characterization' of the patient that may be false or a 
caricature of a complex human being?" (19). To some degree, characterization is 
inevitable if the patient is to be placed within a symbolic narrative: the patient literally 
becomes the character of the text. But, if the patient's story is to be rescued from amongst 
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the isolated comments of the chart then an alternative fonnat is thought to be more 
representative not only of the patient, but also of the conditions of writing the document. 
Having asserted this, the SOAP fonnat does not obliterate all the components of story. 
The attentive reader preserves the ability to reconstitute the narrative. As Poirier 
comments, each of the readers respond to Mrs. R's isolation and fear, feelings which 
"cannot be repressed despite the structure of the chart or the concerns of its constructors" 
(20). But such a fonnat exacerbates the reader's difficulty of gaining an insight into the 
psychology of either the patient or the health official. The impersonal tone in which the 
entries are expressed ("Pt. found crying in room"; "Pt. unable to wash ... " [3]; "Mrs. R has 
been very tearful throughout ... " [5]) does little more than suggest the fear, despair and 
inadequacy which, despite the fonnat, Mrs. R is nevertheless sensed to have felt. 
The literary theorist Jonathan Culler, in his discussion of Gustave Flaubert's theory of 
writing (as a synecdoche for modernist poetics in general), suggests that "impersonality 
depends not on what is said but on the fact that no identifiable narrator speaks" (Culler 
1984: 110). As the third criticism makes clear, the flat and impersonal voices demanded 
by the chart imply 
the desire to prevent the text from being recuperated as the speech of a 
characterizable narrator, to prevent it...from being read as the vision of 
someone who becomes an object that the reader can judge ... a personality 
whom we feel we know (78). 
However, unlike the modernist writer, the impersonal clinical author does not refine him 
or herself out of existence in order that the reader will attend more closely to complexities 
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of language and characterization. The scientific narrator stands at the inaccessible locus 
of authority, thereby increasing the difficulty for the reader of the text to judge how the 
patient responds to, and is treated by, health officials. As a result, the reader is left with 
only a vague sense of either the subject of the story or its storyteller(s). 
Sacks argues in his article 'Clinical Tales' (1986) that it is possible to construct a narrative 
in such a manner to highlight the voice of the physician as writer as much as the character 
of the patient. By constructing a case history as a "tale", the reader is aware that the 
document is the physician's aesthetic response to the patient and not a value-neutral 
clinical biography. Thus, Sacks asserts, "if I write 'Clinical Tales' it is because I am 
forced to ... they do not seem to me a gratuitous or arbitrary compound of two forms, but 
an elemental form which is indispensable for medical understanding, practice, and 
communication" (Sacks 1986b: 16). A "tale" does not merely refer to a narrative of 
character and event, but represents a mode of writing in which it is possible to express 
the subjective aspects of the illness (aspects which cannot be scientifically documented) 
by constructing them within a symbolic narrative. The "elemental" quality of the tale 
derives from Sacks's claim that "it is the form patients adopt" (16) when they explain 
themselves to the doctor. The patient's story is not usually presented in the form of 
anecdote or isolated comment, but a temporal narrative, through which the different 
"stages" of the illness are described. I I 
11 Often a patient's response is provoked or prompted by particular questions p o s ~ d d .by the health o f f i c ~ a l . .
This technique can be used to substantiate the idea that the making of.the story IS In fact a collaboratIve 
practice. As such, Sacks argues that it is essential to pay close attentIOn to the fonn and content of the 
questions as much as the patient's response. 
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As Larry Churchill argues in 'The Human Experience of Dying' (1979), the illness 
experience is not a series of disconnected stages, but integrally influenced by the 
personality and viewpoint of the storyteller: 
"story" is a category of interpretation .. .logically prior to "stage" ... Stages 
are formal abstractions created by professionals ... Stories employ the 
words of patients; stages are couched in the language of psychiatry, 
clinical psychology and the behavioral sciences. Stages are second-order 
creations whose validity in interpreting the meaning of a particular 
patient's experience is contingent upon their derivation from and fidelity 
to that patient's story (Churchill 1979: 30). 
Although the SOAP format does not entirely write out the patient's story (Poirier claims 
that it remains present in "the margins of the text" [Poirier 1992: 21]), it tends to 
obliterate the personality of the storyteller beneath the institutional weight of the chart. 
Unlike the modernist aesthetic to which Culler refers, the chart, like the historical annal, 
fails to elaborate on character because of brevity of form and rigidity of structure. In 
response, Sacks counteracts the kind of format in which the patient is reduced to a case, 
by envisioning a written medium through which it is possible to delineate "a history of 
illness from its first intimations, through all its subsequent effects and evolutions, to 
(perhaps) its final crisis and resolution" (Sacks 1986b: 17). 
Neither Sacks nor Churchill discount the importance of breaking down a narrative into 
sequential stages in order to understand aspects of the experience; nor do they dismiss the 
importance of abstract categories of syndromes and types for characterizing forms of 
illness. Rather, they emphasize that the story should be viewed as ontologically prior to 
the abstraction of stages and components. Only when the format begins to "assume the 
status of impersonal, rationally-ordered scientific data" (Churchill 1979: 31), do they 
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argue that it is important to rescue the personal quality of the story. Sacks believes that 
disease cannot be easily separated from how it is manifested in, and embodied by, the 
patient as illness. Instead of conceptualizing the disease and the patient as separate 
entities, he makes the romantic claim that they must to be conceived as an ontological 
whole. 
The concept of the "diseased individual" leads Sacks towards a concentration on "the 
subject, at the deeper, the 'existential', level of an identity struggle" (17). At this level, 
he figures the individual as undergoing a symbolic battle to recover a sense of agency, to 
regain " o n e ~ ' s s 'world' (the integration of one's nervous system, one's mind, one's se/f)" 
(18). By attempting to construct the life-world of the patient within the textual world of 
the tale, it is possible to productively contextualize illness with a view to understanding 
how the disease is experienced. In other words, even if the organic disease is incurable 
as such, it may be possible, through the collaborative construction of narrative, for the 
patient to accommodate the illness. Sacks argues that the patient's world (corresponding 
to Binswanger's threefold world) is not to be regained passively, but must be actively 
"remade" from within the hostile environment of illness. Thus, importantly, as I have 
argued in relation to Cavell's perfectionist theory of self, identity is never refound but 
always refigured. 
In cases where severe debilitation or profound illness may render the patient inarticulate 
or unable to express their condition, Sacks claims it is the physician's ethical duty to help 
the patient construct the story. He is sceptical about approaching this position from a 
wholly objectivist view-point, or by making a wild imaginative leap into the mind of the 
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sufferer. 12 Imagination and observation should be deployed together with extensive 
research into the patient's personal and family history, through which it may be possible 
to piece together some of the biographical fragments. The process of constructing the 
tale may often turn out to be of greater value to the physician and patient than is the 
completed text. 13 But this is Sacks's point. As for James and Cavell, the construction of 
the tale is always in process and under revision. As Albert Camus intimates in his 
retelling of the Sisyphus myth, a story of perpetual process may tum out to be preferable 
to one which eventually reaches its telos. 
Although it is possible to follow Sacks's central argument throughout his books and 
articles, he creates difficulties for the reader through his ambiguous use of terminology. 
The extraordinary and fabulous dimensions of the tales in The Man and, to an extent, in 
his latest book An Anthropologist on Mars (1995) signify, on one level, an aesthetic or 
fictive realm which is some distance from the realities of neurological illness. It can be 
argued that he leaves the material body behind for an aesthetic plane of idealistic 
musings. In other places, his formulation of the generic character of his tales often 
appears confused. For example, in his preface to Awakenings he states: 
what I needed to convey, was neither purely classical nor purely romantic, 
but seemed to move into the profound realm of allegory or myth. Even 
my title, Awakenings, had a double meaning, partly literal, partly in the 
mode of metaphor or myth (Sacks 1991 a: xxxvii). 
12 Arguably, this approach is characterized by Tony Harrison in his t r e a t m e n ~ ~ ~ f f ~ l z h e ~ m e r ' s s d i s e ~ s e e in 
Black Daisies For The Bride (1993). The question of imaginative authentiCity IS raised by Michael 
Ignatieff in aBBe Late Show Special interview with Harrison (30/6/1993). 
13 Sacks is always aware of the 'other' reader of his tales. Even if the tale offers no tangible assistance for 
the severely ill patient, it may provide insight into the experience of illness, or provide solace, to other 
isolated or despairing sufferers. 
276 
Here he appears to use "allegory", "myth" and "metaphor" as synonyms without 
acknowledging their important differences. Likewise, in 'Clinical Tales', he suggests that 
one manner in which the drama of illness can be extrapolated is by situating the battling 
self within "a sort of allegory or epic" (Sacks 1986b: 18). By equating these literary 
terms he seems to deploy them in a suggestive sense, to create a mood or a set of signals 
for his texts, rather than formulating a prescriptive code of writing. However, sharing the 
tendency of literary theorists of romanticism like J. Hillis Miller and Paul de Man, Sacks 
can be understood to use allegory in a particular way. By focusing briefly on the term, 
allegory, it is possible to distinguish some recurrent characteristics of Sacks's writing 
from these, seemingly, blurred markers. 
The renaissance-humanist concern with dissembling and duplicity can be traced through 
the figure of allegoria. Allegory can simply be seen as a temporally extended metaphor 
which produces meaning on a number of simultaneous levels. It is the reader's task to 
find the hidden planes of meaning which lie concealed behind the ostensible level. 
Famously, Thomas Aquinas, in Summa Theologica (1273) suggested four such levels. 
The literal, or historical, level is that by which language simply refers to objects in the 
world, whereas the other three levels (the moral, the analogical and the anagogical) are 
collectively known as allegorical planes of interpretation. Accordingly, the critic 
Northrop Frye, in his discussion of Aquinas's fourfold scheme, suggests that allegory 
refers to a "whole descriptive level of meaning" (Frye 1950: 250) and that "all 
commentary is allegorical interpretation, an attaching of ideas to the structure of poetic 
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imagery" (Frye 1957: 59). As such, allegory (alienum, diversium) can be seen, through 
a consideration of its etymology, to suggest a multiplicity of polysemic meanings. 
There are broadly two ways in which allegory can be understood. Firstly, as a generic 
form, an allegory represents a telling of a 'twice-told tale' which relies on the reader's 
knowledge of a known precedent. Without reference to the archetypal myth on which it 
is based, allegory loses much of its impact. As such, the world of allegory is often 
experienced as a "combination of elusiveness and familiarity" (Clifford 1974: 2). The 
reader, thrown into a strange landscape, must actively interpret images and events with 
reference to an established framework. This mythic framework, as it is manifested in 
mediaeval morality plays and in Spenser's and Bunyan's allegories, tends to be culturally 
conservative. Thus, allegory is often employed for pedagogic instruction. The reader 
follows the journey of a central figure whose task it is to interpret the signs of the (often 
alien) world in which they find themselves. The author is thus able to include enough 
clues to enable the reader to unravel the hidden meaning which is, to a great extent, fixed 
and limited. However, the second, polysemous, trajectory of allegory indicates that there 
are a number of possible ways of reading allegory. Even if the author's intention to 
convey a primary story is evident, there are other readings and configurations which can 
be elicited from the text. 
This second reading, however, moves away from the traditional conception of allegory, 
towards a mode of symbolism popular amongst romantic writers. Unlike the fixity of an 
icon, a symbol connotes a multitude of possible meanings. There is no one allegorical 
reading upon which the whole piece of writing depends. Although allegory and 
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symbolism are often delineated as contrasting literary figures, they can be rendered 
compatible by pursuing the conception of allegory as a polysemous fonn. Moreover, not 
only can this kind of 'symbolic allegory' surpass the limits of didactic instruction it has , 
the potential to disrupt and subvert. Contributing to the debate on the reappraisal of 
allegory, the literary critic Stephen Greenblatt comments in his preface to Allegory and 
Representation (1981) that its "deeper purpose" and effect "is to acknowledge the 
darkness, the arbitrariness, and the void that underlie, all representation of realms of light, 
order, and presence" (Greenblatt 1981: vii). 
Rather than an uncomplicated mimetic representation rendered in and through language, 
Greenblatt argues that allegory avoids the dangers of portraying a "stable, objective 
reality" (viii). Following de Man's thesis in Blindness and Insight (1974), by 
understanding the "hidden" meaning the reader does not unravel the text in its entirety; 
at the moment of insight other, unseen, possibilities remain latent. The act of reading 
suppresses some potential meanings and realizes, or activates, others. By highlighting 
the impossibility of understanding "order and presence", allegorical understanding can 
indicate the uncertainty which reading always entails. 
Sacks, then, far from misusing the tenn, can be read as deploying allegory in two 
complementary ways. In the broadest sense, an allegorical tale is a metaphorical and 
descriptive tale which recognizes and discloses its own figurative status. Unlike the 
SOAP fonnat which, although rudimentary, describes a relatively unproblematic social 
and personal reality, an allegorical tale displays its own structure of representation. its 
limits and indeterminacies. However. at the moment of disruption, allegory retains the 
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ability to preserve and connect: the disruptive potential of symbolic allegory is checked 
by the conserving structure of the traditional narrative allegory. Greenblatt comments, 
"allegory arises in periods of loss ... from the painful absence of that which it claims to 
recover" (viii). By presenting an often stylized story the allegorical mode reveals wider 
cultural archetypes through which the illness experience can be understood. 14 If allegory 
positions an individual experience within a larger cultural narrative, then such a 
reclamative story may provide a means to empower the suffering patient. Sacks's 
allegorical form does not pretend to fully represent the illness experience, nor does it 
claim to possess messianic powers. But as the patient actively tells and interprets his or 
her own story, it may be possible to glimpse the seeds of hope in a recovery from, or an 
accommodation of, illness. 
14 Three of these archetypal experiences, the quest, the transfonnation and the ~ a l l l (archetypes explored, 
although far from exclusively, by romantic writers), I discuss more thoroughly WIth reference to A Leg To 
Stand On. 
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(3) Constructing Narrative Voices 
After two lengthy, but important, preliminary sections, I will now make a detailed 
analysis of Sacks's clinical tales, in order to assess his claims for the development of the 
medical case study. Although the patients documented in Awakenings react to L-DO P A 
in unique ways, their narratives share a general underlying structure, the study of which 
provides an insight into the manner in which Sacks conceives of encephalitic illness. The 
cases continue to contain an extra-narrative dimension of commentary and footnoting, 
but Sacks consistently foregrounds the patient's story. This format is evidently distinct 
from the brevity of the medical chart and the cases presented in Sacks's earlier book, 
Migraine, where typology is highlighted over and above the emplotment of story. 
However, the two books are alike in the respect that they both follow a pattern of 
description, explanation and speculation which, as the critic William Howarth discerns, 
"follows classic therapy (observe, describe, analyze, prescribe) but toward a romantic 
end, the "continuous double vision" that sees migraine as both a structure and strategy, 
reflecting "the absolute continuity of mind and body" (Howarth 1990: 107). The two 
perspectives, focusing on neurological "structure" and emotional "strategy", enable Sacks 
to figure different illnesses as both "physical and symbolic events" (Sacks 1970: 14). 
Migraine and Awakenings have been published in numerous editions, in which Sacks 
extends and updates the case studies and commentaries and which, in the words of 
Howarth, are presented as "unfmished and continuing, very like a series of medical charts 
waiting for new entries" (Howarth 1990: 107). But, unlike the medical chart discussed 
in the previous section, the discursive and narrative dimensions serve to locate 
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Awakenings outside the scope of classical scientific texts. In addition to a description 
of neurological details, the cases are situated within a web of fragmenting and 
interconnecting symbolic narratives, which are not only told, but re-told; the "mystical 
thread" of symbolic stories is intertwined with the primary narrative relating the long-
term effects of encephalitis, the life of the patients in Mount Carmel and the 
administration of L-DOPA (Sacks 1992: 32).15 In this manner, the reader is invited to 
shift across different planes of textual engagement. 
The story of the patient's illness, moving through, but irreducible to, a series of distinct, 
yet continuous, stages, is not a stable narrative, but constantly under revision. The 
shifting relationship between narrator (alternating between the physician and the patient) 
and narrated (variously, the physician, the patient and the illness) highlights questions of 
authority and authorship: who is the storyteller? whose story is being told? and what is 
the epistemological status of (re )telling? Moving between these unstable textual spaces 
is the figure of Sacks. By presenting himself variously in the roles of reader, listener and 
narrator he exemplifies what Jean-Fran90is Lyotard has termed the "pragmatics" of 
narration: "all the complicated relations that exist...between the story-teller and his 
listener, and between the listener and the story told by the story-teller" (Lyotard 1989: 
125). 
Sacks highlights the symbolic dimension of storytelling in order to complicate 
conventional scientific explanations of neurological phenomena; he argues that scientific 
IS In Awakenings these stories tend to be one of two kinds: stories of strangeness (Lewis C ~ o l l ' s s Alice 
and Gogol's tales) and stories of rebirth (Lazarus, Oliver Twist, Sleeping Beauty.). Both kmds serve to 
disrupt a continuous narrative by moving through one of a number of transformatIOns. 
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explanation should never be totalizing, for "like any story [it] takes other stories as its 
reference" (126). In splicing explanation with allusion, suggestion and comment, Sacks 
undermines a closed explanatory structure. Narrative openness provides the retelling of 
patients' stories with two therapeutic dimensions: fIrstly, the emotional appeal of the story 
provides a touchstone through which the patient may be able to connect with his or her 
lost past; and, secondly, because any single account is embedded in other stories, the 
narratives are open to revision and extension. In (re )telling stories it may be possible, as 
Howard Brody has commented, to alter the "meaning of the illness experience .. .in a 
positive direction" (Brody 1987: 5). 
Arguing from a similar position to Sacks, Roy Shafer, in his reading of Freud, suggests 
that this type of destabilizing narrative can actually be reconstitutive. Instead of the 
analyst "reconstituting a single past" from "the analysis of the analytic encounter itself', 
an encounter "held to be in itself a fmal criterion of insight and an essential determinant 
of analytic results", he argues that "the analyst goes on learning about the analytic 
encounter as he or she goes on developing the .. .life-histories" (Schafer 1983: 208). 
Whereas Binswanger narrates the 'finished' stories of Lola Voss and Ellen West, both 
Schafer and Sacks argue that there is never a safe point outside the narrative from which 
to tell the story. For Schafer, 
the analyst uses the analytically defined elements of narrative incoherence 
to begin to retell the analysand's presentations and to bring the analysand 
into the process ofretelling ... the analyst and analysand together construct 
a history ... [which]. .. will be ... both more confident and more provisional 
than those they have replaced (Schafer 1992: 10). 
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In order to help the patient find his or her own therapeutic solution, the (re )telling of 
narrative should be conceived both as reclamative and open-ended. Heuristic narratives 
inscribe the past with meaningful patterns, through which it is possible for the patient to 
come to an understanding and acceptance (in Sacks's language, an "accommodation" 
[Sacks 1991 a: 266]) of his or her illness, whilst the multiple telling of unfinished tales 
opens up the possibility of future recovery. 
Just as this type of flexible story can open up the fixity of a patient's long-tenn illness to 
the possibility of change, so, too, the physician has a stake in the revision of cases. David 
Flood and Rhonda Soricelli have suggested that the construction of the discursive 
medical study (as opposed to the concise fonnat of the chart) is crucially dependent on 
"finding an appropriate narrative voice" (Flood 1992: 67), by which the physician can 
shift between the positions of medical authority and collaborative researcher of illness. 16 
In oscillating between the "diagnostic utility" of documenting medical complaints and the 
"personal encounter" (71) with the patient, drawing from an extra-medical or "premedical 
understanding of people" (67), the physician must tackle the difficulties of constructing 
a narrative voice. Because the physician should be flexible enough to account for the 
particular characteristics of the illness and the needs of the patient, the voice must be 
adaptable, whilst retaining a sense of continuous personality. Rather than refining "the 
author out of existence", the case study should "concentrate on finding the author" (80). 
16 In Speech and Phenomena Derrida insists that voice, as a metaphor for ex?ressing the ~ n t i m a t e e
relationship between speech, presence and sense, has traditionally been suggestive of self-evident or 
unmediated truth, in contrast to the dissemination of meanings indicative of writing. In deploying 
metaphors of speech, I wish less to endorse these correspondences and more to suggest that "voice" is not 
confmed to intentional utterances: voices can also be unintentional or somatic. Like CaveIl, Sacks balances 
the romantic belief in an expressive and authentic 'inner' voice and the poststructuralist notion that there 
is no one transparent route to truth, only a number of textual detours or possible stories to be told. 
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Flood and Soricelli suggest that whilst attending to the patient's voice, the physician must 
also be able to listen to the "narrative voice to hear what it reveals about the author's 
professionalized self' (80). Accordingly, rather than focusing on one particular voice, 
I will· transfer my attention between the textual spaces designated to patient and 
physician. 
Instead of attempting to analyze the whole text, of the twenty patients featuring in the 
book I have chose.n just two (Frances D. and Leonard L.) to provide the basis for my 
discussion of the wider framework of Sacks's practice. These two studies have something 
of a representative quality of his clinical tales, if only because they contain many of 
Sacks's ideas and revisions that are germane to the other entries. 
Frances D. 
The narrative of Frances D. (39-67) is the first and also one of the longest of those 
presented. Typically, it is split into five sections through which the story moves from an 
initial medical commentary of Frances's experiences, to her admission at Mount Carmel 
hospital and her reactions to L-DOPA, followed by later developments and her attempts 
to accommodate her condition. However, the closure of the narrative is deferred for a 
number of reasons, not least because Sacks inserts an epilogue (1982) later in the text, 
in which he summarizes the changes of the following decade and, in Frances's case, her 
eventual death. But her death is situated outside the frame of this story (although it 
always looms close by) as a future draft or another text embedded in the larger story of 
Awakenings. The individual stories are not told in isolation; they are inextricably 
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intertwined with the narratives of the other patients. This larger story frames 'jifty 
'awakenings' ... fifty individuals emerging from the decades-long isolation their illness had 
imposed on them" (Sacks 1991a: 65). Here, Sacks stresses the importance of the 
community, or "body", of sufferers, in whom the contagious laughter of "camaraderie" 
and "conviviality" serve to replace the muted voices of illness (65). There is a curious 
tension between the isolation of the ageing and enfeebled bodies and the renewed vitality 
of a hitherto arrested youthfulness: on one level, hinting to an allegorical passage to a 
higher and less corporeal form of existence and, on another, conveying the possibilities 
of recovery amongst the distressing realities of bodily decrepitude and of institutionalized 
life. 
Although Sacks insists that the primary trajectory of Awakenings is to convey the 
personalities of the patients, the stories read as discontinuous biographies in which the 
narrator pauses at certain times to expand his commentary, either within the body of the 
text or in a footnote, to questions of illness, neurological practice and modes of therapy. 
However, the patient's story is rarely overshadowed by excursus. The arrangement of 
sections indicates that the administration of L-DOPA is the crucial catalyst for changing 
the direction of the illness narrative; a catalyst which, in this case, presents Frances with 
a chemical window through which to speak of her experience. 
Whilst most of the first section is presented in a factual manner by a third-person 
narrator there are traces which inscribe the description of the physiological symptoms , 
with philosophical and symbolic subtexts. The opening sentence ("Miss D. was born in 
New York in 1904, the youngest and brightest of four children" [39]) serves to introduce 
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the patient, but also outlines an allegorical strain which runs through the narrative. As 
Bruno Bettleheim indicates in The Uses of Enchantment (1976) the hero of Mdrchen, is 
often the youngest of the family (usually the youngest of three), representing the most 
spirited and the quick-witted of the siblings. Here, the mythic resonance carries the 
impact of the tragic illness which strips the youth and intelligence from this fifteen year 
old girl to "cut across" her life. This cut serves to sever the orderliness of her life and to 
arrest the promise of her childhood. But, at this stage the "cut" does not represent a 
complete break from the balance of her childhood, for she is able to regain her 
"previously well-integrated personality and harmonious family life" (39). 
Frances's extravagant and hyper-kinetic form of encephalitis iethargica, marked by 
"insomnia", "restlessness" and "impulsiveness" (39), within a year subsides sufficiently 
for her to reintegrate with a healthy body and a relatively unimpaired life at high school. 
Unlike the narrowing of Lola Voss's condition, Sacks stresses the richness and fullness 
of Frances's life, focusing particularly on her creative talents - "she was fond of theatre, 
an avid reader, a collector of old china" - and her interaction with others (Binswanger's 
Mitwelt) - she was "an active committee-woman" and "frequently entertained friends" 
(40). Although the residues of her initial illness ("panting attacks" [39] and oculogyric 
crises!7), remains with her until 1949, Sacks charts a simple movement from the vitality 
of childhood to debilitation and back to a healthy social and emotional life. The temporal 
movement can be conceived either as cyclic or as linear, marked by a "cut" (39). or 
marred by a period of invalidity, before order is resumed. However, health is viewed 
17 Oculogyric crises are glossed as "attacks of forced deviation of gaze, often associated with a surge of 
Parkinsonism, catatonia, tics, obsessiveness, suggestibility, etc., etc." (392). 
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more than just a regulative concept, a balanced body characteristic ofhomeostasis l8 ; it 
is also performative, a background ability which enables an agent to execute coordinated 
actions. 
A marked change in Frances's condition occurs in the 1950s, characterized by the 
contrary tendencies to freeze and hurry in her speech and movements. At this point 
Frances speaks in her own voice, through which she is able to indicate the "essential 
symptom" (40) of her experience, in opposition to the "banal symptoms" that Sacks is 
able to perceive ("essential" suggesting the most profound, or intensely felt, of the 
experiences). By privileging Frances's own diagnosis, Sacks indicates the importance of 
the patient's attempt to describe the characteristics of his or her illness. Even though an 
observer is able to detect the starting and stopping of her bodily movements, the loss of 
"in-between states" (40) felt by Frances can only be spoken in the first-person. 19 Frances 
appears to experience these "urges" (42) passively, as if she has lost regulative control 
over her body. However, her knowledge that the attacks usually occur at regular intervals 
("'like clockwork' every fifth day" [40]) enables her mentally to prepare for the routine, 
even though she is unable to do much about the crises. Her balanced bodily state which, 
until disrupted by illness, makes action possible, is threatened by the violent forces 
experienced during her crises. 
18 The history of homeostasis and bodily equilibrium encompasses pre-m.odem c o n c e p t i o ~ s s of heal,th, 
including Heraclitus's correspondence theory of harmony in the macro- and m l c r ? ~ o s m s s (a ,verSIOn o f w h ~ c h h
is to be found in Emerson's essays), the medieval humours (umor), and traditIOnal Chmese and Indian 
notions of balance, 
19 As I have commented, the accuracy of the portrayals has, to a large extent. to be taken on trust. Of 
course the narratives can be read as purely fictional stories, but the evidence of the Awakenings 
d o c u m ~ n t a r y y (1974) and the textual details (both biographical and neurological) substantiate Sacks's claims 
for realism and accuracy, 
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The body cannot be explained merely as being out of control, or asserting a will of its 
own; Frances simultaneously displays both a withdrawal into herself (a fixed emotion and 
expression) and an exaggeration of activity (deviation of gaze and flaying of limbs). 
There appear to be two competing conceptions of personal identity at work here: one 
founded on the Cartesian split between body and mind and the other viewing the 
Parkinsonism as affecting the whole and indivisible self. Whilst it may seem naive to 
conceive of the 'real' Frances as being the sentient prisoner of a wildly malfunctioning 
body, the images of "Rip van Winkles or Sleeping Beauties" (65) are potent symbols for 
conveying the potential recovery from torpor. In contrast, supporters of the second view, 
such as Edelman, would argue that, although it may appear that the motor part of the 
brain has lost its regulative capacity, whilst the cognitive part (that which Edelman calls 
higher-order consciousness) remains functional, but powerless, to reflect on the condition 
of her body, signs of engagement remain. The tension between these two views is 
evident when Sacks implies that the opposing Parkinsonian forces of pushing and pulling 
are in competition for possession of her whole person, the distinctive trait of staring 
attacks becoming dominant at this moment, suggesting that the 'real' self is locked inside 
the body. Such crises are figured as kinds of anti-epiphany, where corporeal sensation 
suppresses a freezing of the expressive voice, resulting in a purely internal moment 
without any transcendence.2o 
By the time Frances is admitted to Mount Carmel in 1969, her condition has worsened 
to the extent that she is unable to walk or hold her body upright. The following section, 
20 Ashley Nichols detects the recurrent characteristics of the literary epiphany to be its brevity and i ~ s s
personal significance (Nichols 1987: 1-12). In this instance, ?oth o f t ~ ~ s e e aspects are reversed: Francess 
anti-epiphany is marked by temporal extension and compulSIve repetItIOn. 
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'Before L-DOPA', serves to recapitulate, and to expand upon, the inventory of symptoms 
that she had developed, in order that Sacks might show the changes which the drug brings 
about. 
Frances's bodily pulsion decreases in inverse proportion to her tendency to freeze; only 
when some external stimulus distracts her fixed attention can she continue her 
movements. Her body continues to show signs of movement and rapid action, but 
movement which prohibits her from acting in any meaningful sense: the "flapping" of her 
right hand, the "grinding" of her teeth and the "puckering" of her mouth display a 
prohibitive channel of energy (44). Similarly, Sacks indicates that Frances's 
"restlessness" can only be quelled by occupying her hands. The most marked changes 
appear in the loss of her "personal" qualities (42), marked by a masking of her face and 
the monotony of her voice, which varies only in the speed of her utterances. Her 
handwriting also loses its distinctive quality ("large, effortless and rapid"), resulting either 
in chaotic and illegible scrawl or gradually becoming "smaller and slower and stickier 
until it became a motionless point" (43).21 Bodily symptoms are here transferred into a 
textual space, in which her writing serves to display the opposing tendencies of pulsion 
and festination. 
In order to balance these distressing signs of bodily deterioration, Sacks focuses briefly 
on the aspects which maintain the traits of Frances's personality. She remains alert in 
21 This writing tendency is one commonly displayed by the other patients with se.vere P a r k i ~ s o n i s m . . But 
as Joseph Conrad has portrayed, through the figure of the idiot character, .Stevle Verloc, In The S ~ c r e t t
Agent (1907) it represents a powerful metaphor for chaotic mental (and SOCial) states. For an analYSIS of 
this text see my MA dissertation (Halliwell 1993: 52-72). 
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observation; she retains a quickness of thought (which is present despite the loss of vocal 
intonation); she is "punctual, and methodical in all her activities" without being 
obsessional or phobic; and she is able to recognize similar maladies amongst the other 
patients in her ward. In these aspects Frances appears able to retain the qualities of 
selfhood and to maintain what Sacks perceives as "a healthy self-respect" (44) for her 
(virtually) uncontrollable body and the demoralizing effect of institutionalization.22 
Throughout all the narratives Sacks is at pains to indicate the limited methods which the 
patients' adopt in orde"r to remain "alive and human in a Total Institution" (62). For 
Frances, it seems that only through such means can she compensate for a loss of bodily 
mastery and motor control, in order that she might assert herself as a meaningful actor in 
her oppressive physical and topographical environments.23 
The central section of the narrative, 'Course on L-DOPA', is structured in the form of 
successive journal entries. Sacks closely documents the dates and precise quantities of 
L-DOPA administered, in order to chart the "complex mixture of desirable and adverse 
effects" of the drug (45). He continues to focus on the body as the site of display, 
inferring cognitive changes with the aid of Frances's own comments. 
22 Howard Brody suggests that the patient's self-respect is a crucial sign that he or she still possesses the 
desire to live and is willing to take measures to combat the illness. Michael Ignatieff, in an article published 
in New Society (20/1/83), focuses on the significance of personal items ("a comb, a mirror and make-up" 
[Ignatieff 1983: 96]) which, however inadequately, enable the patient to tend to their bodies: "the 
selL.manoeuvres if it can towards some tiny affirming gesture" (97). 
23 Sacks borrows the term "Total Institution" from Erving Goffinan's influential study on Asylums (1961). 
In many ways Sacks echoes Goffinan's stress on the negative experiences of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z ~ d d life; but, ~ s s
a practising physician, he needs to retain a positive and life-affirming outlook both fO.r himself and hiS 
patients. Goffman claims that a meaningful activity is too dignified a term to d ~ s c n b e e ,:hat he calls 
"removal activities": "voluntary unserious pursuits" which are encouraged by the hospital staff m an attempt 
to "lift the participant out of himself' (Goffinan 1961: 67). He argues, that instead of granting the patient 
any sense of agency, the activities merely serve to "kill" time. 
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The initial dosage of L-DOPA serves to increase Frances's "drive" to act in any manner 
that she found possible - crochet, wash, write - for, at this stage, as Sacks informs the 
reader, she is "unable to tolerate inactivity" (45). An increase in dosage appeared to 
stimulate a feeling of "well-being and abounding energy" (45), together with the ability 
to channel, or structure, the energy into the shape of words or pedal movement. 
Adversely, however, her ability to breathe is affected, although her "urge" to respire 
becomes more intense; an urge which, after subsequent modification of dosage, manifests 
itself in frequent respiratory crises. In a long footnote, Sacks comments that these attacks 
display a mixture of the "idiosyncratic" and the communal: they represent a "remarkable 
'fossil' symptom" left over from the onset of Frances's encephalitis in 1919, but also share 
a characteristic in common with the other Parkinsonian patients (46). Sacks interprets 
such crises to be associated "with emotional needs and contexts" brought on by the 
peculiar bodily reactions to L-DOPA (46).24 
Such was the violence and persistence of these attacks that Sacks expresses an 
unwillingness to continue with the drug; but, with Frances's "insistence" (47), he decides 
to continue with half the dosage. However, although she "was looking, feeling and 
moving far better than she had done in twenty years", the crises continue and Sacks is led 
to, what he calls, a "therapeutic dilemma" (48). Acting in his role of physician, he is 
forced to judge between the different qualitative effects on the patient. He ceases his 
hitherto primary role of documenter of physiological detail and now admits his 
predilections in the narrative. Consequently, he shifts his stance from being primarily a 
24 See Sacks's paper written with Marjorie Kohl, 'Incontinent N o . s ~ a l g i a a l ~ d u c e d d b ~ ' ' L-DOPA', L a ~ c e t t I, 
1970, 1394-95 and Smith Ely Jelliffe's early study Post-EncephalItIC RespIratory DIsorders, Washmgton 
D.C.: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1927. 
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third-person narrator to become a central figure in the story, and thus charts a movement 
from Binswanger's "post to which existence clings" to James's model of the active 
experiencer. He appears to share Frances's need to rediscover, or newly to find, this lost 
"in-between" equilibrium of health, by finding an amenable drug dosage. At this stage 
he speaks in the plural ("could we fmd a happy medium" [48]), but when describing the 
"emotional needs and contexts" of Frances's illness, he reverts to the autobiographical 
first-person: 
I was slow to realize, while noting the causes of Miss D.'s crises, that the 
most potent "trigger" of all was me, myself ... When I asked Miss D. if this 
could be the case, she indignantly denied the very possibility, but blushed 
an affirmative crimson (49). 
The introduction of the first-person voice can be seen from two contrasting points of 
view. Firstly, by positioning his persona in the story Sacks adds to its sense of historical 
authenticity, but, more importantly, he is able to convey a sense of intimacy with his 
patient. Currents of transference and counter-transference indicate that the relationship 
between patient and physician is also an analytic one: the use of drugs to regulate the 
illness is seen as an addition to, rather than a replacement of, a personal encounter. 
However, the second viewpoint, expressed by Ella Kusnetz in her essay 'The Soul of 
Oliver Sacks' (1992), treats such comments with greater suspicion. Sacks begins to 
recognize signs of Frances's psychic transference, "only when an observant nurse giggled 
and remarked to me, 'Dr Sacks, you are the object of Miss D.'s crises!', that I belatedly 
tumbled to the truth" (49). The tone here implies (unlike the more open contact with 
another patient, Rose R.) the encounter to be one of (sublimated) desire, revealed through 
this "belated" disclosure and the repetition and assertion of "me, myself." Moreover. as 
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Kusnetz indicates, when "the therapy goes wrong" (Kusnetz 1992: 181-82) the personal 
pronoun is replaced by "we", implying the culpability of the whole medical team. 
Kusnetz claims that "he is eager to divest himself of this identity", a criticism validated 
later in the narrative when Sacks records the adverse reactions to L-DOPA: "it produced 
more and more 'side-effects' which I - we, her doctors - seemed powerless to prevent" 
(Sacks 1991a: 54). 
Although these "emotional needs" constitute an important determining factor, the 
respiratory crises have many causes: organic, psychic and social. Another important 
"psychic cause" which, Sacks claims, he "could not have known of had Miss D. not 
mentioned it", is revealed when Frances comments that "as soon as I think of getting a 
crisis .. .! am apt to get one. And if I try to think about not thinking about my crises, I get 
one. Do you suppose they are becoming an obsession?" (49). Here, the idea that the 
body entirely extricates itself from the motor control of the brain is again refuted. 25 
Frances's emotions of "passion, intransigence, obstinacy and obsession" (50), to a large 
degree, induce her respiratory attacks. Furthermore, the fear which accompanies the 
onset of each attack is described as "a special, strange sort of fear" (50): in clinical terms 
diagnosed as a pathology and in existential terms described as subliminal dread or Angst. 
To her mind the drug-as-regulator has been replaced by the drug-as-lifeline. Frances 
reveals her dependency for L-DOP A as she claims that the discontinuation of the drug 
25 There is a psychoanalytic subtext which Sacks goes some way to avoiding in his emphasis upon the 
neurological, rather than the psychological, causes of the illness. The references to obsessive somatic 
compulsions are similar to those discussed by Freud and Breuer in Studies in Hysteria, in which the 
(female) patient is often deemed to be at fault in contracting the illness. Although Sacks shares Freud's 
perspectives on many issues (the existence of psychic obstacles, or defense m e c h a n i s ~ s , , an.d a version of 
the principle of constancy), there are clear theoretical differences. Importantly, Sacks (like Bmswanger and 
Shafer) argues that there is no one event, or occurrence (for Freud, having libidinal origins), which can be 
cathartically brought to consciousness during analysis. 
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would be "like a death penalty" (50). However, both patient and physician note that, 
when once she is transfixed and "rooted to the spot", the body appears to be autonomous 
and to have a will of its Own.26 
Sacks infers that beneath, or bypassing, the level of coordinated neurological control is 
"a mass of strange and almost sub-human compulsions" (51). Here, "sub-human" refers 
to two levels of implied meaning: affirming that humans are fundamentally animals 
(Frances claims: "I bite and chew like a ravenous animal, and there's nothing I can do 
about it" [51]) and also indicating that such dark compulsions cannot always be 
understood through the rational grammar of thought. The only way in which the 
physician can glean a sense of these, almost, reflexive processes is through close 
observation of, and participation with, patients and by encouraging them to express (in 
whatever form) what it is like to experience such sensations. Again, the mythic element 
is herein revealed. Both the patient and physician are figured as ill-equipped travellers 
in the strange world of neurological disorder. However, unlike classical allegory, the 
signs do not indicate a single level of meaning. Instead, there are layers of possible 
meaning which intersect and often contradict each other. 
This symbolic pattern is apparent in the conflicting symptoms warring on the bodily site. 
Similarly, the stark contrast of Frances's "good day" (in which she spends "a perfect day -
so peaceful" in "the country") is thrown into relief by the following one which "saw the 
26 This rooting to the spot maybe an unwillingness, as well as an inability, to move from a zone of safety; 
when faced with a traumatic situation, the patient's need to find roots often proves stronger than the need 
for movement. However, Luce Irigaray has indicated that "hysteria", in this case marked by somatic 
symptoms and immobility, may be a manner in which to avoid the hegemony ofpatr,iarchal s ~ . e e c h h ( h e r ~ ~
manifested by the controlling voice of the physician): "a privileged place for preservmg - but m latency, 
'in sufferance' - that which does not speak" (lrigaray 1991: 138), 
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onset of the worst and most protracted crisis of Miss D.'s entire life" (51), the experience 
of which convinces Sacks to discontinue his administration of L-DOPA. The violence 
of this sixty-hour crisis can be sensed in the verbs "jam" and catapult, which replace the 
less virulent texture of "freeze" and "urge" (51). The crisis is described as moving from 
an increase in bodily distraction and palilalic speech to wild movement of the arms and 
"a shrill piercing scream" (52). Waves of excitement accompany a denial of selfhood 
("It's not me, not me, not me at all" [52]), as if the only way to contend with the anguish 
is for Frances to attempt to extricate her life-world from the outward contortions of her 
body. Sacks conveys this disjunction with the broken prose of his quotation and the 
anecdote in which, after the crisis, Frances wryly christens the drug "Hell-DOPA!" Her 
extreme states are couched in a symbolic opposition between the heaven of the pastoral 
day, which Frances claims she will never forget, and the hellish distress of these climactic 
moments of self-negation. The exteriority of the countryside (a recurrent romantic motif 
for Sacks) is figured outside of the tyranny of the body and the hospital and is presented 
in stark contrast to the interiority of this crisis: a turning inwards (almost) to a point of 
self-annihilation. 
Another level of meaning is revealed by the respiratory nature of the crises. Sacks notes 
that for Frances each crisis is inexorably linked both to the presence of voice and an 
emotional, or spiritual, need: "her voice, nonnally low-pitched and soft, rose to a shrill 
and piercing scream" (51-52). The movement upwards and outwards ("each wave rising 
higher and higher towards some limitless climax" [52]) suggests a macabre anti-epiphany 
where the physicality of the body prevents any transcendental experience. In a discussion 
on asthma, Marsha Rowe has pointed out that the verb 'breathe' and the noun 'breath' have 
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two etymologies.27 The fIrst derives from the fourteenth century, from the Latin animalus 
- an animal, or being, that breathes - and the second, widespread in Augustan thought, 
from spiritus. In both cases the connection between breath, breathing and soul is evident. 
Thus, the most severe of Frances's respiratory crises is cast amongst the most profound 
of symbolic proportions: her struggle to cling onto a physical and spiritual life is, at root, 
wholly dependent on her ability to breathe. 
The next two sections, which focus on the changes occurring when Frances stops taking 
the drug, are the most reflective and speculative of the fIve, as can be sensed by the 
frequency and length of the footnotes. One reason for this is that Frances appears to enter 
a more stable "subterranean state" (52), which the speech-therapist, Miss Kohl (a source 
of information whilst Sacks is absent from the hospital), compares to the withdrawn 
fugue state of shell-shock. It is as if her "appetite for living" (52-53) extinguishes itself 
for two important reasons. Firstly, the drug, which seems to offer a life, is now 
unmistakably seen as a false god and, moreover, in Sacks's absence, the other sources of 
life, the relationships with the physician and fellow sufferers, "had been disbanded" (53) 
due to administrative changes. Once more echoing Binswanger's stress on Mitwelt, Sacks 
feels that only if he can succeed in reestablishing these relationships would Frances 
recover her motivation to live. 
The commentary accompanying this section is not merely limited to the physician's 
thoughts, for Sacks stresses that he wishes to "interrupt her 'story' for her analysis of the 
27 In a discussion chaired by Roy Porter at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, 7112'93. 
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situation" [my italics] (54). Here, the extremes of illness, the rise and fall of bodily 
states, the emotions of fear, rage and betrayal are left for Frances to recount. Following 
the general tone of this section, Sacks acts as the scribe and the memory of the patient, 
his theoretical comments being reserved for footnotes, which, perhaps to his discredit, 
often spill over into the body of the text. 
One significant example of this occurs when, once again, Sacks stresses the view that 
body and mind should not be split. Sacks frames this moment of authorial speech within 
the context of a liaison with Frances. He writes: 
the 'things' which gripped her under the influence ofL-DOPA ... could not 
be dismissed by her as 'purely physical' or completely 'alien' to her 'real 
self, but, on the contrary, were felt to be in some sense releases or 
exposures or disclosures or confessions of very deep and ancient parts of 
herself, monstrous creatures from her unconscious and from unimaginable 
physiological depths below the unconscious ... and she could not look upon 
these suddenly exposed parts of herself with detachment; they called to 
her with siren voices, they enticed her, they thrilled her, they terrified her, 
they filled her with feelings of guilt and punishment, they possessed her 
with the consuming, ravishing power of nightmare (55). 
It is in passages such as this that Sacks may be accused of losing the precision of his 
earlier documentation in wildly suggestive rhetoric, where ideas are stressed at the 
expense of losing the feel of the patient's voice. The meaning is beautifully poised 
between the registers of psychoanalysis and myth; but, as Sacks says of certain of his 
patients, the language seems over-ebullient, leaving an investigation of the patient's 
condition behind for a moment of poetic excess. In defence of Sacks, though, such a 
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passage does convey the almost gothic drama of visual scenes (such as Frances's 
grotesque crisis) in a manner which would be lacking in more clinical prose.28 
Sacks, as physician, moves from a dispassionate recorder of detail to a central actor , 
intricately bound up in this emotional drama. The earlier comments from Schafer 
indicate that, given the patient's dependency on the physician for her physical and 
emotional needs, such a meeting is inevitably an analytic one, involving transference and 
resistance. The physician is seen as the sole arbiter of life and death. For Frances, the 
physician-cum-alchemist, caught between the images of Redeemer and Devil, or good 
and wicked doctors, experiments with a drug which promises salvation only to offer her 
a living death. But, here, unlike the coy amorosity of the previous passages, Sacks is 
comfortably able to discuss the transference of Frances's feelings: "thus Miss D. found 
herself entangled in the labyrinth of a torturing transference-neurosis, a labyrinth from 
which there seemed no exit" (57). 
Sacks realizes that in order to bear the mantle of an analyst, as well as physician, he must 
be the figure with whom Frances works through her anxieties. In the mode of Freud's 
transference cure, this identification of the doctor as a source of health and life 
encourages the patient to invest her desire in the figure. When she realizes that the offer 
of life is only illusory, alienation followed by a disintegration of her ego-ideal occurs. 
Only then can the patient recognize her unconscious desires and come to realize the 
extent to which she has invested of her emotions. However, the presence of severe bodily 
28 The visual impact of the Parkinsonian body is, perhaps, inevitably lost i ~ ~ a ~ i t t e n n acc?unt; 
Consequently, Sacks commends the documentary film as a companion to the text, In whIch the patIents 
bodily contortions are visually presented. 
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illness complicates matters. The sense of bodily fragmentation is likely to lead to the 
need to secure relationships (in Frances's case relationships with Sacks and the other 
patients) which the third stage of psychic fragmentation tends to undermine. In this case, 
the sense of double fragmentation may be so painful that a resolution is never adequately 
established. 
The image of the closed labyrinth conjures up this sense of blockage, but it may be one 
that Sacks, because he is not a professional analyst, is unable to resolve. in referring to 
Freud's paper 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937), Kusnetz points out, "if, as 
Freud discovered ... the sticky matter of psychic resistance makes a simple transference 
cure an inadequate model for the physician's treatment of neurotic illness, it is even more 
inadequate for the physician's management of such intractable medical illness" (Kusnetz 
1992: 181). Kusnetz argues that unless Sacks is to burden himself with the permanent 
mantle of analyst, a position which is not amenable to the variety of roles he seeks to 
adopt, he needs to abandon the "old transferential figure of 'magic' and 'authority"', and 
also his reluctant role as the administrator of drugs, and relate to his patients as "'co-
equals', 'co-explorers' and co-actors in the drama of their illness" (185).29 Although many 
of Kusnetz's comments are well targeted, she neglects to point out that in this instance 
Sacks does trace the transference-neurosis to its resolution. He recounts that over a year 
later Frances manages to find a "release from the labyrinth", to tum "away from her 
phantasies, and towards her reality" (62). Having asserted this, Sacks's later description 
29 It is noticeable that increasingly in Awakenings and, especially, in An Anthropologist on Mars, Sacks 
stresses his role as fellow traveller and befriender (using the language ofthe social-worker) rather than as 
analyst and problem-solver. 
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of the manner in which the "impostures of the L-DOPA 'situation' fell away like a 
carapace, revealing ... the real self ... undemeath" (62) tends to be too neatly resolved on 
textual and therapeutic levels. 
In the last section, 'Summer 1972', Sacks continues to relate Frances's story, but now from 
a position of temporal and theoretical distance. His personal involvement in the story 
recedes to a point of professional concern as he reviews the methods of therapy employed 
over the three subsequent years. This section updates the story to the publication date of 
the first edition of the book and, in many respects, represents a tribute to Frances's 
courage and "mysterious reserves of health and sanity" (58). Sacks believes that the 
extreme tensions of 1969 had served to "forge" and "temper" Frances, rather than break 
her: a rebuilding of stability, rather than a crumbling of foundations. He administers 
another low dosage of L-DOPA which causes a "milder" cyclic reaction of 
"improvements-exacerbation-withdrawal symptoms" (59). In contrast to the 
uncontrollable extravagance of the earlier respiratory crises, an awareness of this cyclical 
movement enables Frances to contend with the approaching stages. 
The narrative ends with commentary on other therapeutic techniques employed in order 
to help Frances regain a sense of autonomy and selfhood. Of the techniques, the most 
personal and intimate (laughter, touch and music) contain the greatest capacity to 
"awaken" Frances, to "defreeze" her (63), to free her from the constrained monotony of 
her torpor and to provide a means through which her attention can be channelled away 
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from her physical condition.30 For example, Sacks finds, in order to rouse Frances, it is 
necessary that music appeals to her individual sensitivity. In a moment of recognition, 
reminiscent of the care with which Binswanger's treats the structure of his patients' 
world-designs, Sacks realizes that Frances required music to be "firm but 'shapely'" (61) 
and "legato" (62), because "raw or overpowering rhythm ... causes pathological jerking; 
it coerces instead of freeing the patient, and thus has an anti-musical effect. Shapeless 
crooning ... without sufficient rhythmic/motor power, fails to move her - either emotionally 
or motorically - at all" (61). 
Sacks cites Nietzsche's view of healthy and degenerate, or sick, music, but does not 
prescribe the particular forms these should take, because he realizes that different patients 
respond to particular pieces in a variety of ways. Music does not appeal to cognition, but 
on different levels of reception: physically, to the rhythm of the body; chemically, to "the 
'go' parts of the brain" (61); and, metaphysically, serving to "move" her soul. Sacks 
suggests that, by synchronizing bodily movement with the tempo and rhythm of the 
music, the Parkinsonian patient is able to discover an ability to channel the displays of 
excessive energy. In this way it is possible to coordinate the movements of limbs and so 
to give a shape and structure to the violent tics. Accordingly, he comments that "the 
'movement' [of the body] was simultaneously emotional and motoric, and essentially 
autonomous" (62). This mode of therapy is shown to affirm Frances's individuality and, 
with it, some notion of autonomy and agency, as well as gesturing towards an elusive 
return to health. 
30 Sacks's conception of an "expressive" music is thoroughly romantic: the patient's life-world is not 
revealed through speech, but through the rhythm, or voice, of the body. 
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Leonard L. 
Forming the backbone of the plot for the Penny Marshall film, Awakenings, the narrative 
of Leonard L. (203-19) powerfully portrays the creative dimensions of recuperation in 
contrast to the mental poverty of catatonia. However, as Sacks comments in an appendix 
to the 1991 edition of Awakenings, the film is both "very different in structure, 
concentrating on a single patient" and adds dramatic details (such as Leonard's romantic 
involvement with Paula, "the creation of a violent psychiatric ward", and the stereotyped 
responses of "repressive" doctors) which are "entirely new" (374). Consequently, in a 
consideration of the narrative it is important to distinguish between Sacks's neurological 
case and Robert de Niro's portrayal of Leonard in the film. Having asserted this, Sacks 
expresses that the film and his text both share, what he calls, the "emotional truth of the 
portrayals": that is, "the imagination and depiction of the inner lives of the characters" 
(374). Sacks claims that Steve Zaillian's screenplay shares with him an attempt to blend 
emotional sincerity with neurological accuracy (de Niro convincingly mimics 
Parkinsonian symptoms ), and maintains a focus upon the human dimension of the 
narrative.3 ! 
Unlike Frances's narrative, the story of Leonard does not begin with a biographical 
sketch; Sacks describes Leonard as he appeared to him as a "mummified" patient (204). 
Rather than the physician composing a resume of his life, Leonard is left to describe the 
significant details. Sacks comments that he is only "able to form any adequate picture 
31 A conflicting view is to be found in an article by Paul Taylor in The I n d ~ p 7 n d e ~ t t ( 2 8 / ~ , 1 9 4 ) ) in w h i ~ h h he 
questions Sacks's "criterion" of "emotional truth" and he castigates de N!ro s actmg as both t e c h n I c a l l ~ ~
dazzling and morally quite unacceptable" (Taylor 1994: 23). 
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of his state of mind and being" (206) over a number of years of contact with Leonard and 
his mother.32 Towards the beginning of the narrative Leonard is described as "a man of 
most unusual intelligence, cultivation, and sophistication ... with an introspective and 
investigative passion" (204), qualities which import a poetic and philosophical feel to this 
case. Even before Frances is given L-DOPA she retains her voice, albeit only a whisper. 
with which to speak of her experience of illness. In contrast, by the time Sacks is 
introduced to him in 1966, Leonard's only means of communication is a letter-board 
through which he painfully taps out phrases in "an abbreviated, telegraphic, and 
sometimes cryptic form" (207). The role of Sacks as reader of the codes and 
manifestations of illness is hereby illustrated. 
Leonard's unique characteristics of introspection and enforced introversion stimulate 
Sacks to comment that, 
this combination of the profoundest disease with the acutest investigative 
intelligence made Mr L. an 'ideal' patient, so to speak, and in the six and 
a half years I have known him he has taught me more about 
Parkinsonism, post-encephalitic illness, suffering, and human nature than 
the rest of my patients combined (204). 
In contrast to Sacks's semi-amorous relationship with Frances (diffused in the film 
through the love interest with the nurse, Eleanor Costello), Sacks displays a mixture of 
identification with, and compassion for, Leonard which establishes a bond of 
companionship. The relationship is based upon mutual need. Leonard needs someone 
to interpret the signs of his illness, whereas, if he is to fully understand Parkinsonism, 
32 There is not space enough here to consider the important bond between Leonard and his mother. a 
mutually dependent relationship that is sensitively dramatized in the film. 
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Sacks requires an articulate channel for personal experience. Although Sacks retains the 
privileged role of the framing author, more than anywhere else in Awakenings the reader 
has the sense that this narrative is jointly told. Indeed, when Sacks admits that, although 
he feels that Leonard "deserves a book to himself', he has chosen to "confine" himself 
to "the barest and most inadequate outline of his state" (204), he simultaneously realizes 
the inadequacy of his study for fully representing Leonard's illness experience and 
renounces the role of sovereign author to acknowledge Leonard's role as co-writer. 
However, this claim is weakened by the fact that traces of Leonard's written 
autobiography are only marginally included in the text. 33 
Leonard is described as having rigid and dystrophic hands, facial masking and a toneless 
voice, symptoms which imply that the neurological damage is mainly in the right 
hemisphere and lower parts of the brain. Although Leonard describes feelings of 
"mosaic" vision (206) similar to those described in Migraine, Sacks infers from the signs 
of Leonard's "rapid and sure" eye movements that his cognitive left hemisphere is 
virtually unimpaired, hinting towards an "alert and attentive intelligence imprisoned 
within his motionless body" (204). Here, the tension between the two conceptions of 
illness (as it affects the whole self and the imprisoning of a reflective self inside the body) 
is developed. The evocative image of the caged animal, taken from Rainer Maria Rilke's 
poem 'The Panther' (c.1903), serves suggestively to convey Leonard's feeling of 
entrapment in a bodily prison "with windows but no doors" (207) together with, what he 
33 One example of the argument that Sacks has constructed the character o f L e ? n ~ d d ~ ~ a vehicle solely f ~ r r
probing the autobiographical nature of illness can be discerned in the marked. Similarity b e ~ e e n n L e o n ~ d d S 
love of the post-romantic/modernist poetry of RiIke and the late T. S. Ehot and Sacks s own mystical 
quotations from Eliot and Herman Hesse later in the text (275). 
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calls, the simultaneous existence of an "awful presence ... and an awful absence" (205). 
Leonard contrasts the presence of a "nagging and pushing and pressure" with a feeling 
of being "constrained and stopped." The alternative to this, "a terrible isolation and 
coldness and shrinking", is described as being less torturous, but is figured as a 
consequence of 'castration': a dumbness which is "something like death" (205). This 
severance echoes the "cut" which slices across Frances's balanced life, but is here 
couched in the terms of male sexuality which becomes a central feature later in the 
narrative. 
Sacks quotes the first stanza of 'The Panther', followed by a prose translation (he neglects 
to cite the translator), while the film presents a translation of the whole poem as a central 
metaphor of the post-encephalitic experience.34 The withdrawal of the panther's "gaze" 
(l) into the body ("a thousand bars") is seen as a retreat from the monotony and the 
confines of illness and institutionalization ("no more world" [4]). The motivating force 
of "some mighty will" (8) lies paralysed at a centre around which the panther's body 
erratically moves. The "supply powerful paddings" (5) convey the sense of a padded and 
locked cell and of a constrained, prowling energy which must find an outlet any way it 
can. The third stanza offers some relief from the monotony: "just now and then the 
pupils' noiseless shutter/is lifted" (9-10). Despite the utter interiority of the scene, an 
engagement with the outside world is retained ("an image will indart" [10]), implying that 
vision and cognition remain functional. In the last two lines of this [mal stanza the poem 
34 Notably, in the film the poem is read as the Sacks figure sits alone in his place of pastoral m e d i t ~ t i o n , ,
hinting that it is as much his touchstone as it is a manner in which Leonard can .grasp an u n d e r s t a n , d m ~ ~ of 
his illness. Subsequent line references are from J. B. Leishman's verse translatIOn of 'The Panther (Rllke 
1964: 33). 
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recited in the film differs radically from the Penguin translation. Leishman's translation 
follows the implication that this "image" finds its way to the intact "heart" of the body 
(the centres of will and emotion) and there "end its being" (12). In contrast, the film 
version traces the "shape" of the image "through the silence of the shoulders", as it 
"reaches the heart, and dies." In this version, the "heart" has been so long affected by 
suffering and torment that it can no longer cherish this image of release, as it "dies" 
within bodily interiority. The two interpretations of literary epiphany described by 
Ashton Nichols - "in which an object...or experience reveals itself' which, in tum, is 
"coalesced into a sudden disclosure of meaning" (Nichols 1987: 10) - are undercut in this 
translation. As Frances found, there is no epiphanic uplifting, for the personal 
significance of the "shape" is swallowed up and consumed by the disease. This rendering 
(presumably one endorsed by Sacks, who was consulted in the film's making) 
concentrates on the rigorous effects of the disease on the whole self (body, mind, spirit, 
and the activities of perceiving and willing), rather than the retention of a stable and vital 
Inner core. 
Despite prevalent feelings of entrapment and alienation, Leonard elsewhere finds the 
capacity to acknowledge a kind of grotesque charm in his "disease and deformity." He 
says that "they are beautiful in a way like a dwarf or a toad." Sacks sees this as a kind of 
"Rabelaisian relish of the world", which, in the terminology of Mikhail Bakhtin, can be 
interpreted as a celebration of the festive and camivalesque disorder of the body (in this 
instance, the individual body, but, also, the collective body represented by the community 
of sufferers). Peter Stallybrass and Allon White have argued that, rather than the 
controlling and ordering narrative of classical psychoanalysis, this celebration of the 
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"grotesque" body (contrasting with Frances's protest when she is rooted to the spot) 
signifies a liberation of the "second narrative fragmented and m a r g i n a l i z e d " ~ ~ a narrative 
which "witnesses a complex interconnection between hints and scraps of parodic festive 
fonn and the body of the hysteric" (Stallybrass 1993: 286). Here, Leonard finds the voice 
to speak of his condition in terms other than those of distress and decrepitude. 
Leonard's initial reaction to L-DOPA is described in positive terms. He displays a 
"delight" in being "released from entombment or prison" and an "intoxication with the 
sense and beauty of everything around him" (Sacks 1991a: 208). Sacks describes his 
desire to visit the hospital garden, where he not only relishes his release from his prison-
house, but reveals a pantheistic impulse to touch and kiss the flowers, reminiscent of 
Coleridge's Mariner who finds release from his life-in-death by embracing the sea 
creatures. Leonard figures this liberation in the terms of love, grace and a reading of 
Dante's Paradiso (1321). But, already apparent here, are the signs of a plentitude and 
fullness (soon to become an extravagant over-abundance), which "started to assume an 
extravagant, maniacal and grandiose form" (Sacks 1991a: 209). 
The reactions of Frances and Leonard are similar, but clearly distinct, as their own 
personalities reflect the descriptions of their conditions. Frances describes her 
experiences as follows: "I'd done a vertical take-off ... I'd gone higher and higher on L-
DOPA - to an impossible height. I felt I was on a pinnacle a million miles high ... And 
then .. .! crashed .. .! was buried a million miles deep in the ground" (54). In contrast, 
Leonard experiences a "pathological driving and fragmentation" (210) which leads. as he 
adopts the mantle of spokesman for the other patients, to delusions of messianic 
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grandeur: a releasing of "a Dionysiac god packed with virility and power" (211). The 
entrapped self is converted to a "wanton" dispersal, or out-pouring, spilling over into a 
promiscuous sexual drive of "libidinous and aggressive feelings" (211). His desire to kiss 
the garden flowers soon turns into a need to kiss and harass the nurses and masturbate 
"fiercely, freely, and with little concealment" (212). 
In contrast to the balance and "suppleness" characterizing the account of Frances's 
childhood life, Leonard's psychic and physical energy at this stage lacks any kind of shape 
or structure. Sacks records that "all his reactions had become all-or-none. The 'middle-
ground' of health, temper, harmony, moderation almost disappears entirely at this time, 
and Mr L. became completely 'decomposed' into pathological immoderations of every 
sort" (216). The liberatory "awakening" of the self turns into a kind of hyper-awareness 
of the prosaic reality of habit and the strictures of hospitalized life. Moreover, the 
awakenings no longer accompany a positive feeling of well-being, but, of "general" and 
"specific excitements" - "urge, push, repetition, compulsion, suggestion and 
perseveration" (212). Only his writing of a painstaking autobiography (typed with "his 
shrunken, dystrophic index-fingers") seems to give a coherence and pattern to this excess 
of bodily and psychic energy. Sacks relates that during his obsessive task of writing, 
Leonard "found himself free ... from the pressures which were driving and shivering his 
being" (213). These pressures are manifested in the form(lessness) of "tics and 
distractions" which returned when he finished typing. Just as music grants Frances a 
moment of coordination, so typing presents Leonard with a creative channel for 
expressing his "floods of sexual phantasy, jokes, [and] pseudo-reminiscences" (213). 
But unlike the sedate movements of Frances, these outlets often take the form of 
, 
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"carnivorous and cannibalistic fantasies", indicating that Leonard's independence and 
autonomy does not coincide with the grain of Sacks's romantic outlook. Indeed. such are 
the violence of Leonard's "frenzied" movements and vividness of his "voluptuous and 
demoniac visions", visions in which, like Ellen West, he schizophrenically creates and 
denies reality, that Sacks records the necessity to use "physiological safeguards" and a 
"punishment cell" (216), precautions which he admits "in themselves were highly 
distressing or disabling" (214).35 
At this stage, Leonard's reactions appeared to be entirely pathological. With the explicit 
request of his patient, Sacks relates his decision to discontinue the drug. Leonard returns 
to a "cool" state of "composure" and an "'elegaic' detachment of mind" (307), in which 
he appears to accept and accommodate the "violent feeling of promise and regret" (218). 
Like Frances, he, too, overcomes his violent psychic reactions to the drug (figured both 
as an "Elixir of Life" and "a deathly poison" [218]), and, although he admits that the 
situation is profoundly "sad", the narrative ends in triumphant self-affirmation: "I've 
broken through barriers which I had all my life. And now, I'll stay myself, and you can 
keep your L-DOPA" (219). 
In Awakenings, the telling of narratives serves, at least, a threefold purpose: 
documentation of the patient's illness; scientific and theoretical speculation; and a 
reflection upon different modes of therapy. But, rather than remaining on these planes 
35 Although Sacks does not usually condone such r e ~ t r a i n t s , , the instruments employed serve, ~ n n Goffman's 
h t " rt'fy" or "curtail" Leonard's grandIOse sense of selfhood (Goffman 1970. 50). Such prase, 0 mo I . .. f "T I I . . " 
"assaults" (24) or "encroachments", although they serve to typify the negatl.ve vISIon 0 ota nstltutlo.ns, 
and their staff, are sometimes necessary and may, as Gotfman concedes, bnng about "psychological reller 
for the patient (50). 
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of generalization, Sacks argues that, in order to do justice to the individual patients, each 
narrative should be situated in its personal and, in the case of severe long-term illness, 
institutional contexts. There are also hints, particularly evident in the "elegiac" letters 
between Sacks and Mrs L. in the 1982 epilogue, that the narratives are, at least partly, 
constructed as tributes to the patients' ordeals. Sacks attempts to expand upon the 
traditional forms of pathography and case history, less for pedagogic reasons and more 
in an attempt to construct a vehicle which can crystallize these intentions. As with 
Sacks's idealized notion of relatedness, even if such attempts fall short of his optimistic 
goal, the radicalization of medical form displays an ethos of anti-institutionalism, which, 
in its refusal to finally categorize patients according to disease type, goes some way to 
opening up the possibilities of change and recovery. At times the narratives display 
perceptible inconsistencies: for instance, when Sacks takes on roles and voices which, 
elsewhere, he expresses his wish to discard. But, in spite of these problems, as David 
Flood and Rhonda Soricelli suggest, the development of the physician's voice is as crucial 
and as unfinished as the writing of narrative. 
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(4) Neurological Autobiography: A Text to Stand On 
Sacks, writing in one of his more expressively romantic moods towards the end of 
Awakenings, considers the possibilities for his post-encephalitic patients "to re-feel the 
grounds of their being, to re-root themselves in the ground of reality, to return to the first-
ground, the earth-ground, the home-ground, from which, in their sickness, they had so 
long departed" (Sacks 1991a: 275). The mythical motif of the journey, an arduous 
passage through the tribulations of illness before a circuitous return to health, is a well-
worn classical, biblical and romantic allegory of death and rebirth, which provides an 
extended metaphor to express a radical accommodation by the patient ("a slower, deeper, 
imaginative awakening" [275]), which can be contrasted with the briefer and less 
substantial awakenings induced by L-DOPA. There are a number of latent rhetorical and 
theoretical issues evident in this quotation which can productively be interrogated in 
order to provide a framework for approaching Sacks's 'autobiographical' book A Leg To 
Stand On. 
The ambiguity of "re-root" serves to indicate a semantic slippage between a conception 
of an originary self, which is rediscovered in a moment of enlightened introspection, and 
the notion that to "re-root" suggests the possibility that the roots are laid down elsewhere: 
that health and selfhood can be redescribed in order to accommodate the present 
condition. As such, it is possible to understand what Sacks describes as "the sense that 
something is going wrong", to the extent that the "wrong world" can be incorporated into 
the psychological landscape of the patient (249). This would initiate a cure which does 
not overcome bodily dysfunction, but which can interpret the execution of certain 
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significant activities as indicative of a return to health. Of course, in a constantly 
worsening illness, such redescription may be precarious, but necessary in order to cope 
with prolonged disability or the imminence of death. 
Although this second reading may be tenable, the rhetoric of "the first-ground, the earth-
ground, the home-ground" implies. a kind of transcendental consciousness which retains 
the ability to recover a mystical integration with itself: "a quality of nostalgia, 
recollection, returning to what one had somehow, always felt and known" (Sacks 1991 b: 
168). In this view, by finding a "voice" with which to express the experience of illness, 
the patient is able to reassimilate their altered perception of Being-in-the-world into a 
fresh pattern of figurative significance. Implied here is a description of an inner 
monologue, which is termed by Derrida, in his critique of Husserl in the first section of 
Speech and Phenomena, a "phenomenological voice." Derrida takes Husserl to task for 
privileging expressive language which "lies outside the empirical sphere" and, in doing 
so, bracketing off the indicative form of signification which, in its interconnecting 
network of associations, disrupts a pure sphere of ideality (Derrida 1973: xxxix). 
Transferred into the scene of this debate, an understanding of health may be conceived 
as a purely expressive sign through which the self, in a triumphant moment of 
transcendence, can accurately express the phenomenal contents of consciousness and 
thereby recover the sense of itself, hitherto lost through the rigours of illness. 
Conversely, sickness would be defined as an inability to express this notion of self-
referentiality (the self grounded in itself) and the inability to transcend the confusion of 
an inexplicable bodily condition. In contrast, like James and Binswanger. Sacks 
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understands health and sickness to be integrally related to each other. Just as the 
conditions of the post-encephalitic patients in Awakenings oscillate between the poles 
of ebullience and withdrawal, so the signification slips between an excess (the dialectic 
of health/sickness being identifiable in every activity) and a lack of meaning 
(health/sickness being an inexpressible precondition of Being). 
Derrida understands Husserl's theory of time to be self-defeating; his theory "dictates 
against any 'punctually isolated' moment, for time is a 'phasing', a continual movement 
of prot en tiona I and retentional traces" (xxxvii). Husserl privileges the present moment 
as a still point in which memories and past experiences can be organized. In contrast, 
Derrida argues that the present is mutable and unstable: "a moment compounded of 
manifold retentions and anticipations, never existing in the isolated instant of awareness" 
(Norris 1982: 47). From this perspective, embodied experience should be seen as 
perpetually in temporal flux. Anyone attempt to understand it as an abstraction should 
be understood, not in or for itself, but in reference to other attempts to understand, or 
frame, it. This argwnent closely aligns itself with Cavell's notion of moral perfectionism. 
Only through a constant revisional process (that is, revision without progression towards 
a full, or self-present, sign) along a narrative plane (or planes) can temporal flux be 
adequately represented. Similarly, the British philosopher, Jonathan Glover discerns such 
a revisional process is a necessary one to "keep the person's behaviour coherent and 
intelligible" (Glover 1991: 81). As I shall argue later in this section with reference to the 
writings of Glover and Israel Rosenfield, neurological disturbances in the (usually) 
unproblematic awareness of body-image will necessitate, however fragmentarily and 
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incompletely, the patient's narrating his or her condition in a concerted attempt to cope 
with such interpretive confusion. 
The expression of a unified self is also evident in Sacks's Emersonian tendency to refer 
to an idealized concept of Nature: "in the bosom of their causes" once more suggests a 
return to a grounded self. However, alternatively, rather than sinking into romantic 
reverie, Sacks can be understood to mean that, by engaging with this register of language, 
the patient is nevertheless able to imaginatively reconceive him or herself as (always) 
"real and alive" (274), like the Umwelt (the organic world) of which they are a part. One 
of the central commitments apparent throughout Sacks's writing is the idea that through 
a coming to awareness of the richness and multi valency of the human condition (or 
Dasein), that which cannot be reduced to one representational mode, the patient may be 
able to take the first steps away from the mortification of illness towards, as Leonard L. 
briefly expresses, a celebration of self-existence (Eigenwelt). 
Sacks, identifying closely with the experience of his patients through the employment of 
the personal pronoun, suggests the journey of the patient is "endless", a quest with an 
always unreachable goal, the pursuit of which is figuratively rendered as a "homecoming" 
(Sacks 1991 a: 168). The quotations from Hesse's The Glass Bead Game (1943) and 
Eliot's 'Little Gidding' (1942) imply, like Odysseus's circuitous voyage. that "home" 
(Ithaca) can only be recognized and appreciated through the leaving of it: that is, through 
the realization of what it is like to be away from home, whether it is the hostility of 
foreign lands for Odysseus, or, as Sacks would describe them, the strange distortions of 
neurological illness. As such, "home" can only be perceived from a vantage point of its 
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opposite, just as "health" can only be understood from a knowledge of illness and 
dysfunction. While the symbols of health and home can be productively elided to 
encourage the patient to reactivate, or to newly learn, abilities, it is in the values attached 
to the execution and the accomplishment of these activities that the patient can initiate 
a renewed sense of selfhood. In these terms, the self is not to be conceived as a 
metaphysical entity, but an enabling device through which hostile bodily conditions can 
be dealt. Following this reading of Sacks, it is more productive to talk about ability and 
disability than health conceived as an abstract ideal. 
Sacks makes the point of stressing that feelings of "homeliness" correspond to "knowing 
in the depths of one's being that one has a real place in the home of the world" (Sacks 
1991a: 272). This home is conceived as being both corporeal (an awareness of a 
perishable body) and topographical (for the patients of Awakenings, Mount Carmel is the 
only home they can remember). Such an awareness of home-in-the-world allows a place 
which is not-home (Mount Carmel) to act "as a home", an understanding which, as Sacks 
suggests, is "deeply therapeutic to all of its patients" (272).- But, to the extent that a 
chronic hospital is an institution, forcing the patients to follow the rules and restrictions 
which define their role as patients, "it deprives them of their sense of reality and home, 
and forces them into false homes and compensations of regression and sickness" (272). 
To use a Wordsworthian phrase, only through a rectification of feeling36 (that is, the 
emotional values that are associated with home: familiarity, friendliness, compassion, 
comfort and care) can the notion of this figurative return to health be edifying or 
36 See the discussion of Wordsworth's rectification of feeling in my MA dissertation (Halliwell 1993: 16-
22). 
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conciliatory .. By stressing the word "settle" (272), Sacks is able to suggest the 
simultaneity of pacifying (to settle down), active decision-making (to settle) and a notion 
of dwelling in the world (a settlement). As I will explore in A Leg To Stand On, the 
therapeutic potential of symbol and myth cannot work on the level of the miraculous and 
must, to a large extent, be mirrored by amenable conditions of living, which can propel 
the promise of the narrative into proximity with the patient's experience. 
Many of Sack's critics have approached A Leg To Stand On as a text which, in the corpus 
of Sacks's writing, requires special consideration. Although Awakenings disrupts many 
of the conventions of classical science, it retains a recognizable structure in its 
assemblage of case histories through which Sacks's commentary is channelled. 
Conversely, the discursive narration of A Leg To Stand On places this "neurological 
novel" firmly outside the generic realm of scientific writing (Sacks 1991 b: viii). 
However, this does not render it anti-scientific or anti-philosophical. In many ways it 
represents an amalgam of the Bildilngsroman, a novel of exploration and human growth, 
and the philosophical novel, characterized by the high modernist writings of Mann, Hesse 
and Musil. Because the Germanic feel of the novel aligns it closely with the tradition of 
romantic science, it is not surprising to find Sacks evoking Mendelssohn and Kant at 
crucial moments in the text. The history of the novel's composition indicates that the 
published version is a severely curtailed edit of a sprawling work which would probably 
have been more discursive than narrational. As it exists, the narrative dimension is 
clearly the focus and provocation for ideas and reflections. 
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The story represents an autobiographical account of a profound injury to his leg which 
Sacks sustained in the mid-1970s while mountaineering in Norway. Instead of merely 
documenting the medical complications which arise when he loses feeling and tone in his 
leg (sustained after an operation to his quadriceps), Sacks sees his "own story" has the 
"shape" of a "universal existential experience, the journey of a soul into the underworld 
and back, a spiritual drama - on a neurological basis" (Sacks 1991 b: 146). As Teresa de 
Lauretis has commented in an essay on Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar (1963), the claim of 
a "universal existential" drama must be established by 
filtering a unique emotional and experiential content through the sieve of 
symbolic discourse .. .its success and forcefulness are due in large part to 
the author's ability to integrate the historical, diachronic self...with a 
synchronic, timeless mythic structure, the descent-ascent pattern ... or from 
one state of being to another (de Lauretis 1976: 173). 
This "theme of rebirth" presents a similar structural pattern to that used in Awakenings 
and, as such, can be understood as an attempt by Sacks, as physician, to complement his 
attempts to empathize with his patients. Here, he figures himself as a patient forced to 
contend with fear, pain, confusion and the slow process of rehabilitation which, in the 
autobiographical mode of the book, allows him insights into the experiences of other 
patients. William Howarth claims that this autobiographical mode "is a double form of 
retrospection in which the author plays both character and narrator, one to whom events 
happened and one who now relates the history" (Howarth 1990: 110). 
This double perspective allows Sacks to shift between positioning himself as a 
protagonist (in many ways, an anti-protagonist to whom events happen) in a symbolic 
drama and also the commentator and committed, but detached, philosopher of illness. 
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The projection of two roles, "two selves, patient and physician" (Ill) indicates that here 
the self, rather than something originary, is a textual construction which enables modes 
of (always incomplete) understanding to cluster around different subject positions. The 
dual commitment of protagonist and engaged thinker indicates that this novel, despite 
posing many conceptual problems, is a project of "good faith" and not the "false book" 
which Ella Kusnetz believes it to be (Kusnetz 1992: 192). 
Although she is generally hostile to Sacks's writing for patronizing his patients or 
overshadowing them with his own voice, Kusnetz is particularly critical of A Leg To 
Stand On. She has two broad, but connected, criticisms of Sacks. Firstly, she claims he 
is caught in a conceptual trap: 
although the very science he appeals to subverts any notion of a "self' or 
a "soul" granted by God or metaphysics, he is inclined to override his own 
logic with emotion. His books, in fact, talk about disease as though it 
were a falling-away from some pre-wired wholeness, a disintegration 
longing for reintegration (178). 
Her second criticism stems from what she sees as Sacks's close, but troubled, allegiance 
with Freud. She claims Sacks scientific project, to "describe mental phenomena 
physiologically" (177), closely resembles Freud's, as does his role as "neurologist qua 
analyst, the analyst qua guru" (178). She views this identification to be misplaced, 
because cures for "intractable" diseases such as "organic brain disorders" are very rare 
(179, 197). It is for these very reasons that Kusnetz suggests that "these stories appeal 
to readers so powerfully": "underlying them all, more basic to the narratives than even 
the structure of analytic cure or spiritual conversion, is a much more irresistible, primitive 
fantasy of primal narcissism, of wholeness regained, of return to undifferentiated unity" 
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(194). She claims that the text is merely a strategy on behalf of Sacks to gain his 
patients's confidence and, thereby, to fulfil a narcissistic wish for himself and the reader: 
"Sacks needs to lose the leg .. .in order to regain it" (194). 
Whilst I would agree with Kusnetz's reaction to Sacks's tendency to "go mystical" (177) 
at times of romantic rapture, by interpreting Sacks's project to be, in her mind, a 
misplaced psychoanalytic one, she is reducing a complex body of writing to a predefined 
genre. His writings, instead of being little more than confidence tricks, may better be 
appreciated as artful attempts to move to the margins and between limited discourses in 
the Jamesian hope that more, rather than less, experiences are accounted for. Although 
Sacks periodically lapses into romantic reverie, this does not render his project defunct. 
As I have made evident in my reading of Awakenings, by harnessing his understanding 
that regular encounters with his patients are, to some degree, analytic ones, together with 
his piecemeal deployment of Freudian terms, he is able to appropriate psychoanalytic 
ideas without relying on them to the extent that they become the dominant explanatory 
discourse. Even if no cure is effected, the telling of stories can often be a lifeline when 
others have dissolved. As Martin Swales comments in his work on the German 
Bildiingsroman: 
the story, then, becomes the guarantor that one is living. Obliteration of 
the story may seem to promise the realization of human w ~ o l e n e s s , , b.ut 
ultimately it is a wholeness brought at the unacceptable pnce of staSIS, 
bloodlessness, death (Swales 1978: 33). 
In other words, the telling of, and participation in, narrative may make the 
"contingencies" of bodily existence "acceptable" (33). Moreover, Sacks does intimate, 
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as I have shown above, that there is, in the words of Kusnetz, "no paradise regained, just 
as there are no transcendent consolations" (Kusnetz 1992: 195). The telling of narratives, 
which lead towards, but never finally reach, a state of idealized health, is a manner in 
which to organize data as it is experienced, in an attempt to find patterns of significance 
in illness. Rather than equating wholeness solely with the fulfilment of a narcissistic 
wish, stories serve to infonn "the very flux of a character's life and experience" (Swales 
1978: 36). This is not to deny that stories of recovery do, on one level, appeal to a 
primaeval wish to recover a feeling of lost wholeness, but it may be possible to 
incorporate this trajectory as part of the symbolic texture of narrative without it 
dominating and paralysing the other dimensions. 
I detect an additional problem with Sacks's narrative which goes some way to vindicating 
Kusnetz's claim that the text is a kind of confidence trick to gain the reader's or the 
patient's trust. The injury occurred in the early 1970s, but Sacks writes his account nearly 
a decade later. The fear and uncertainty which accompanies the experience has, by the 
time of writing, receded to a point of temporal and emotional distance. Although the 
meaning of certain experiences are constantly revised and qualified (most profoundly, the 
shifting metaphors through which he attempts to describe the feeling, or lack of feeling, 
in his damaged leg), the story cannot be interpreted solely as a mode of self-therapy. If 
it is to be representative of such, the narrative should have been drafted during 
rehabilitation. In many ways, Sacks is able to "stand" outside the frame of the narrative 
and, in doing so, distances himself from the kind of engaged autobiography that would 
represent a lifeline for the patient. However, in his defence, Sacks claims that the 
narrative should not be read wholly in this manner. He states that the narrati ve 
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investigates wider neurological issues concerning "singular disorders of body-image and 
body-ego" (Sacks 1991 b: vii), together with an ongoing "critique of current neurological 
medicine" (viii) and the concepts and taxonomies currently in use. As such, Sacks's 
journey is twofold: the recovery from illness, "the abyss of bizarre, and even terrifying 
effects" (vii), and the search for a scientific (but not systematic) understanding of 
neurological damage. Only from the "double-perspective" detected by William Howarth 
and asserted by Sacks in his Binswangerian formulation of a "clinical ontology" or 
"existential neurology" (166), can these issues be explored together. 
Another pejorative charge which Kusnetz levels at Sacks, is that he poeticizes the 
experience of illness by projecting himself as the hero, or quester, of his texts. But, 
unlike the criticisms levelled at Awakenings and The Man, in which Sacks's rhetoric 
often obscures the voice of his patient, in his autobiographical novel he is, by definition, 
the protagonist. As such, his quest is both positive and negative, On one level, within 
the frame of the leg-story, his goal is to actively redescribe health in order that he can 
once more begin to think of himself as an active being. But, his is not a journey to 
discover a graspable object, for his grail also consists of the passive process of recovery. 
Sacks figures himself as a specific type of quester. Following the spiritual strain of the 
story, Sacks envisages his illness and recovery as a "pilgrimage" which, he suggests, 
"fortune, or my injury, had forced upon me" (Sacks 1991b: 146).37 Reacting to the 
37 Th I" that Sacks turns to "for comfort" in his state of "limbo" is closer to Jamesian mysticism than 
e re Iglon , ' h I I" , 
any doctrinal belief, for he claims that they do not demand ~ ~ ~ "blunt plaIn c o m ~ l t m e n t t t at re l ~ l o n n
involved" (Sacks 1991 b: 81), He claims that through the deSCrIptIOns, as w e l ~ ~ as the rItuals and evocations, 
found in "art and religion" he is ablet.find solace, "fonnulation and hope", In t ~ e e respect that these texts 
"could communicate, could make sense, make more intelligible - and tolerable (81), 
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predictable label of "uneventful recovery" (119) by which the doctors characterize his 
case, Sacks describes his pilgrimage as, 
a j ~ u r n e y , , in which one moved, if one moved, stage by stage, or by 
s t a t 1 ? ~ s . . Every stage, every station, was a completely new advent, 
requlnng a new start, a new birth or beginning. One had to begin, to be 
born, again and again. Recovery was an exercise in nothing short of birth, 
for as mortal man grows sick, and dies, by stages, so natal man grows 
well, and is quickened, by stages - radical stages, existence stages, 
absolute and new: unexpected, unexpectable, incalculable and surprising 
(Sacks 1991 b: 124). 
This description of sequential stages does not contradict the argument of Paul Churchill, 
who suggests that story should be conceived as prior to any such divisions; rather, that 
these "stations" or "advents" (119) are defined as ritualized exercises or "acts" (140) 
defined within the frame of the individual's story. On a formal level these stages 
represent ways in which the recovery process can be traced (for example, 'Becoming a 
Patient' and 'Convalescence') through the breaks or discontinuities in the story ("the 
unimaginable next step" [119]) and, on an existential level, attempts to render the 
personal significance of the experiences ('Limbo', 'Quickening', 'Solvitur Ambulando'). 
Accordingly, a "new birth or beginning" becomes a conceptual strategy for refocusing the 
mind on overcoming of bodily breakdown within a narrative of "healthening" (139). 
Such beginnings and rebirths represent significant moments in a narrative which, like 
Cavell, Sacks conceives as a one of self-becoming. Self-construction can be envisaged 
as a strategy to activate the self in an attempt to deal with the situation at hand. Instead 
of moving towards a te/os where the self is fully realized, the process is revealed as 
unending: in Sacks's words (but closely echoing the Emerson of 'Circles'), a journey 
leading "both forwards and backwards" (168). Whilst his description of the story as 
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pilgrimage goes some way to distance the text from the criticism of quest-narratives as 
representing stories of male conquest, Sacks, like James's doctrine of the strenuous l i f e ~ ~
runs into the trap of equating activity too closely with masculinity. The "philosophical 
emergency" into which he is thrown after his operation forces him to seek a redescription 
of his identity (through an exploration of his disrupted body-image) in order that he might 
reconfirm himself as a human being. The enforced passivity of patienthood forces him 
"to relinquish all the powers [he] normally command [ ed]": in other words, "the sense and 
affect of activity" (79). Sacks finds this mortifying because he claims it humbles his 
"active, masculine, ordering self', which he equates with "science", "self-respect" and 
"mind" (79). Illness and passivity are not only blows to a self defined as human, but, thus 
conceived, also rational, moral and masculine. 
If Sacks figures his symbolic story as a "universal existential experience", following a 
mythic pattern of descent and ascent (the fall on the mountain into a condition of 
suffering, then from a state of wilderness and limbo to a reintegration back to health, 
bringing with it the joy ofrecovery)38, but the text actually reveals itself as a male story, 
then Kusnetz's position may be strengthened: that the text is a duplicitous one which 
attempts to hide its own gendered foundations. Furthennore, the fact that it is Sacks's leg 
that is damaged, an organ commanding mobility (allowing action and movement) and 
38 In a discussion of Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, Cavell quotes Robert Penn Warren who, in his essay 'A 
Poem of Pure Imagination: An Experiment in Reading (1951), n o t ~ s s two important : ' q ~ , a l i t i e s " " o ~ t h e e Fall: 
"it is a condition ofwill...'out of time' and it is the result of no smgle human motive (quoted In Cavell 
1988: 57). In line with the existential story which Sacks narrates, Cavell's Heideggerian i n t e r p ~ e t a ~ i o ~ ~ of 
Warren suggests that because "there is no (single) motive" which brings about the Fall, the motive IS the 
horror of being human itself." (57) When Sacks stumbles across the bull, figured both as " m a g n i ~ c e n t " "
and "utterly monstrous" (5), he is, on this reading, confronting the "horror", or the "nausea", of hiS own 
existence. 
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stability (the maintenance of the vertical, or phallic, human form) provides fuel for such 
an argument. Instead of writing a text which, in its interweaving of different narratiYe 
strands with other generic strains, is open and liberating, Sacks may be seen as merely 
relying on a narrative framework which conceals a masculinist myth. One response to 
such a claim would be that Sacks has written an example of what a neurological text 
might be and, in so doing, he may encourage other patients to write their own texts. He 
is not so much seeking to overlay every story with a universal symbolic pattern, but, in 
his drive to privilege individual subjectivity and unique phenomenological experiences, 
he outlines some of the investigative and therapeutic possibilities of narrative. 
Rather than pursuing these problems in the direction of a feminist critique of Sacks's 
masculinist view of health and activity, I wish to acknowledge the importance of such a 
project (one which counters, in Donald Meyer's phrase, the 'positive thinking' of romantic 
science), but here I will concentrate on the concept of body-image and how it is figured 
in A Leg To Stand On, in order to return to my central interest in Sacks's larger 
philosophical project which seeks to explore various aspects of selfhood. 
Jonathan Glover detects "at least three different things" to which the term body-image 
refers: a visual image of the body, a tactile sensation and an awareness of "size, shape and 
posture" (Glover 1991: 81). He argues that usually these three aspects contribute together 
to create a fully sensuous body-image, although, as James indicates in Principles. a 
person is rarely aware of each aspect in isolation. Unless conscious attention is focused 
explicitly on how the body feels or looks, the body-image retains a background awareness 
which constitutes, in Israel Rosenfield's phrase, "the brain's absolute frame of reference" 
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(Rosenfield 1992: 45). By this he means an equation between an objective body viewed 
from an Archimedean point and a sense that the individual body conforms to such a 
model. As such, Rosenfield suggests that the undisrupted body-image represents a self-
referential space which provides a marker of corporeal and, by extension, mental 
continuity. If the body-image was not conceived as a sustaining, if evolving, entity then 
Humean attacks on the continuity of personal identity would seem more convincing. As 
Glover indicates, the elusiveness of the pronoun 'I', as an "indexical" (Glover 1991: 66) 
or an empty signifier, is given signification by the presence of the body which lends the 
'I' an empirical context by which it is grounded and contextualized. 
Rosenfield and Glover both consider the breakdown or distortion of the body-image in 
reference to neurological impairment. They claim that it is in the fleeting and insistent 
impressions of the body that value and significance are placed upon the confirmation of 
bodily continuity. When this confirmation is disrupted through a radical change in the 
impressions of the body-image, as it is for Sacks after his operation, an attack on the basis 
of personal identity and selfhood is initiated. In a similar vein, Rosenfield in recalling 
the case of Madame I who, in the 1905 account of Deny and Camus39, is recorded 
substantially to have lost her sense of bodily awareness. She entirely loses the capacity 
to visualize her body as a self-referring entity and, consequently, can only affirm it as 
belonging to, or "that she was", herself "by touching her own flesh" (Rosenfield 1992: 
41). Her disorder is not that her fleshy body has slipped out of existence, but that she has 
lost the ability to remember her body as part of a dynamic continuum: 
39 G. Deny and P. Camus, 'Sur une forme d'hypocondrie aberrante due a la perte de la conscience du corps', 
Revue Neurologigue, London, 1920, 32ff. 
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M a d ~ e e I was despe:ately trying to recreate that reference to herself by 
touchIng her body, SInce she could not otherwise remember her past. 
Unable to know her body as part of her memory (her brain could not 
create a body image ) ... Madame I's existence was in doubt to her own self , 
and hence so, too, were her memories. Her attempt to create a sense of 
self, her constant touching and rubbing her own body, is a metaphor for 
memory; a brain isolate from the body has no memory (42). 
In order to compensate for her inability to visualize the body as a continuing entity she 
attempts to refamiliarize herself with her body: 
[by] creating momentary images of herself as she ran her hands through 
her hair and over her body. But the images were disconnected, referring 
neither to one another nor, as a consequence, to a continuous image of 
herself, and hence they were phantom-like. Her body existed only 
intermittently, in starts and stops; and so did her recognitions (42). 
This quotation confirms Glover's claim that the three perspectives of body-image which 
he detects should not be conceived as a "unity", for "perhaps some of the distortions 
involve interference with one [aspect] and not another" (Glover 1991: 81). By privileging 
one of the aspects (in this case the tactile over the visual and the proprioceptive) it may 
be possible strategically to reintroduce the memory of a body-image and, emerging from 
this, a sense of selfhood. In Rosenfield's thesis this constitutes a relocation of the familiar 
in the strange and estranged. 
After his operation, Sacks suffers more localized neurological damage than does Madame 
I, but to similar effect, resulting not only in a wasting of his leg, but an inability to 
recognize the leg as belonging to him: "the day before touching it, I had at least touched 
something _ unexpected, unnatural, unlifelike, perhaps but nevertheless something; 
whereas today, impossibly, I touched nothing at all" (48). It is as if, in an attempt to cope 
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with the damage to his nervous tissue, Sacks ceases to recognize the leg as part of 
himself, misplacing, or jettisoning, the leg-image and sealing the body in an adaptive 
configuration of unity. Unlike Madame I, for Sacks it is the tactile aspect of the body-
image which is most profoundly impaired. He is able to see his leg, but he loses the 
sense that it is connected to the rest of his body. In contrast to the heavy presence of the 
cast which encases the leg, Sacks dreams that his leg is either inorganic ("chalk or plaster 
or marble" [64]), "something friable and incoherent, like sand or cement" lacking "inner 
structure or cohesion" (65), or lacking existence (mist, darkness or shadow).40 Crucially 
for my consideration of narrative, Sacks reflects that, "none of the dreams seemed to tell 
any 'story'. They were fixed and static, like tableaux or dioramas, solely designed, as it 
were, to exhibit their appalling-boring centre-piece, this nothingness, this phantom, of 
which nothing could be said" (65). The breakdown of a coherent body-image is integrally 
connected with the (in)ability to tell a cohesive story of selfhood and identity.41 
Another example of this fracturing of everyday experience is dramatized in the "scotoma" 
(67) or hiatus which Sacks experiences when he loses the left-side of his visual field. He 
watches the nurse's gestures but does not see "her movements as continuous, but, instead, 
40 Following Binswanger's emphasis on the mood of dreams in his analysis, when ~ a c k s s reflects on ~ i s s
condition, his experiential time, that which consists "solely of personal moments, lIfe-moments, crucIal 
moments" (Sacks 1991 b: 8), 'thickens' in the manner of dreams. 
41 It is important to note that the cohesiveness of the story may be entirely d e p e n d e ~ t t upon the firmness. of 
belief or the emotional involvement, with which the storyteller, or reader, e ~ g a g e s s WIth ~ e e s ~ o r y . . CoheSIon 
cannot be understood as the pregiven unity and continuity of a linear narratIve; as S a c ~ ~ m d l ~ a t e s , , ~ f t e r r ~ h e e
initial mountain confrontation "there ceased, in a sense, to be any 'story', or any partIcular mood to gIve 
tension and connection to the days that followed" (Sacks 1991 b: 23). He realizes that the story that had 
been told and the story that is to be told are "essentially connected", in that Sacks, as narrator, makes these 
connections and unifies disparate experiences into a narrative whole. ~ s s such, the s e ~ s e e of a c ~ ~ , ~ ~ c t e d d
story echoes the notion of a constructed self which is central to the narratIve process of h e a l t h e n m ~ ~ (139). 
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as a succession of'stills' ... [a] mosaic world ... [without] action" (70).42 However, unlike 
the tactile and proprioceptive aspects of body-image, this aura, or Sartrean nausea (fa 
nausee), soon vanishes and is replaced by a continuous field of vision. Sacks, like 
Madame I, emphasizes the confusion and consternation which accompanies his loss of 
bodily continuity: 
I could no longer remember having a leg. I could no longer remember 
how I had ever walked and climbed. I felt inconceivably cut off from the 
person who had walked and run and climbed just five days before. There 
was only a 'formal' continuity between us (58). 
Sacks, the professional and attentive physician, knows of the "visual relation" (Rosenfield 
1992: 54) of the leg to his trunk (that is, the 'formal' sense of bodily continuity), but 
Sacks, the fearful and experiencing patient, has no sentience of such a connection. Only 
by continuously casting around for language to describe his loss of feeling or "mysterious 
'abeyance'" (93) can Sacks, as spectator, affirm this formal continuity and hope that the 
familiarity of wholeness will follow closely upon such Cavellian acknowledgement. 
At this stage, Sacks comments that "there was no 'entering', nor any thought or possibility 
of entering, these purely sensorial and intellectual phenomena" (111). The gap between 
third- and first-person allows Sacks to affirm the leg to be "[me, surgically speaking" but 
to be "disquieted" and "shocked" (91) by the impairment of a integral feeling. As 
Rosenfield discerns, "seeing is not by itself 'knowing' and that the lack of inner self-
42 The description of a "mosaic world" corresponds to S a c k s ' ~ ~ discussion ~ f f "mosaic v i s i o ~ " " \ .. ~ i c ~ ~ he 
detects often accompanies severe migraines. The close overlappmg of categorIes d o c ~ e n t e d d m M I gra me, 
d· d f· I t·on body i·mage distortion speech and language problems, states of double or Isor ers 0 Vlsua percep 1, - '. . . . " . 
I · I . "d "elaborate dreamy nightmarIsh trance-lIke or delIrIOUS states (Sacks 1973. mu tip e conscIOusness an " 
93-96), are all dramatized during Sacks's illness in A Leg To Stand On. 
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reference, together with the incontrovertible sight of the leg, therefore created a 
paradoxical relation to it" (Rosenfield 1992: 53). 
Like the post-encephalitic patients of Awakenings, Sacks, through the faculty of his 
higher-order consciousness, is able to reflect upon an injury which, following the work 
of Edelman, is thought to effect the "identity, memory and space ... [which] 
compose ... 'primary consciousness'" (186). The problematic in both books is that the 
bodily condition is unrecognisable (that is, unrepresentable in language) or, because it is 
so changed from that which was previously accepted as familiar, the patient wishes to 
deny a connection to, or equation with, his or her body. Thus, the activity of narrating 
the illness can not only connect the outlandish present to a familiar and known past but, 
through its revision and development, it can help clarify, or give expression to, disturbing 
phenomenological experiences. Like Heidegger's therapeutic philosophy which seeks to 
rescue Dasein from estrangement, this kind of therapeutic narrative can make the 
connection which may help recover the "immediate there ness ... which no thinking could 
reach" (118). This "thereness" constitutes both a renewed sense of the self as coextensive 
with the body and an acknowledgement that the self has a place in the world through 
which, in the utopian words of Sacks, the patient can come to "know life, as never 
before. ,,43 
43 This is evident as Sacks comments on his recovery, he feels that his "leg had come ~ o m e , . . to its home. 
to me" (Sacks 199 I b: I I I). This homecoming seems to correspond to Rosenfield s notIons of self-
reference as well as to the existentially inspired conception of "thereness." 
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Having insisted on the importance of narrative in making sense of bodily conditions, in 
which the disconnected and "fluttering frames" (106) of the body-image can be lent 
temporal significance and dynamic continuity, it is important to emphasize that 
neurological damage cannot be repaired in such a way (similarly, illness cannot be simply 
overcome by willing the body into action). Autobiographical narration is merely a 
strategy or a trick (like a mirror, a video-film, a rhyme or a piece of music used as a 
"'symbolic' ... form of self-reference" [Rosenfield 1992: 58]), which works by interweaving 
a number of figurative levels. Narrative can thus lend a static image of the body (and an 
idealized version of self) a plasticity and a fluidity along its temporal axis. 
I will discuss the failure of narrative in the next section, but here, as with Awakenings, 
an acknowledgement of the "uselessness of words" (107), rather than discouraging the 
patient to narrate, may provide the spur to write or tell a revisional narrative, in which the 
interweaving of different strands may help to contextualize notions of health and 
healthening towards which the patient can work. This multi-layered technique of 
construction and self-creation, in certain neurological disorders affecting primary 
consciousness, may help to activate a process of bodily rehabilitation. 
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(5) Defamiliarizing the Self: Narrating the Other 
In The Man Who (1994), the English version of Peter Brook's dramaturgical development 
of Sacks's work, one of the patients, arising momentarily from his immobility and 
despair, expresses a realization that he has no habits, but only tricks and strategies with 
which to combat his disorder. Much of the strangeness which Sacks associates with the 
life-world of those suffering neurological impairments results from the disruption of 
habitual responses to the environment, previously either innately present (such as 
reflexive responses) or acquired subconsciously and gradually from an early age. When 
these background abilities are affected, the patient's phenomenological and physiological 
worlds are thrown into crisis. In an attempt to recover these lost abilities, not only do the 
patients have to reorient themselves in their world (through a process of strategic 
redescription), but they also have to learn different practical methods for compensating 
for impairments. If, in an existential reading of James, habit is associated closely with 
habitat (a place, or a home, in the worldt4, then the arduous task of the patient is one of 
more than just metaphorical relocation. As Joseph Thomas comments in an essay on 
'Figures of Habit in William James' (1993), habit "is meant to perform a kind of 
midwifery, easing entry into a more secure, less 'uncanny' world" (Thomas 1993: 15). In 
cases when these habitual responses are undermined, the resulting uncanny world 
becomes one of estrangement. 
44 For instance, James writes: "[Tolstoy's] crisis was the getting of his so.ul in order, the discovery ~ f f its 
genuine habitat and vocation, the escape from falsehoods. int? w h ~ t t for h1m w e , ~ e e ways of t r u ~ h . . It \It as a 
case of heterogeneous personality tardily and slowly findmg 1ts umty and level (James 1985. 186). 
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In this, my concluding section of this chapter (and the thesis), I outline some of these 
tricks and techniques deployed to combat self-estrangement as they arise in what has 
become Sacks's most popular book, The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat. I argue 
that many of these tricks, although ostensibly compensating for the loss of narrative 
coherence, often serve to recoup the importance and primacy of telling stories. By 
developing his clinical tales, Sacks continues his progression away from the 
institutionalized case history towards a symbolic structure in which he attempts to rescue 
something of the unique qualities and personalities of his patients. Unlike Jacqueline 
Rose's argument that The Man represents an extended and "unending joke" (Ross 1988: 
238), or Dominique Goy-Blanquet's assertion that the text "arouse[s] more laughter than 
compassion" (Goy-Blanquet 1993: 20), I contend that if laughter is evoked from the 
reading of these tales, it serves to engage the reader more out of a sense of compassion 
and, often, the discomfort of identification, rather than arousing mockery and denigration. 
It is helpful to view Sacks's moral scheme as a response to the model set up by Erving 
Goffman in Stigma (1963), where the outlandish appearance and behaviour of the 
severely disabled (defined as outlandish through normative social codes, which disqualify 
the individual "from full social acceptance" [Goffinan 1963: 9]) marks them out, or 
stigmatizes them, as Other. In Goffinan's view, these differences, whether "abominations 
of the body", "blemishes of individual character", or "tribal stigma", serve to reduce the 
stigmatized person "from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one" (12). 
Instead of affirming such reduction and disqualification, Sacks wishes to depict each 
patient in a "fabulous" world which conveys the idiosyncratic impressions of their 
particular neurological disorder (Sacks 1986: xi). However, as a caveat, it is important 
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to note that Sacks encounters a double bind. By framing his sketches with sensationalist 
titles and the rhetoric of fantasy (as can be detected in the title of An Anthropologist on 
Mars), Sacks is in danger of creating a series of stigmatized and grotesque freak-shows 
which invite a voyeuristic curiosity, instead of encouraging pathos. But, in Sacks's 
defense, perhaps this is a danger it would be hard to avoid if he is to engage with the 
often. profoundly disorientating experiences of neurological impairment. I have traced 
the problematic of figuring the Other in Sacks's writing, from his early idealistic 
aspirations and the writing of case studies in Awakenings to the emergence of the selfs 
Other in A Leg To Stand On. But it is in The Man that the difficulties of representation 
are foregrounded. Against the assertion that Sacks succeeds only in stigmatizing and 
dehumanizing his patients in order to make them interesting, it is more profitable to view 
such a technique as a wager, through which he risks the apparent integrity of the text in 
order to illuminate his interest in identity and selthood. 
Many of the tales are concerned centrally with recognition and the disturbance of basic 
cognitive faculties. The title case study (7-21) introduces concerns which run throughout 
the opening section on neurological losses and defects. Sacks's patient, a musician, Dr 
P., has "wholly lost the emotional, the concrete, the personal, the 'real"', although his 
abstract and musical skills remain unaffected (Sacks 1986a: 5). In their initial encounter 
Sacks reports, 
instead of looking, gazing, at me, 'taking me in', in the normal way, m a ~ e e
sudden strange fixations - on my nose, on my right e ~ , , d ~ ~ ~ to my chIn, 
up to my right eye - as if noting (even studying) these m d . l v l d u ~ l l f e ~ t u r e s , ,
but not seeing my whole face, its changing e x p r ~ s s l O ~ s , , me, as a 
whole ... there was just a teasing strangeness, some faIlure m the normal 
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interplay of gaze and expression. He saw me, he scanned me, and yet. .. 
(8) 
Dr P. suffers no impairment to his optical apparatus, but he incurs some damage in the 
parietal and occipital lobes at the back of his brain. As a result he is unable to relate 
details and "tiny features" to "the picture as a whole" (8-9). Dr P. thus "constructs the 
world as a computer construes it, by means of key features and schematic relationships" 
(14), but he fails to "behold" (12) or make any sense "of a landscape or scene" (9).45 
Because "he saw nothing as familiar" (13) Dr P. approaches objects and faces as "if they 
were abstract puzzles or tests" to painstakingly decipher (12), and, whilst he can easily 
recognize abstract shapes, he tends to explain a more complex object (like a flower) by 
reducing it to its constituent parts. But, whilst Dr P. continues to mistake people and 
objects, Sacks encourages him to nurture a kind of "inner music" to supply himself with 
a sense of bodily continuity (17). Thus, by focusing on his sensitivity to musical rhythm, 
Dr P. is able to provide an accompaniment to activities such ~ d r e s s i n g g and washing. 
Another example of confused cognIzance is found in the case of Christina, 'The 
Disembodied Lady' (42-52), who has lost her "sixth sense" of proprioception, and with 
it the automatic "sensory flow" and "body tone" (42) which lends a sense of three-
dimensionality to the body. As a result she feels "disembodied", "pithed"; in Sacks's 
words, "she has lost...the fundamental, organic mooring of .. ,corporeal identity" (50). 
45 Dr P.'s story can be read as a parable of reductive interpretation, Just as ,the "key features a ~ d d s c . h e m ~ t i c c
relationships" which Dr p, is able to identify cannot acc?unt for f a c ~ s s ~ r r p l c t u r ~ s , , so too the. Ide.ntIficatlo.n 
of particular neurological mechanisms cannot do justIce to a ~ a t l e n t t s e,xpenences. S a ~ k s s hmts at thIS 
, 'h hI' Dr P 's agnosia is similar to "a sCIence whIch eschev,s the Judgmental. the 
mterpretatlOn w en e calms ' . " . . 
particular, the personal, and becomes entirely abstract and computatIOnal (Sacks 1986a. 19). 
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Like Deny's and Camus's 1905 case, Madame I, Christina has to continually stimulate her 
body to recognize it and to acknowledge that it is there. 
Similarly in 'Hands' (56-62), Madelaine 1., congenitally blind and suffering from cerebral 
palsy, cannot "recognize or identify anything" that is placed in her hands. Whilst her 
hands are "mildly spastic and athetotic" and felt like "lumps of dough", Sacks infers that 
her "sensory capacities ... were completely intact" (56). But she is unable to perceive or 
recognize objects until, stimulated by hunger, she reaches out for a bagel. This moment 
induces her to "reach out to explore or touch the whole world ... by a curiously roundabout 
sort of inference or guesswork" (59), as she begins to refamiliarize herself with the spatial 
properties of simple shapes. 
These three examples reveal Sacks's ongoing concern with recognition and perception: 
how his patients conceive of themselves and their location in the world. He concentrates 
on the most basic of faculties and the most common of activities in order to unearth the 
confusions and incertitudes which characterize the recurring existential questions which 
preoccupy James and Binswanger. I do not wish to suggest that neurological concerns 
merely provide a vehicle for posing insoluble epistemological questions about identity, 
but I will continue to focus attention on how the questions arise from individual 
experience. As I have already argued, Sacks chooses to avoid a mimetic mode of writing 
which would tend to suppress these questions and, instead, he foregrounds figurative 
language in order to focus upon the manifold problems of recognition and 
acknowledgement. 
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Sacks's clinical tales can be read as versions of the uncanny. I do not wish unnecessarily 
to burden the cases presented in The Man with the critical baggage of the uncanny; but 
Sacks, echoing the theories of Binswanger and Cavell, responds to those qualities in his 
patients which exemplify idiosyncrasy and which serve to transform the familiar and the 
prosaic into the fantastic and the strange. A brief consideration of the uncanny indicates 
the unknowability which lies at the heart of identity; the acknowledgement of which, as 
I have demonstrated in the work of James and Binswanger, shifts the concerns of 
romantic science away from questions of epistemology towards forms of pragmatic 
narrative. 
In one of the exemplary studies of structuralist poetics, Tzvetan Todorov outlines the 
generic parameters of the fantastic, positioning it between the categories of the 
marvellous (supernatural) and the uncanny (natural). Todorov suggests that the fantastic 
is characterized as the reader hesitates "between a natural and a supernatural explanation 
of the events described" (Todorov 1975: 31). He claims, the "reader's hesitation is 
therefore the first condition of the fantastic" (31). Todorov indicates central differences 
between the three terms, but he allows for their combination to create hybrid forms of 
writing; although, as Rosemary Jackson notes in her reading of Todorov, the 
"polarization of the marvellous and the uncanny leads to some confusion" (Jackson 1981: 
32). Jackson characterizes fantastic narratives (which, as a mode of writing, rather than 
a genre, can encompass the uncanny) as transporting "the reader of the known and 
everyday world into something more strange" (34). Unlike the manrellous which tends 
towards a non-referential mode of writing, the fantastic insists on its "interstitial placing" 
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(65), in a way which can be used to question the categories of "real" and "imaginary" by 
"shifting the relations between them through its indeterminacy" (35). 
Jackson's central thesis is that, rather than circumscribing an escapist fiction, the 
deployment of fantasy can serve to disrupt dominant forms of medical 'realism' (in the 
case of romantic science) and, as such, in Shklovsky's phrase, it can defamiliarize 
habitual channels of interpretation. This is not to devalue the importance that James 
places on the mechanisms of habit, but Jackson foregrounds the presence of a threshold 
between the two modes which helps to illuminate the devices at work in habitualized 
writing. As a result, the fantastic 
produces a feeling of estrangement, of being not 'at home' in the world .. .!t 
uncovers what is hidden and, by doing so, effects a disturbing 
transformation of the familiar into the unfamiliar .... To introduce the 
fantastic is to replace familiarity, comfort, das Heimlich, with 
estrangement, unease, the uncanny. It is to introduce dark areas, of 
something completely other and unseen (Jackson 1981: 65, 179). 
If Sacks is to envision the phenomenological experiences of his neurologically-impaired 
patients - experiences which cannot be adequately represented through mimetic modes 
of writing - he moves towards the fantastic in order to convey the coexistence of the 
familiar and the unfamiliar. But, unlike many fantasy writers, his fantastic is not other-
worldly. Rather, the fluidity and expansiveness of phenomenological descriptions 
emerge to disrupt finn boundaries and categorical distinctions. With this "disturbing 
transfonnation of the familiar into the unfamiliar" Sacks encroaches on the territory of 
the uncanny as described by Todorov and Jackson and outlined in Freud's classic essay, 
'The Uncanny' (1919). 
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In his discussion of E. T. A. Hoffman's short story, 'The Sandman' (1815), Freud, 
following his predecessor Ernst Jentsch, works through the notion that the unheimlich is 
to be found within the heimlich. By this he means that the foreign and the strange are to 
be found in, and implicated by, the everyday and the familiar, the dominant interpretation 
depending on the affect invoked in the reader and the depth and angle of his or her 
perception. Thus, the uncanny comes to represent a region within, or inside, the homely 
which disturbs. As such, "the uncanny is that class of the frightening which leads back 
to what is known of old and long familiar" (Freud 1964: 17, 220). Freud rightly stresses 
that the uncanny cannot be completely equated with the unfamiliar; he indicates the 
tendency for heimlich to develop "in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally 
coincides with its opposite" (226). As Tobin Siebers has indicated, Freud's emphasis on 
ambivalence, linked with Todorov's notion that the fantastic arouses hesitation in the 
reader, indicates both the "importance of narrative perspective" and a disturbing, if 
incomplete, "identification between subjects" (Siebers 1984: 48). 
Rosemary Jackson suggests that the uncanny should not only be understood as a domain, 
a place or "something one does not know one's way about in" (Freud 1964: 17, 221). It 
is primarily a literary effect, or a technique of representation, in which this sense of 
ambivalence is stressed. According to Jentsch, 
in story-telling, one of the most reliable artistic devices for producing 
uncanny effects easily is to leave the reader in uncertainty as to whether 
he has a human person or rather an automaton before him." This is done 
in such a way that the uncertainty does not appear dir,ectly ~ t t the ~ o c a l l
point of his attention, so that he is not given the occaSIOn to InVestIgate 
and clarify the matter straight away (Jentsch 1995: 13), 
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Freud wishes to force a distinction between the uncanny as it is manifest in "life" and 
fiction (Freud 1964: 17, 249), but Jentsch points to "devices" and "effects" which, along 
with his reference to the reader, emphasizes the primacy of representation. Importantly, 
Jentsch indicates that the effect of the uncanny cannot be easily reduced to its literary 
devices. Rather than trying to codify the uncanny as a specific reading operation, which, 
as in Jonathan Culler's reading of Todorov, "attempts to discover a central structure or 
generative device which governs all levels of the text" (Culler 1975: 172), an uncanny 
sensation often results from the indeterminacies and the discontinuities of the text. 
Experienced as affect, the uncanny has a dimension which cannot be wholly explained 
by reference to the formal technique used to produce it, or to the authorial intention which 
informs it: there is a margin of mystery which cannot be explained. This notion is akin 
to Paul de Man's conception of "hermeneutic understanding", which, as he comments in 
his essay on American New Criticism, "is always, by its nature, lagging behind" and, 
therefore, can never fully encapsulate the "mystery" of the text (de Man 1971: 32). 
In the case of Sacks's tales, although his efforts to figure his patients in the "mythical" and 
"fabulous" worlds (Sacks 1986a: xi) in which he believes them to reside, there is always 
"the inaccessibility of a secret" (Derrida 1981: 71): a fund of inexplicability which is 
discemable from his reading of his patients and, in turn, is mirrored in the reader's efforts 
to read Sacks's tales. This inexplicability turns upon the nature of selfhood and how it 
might be represented. This notion is contrary to Freud's interpretation which, as Helene 
Cixous observes, reduces the ambivalence and suggestiveness of 'The Sandman' to what 
he perceives to be the "thematic economy of the story" (Cixous 1976: 534). Thus, Freud 
.. . f th b derwrl·ting the storY v.ith a primarY 
undermInes hIS conceptIOn 0 e uncanny y un - . 
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reading of the castration complex. Sacks resists falling into this trap of reductionism. 
Although he utilizes the language of neurology in order to organically root his patient's 
conditions, their experiences remain fundamentally irreducible. Sacks chooses not to 
prune "all 'superfluous' detail" from his text (534), but lets it float on an indefinite level 
of signification. He is quick to acknowledge areas where his professional learning can 
do little to unravel the mysteries of illness or to provide therapeutic aids for his patients. 
Although Sacks is in possession of the interpretive tools which his patients lack or have 
lost, like James and Binswanger, as a committed reader of illness he does not avoid 
acknowledging areas of doubt and incertitude.46 
I wish to argue that there is one particular strain of the uncanny infusing Sacks's tales 
which moves beyond a simple admission of their strangeness. Freud understands Jentsch 
to be interested in the manifestations of acute illnesses ("epileptic fits, and of 
manifestations of insanity") because "these excite in the spectator the impression of 
automatic, mechanical processes at work behind the ordinary appearance of mental 
activity" (Freud 1964: 17,226). Although the reader of Hoffman's 'The Sandman' has 
little doubt that Olympia is an automaton when her passivity is contrasted with the 
strength of Clara's character (despite Nathaniel's pathetic fallacies), there is an uncertainty 
as to what the symbolic significance of the characters represent. Similarly, although 
Sacks maintains his faith that on a hidden level all of his patients remain animate and 
human, many of the illnesses he describes not only attack the personality of the 
experiencing patient, but also serve to question the very substance of selfhood: the loss 
46 Jackson attributes such a scenario where "the narrator is no clearer than ~ h ~ ~ protagonist ab.out what is 
going on, nor about interpretation" (Jackson 1981: 32) as another charactenstlc of the fantastIc. 
341 
of a feeling of selfhood constitutes a crucial disengagement with a 'healthy' life. Taken 
up as a central theme in The Man, the limits of selfhood serve to question the boundaries 
between heath and sickness and, by implication, between life and death. The insistent 
question of how far the life of a person can be stripped away before he or she ceases to 
be alive haunts the reading of the book. 
Once more, this kind of hesitancy and incertitude represents a feeling of uncanniness. As 
Cixous comments, "the phantasm of the man buried alive represents the confusion of life 
and death: death within life, life in death, nonlife in nondeath ... Hence, the horror: you 
could be dead while living, you can be in a dubious state" (Cixous 1976: 545). This 
horror spills over into a reading of The Man and tempers any laughter evoked in the 
portrayal of stigmatized patients. Sacks's depiction of selfhood as friable and elusive 
serves to implicate the reader through an identification with the philosophical dilemmas 
of the patients and neurologist. This identification is, however, always incomplete. The 
scientific filter of classical neurology reverberates through the text to distance the reader; 
at times moving beyond the personalities and the experiences of the patients to questions 
of neural organization. In order to shuttle between these levels of intimacy and 
explanation, Sacks devises a literary method which encourages the reader to focus upon 
the peculiar coexistence of familiarity and strangeness. Viewed as a study of the 
"phenomenon of the 'double'" (Freud 1964: 17,234), The Man can be situated as a text 
which seeks to develop the themes of the animate and the inanimate inte[\\'oven with 
those of the habitual and the strange. 
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In his preface to The Man, Sacks indicates that the coupling of these themes invites a dual 
perspective through which he figures the subjects of the tales. He claims that he is 
committed to conceiving humans both as a "what" and a "who": both a machine and a 
person (Sacks 1986a: x). Thus, following the role of Binswanger, classical neurology 
should be complemented by an "'existential' science" (142) which can account for the 
"representations ... which are the very thread and stuff of life" (140). As such, Sacks 
understands neurological conditions in the abstract (a series of interlinked components 
which have ceased to function by design) and also as experienced by an individual who 
is undergoing a disorientation and is forced to adjust to perceptual or motor 
disorganization. By concentrating on disorders affecting the right cerebral hemisphere, 
Sacks wishes to focus on illnesses which disrupt the "crucial powers of recognizing 
reality" (Sacks 1986a: 1): powers which are both perceptual and hermeneutical. 
Closely linked to the recurring questions concerning ownership and selfhood (and their 
loss) is a series of implicit, but vital, concerns with reading: how the patient reads his or 
her condition; how Sacks reads and represents the patient; and how the reader interprets 
the text. The reading of selfhood leads back to Rosemary Jackson's understanding of the 
fantastic as questioning the presuppositions of reality, which, together with the 
interpretive oscillation between the levels of the mechanical (inanimate) and the personal 
(animate) help to lend these tales uncanny qualities. 
Sacks articulates his interest in "neurological disorders affecting the self' by focusing 
much of his attention on patients who have incurred right-hemisphere damage. He 
complements his research with an understanding of the adaptability of the body-image. 
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He claims that "there is always a reaction, on the part of the affected organism or 
individual, to restore, to replace, to compensate for and to preserve its identity" (Sacks 
1986a: 4). The rhetoric of recuperation once again confrrms Sacks's working model that 
there is a fundamental regulative structure, or survival instinct, which maintains a balance 
(often a compensatory one) even in those suffering from the most profound of illnesses. 
I have argued that one of the fundamental tools for the structuring and ordering of chaotic 
impressions is through the narration of a condition, which explains how the illness arose 
and its ongoing significance for the patient. In The Man, Sacks presents a variety of 
sketches in which he seeks to describe the many dimensions germane to an understanding 
of illness. However, if a patient is to invest emotionally in a narrative, then he or she has 
to have the ability to recognize and connect phenomenological states with one another: 
the patient has to be able to maintain a basic level of cognition and memory in order for 
narration to be beneficial or, indeed, possible. In other words, the patient has to maintain 
an ability to read his or her condition in order to represent it in a significant form to him 
or herself. 
The texts I have previously discussed in this chapter present narrative as having distinct 
therapeutic possibilities. However, the worlds of many of the patients portrayed in The 
Man are distorted in a manner for which narrative no longer has the potency to connect 
the perceptual fragments. The redescription and reconstruction of the self, crucial for 
Sacks in A Leg To Stand On, becomes prohibited, or barred, due to the physiological 
effects of neurological conditions. This can be linked to Nietzsche's and Foucault's 
description of aesthetic self-creation (as described in the previous chapters) to indicate 
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that neurological, or constitutive, damage can result in the retardation of an ongoing 
process of self-realization. 
One of the patients presented in Awakenings, Rose R., reappears in The Man in the short 
study, 'Incontinent Nostalgia' (143-45).47 After the privation of her torpor, Rose's 
awakening is characterized by an increase of liveliness and exuberance, an "increased 
libido", "nostalgia, joyful identification with a youthful self' (144) and the singing of 
"innumerable songs of astonishing lewdness" (Sacks 1991 a: 82). Despite the unequivocal 
renewal of Rose's life-force, Sacks comments that she appears entirely transfixed in her 
youthful world of the mid-1920s (at the outbreak of the encephalitis lethargica 
epidemic). Sacks conjectures that Rose experiences "her 'past' as present.. .perhaps it has 
never felt 'past' for her" (83). Although Rose acknowledges a formal present through 
which she is passing, her feeling for life corresponds to her "ontological age", a twenty-
one year old (87). One explanation may be that Rose cannot bear to identify herself with 
her formal, or chronological, age and so seeks to immerse herself in an idealized world 
of her past. Sacks suggests that the "uncontrollable upsurge of remote sexual memories 
and allusions" (Sacks 1986a: 144) which Rose experiences may be due either to an 
increase in nervous excitation induced by L-DOPA or the provocation of "disinhibition" 
(145). He contrasts "incontinent nostalgia", or "fossilised memory sequences", with 
"forced reminiscence" which mnemonic stimuli may bring about (144). Sacks concI udes 
47 It is notable that in Rose's case history both she and Sacks use the term uncanny, but in different senses. 
Firstly, in describing her transfixed torpor, Rose says, "It was uncanny ... My eyes were s p ~ l I b o u n d d .. 1 fe.1t 
I was bewitched or something, like a rabbit or a snake" (Sacks 1991 a: 81). Here Rose S expressIon ~ s s
marked by uncertainty, her human fonn undennined by the animal i ~ a g e r y . . S u b s e q ~ e n t l y , , Sacks IS 
surprised by the vivid nature of Rose's m e ~ o r y y " ~ o n s i d e r i n g g s h ~ ~ is speakmg of so long ago (82). He calls 
it "uncanny" because it seems to run agamst ratIonal expectatIons. 
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that "an almost infinite number of 'dormant' memory-traces" remain as "subcortical 
imprints" and "archaic traces" which are released due to disinhibition (145). 
His short commentary on Rose R. provides a touchstone for the book: the blurring of the 
patient's subjective realities (marked variously by the loss of proprioception or of 
memory) with the categories of time and space. On one level Rose is a living being who 
expresses her disinhibition through the language of her youth, but on another level she 
remains asleep or dead to the biological and neurological changes in her life. She seems 
to recognize her condition, but chooses to immerse herself in another, more vivid, 
psychological world in which she can express her exuberance. Thus she has the ability 
to read her condition, but, because she has no powers to compensate for the time lost 
during her catatonia, she chooses to erase it (although it is doubtful as to whether this is 
a conscious decision). She not only exemplifies the inability to cope with present 
realities, but also the problems of reading an illness. 
Jimmie G., the patient presented in 'The Lost Mariner' (Sacks 1986a: 22-41), suffers from 
a severe loss of episodic and short-term memory "due to alcoholic degeneration of 
mammillary bodies", which characterize Korsakov's syndrome (28).48 Whilst Jimmie 
finds no difficulty with abstract problems or games that can be quickly achieved, he 
cannot retain the continuity of a conversation with Sacks for longer than two minutes. 
He occasionally has hunches that he is forgetful ("I do find myself forgetting things. once 
in a while - things that have just happened" [25]), but he is largely unaware that his 
48 Another of Sacks's studies on profound damage to memory is to be found in 'The Last Hippie'. one of 
the "paradoxical tales" in An Anthropologist On Mars (Sacks 1995: 39-72). 
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participation in the present (that is, Sacks's present) is minimal: "Jimmie both was and 
wasn't aware of this deep, tragic loss in himself, loss ojhimself' (34). Moreover, Jimmie 
is unable to read (or write) his condition in any conventional way. When Sacks suggests 
that he keeps a diary he not only continually misplaces it, but he "could not recognise his 
earlier entries": 
his entries remained unconnected and unconnecting and had no power to 
provide any sense of time or continuity. Moreover, they were trivial -
'Eggs for breakfast', 'Watched ball game on TV' - and never touched the 
depths. But were there depths in this unmemoried man, depths of an 
abiding feeling and thinking or had he been reduced to a sort of Humean 
drivel, a mere succession of unrelated impressions and events? (34). 
This quotation displays those qualities of uncertainty and hesitancy which are 
characteristic of the uncanny: does Jimmie just exist as a neurological machine or does 
he continue to live as a sentient being? 
Like Rose R., Jimmie's pre-1945 past is coherent and vivid, but he struggles "to make 
sense" of recent historical events (for example, the filming of the earth from the moon 
and the building of new aircraft carriers). Sacks suggests he is entirely disconnected from 
a continuous sense of selfhood which would enable him to root any "single moment of 
being" in his own autobiography (28). However, whilst Sacks acknowledges the crucial 
importance of memory, rather than finally turning to a model of "Humean dissolution" 
(37), he maintains his belief that Jimmie consists of more than just memory. Sacks 
detects ingrained practical skills (morse code and touch typing), together with qualities 
of "feeling, will, sensibilities, moral being - matters of which neuropsychology cannot 
speak" (32). He encourages Jimmie in his typing, employing him for "real work" in the 
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hospital, but he goes on to claim that "this was superficial tapping and typing; it was 
trivial, it did not reach the depths" (35).49 Once more affIrming his romantic sensibilities , 
Sacks observes a calmness and attentiveness in Jimmie when he communes with a larger 
Being in the chapel or in the garden: he "was absorbed in an act, an act of his whole 
being, which carried feeling and meaning in an organic continuity and unity, a continuity 
and unity so seamless it could not permit any break" (36). Whilst Jimmie cannot express 
himself through phonetic or graphic means, Sacks detects that this incommunicable 
communion is expressive of a survival of Jimmie's integral self. 
But the question remains of how this integral self can be known or represented without 
wandering into vague metaphysical territory. Richard Rorty comments in Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature (1979) that "the way things are said" or expressed is more 
"essential" (that is, useful) as a method "of coping with the world" than talking about a 
world of factuality (Rorty 1980: 359). In this sense the patient does not necessarily have 
to grasp the technicalities of their disorder, but, just by virtue of expression (whether in 
words, pictures, music, dance, touch or gestures) they can reaffirm themselves. Rorty, 
however, privileges the language of rational thought in a manner which subordinates 
other modes of expression: "the events which make us able to say new and interesting 
things about ourselves are, in this nonmetaphysical sense, more 'essential' to us ... than the 
events which change our shapes or our standards of living" (359). Here, Rorty addresses 
his comments to his fellow "relatively leisured intellectuals" and not to people whose 
very lives (both existential and physical) are determined by the "change" in their "shape" 
49 However here Sacks seems to underestimate the application and cultivation of skills for renewing a 
, 
sense of health and well-being in his patients. 
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and constitution. Rather than asserting a continuous memory or a notion of rational 
expression as the essential, or primary, constituent of selfhood, it is Sacks's hope that 
other less canonized modes of expression can be found to encircle a sense of selfhood. 
This returns his attention to an emphasis on reading and narration: what it means to tell 
and retell a self, without relying upon the fully functioning capacities of cognition and 
memory. This line of thought may provide fuel for the sceptical reader, but Sacks retains 
a faith that expression and the barest hint of narrative (fractured and barely coherent) may 
be detectable in even the smallest gesture. 
In an excellent paper on the failure of narrative, Richard Allen suggests that the condition 
of William Thompson, the patient presented in 'A Matter of Identity' (Sacks 1986a: 103-
14), exemplifies such a disassociation from the structuring potential of narrative. This 
loss has little to do with any moral failing on the subject's behalf, but is a direct result of 
the neurological damage caused by his Korsakov's syndrome. Like 'The Lost Mariner', 
his syndrome causes extreme loss of short-term memory, but leaves "archaic" memories 
unimpaired. William's syndrome appears to be more severe than Jimmie's, because he 
cannot maintain his attention for more than a few seconds at a time. Thus William lives 
in a world of simultaneity: a continual present. Like Jimmie, because he has lost 
connection with an immediate past, William also loses any sense of a continuous or 
coherent identity. For Sacks, it is this very lack of self-awareness that serves to wholly 
implicate William in his illness. The reader is told that William frenetically and 
"continually" (105) creates a series of worlds and selves through the telling of "ceaseless 
tales his confabulations, his mythomania" (106). , 
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Sacks begins the tale with fragments of a dialogue (if it can be called that) where William 
continually "misidentifies" Sacks. William projecting himself into his habitual but , 
mistaken, role of a grocer (mis)recognizes Sacks as a customer, a butcher and a mechanic 
within a few moments. Sacks, as a reader of William's world, confirms that, 
he was continually disorientated. Abysses of amnesia continually opened 
beneath him, but he would bridge them, nimbly, by fluent confabulations 
and fictions of all kinds. F or him they were not fictions, but how he 
suddenly saw, or interpreted, the world .... there was ... this strange, 
delirious, quasi-coherence, as Mr Thompson, with his ceaseless, 
unconscious, quick-fire inventions continually improvised a world around 
him (104). 
Sacks shows an understanding of how William might experience his world, or, in 
Thomas Nagel's phrase, what it might be like for him: "for Mr Thompson .. .it was not a 
tissue of ever-changing, evanescent fancies and illusion, but a wholly normal, stable and 
factual world. So far as he was concerned, there was nothing the matter" (104). 
Unlike the illnesses presented in Sacks's previous books, severe Korsakov's syndrome can 
be seen to strip away all sense of self-consciousness, or the interpretive faculty through 
which it is possible to read the illness experience. Like Rose R.'s retreat into a 
resplendent past, William's "shimmering, iridescent, ever-changing" world represents a 
simulacrum of life: a storyteller who is unaware how fractured his narratives have 
become. There is no stable world (nor home) in which to locate the self because "the 
world keeps disappearing, losing meaning, vanishing" (106). His continual reinvcntion 
in scraps of conversation and turns of phrase is almost a caricature of the myth of self-
becoming. As Allen discerns, William "ceaselessly invents and reinvents his self and 
world in a parody of narrative" (Allen 1993: 27). There is no development. no sensc of 
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growth, nor an imaginative movement towards a redescription of health. For \Villiam, 
there appears to be no consciousness of his predicament: he is totally consumed by the 
illness. However, Sacks detects a pervading anxiety and a look of "ceaseless inner 
pressure" which suggests that on some level William is aware of the "meaninglessness, 
the chaos that yawns continually beneath him" (Sacks 1986a: 106). 
Finally, Sacks turns his attention to a brief consideration of the importance of storytelling 
and recollection: 
If we wish to know about a man, we ask 'what is his story - his real, 
inmost story?' - for each of us is a biography, a story ... To be ourselves we 
must have ourselves - possess, if need be re-possess, our life-stories. We 
must 'recollect' ourselves, recollect the inner drama, the narrative, of 
ourselves. A man needs such a narrative, a continuous inner narrative, to 
maintain his identity, his self (1 06). 
It is possible to interpret this passage either as a therapeutic homily or as an affirmation 
of a type of reflective, or introspectivist, narrative in which the self (situated in a 
privileged position outside the finished narrative) retrospectively narrates itself. 
However, Allen detects two other important aspects at work here. Firstly, he reads Sacks 
to mean "there is no separation or distance between self and narrative. A person's identity 
is the narrative she or he embodies" (Allen 1993: 28). That is to say, the self is \\ritten 
by the narrative as a point of reference: a space, a home, an indexical. Secondly, Allen 
comments: 
Sacks recognizes that one's life narrative - that is, the narrative one is -
is more than the enactment of a script...a life narrative is more than a 
structured sequence of words; it is told in part " u n c o n ~ c i o u s l y " . . an.d it 
collects within itself both the nonverbal and the verbal - Image. emotion. 
act and word (28). 
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Both insights move away from the type of omnipotent narrative of redescription that 
Rorty appears to advocate (and which is evident in Binswanger's work), and moves 
towards a fragmentary, hesitant and uncertain narration over which the narrator only ever 
has partial control. 
However, this notion of living (and reading) as narrative leaves two important questions 
unanswered. Firstly, although authorial control is unnecessary and sometimes restrictive, 
the patient has to have some capacity to reflect upon the narrative in order to modify it 
or tell it anew. Secondly, if the narrative is to be therapeutic and lead away from a 
condition of illness towards a different home (the Cavellian narrative tracing the route 
rather than the goal), then the narrator has to be able to restrict the range, rhythm and 
complexity of the narrative in order to follow it. Both questions indicate that the self 
(that which is written or told) is also the writer or teller who exists outside the frame of 
the story. Narration taken to the limit, so that the writer of one story becomes the written 
of another, leads either to the kind of restless metamorphosis characteristic of William's 
proliferation of narratives, or to an infinite regress where the 'real' self is lost from view 
in a constantly diminishing perspective. In this sense the recognition of the self is always 
an uncanny one because it is split: at one and the same time, it is the very point of 
locational reference (the 'I' which is read) and something that always lies outside the 
narrative frame (the 'I' who reads).50 
50 Th"d h an analogue in Jacques Lacan's notion that the self should be conceived as fundamentally 
IS I ea as h' .' th f 
split betweenje (the speaking subject) and moi ~ t h e e subject that ~ p e a k s ) . . F o ~ ~ 1m m.0l IS e s o u r ~ e e ? 
disruption in je's unified discourse which occasIOnally surfaces m the .speakmg s u b J ~ c t t and. thro\\s Its 
appar:nt, a l t h o ~ g h , , for him, iIIu.s?l)', unity into question. Thus, ~ e e r e _ ~ o ~ l t l O n n of the mal surfaCIng through 
conscIOusness IS also a recogmtlOn of Otherness (Lacan 1977. - 92 - 2 ). 
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As one of the latest manifestations of romantic science, Sacks's neurological tales indicate 
the imaginative possibilities as well as the actual limitations of this tradition of inquiry 
into selfhood. Indeed, his tales reveal both the proximity of self ('I' can only ever be 
myself) and the emptiness and vacuity which lies behind such tautology. Nevertheless, 
as I have argued throughout this thesis, James, Binswanger and Sacks, as practitioners 
of the incomplete (and incomplete-able) project of romantic science, all indicate that. 
when illness strips the certainty and familiarity from the platitudes of self-identity, the 
resulting philosophical emergency demands that the assumptions which underlie the areas 
of the known and the habitual are radically requestioned. In conclusion, then, these three 
practitioners of romantic science make evident the formal limits of medical knowledge 
as much as they stress the therapeutic possibilities of individual self-creation (within the 
parameters of the communal) in their narratives of healthening. 
353 
Bibliography 
Abrams, M. H. (1953) The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory 
and the Critical Tradition, New York: Oxford V.P. 
(1973) Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution 
in Romantic Literature, New York: Norton 
Allen, Richard C. (1993) 'When Narrative Fails', 
Joumal-ofReligious Ethics, 21(1), 27-67 
Allott, R. M. (1972) 'Letters', The Listener, 30111172, 756 
Anderson, Pamela (1993) 'Having It Both Ways: Ricoeur's Henneneutics of the Self, 
Oxford Literary Review, 15(1-2),227-52 
Augustine (1992) Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick, Oxford: O.V.P. 
Bachelard, Gaston (1987) The Psychoanalysis of Fire, trans. Alan Ross, 
London & New York: Quartet 
Bain, Alexander (1899) The Emotions and the Will, 4th ed., 
London: Longmans, Green & Co. 
Bakhtin, Mikhail (1984) Rabelais and his World, trans. H6Ume Iswolsky, 
Bloomington: Indiana V.P. 
Barzun, Jacques (1983) A Stroll With William James, Chicago: Chicago U.P. 
Baudrillard, Jean (1987) The Ecstasy of Communication, trans. Bernard 
& Caroline Schutze, ed. Sylvere Lotringer, New York: Semiotext( e) 
Bercovitch, Sacvan (1975) The Puritan Origins of the American Self, 
New Haven: Yale V.P. 
354 
Berlin, Isaiah (1979) Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, 
ed. Henry Hardy, London: Hogarth 
BetteJheim, Bruno (1978) The Uses of Enchantment, London: Penguin 
(1983) Freud and Man's Soul, London: Chatto & Windus 
(1991) The Informed Heart, London: Penguin 
Binswanger, Ludwig (1941) 'On the Relationship between Husserl's 
Phenomenology and Psychological Insight', 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2, 199-210 
(1956) 'Existential Analysis and Psychotherapy', in 
Progress in Psychotherapy, eds. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann 
& J. L. Moreno, London & New York: Grune & Stratton, 144-48 
(1957) Sigmund Freud, Reminiscences of a Friendship, 
trans. Nobert Guterman, New York: Grune & Stratton 
(1964) Grundformen und Erkenntnis Menschlichen Daseins, 
4th ed., Munich & Basel 
(1981) 'On a Quote from Hofmannsthal: "What Spirit Is, 
Only the Oppressed Can Grasp"', trans. Vernon Gras & 
Irmgard Hobson, Boundary 2, 9(2), 187-95 
Bixler, Julius S. (1959) 'The Existentialists and William James', 
The American Scholar, 28, 80-90 
Blake, William (1986) William Blake and his Contempories, 
Cambridge: Fitzwilliam Museum Enterprises 
Blauner, Jason (1957) 'Existential Analysis: Ludwig Binswanger's 
Daseinanalyse', Psychoanalytic Review, 44, 51-64 
355 
Bordo, Susan (1986) 'Anorexia Nervosa: Psychopathology as the Crystallization 
of Culture', The Philosophical Forum, 17(2), 73-104 
Boss, Medard (1977) "I dreamt last night. .. ", trans. Stephen Conway, 
New York: Gardner Press 
(1979) Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology, 
trans. Stephen Conway & Anne Cleaves, New York: Aronson 
(1982) Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis, 
trans. Ludwig B. Lefebre, New York: Da Capo Press 
Bowie, Andrew (1993a) Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche, 
Manchester: M.D.P. 
(1993b) Schelling and Modem European Philosophy: An Introduction, 
London: Routledge 
Boyle, Nicholas (1991) Goethe: The Poet and the Age: Volume 1, 
The Poetry of Desire (1749-1790), Oxford: Clarendon 
Brody, Howard (1987) Stories of Sickness, New Haven: Yale D.P. 
Bronowski, Jacob (1961) Science and Human Values, London: Hutchinson 
Bruns, Gerald L. (1984) 'Loose Talk about Religion from William James', 
Critical Inquiry, 11(2),299-316 
Buber, Martin (1987) I and Thou, trans. R. G. Smith, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark 
Buckley, J. H. (1981) The Victorian Temper, Cambridge: C.D.P. 
Burke, Kenneth (1969) A Grammar of Motives, Berkeley: 
University of California Press 
Burstow, Bonnie (1981) 'A Critique of Binswanger's Existential Analysis', 
Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry. 17(2-3),245-52 
356 
Bush, Clive (1991) Halfway to Revolution, New Haven, Yale V.P. 
Caldwell, Patricia (1983) The Puritan Conversion Narrative: The Beginnings 
of American Expression, Cambridge: C.U.P. 
Canguilhem, Georges (1991) The Normal and the Pathological, 
trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett & Robert S. Cohen, New York: Zone Books 
Carafiol, Peter (1991) The American Ideal: Literary History as Worldly Activity, 
New York: Oxford U.P. 
Carlyle, Thomas (1971) Selected Writings, ed. Alan Shelston, London, Penguin 
(1991) Sartor Resartus, ed. Kerry McSweeney & Peter Sabor, 
Oxford: O.U.P. 
Carpenter, William B. (1874) Principles of Mental Physiology, 
London: Henry S. King & Co. 
Cavell, Stanley (1981) Pursuits of Happiness, Cambridge, MA: Harvard V.P. 
(1988) In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and 
Romanticism, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press 
(1989) This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after 
Emerson after Wittgenstein, Albuquerque: Living Batch Press 
(1990) Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: 
The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
(1992) The Sense of Walden: An Expanded Edition, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
(1994) A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P. 
357 
(1995) Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, 
Derrida, Oxford & Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Chapple, Gerald & Hans H. Schute, eds. (1981) The Turn of the Century, 
German Literature and Art, 1890-1915, Bonn: McMaster 
Churchill, Larry R. (1979) 'The Human Experience of Dying: The Moral 
Primacy of Stories over Stages', Soundings, 62, 24-37 
Churchill, Larry R. & Sandra W. Churchill (1982) 'Storytelling in 
Medical Arenas: The Art of Self-determination', 
Literature and Medicine, 1, 73-79 
Cixous, Helene (1976) 'Fiction and Its Phantoms: A Reading of Freud's 
Das Unheimliche', New Literary History, 7(3), 525-48 
Clifford, Gay (1974) The Transformation of Allegory, 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor (1974) Poems, London: Dent 
(1984) Biographia Literaria, ed. George Watson, 
London: Everyman 
Copjec, Joan, ed. (1994) Supposing the Subject, London: Verso 
Corlett, William (1993) Community Without Unity, Durham, NC: Duke V.P. 
Cotkin, George (1986) 'William James and the "Weightless" Nature of 
Modem Existence', San Jose Studies, 12(2),7-19 
Culler, Jonathan (1975) Structuralist Poetics, London: Routledge 
(1984) The Uses of Uncertainty, London: Elek 
Deleuze, Gilles (1994) Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, 
London: Athlone Press 
358 
de Lauretis, Teresa (1976) 'Rebirth in The Bell Jar', Women's Studies, 3(2), 173-83 
de Man, Paul (1983) Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric 
of Contemporary Criticism, London: Methuen 
(1993) Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism: The Gauss Seminar 
and Other Papers, eds. E. S. Burt et aI, Baltimore: John Hopkins D.P. 
Dennett, Daniel C. (1969) Content and Consciousness, 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
(1988) 'Why Everyone is a Novelist', Times Literary Supplement, 
16/9/88, 1016 & 1028-29 
(1990) The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
(1993) Consciousness Explained, London: Penguin 
Dennett, Daniel & John Searle (1995) "'The Mystery of Consciousness": 
An Exchange', New York Review of Books, 62(20), 83-84 
Derrida, Jacques (1973) Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory 
of Signs, trans. David B. Allison, Evanston: Northwestern D.P. 
(1978) Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, London, Routledge 
(1981) Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson, London: Athlone 
(1984) 'My Chances/ Mes Chances: A Rendezvous with Some 
Epicurean Stereophonies', in Taking Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis, 
and Literature, eds. Joseph H. Smith & William Kerrigan, trans. 
Irene Harvey & Avital Ronell, Baltimore: John Hopkins U.P .. 1-32 
Descartes, Rene (1986) A Discourse on Method, trans. John Veitch, London: Dent 
Dewey, John (1946) Problems of Men, New York: Philosophical Library 
359 
Dews, Peter (1987) Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist 
Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory, London: Verso 
(1995) The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary 
European Philosophy, London: Verso 
Diggins, John Patrick (1994) The Promise of Pragmatism: 
Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Donadio, Stephen (1978) Nietzsche, Henry James, and the Artistic Will, 
New York: Oxford U.P. 
Dreyfus, Hubert (1991) Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's 
Being and Time, Division 1, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
Dreyfus, Hubert & Paul Rabinow (1982) Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism 
and Hermeneutics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Edelman, Gerald (1978) The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory 
of Consciousness, New York: Basic Books 
(1994) Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, New York: Penguin 
Edie, James M. (1987) William James and Phenomenology, 
Bloomington: Indiana U.P. 
Edmundson, Mark (1990) Towards Reading Freud: Self-creation in Milton, 
Wordsworth, Emerson and Sigmund Freud, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton U.P. 
Ellenberger, Henri F. (1970) The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History 
and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry, New York: Basic Books 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1983) Essays and Lectures. New York: Library of America 
360 
Engelhart, Dietrich von (1988) 'Romanticism in Gennany', in Romanticism in National 
Context, eds. Roy Porter & Mikulas Teich, Cambridge: C.U.P., 109-33 
Epstein, Julia (1992) 'Historigraphy, Diagnosis and Poetics', 
Literature and Medicine, 11 (1), 23-44 
Feinstein, Howard M. (1979) 'The Use and Abuse of Illness in the James Family 
Circle: A View of Neurasthenia as a Social Phenomenon', 
The Psychohistory Review, 8(1-2), 6-14 
(1984) Becoming William James, Ithaca: Cornell U.P. 
Fichtner, Gerhard, ed. (1992) Sigmund FreudlLudwig Binswanger: 
Briefwechsel 1908-1938, Gennany: Fischer 
Fischer, Michael (1989) Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Fisher, Philip (1973) 'The Failure of Habit' in Uses of Literature, 
ed. Monroe Engel, Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P., 3-18 
Flood, David H. & Rhonda L. Soricelli (1992) 'Development of the 
Physician's Narrative Voice in the Medical Case History', 
Literature and Medicine, 11 (1), 64-83 
Foucault, Michel (1976) Mental Illness & Psychology, trans. Alan Sheridan, 
New York: Harper & Row 
(1986) The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences, 
trans. unidentified collective, London: Routledge 
(1988) Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, 
ed. Luther Martin et aI, London: Tavistock 
361 
(1989) The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical 
Perception, trans. Alan Sheridan, London: Routledge 
(1991) Remarks On Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trom badori, 
trans R. James Goldstein & James Cascaito , 
New York: Semiotext(e) 
(1992) The History of Sexuality Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure, 
trans. Robert Hurley, London: Penguin 
Frank, Arthur W. (1993) 'The Rhetoric of Self-Change: Illness Experience 
as Narrative', The Sociological Quarterly, 34(1), 39-52 
Freud, Sigmund (1946) New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, 3rd ed., 
trans. W. J. H. Sprott, London: Hogarth 
(1961) Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, 2nd ed., 
trans. Joan Riviere, London: Allen & Unwin 
(1977) The Interpretation of Dreams, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
(1984) On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis, 
ed. Angela Richards, trans. James Strachey, London: Penguin 
(1986) The Essentials of Psychoanalysis, 
trans. James Strachey, London: Penguin 
Freud, Sigmund & Josef Breuer (1974) Studies on Hysteria, ed. Angela Richards. 
trans. James & Alix Strachey, London: Penguin 
Fromm, Eric (1984) Fear of Freedom, London: Ark 
Frye, Northrop (1950) 'Levels of Meaning in Literature', Kenyon Review, 12. 246-62 
(1957) Anatomy of Criticism, London: Penguin 
362 
Funkenstein, Amos (1994) 'The Polytheism of William James', 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 55(1), 99-111 
Gay, Peter (1989) Freud: A Life for our Time, London: Macmillan 
Gilman, Sander L. (1988) Disease and Representation: Images of Illness 
from Madness to AIDS, Ithaca: Cornell D.P. 
Glover, Jonathan (1991) I; The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity, 
London: Penguin 
Goethe, Johann Wofgang von (1980) Essays on Art and Literature, ed. John Geary, 
The Collected Works, Volume 3, New Jersey: Princeton D.P. 
Goffman, Erving (1961) The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, 
London: Penguin 
(1968) Stigma: Notes On the Management of Spoiled Identity, 
Harrnondsworth: Penguin 
(1970) Asylums, London: Penguin 
Goodman, Russell (1990) American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition, 
Cambridge: C.D.P. 
Goy-Blanquet, Dominique (1993) 'Slides of the Cortex', Times Literary Supplement, 
14/5/93, 20 
Graham, David T. (1967) 'Health, Disease, and the Mind-Body Problem: 
Linguistic Parallelism', Psychosomatic Medicine, 29( 1), 52-71 
Gras, Vernon W. (1973) European Literary Theory and Practice: From 
Existential Phenomenology to Structuralism, New York: Dell 
Greenblatt, Stephen, ed. (1984) Allegory and Representation, 
Baltimore: John Hopkins D.P. 
363 
Habermas, Jtirgen (1982) 'Modernity - an Incomplete Project', 
in ModernismIPostmodernism, ed. Peter Brooker, 
London: Longman (1992), 126-38 
(1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 
trans. Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
Halliwell, Martin (1993) 'The Trembling Nether Lip: Some Modem Versions 
of Idiocy', MA dissertation, University of Exeter (unpublished) 
Hampshire, Stuart (1988) 'Amiable Genius', New York Review of Books, 35(6), 17-20 
Harris, Kenneth (1978) Carlyle and Emerson: Their Long Debate, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P. 
Haughton, Hugh (1995) 'House-calls to Space Cadets', 
The Independent on Sunday, 5/02/95,31 
Havens, Leston L. (1972) 'The Development of Existential Psychiatry', 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 154, 309-31 
Heidegger, Martin (1962) Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie 
& Edward Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell 
(1978) Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell, 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
(1982) Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
trans. Albert Hofstadter, Bloomington: Indiana V.P. 
Heller, Erich (1952) 'Goethe and the Idea of Scientific Truth', 
in The Disinherited Mind, Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 3-26 
364 
Heuscher, Julius E. (1989) 'Dread and Authenticity', 
The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49(2), 139-57 
Higham, John (1970) 'The Reorientation of American Culture in the 1890s' 
, 
in Writing American History, Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 73-102 
Hinderev, Drew (1992) 'William James on Mystical Epistemology', 
Michigan Academican, 25(1), 1-7 
Hoare, Rupert (1973) 'A Comparison of the Work of Bultmann and Binswanger', 
Ph.D thesis, University of Birmingham (unpublished) 
Hodgson, Shadworth H. (1878) The Philosophy of Reflection, 2 volumes, 
London: Longman, Green & Co. 
Hoeller, Keith, ed. (1988) Heidegger & Psychology, special issue of Review of 
Existential Psychology & Psychiatry, originally 16(1-3), 1978-79 
(1990) Readings in Existential Psychology & Psychiatry, 
special issue of Review of Existential Psychology & Psychiatry, 
originally 20(1-3), 1987 
(1993) Dream & Existence: Michel Foucault & Ludwig 
Binswanger, New Jersey: Humanities Press 
Hoffman, E. T. A. (1992) 'The Sandman' in The Golden Pot and Other Tales, 
trans. Ritchie Robertson, Oxford: O.U.P, 85-118 
Hofstadter, Douglas & Daniel Dennett (1981) The Mind's I: Fantasies 
and Reflections on Self and Soul, London: Penguin 
Hofstadter, Richard (1992) Social Darwinism in American Thought, 
Boston: Beacon Press 
365 
Hoopes, James (1989) Consciousness in New England: From Puritanism and Ideas 
to Psychoanalysis and Semiotic, Baltimore: John Hopkins V.P. 
Howarth, William (1990) 'Oliver Sacks: the Ecology of Writing Science', 
Modem Language Studies, 20(4), 103-20 
Howe, Irving (1986) The American Newness: Culture and Politics 
in the Age of Emerson, Cambridge, MA: Harvard V.P. 
Hughes, H. Stuart (1961) Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European 
Social Thought 1890-1930, New York: Vintage Books 
Hume, David (1967) A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 
Oxford: Clarendon 
Hummel, Hermann (1940) 'Emerson and Nietzsche', New England Quarterly, 19, 63-84 
Hunter, Kathryn Montgomery (1992) 'Remaking the Case', 
Literature and Medicine, 11 (1), 163 -79 
Husserl Edmund (1964) The Paris Lectures, trans. Peter Koestenbaum, 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
(1973) Experience and Judgment, ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, 
trans. James S. Churchill, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
(1977) Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns, 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Huxley, Aldous (1963) Literature and Science, London: Charto & Windus 
(1994) The Doors of Perception & Heaven and Hell, 
London, Flamingo 
Ignatieff, Michael (1983) 'Life at Degree Zero', New Society, 20/1/83, 95-97 
366 
Ihde, Don (1971) Henneneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 
Evanston: Northwestern V.P. 
Irigaray, Luce (1991) The Irigaray Reader, ed. Margaret Whitford, 
Oxford: Blackwell 
Izenberg, Gerald N. (1976) The Existentialist Critique of Freud: The Crisis 
of Autonomy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton V.P. 
Jackson, Rosemary (1981) Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion, 
London: Methuen 
Jacobsen, Jens Peter (1919) Niels Lyhne, trans. Hanna Astrup Larsen, 
London: Oxford V.P. 
James, Alice (1964) The Diary of Alice James, ed. Leon Edel, 
Hannondsworth: Penguin 
James, William (1899) 'The Gospel of Relaxation', Scribner's, 25, 499-507 
(1903) 'Address' on The Centenary of the Birth of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, As Observed in Concord May 25 1903, 
Concord: Riverside Press, 67-77 
(1912) 'William James's Remarkable Plea for Medical 
Freedom', Medical Freedom, 1 (9), 6-9 
(1920) Letters of William James, Volumes 1 & 2, 
ed. Henry James, Boston: Atlantic Press Monthly 
(l950a) The Principles of Psychology, volume 1 
New York: Dover 
(1950b) The Principles of Psychology. volume 2 
New York: Dover 
367 
(1956) The Will to Believe & Human Immortality, 
New York: Dover 
(1967) Essays in Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe 
- - - . . . . ; ; ; ' - " - = = = . . . . . : : : : : . . ! . ~ ~ , ,
Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith 
(1969) Collected Essays and Reviews, 
New York: Russell & Russell 
(1971) The Moral Equivalent of War and Other Essays, 
ed., John K. Roth, New York: Harper & Row 
(1981) Pragmatism, ed. Bruce Kuklick, Indianapolis: Hackett 
(1985) The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in 
Human Nature, ed. Martin E. Marty, London: Penguin 
(1988) Manuscript Essays and Notes, in The Works of William James, 
ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P. 
Jameson, Fredric (1991) Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism, New York: Verso 
Jaspers, Karl (1962) General Psychopathology, 7th ed., trans. 1. Hoening 
& Marian W. Hamilton, Manchester: M.U.P. 
Jentsch, Ernst (1995), 'On the Psychology of the Uncanny', trans. Roy Sellars, 
Angelaki, 2(1),1995,7-16. 
(''''0) 
Johnson, Michael G. & Tracy B. Henley, eds., Reflections on 
The Principles of Psychology: William James after a Century. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Jones, Ernest (1957) The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, 3 volumes. 
New York: Basic Books 
368 
Jung, Carl G. (1967) Memories, Dreams, Reflections, London: Fontana 
(1984) Dream Analysis: Notes of the Seminar given in 1928-1930, 
ed. William McGuire, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Kant, Immanuel (1993) Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Vasilis Politis, 
London: Everyman 
Kearney, Richard (1984) Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers: 
The Phenomenological Heritage, Manchester: M.U.P. 
Kemp, T. Peter & David Rasmussen (1989) The Narrative Path: The Later 
Works of Paul Ricoeur, London: MIT Press 
Kierkegaard, S0ren (1983) Fear and TremblinglRepetition, ed. & trans. 
Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong, Princeton, NJ: Princeton U.P. 
Kirchner, John H. (1966) 'Ellen West, Existential Analysis and the Faustian Motif, 
Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 7(2), 119-27 
Kirmayer, Laurence J. (1992) 'The Body's Insistence on Meaning: Metaphor 
as Presentation and Representation in Illness Experience', 
Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 6(4), 323-46 
Kirschenbaum, Howard & Valerie Land Henderson, eds. (1990) Carl Rogers: 
Dialogues, London, Constable 
Kling, Merle (1957) 'The Intellectual: Will he Whither Away?', 
New Republic, 8/4/57, 14-15 
Kristeva, Julia (1991) Strangers to Ourselves, 
trans. Leon S. Roudiez, London: Harvester Press 
Kuhn, Thomas (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
369 
Kuklick, Bruce (1977) The Rise of American Philosophy, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1860-1930, New Haven: Yale U.P. 
Kusnetz, Ella (1992) 'The Soul of Oliver Sacks', Massachusetts Review, 33(2), 175-98 
Lacan, Jacques (1977) Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheri den, London: Tavistock 
Laing, R. D. (1982) The Voice of Experience, London: Allen Lane 
Lang, Candace (1982) 'Autobiography in the Aftermath of Romanticism', 
Diacritics, 12(4), 2-16 
Lears, T. J. Jackson (1994) No Place of Grace: Antimodemism and the Transformation 
of American Culture, 1880-1920, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Lentricchia, Frank (1986) 'The Return of William James', Cultural Critique, 4, 5-31 
Lester, David (1971) 'Ellen West's Suicide as a Case of Psychic Homicide', 
Psychoanalytic Review, 58,251-63 
Levin, Jonathan (1994) 'The Esthetics of Pragmatism', 
American Literary History, 6(4), 658-83 
Levinson, Henry Samuel (1981) The Religious Investigations of William James, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 
Lewis, R. W. B. (1991) The James's: A Family Narrative, London: Andre Deutsch 
Lifton, Robert Jay (1993) The Protean Self: Human Resilience in an 
Age of Fragmentation, New York: Basic Books 
Linschoten, Hans (1968) On the Way to a Phenomenological Psychology, 
The Psychology of William James, Pittsburgh: Duquesne V.P. 
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1978) Hippocratic Writings, trans. 1. Chadwick & 
E. T. Withington, London, Penguin 
370 
Luria, Alexander (1975) The Man with a Shattered World: A History of a Brain 
Wound, trans. Lynn Solotaroff, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
(1977) The Making of Mind: A Personal Account 
of Soviet Psychology, eds. Michael Cole & Sheila Cole , 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard V.P. 
Lyotard, Jean-Franyois (1989) The Lyotard Reader, 
ed. Andrew Benjamin, Oxford: Blackwell 
(1993) The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, 
trans. Geoffrey Bennington & Rachel Bowlby, London: Polity 
Macey, David (1994) 'Foucault before Foucault', Radical Philosophy, 68, 58-59 
MacCannell, Juliet Flower & Laura Zakarin, eds. (1994) Thinking Bodies, 
California: Stanford V.P. 
MacLean, Paul D. (1975) 'On the Evolution of Three Mentalities', 
Man-Environment Systems, 5(4),213-24 
Mann, Thomas (1958) Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Man, 
trans. Denver Lindley, London: Penguin 
Marcuse, Ludwig (1951) 'Nietzsche in America', trans. James C. Fleming, 
South Atlantic Quarterly, 50, 330-39 
May, Rollo (1986) The Discovery of Being, New York: Norton 
May, Rollo et aI, eds. (1958) Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry 
and Psychology, New York: Basic Books 
McGuire, William (1984) 'Jung's Complex Reactions (1907): Word Association 
Experiments Performed by Binswanger', Spring, 1-34 
371 
McGuire, William, ed. (1991) The Freud/Jung Letters, trans. Ralph Manheim 
& R. F. C. Hull, London: Penguin 
McRae, Murdo M. (1993) 'Oliver Sacks's Neurology of Identity', in The Literature 
of Science Perspectives on Popular Scientific Writing, 
ed. Murdo McRae, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 97-110 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1962) Phenomenology of Perception, 
trans. Colin Smith, London: Routledge 
(1964a) The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays, 
ed. James M. Edie, Evanston: Northwestern U.P. 
(1964b) Sense and Nonsense, trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus 
& Patricia Allen Dreyfus, Evanston: Northwestern U.P. 
Meyer, Donald (1966) The Positive Thinkers, New York: Doubleday 
Mill, John Stuart (1974) On Liberty, London: Penguin 
(1981) Autobiography and Literary Essays, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
Mill, John Stuart & Jeremy Bentham (1987) Utilitarianism and Other Essays, 
London: Penguin 
Miller, David L. (1989) 'The "Stone" which is not a Stone: C. G. Jung and the 
Postmodern Meaning of "Meaning", Spring, 49, 110-22 
Miller, James (1994) The Passion of Michel Foucault, London: Flamingo 
Miller, J. Hillis (1963) 'The Literary Criticism of Georges Poulet', 
Modem Language Notes, 78(5),471-88 
(1966) 'The Geneva School', Critical Quarterly, 8(4),305-21 
372 
(1970) 'Geneva or Paris: the recent work of Georges Poulet', 
University of Toronto Quarterly, 39(3), 212-28 
(1987) The Ethics of Reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot, Trollope, 
James, Benjamin, New York: Columbia U.P. 
Mishara, A. L. (1990) 'The Problem of the Unconscious in the Later Thought 
of L. Binswanger: A Phenomenological Approach to Delusion in 
Perception and Communication', Analecta Husserliana, 31, 247-78 
Modell, Arnold H. (1993) The Private Self, Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P. 
Monroe, William Frank et al (1992) '''Is There a Person in This Case?"', 
Literature and Medicine, 11 (1), 45-63 
Morison, Samuel Eliot, ed. (1930) The Development of Harvard University 
(Since the Inauguration of President Eliot, 1869-1929), 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P. 
Mulhall, Stephen (1993) On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger 
on Seeing Aspects, London: Routledge 
Murray, David, ed. (1995) American Cultural Critics, 
Exeter: University of Exeter Press 
Myers, Gerald E. (1986) William James: His Life and Thought, 
New Haven: Yale U.P. 
Nadelman, Heather L. (1993) 'Creating an Immortal Life: A Consideration 
of the Autobiography of Henry James, Sr.', The New England QuarterlY, 
66(2), 247-68 
Nagel, Thomas (1986) The View from Nowhere, Oxford: O.U.P. 
373 
Nash, Christopher, ed. (1990) Narrative in Culture: The Uses of Storytelling in 
the Sciences, Philosophy, and Literature, London: Routledge 
Needleman, Jacob (1963) Being-in-the-World: Selected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger. 
trans. Jacob Needleman, New York: Basic Books 
(1966) 'Ludwig Binswanger: 1881-1966', Review of Existential 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 6(2), 168-70 
Nichols, Ashton (1987) The Poetics of Epiphany: Nineteenth-Century Origins 
of the Modem Literary Moment, Tuscaloosa & London: 
University of Alabama Press 
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1968) The Will To Power, trans. Walter Kaufman 
& R. J. Hollingdale, New York: Random House 
(1974) The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann, 
New York: Random House 
(1990) Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, 
trans. R. J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin 
(1994) Human, All Too Human, trans. Marion Faber 
& Stephen Lehmann, London: Penguin 
Nisbet, H. B. (1972) Goethe and the Scientific Tradition, 
London: University of London Press 
Noll, Richard (1992) The Encyclopedia of Schizophrenic and Psychiatric Disorders, 
New York: Facts on File 
Noske, Barbara (1989) Humans and Other Animals: Beyond the Boundaries of 
Anthropology, London: Pluto Press 
374 
Novalis (1989) Pollen and Fragments: Selected Poetry and Prose of Nova lis, 
trans. Arthur Versluis, New York: Phane Press 
Norris, Christopher (1982) Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, 
London: Methuen 
O'Donnell, Patrick (1981) 'Ludwig Binswanger and the Poetics of Compromise', 
Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 17(2-3),235-43 
Olin, Doris, ed. (1992) William James: Pragmatism in Focus, London: Routledge 
Olney, James (1972) Metaphors of Self: The Meaning of Autobiography, 
New Jersey: Princeton U.P. 
Osborne, Peter (1995) The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde, 
London: Verso 
Parker, Gail Thain (1973) Mind Cure in New England: From the Civil War 
to World War I, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England 
Pater, Walter (1986) The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, 
ed. Adam Phillips, Oxford: O.U.P. 
Pellegrino, Edmund (1979) Humanism and the Physician, 
Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press 
Perry, Ralph Barton (1935a) The Thought and Character of William James, 
volume 1, Boston: Little Brown 
(1935b) The Thought and Character of William James, 
volume 2, Boston: Little Brown 
Poirier, Richard (1992) Poetry and Pragmatism, London: Faber & Faber 
Poirier, Suzanne et al (1992) 'Charting the Chart - An Exercise in 
Interpretation(s)', Literature and Medicine, 11(1).1-22 
375 
Posnock, Ross (1991) The Trial of Curiosity: Henry James, William James, 
and the Challenge of Modernity, New York: Oxford U.P. 
Poulet, Georges (1956) Studies in Human Time, trans. Elliott Coleman , 
New York: Harper Torchbook 
(1972) 'The Self and the Other in Critical Consciousness' , 
Diacritics, 2, 46-50 
Puffer, Ethel Dench (1900) 'The Loss of Personality', Atlantic Monthly, 85, 195-204 
Rae, Patricia (1988) 'William James and Contemporary Criticism', 
Southern Review, 21(3), 307-14 
Rajchman, John & Cornel West, eds. (1985) Post-Analytic Philosophy, 
New York: Columbia U.P. 
Ramsay, Bennett (1993) Submitting to Freedom: The Religious 
Vision of William James, New York: Oxford U.P. 
Rapaport, Herman (1989) Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and 
Language, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 
Rice, James L. (1985) Dostoevsky and the Healing Art: An Essay 
in Literary and Medical History, Ardis: Ann Arbor 
Ricoeur, Paul (1970) Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, 
New Haven: Yale U.P. 
(1980) 'Narrative Time', Critical Inquiry, 7(1), 169-90 
(1984) Time and Narrative, volume 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin 
& David Pellauer, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Rieff, Philip (1979) Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
376 
Riese, Walther (1962-63) 'The Impact of Romanticism on the Experimental Method', 
Studies in Romanticism, 2, 12-22 
Riesman, David (1950) The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing 
American Character, New Haven: Yale U.P. 
Rilke, Rainer Maria Rilke (1964) Selected Poems, trans. L. B. Leishman, 
London, Penguin 
Rogers, Carl (1961) 'The Loneliness of Contemporary Man', 
Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 1 (2), 94-101 
Roosevelt, Theodore (1900) The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses, 
London: Thomas Nelson & Sons 
Rorty, A. 0., ed. (1976) The Identities of Persons, 
California: University of California Press 
Rorty, Richard, ed. (1982), Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays 1972-1980, 
Brighton: Harvester 
(1989) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge: C. U.P. 
(1990) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Oxford: Blackwell 
(1991) Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers 
Volume 2, Cambridge: C.U.P. 
Rose, Jacqueline (1988) 'The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat or 
A Wife Is Like an Umbrella - Fantasies of the Modern and 
Postmodern', in Andrew Ross, ed., Universal Abandon?: 
The Politics of Post modernism, Edinburgh: E.U.P., 237-50 
Rosenfield, Israel (1995) The Strange, Familiar, and Forgotten: 
An Anatomy of Consciousness, London: Picador 
377 
Ross, Dorothy, ed. (1994) Modernist Impulses in the Human Sciences 1870-1930 
Baltimore: John Hopkins U.P. 
Roudinesco, Elisabeth (1990) Jacques Lacan & Co.: A History of Psychoanalysis 
in France, 1925-1985, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Ruddick, Lisa (1981) 'Fluid Symbols in American Modernism: William James, 
Gertrude Stein, George Santayana, and Wallace Stevens', 
in Allegory, Myth and Symbol, ed. Martin W. Bloomfield, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P. 
(1983) 'William James and the Modernism of Gertrude Stein', 
in Modernism Reconsidered, ed. Robert Kiely, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P. 
Ruf, Frederick J. (1991) The Creation of Chaos: William James 
and the Stylistic Making of a Disorderly W orId, 
New York: State University of New York Press 
Ryan, Judith (1991) The Vanishing Subject: Early Psychology and Literary 
Modernism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Sacks, Oliver (1970) Migraine: The Evolution of a Common Disorder, 
London: Faber & Faber 
, 
(1972) 'The Great Awakening', The Listener, 26/10/72,521-24 
(1986a) The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat, London: Picador 
(1986b) 'Clinical Tales', Literature and Medicine, 5, 16-23 
(1988) 'Travel Happy (1961)" Antreus, 61, 391-406 
378 
(1990a) Neurology and the Soul', New York Review of Books 
37(20), 44-50 
(1990b) 'Luria and "Romantic Science''', in Contemporary 
Neuropsychology and the Legacy of Luria, 
ed. Elkonon Goldberg, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 
(1991a) Awakenings, London: Picador 
(1991b) A Leg To Stand On, London: Picador 
(1991c) Migraine, London: Faber & Faber 
(1991 d) Seeing Voices, London: Picador 
(1993) 'The Poet of Chemistry', New York Review of Books, 
40(18), 50-56 
(1995) An Anthropologist on Mars: Seven Paradoxical Tales, 
London: Picador 
Sadler, William A., Jr. (1969) Existence and Love: A New Approach in 
Existential Phenomenology, New York: Scribner's 
, 
Said, Edward (1975) Beginnings: Intention and Method, New York: Basic Books 
Sallis, John (1995) Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics, 
2nd ed., Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana V.P. 
Santayana, George (1936) 'What is Aesthetics?', Obiter Scripta: Lectures, 
Essays and Reviews, ed. Justus Buchler & Benjamin 
Schwartz, New York: Scribner'S, 30-40 
(1968) Santayana on America: Essays, Notes, and Letters 
on American Life, Literature, and Philosophy, ed. Richard Colton 
New York: Lyon 
379 
Schafer, Roy (1976) A New Language for Psychoanalysis, New Haven: Yale U.P. 
(1983) The Analytic Attitude, New York: Basic Books 
(1992a) Retelling a Life: Narration and Dialogue in P s y c h o a n a l y s i s ~ ~
New York: Basic Books 
(1992b) 'Reading Freud's Legacies', in Telling Facts: History 
and Narration in Psycho-analysis, eds. Joseph H. Smith 
& Humphrey Morris, Baltimore: John Hopkins U.P., 1-20 
Schamdasani, Sonu & Michael Miinchow, eds. (1994) Speculations after Freud: 
Psychoanalysis, Philosophy and Culture, London: Routledge 
Scheler, Max (1954) The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath, 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Schelling, F. W. J. von (1994) On the History of Modem Philosophy, 
trans. Andrew Bowie, Cambridge: C.U.P. 
Shklovsky, Victor (1965) 'Art as Technique', in Russian Formalist Criticism: 
Four Essays, trans. and eds. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, 
Lincoln, Nebraska, 5-22. 
Schmidl, Fritz (1959) 'Sigmund Freud & Ludwig Binswanger', 
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 28, 40-58 
Schopenhauer, Arthur (1907) The Word as Will and Idea, volume 1, 6th ed., 
trans. R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp, London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trtibner & Co. Ltd. 
(1970) Essays and Aphorisms, trans. R. J. Hollingdalc, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin 
380 
Schrader, George A. (1959) 'Existential Psychoanalysis and Metaphysics', 
The Review of Metaphysics, 13(1), 139-64 
Schwartz, Michael & Osborne Wiggins (1985) 'Science, Humanism 
and the Nature of Medical Practice: A Phenomenological 
View', Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 28(3),331-61 
Scudder, Vita (1887) 'The Moral Dangers of Musical Devotees', 
Andover Review, 7,46-53 
Searle, John R. (1989) Minds, Brains and Science, London: Penguin 
(1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
(1995) 'The Mystery of Consciousness', New York Review of Books, 
62(17), 60-66 & 62(18), 54-61 
Seidman, Bradley (1983) Absent at the Creation: The Existential Psychiatry of 
Ludwig Binswanger, Roslyn Heights: Libra 
Shaw, Charles Gray (1914) 'Emerson the Nihilist', 
International Journal of Ethics, 25, 68-86 
Skinner, Quentin, ed. (1990) The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, 
Cambridge, C.U.P. 
Sidney, Philip (1989) A Defence of Poetry, ed. Jan van Dorsten, Oxford: O.V.P. 
Siegfried, Charlene Haddock (1982) 'Vagueness and the Adequacy of 
Concepts', Philosophy Today, 26(4), 357-67 
Simmel, Georg (1950) 'The Metropolis and Mental Life', in The Sociology of 
Georg Simmel, ed. Kurt Wolff, New Jersey: Free Press 
Simons, Jon (1995) Foucault and the Political, London: Routledge 
381 
Snelders, T. A. M. (1970) 'Romanticism and Naturphilosophie and the 
Inorganic Natural Sciences, 1797-1840: An Introductory Survey', 
Studies in Romanticism, 9(4), 193-215 
Snow, C. P. (1965) The Two Cultures, The Rede Lecture, 1959, Cambridge: C.U.P. 
Sonnemann, Ulrich (1954) Existence and Therapy: An Introduction to 
Phenomenological Psychology and Existential Analysis, 
New York: Grune & Stratton 
Spanos, William V. (1977) 'Breaking the Circle: Hermeneutics as Dis-closure', 
Boundary 2, 5(2), 421-57 
(1981) 'The Indifference of Differance: Retrieving 
Heidegger's Destruction', Annals of Scholarship, 2, 109-29 
Spector, Jack (1974) The Aesthetics of Freud: A Study on Psychoanalysis and Art, 
New York: McGraw-Hill 
Spencer, Herbert (1870) First Principles of Psychology, New York: Appleton & Co. 
Spiegelberg, Herbert (1969) Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: 
A Historical Introduction, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Stallybrass, Peter & Allon White (1993) 'Bourgeois Hysteria and the 
Camivalesque', in The Cultural Studies Reader, 
ed. Simon During, London: Routledge, 284-92 
Strachey, James & Anna Freud, eds. (1961) The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
London: Hogarth Press 
Strout, Cushing (1968) 'William James and the Twice-Born Sick Soul'. 
Daedalus, 97(3), 1062-82 
382 
(1971) 'The Pluralistic Identity of William James: 
A Psycho-historical Reading of The Varieties of Religious 
Experience', American Quarterly, 23(2), 135-52 
Sturrock, John (1993) The Language of Autobiography: Studies 
in the First Person Singular, Cambridge: C.U.P. 
Swales, Martin (1978) The German Bildiingsroman from Wieland to Hesse, 
New Jersey: Princeton U.P. 
Tallack, Douglas (1993) 'Transcendentalism and Pragmatism', 
in Modem American Culture: An Introduction, 
ed. Mick Gidley, London: Longman, 68-93 
Taylor, Eugene (1984) William James on Exceptional Mental States: The 1896 
Lowell Lectures, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 
Taylor, Charles (1971) 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', 
Review of Metaphysics, 25(1), 3-51 
(1989) Sources of the Self, Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P. 
Taylor, Paul (1994) 'A Study in the Right Frame of Mind', 
The Independent, 28/04/94, II, 23 
Thayer, H. S., ed. (1970) Pragmatism: The Classic Writings, 
New York: New American Library 
Thiele, Leslie Paul (1995) Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and 
Postmodem Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton U.P. 
Thiselton, Anthony C. (1992) New Horizons in Hermeneutics, London: HarperCollins 
Thomas, Joseph M. (1993) 'Figures of Habit in William James', 
New England Quarterly, 66( 1). 3-26 
383 
Todorov, Tzvetan (1973) The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary 
Genre, trans. Richard Howard, Cleveland & London: 
The Press of Cape Western Reserve University 
Tricomi, Albert H. (1972) 'The Rhetoric of Aspiring Circularity in Emerson's 
"Circles"', ESQ: A Journal of the American Renaissance, 18(4),271-83 
Tymms, Ralph (1955) German Romantic Literature, London, Methuen 
Valdes, Mario J. (1991) A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination, 
New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 
Varela, Francisco J. et ai, eds. (1993) The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science 
and Human Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
Wachterhauser, Brice R., ed. (1986) Hermeneutics and Modem Philosophy, 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 
(1994) Hermeneutics and Truth, Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press 
Wall, Patrick (1972) 'Is there a Higher Nervous System?', The Listener, 3/8/72, 139-41 
Werth, Lee F. (1986) 'The Banks of the Stream of Consciousness', 
History of Philosophical Quarterly, 3(1), 89-105 
West, Cornel (1989) The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy 
of Pragmatism, Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Wetzels, Walter D. (1970-71) 'Aspects of Natural Science in German 
Romanticism', Studies in Romanticism, 10, 44-59 
White, Morton (1973) Pragmatism and the American Mind, 
New York: Oxford V.P. 
384 
Whitehead, Alfred North (1929) Science and the Modem World, 
The Lowell Lectures, 1925, Cambridge: C.D.P. 
Wild, John (1943) 'On the Nature and Aims of Phenomenology', 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3, 85-95 
(1959) 'Contemporary Phenomenology and the Problem of Existence', 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 20, 166-80 
(1970) The Radical Empiricism of William James, 
New York: Doubleday 
Willcox, Louise Collier (1911) 'Nietzsche: A Doctor for Sick Souls', 
North American Review, 194, 765-74 
Williams, Raymond (1973) Problems in Materialism and Culture: 
Selected Essays, London: Verso 
Wilshire, Bruce (1968) William James and Phenomenology: A Study of 
The Principles of Psychology, Bloomington: Indiana D.P. 
(1980) 'William James's Theory of Truth Phenomenologically 
Considered' in Two Centuries of Philosophy in America, 
ed. Peter Caws, London: Blackwell 
Wilson, Daniel J. (1987) 'Science and the Crisis of Confidence 
in American Philosophy, 1870-1930', Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society, 23(2), 235-62 
Wing, J. K. (1986) 'Distorting Mirrors', Times Literary Supplement, 7/2/86, 146 
Wood, David, ed. (1992) On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, 
London: Routledge 
385 
Wordsworth, William & Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1988) Lyrical Ballads, 
eds. R. L. Brett & A. R. Jones, London: Routledge 
Wulff, Henrik et al (1986) Philosophy of Medicine: An Introduction, 
Oxford: Blackwell 
Ziarek, Ewa Plonowska (1996) The Rhetoric of Failure, New York: 
State University of New York Press 
Zizek, Slavoj (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso 
386 
